United States Defense Thread

SolarWind

Active Member
I believe the attributed implications of this so called "defeat" are largely overblown. Beside the predictable partisan bickering and the CCP politburo cranking up their information warfare, I see a win win for the United States.
1. Public will be satisfied with the ending of wars or at least our visible participation in them.
2. Our self-declared opponents will be forced to increase expenses, while we cut ours and save American lives. That is, why should we be in the first place responsible for stabilizing Russian and Chinese backyard? That would just be ridiculous, wouldn't it?
3. World has changed very much since we first went to war with terrorism and we now face different challenges than before. We must reassess and reallocate our resources to where our new priorities lie.
4. Largely, it turns out our presence in Afghanistan was merely a life support to the Afghan Government and Army. Perhaps the latter were illusions to begin with. What is the value of that? Negative.
 
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John Fedup

The Bunker Group
I believe the exit was overdue and truly I don’t know if there was a good exit strategy. I heard on a radio broadcast the a poll showed 2/3 of the a American public now believe Afghanistan intervention was a mistake. Understandable given the amount of blood and treasure for what seems to be zero return. I know fellow posters differ on my opinion the Iraq intervention doomed any chance of success in Afghanistan but I am now convinced it probably didn’t matter, the only result was what we now are seeing.
 

Terran

Well-Known Member
I feel that the treaty with the Taliban was the worst choice. It undermined the Kabul government and emboldened The Taliban and AQ. It was unnecessary act. It destroyed morale of the ANA. Set the Taliban to receive mass defections. It gave the Taliban and AQ a huge infusion of legitimacy and resources, validated their propaganda and invalidated the ANG.
This was the result of Three administration’s whom chose to blind themselves. To the Interfusion of the Taliban and AQ, allowed themselves to be manipulated and aided in the manipulation. Could there have been another endgame? I suspect yes. The rapid collapse I think was fueled by that treaty. Without it I strongly suspect that the Taliban would still be in the hills. Fighting yes but against an overwhelming force of ANA.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
I feel that the treaty with the Taliban was the worst choice. It undermined the Kabul government and emboldened The Taliban and AQ. It was unnecessary act. It destroyed morale of the ANA. Set the Taliban to receive mass defections. It gave the Taliban and AQ a huge infusion of legitimacy and resources, validated their propaganda and invalidated the ANG.
This was the result of Three administration’s whom chose to blind themselves. To the Interfusion of the Taliban and AQ, allowed themselves to be manipulated and aided in the manipulation. Could there have been another endgame? I suspect yes. The rapid collapse I think was fueled by that treaty. Without it I strongly suspect that the Taliban would still be in the hills. Fighting yes but against an overwhelming force of ANA.
A lower morale does not result in a huge army simply standing down and accepting defeat from the very beginning.
What you describe is true, but certainly would only reduce the effectiveness of the ANA and increase defections, but to get to where we are today, the problems have to be far more serious than just the 'peace deal', and deep rooted.

A key topic you dismissed (presumably) is how motivated the Afghan people, government, and army were to be free from a Taliban rule. An American-Taliban deal and a withdrawal of foreign forces is surely discouraging, but does not break one's determination.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
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A very interesting article from a recently retired USMC Colonel about the command culture within the US military. He says that the US military command CONOPS is to give the commander on the ground their orders and let them get the job done especially because the situation can be very fluid. What is actually happening is the officers higher up the chain of command are very cautious and risk adverse so they basically micromanage. He said that the US military is highly institutionalised and highly resistant to change. The British, Canadians, and everyone else know this, but the US cannot see it themselves. Apparently it's not a recent phenomena, but is historical as well.

 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
This article points out the looming retirement of a significant number cruise missile platforms, naval and air. The reductions are pretty big. A solution may be a revival of a commercial aircraft cruise missile carrier based on 777 and/or 747. Could be a reasonable solution (and cost effective) with numerous surplus wide bodies available and would result in reducing or eliminating the need to use C-17s for this application thus preserving them longer for their primary mission, strategic heavy lift.

 

STURM

Well-Known Member
He said that the US military is highly institutionalised and highly resistant to change. The British, Canadians, and everyone else know this, but the US cannot see it themselves. Apparently it's not a recent phenomena, but is historical as well.
Thank you for the link.

This is book has detailed info on the U.S, Israeli and British approach to mission command, A very interesting but at times not an easy [for me at least] read.


Not to get off topic but 'Not Mentioned In Dispatches' [gibbon] offers a stinging critique on the Brit army's performance at Goose Green which the author contends was largely due to the lack of mission command. Things apparently improved after Chris Keeble took over after H Jones's death. He had previously spent time with the Bundeswehr and was exposed to Auftragstaktik.

 

swerve

Super Moderator
This article points out the looming retirement of a significant number cruise missile platforms, naval and air. The reductions are pretty big. A solution may be a revival of a commercial aircraft cruise missile carrier based on 777 and/or 747. Could be a reasonable solution (and cost effective) with numerous surplus wide bodies available and would result in reducing or eliminating the need to use C-17s for this application thus preserving them longer for their primary mission, strategic heavy lift.

Airbus tried to convince air forces that converted airliners could be good carriers for cruise missiles quite a long time ago - 15 years or more, IIRC. They were talking about A340s, but their idea (converting the cargo hold, I think) could have been applied to other airliners.

Not a glimmer of interest from anyone, that I recall. Times may have changed, though.

They were also touting palletised cruise missiles (e.g. Scalp/Storm Shadow) to be launched from the cargo doors of freighters. Again, no apparent interest, & now Americans are selling it as if it's their idea.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
Thank you for the link.

This is book has detailed info on the U.S, Israeli and British approach to mission command, A very interesting but at times not an easy [for me at least] read.


Not to get off topic but 'Not Mentioned In Dispatches' [gibbon] offers a stinging critique on the Brit army's performance at Goose Green which the author contends was largely due to the lack of mission command. Things apparently improved after Chris Keeble took over after H Jones's death. He had previously spent time with the Bundeswehr and was exposed to Auftragstaktik.

An interesting article, one of many which argue that 'Mission Command' misses the point of Auftragstaktik.
How the Germans Defined Auftragstaktik: What Mission Command is - AND - is Not | Small Wars Journal
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Airbus tried to convince air forces that converted airliners could be good carriers for cruise missiles quite a long time ago - 15 years or more, IIRC. They were talking about A340s, but their idea (converting the cargo hold, I think) could have been applied to other airliners.

Not a glimmer of interest from anyone, that I recall. Times may have changed, though.

They were also touting palletised cruise missiles (e.g. Scalp/Storm Shadow) to be launched from the cargo doors of freighters. Again, no apparent interest, & now Americans are selling it as if it's their idea.
The article claims Boeing offered the CMCA 747-200 concept to the USAF after the B1A cancellation (1980) so that is well beyond the 15-20 years ago Airbus timeframe. Given the massive cost of replacing the retiring air and naval launch capacity, perhaps the bean counters might press this concept as a solution. The USA does not have the same financial resources now as they did in the 1980-90s.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
An interesting article, one of many which argue that 'Mission Command' misses the point of Auftragstaktik.
Thank you. Will certainly give it a read. The biggest issue in moving away from restrictive type orders to mission control is institutional and cultural. Armies are traditionally resistant to change, in the belief that they way they have long been doing things is still valid and only in need of certain refinements.

It's no wonder that the Germans or rather the Prussians came up with mission command as they are known to have a penchant for decentralisation, adapation and flexbility that was mainly absent in other continental armies. It was also in line with the fact that Gernany faced potential opponents with larger populations, plus a larger industrial base, requring Germany to fight short wars.

To fully embrace mission command and to adapt it for ones personal requirenents is a huge and challenging undertaking. Very dependent on how effective armies are as [to quote John Nagl] learning organisations.
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
'institutional and cultural' - exactly! It discusses that.
It’s also what the British Navy did at the time of its domination; OK because of technology limitations they had no choice but delegation of decision making and individual initiative to achieve the commander’s overall intent were actively, actually very actively, encouraged - it was called the Nelson touch, although other admirals such as Rodney and Howe did exactly the same. The same was pretty well true of the USN in WW2, Samar for example. Danger in Naval warfare these days is that technology may now permit centralised command (at least until it is disrupted) and that would not be a good thing
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
It’s also what the British Navy did at the time of its domination; OK because of technology limitations they had no choice but delegation of decision making and individual initiative to achieve the commander’s overall intent were actively, actually very actively, encouraged - it was called the Nelson touch, although other admirals such as Rodney and Howe did exactly the same. The same was pretty well true of the USN in WW2, Samar for example. Danger in Naval warfare these days is that technology may now permit centralised command (at least until it is disrupted) and that would not be a good thing
The “institutional” danger lies in tactical initiative being stifled.
In days of yore young commanders were sent around the globe to complete determined missions. They were beyond oversight by any means, some failed, others excelled and those who did rose through the ranks with a mindset of completion, not compliance.
This can be seen in the generalisation that, during long periods of peace and inaction, administrators/conformers fill the upper echelon but as soon as the hot war begins they generally fail and the tactically savvy and not always conforming leaders rise to the top.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Something which should have been done a long time ago.


It's inevitable that despite all the safeguards taken; civilians have and will be continued to be killed in conflicts; something civilians in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq and other places have long experienced and understood. Yet more needs to be done and there has to be full accountability.
In addition to the loss and suffering it causes to the injured and families of the dead [the price for being at the wrong place at the wrong time - what some euphemistically refer to as 'collateral damage] it is counter productive. Would it be unsurprising that relatives of those obliterated by Hellfire at Afghan weddings [thought by UAS operators to have gathering of Talibs] joined the Taliban or that relatives of those killed by the UAS strike in Kabul
[which the U.S. initially claimed was a legitimate target] decided to join IS. The general feeling amongst the locals in various places is that despite all the claims to the contrary and the apologies; in reality their lives are not worth much to foreign forces.

In too many instances, US drone strikes have instead led to unintended and deadly consequences – killing civilians and increasing anger towards the United States,” the group of 50 US legislators wrote in a letter to President Joe Biden on January 20.''

''
The directive comes after a US drone attack in the Afghan capital, Kabul, in August that killed 10 civilians, including seven children, drew widespread condemnation and calls for accountability.

''The Pentagon initially defended the bombing, stressing that it killed operatives from the Islamic State in Khorasan Province, ISKP (ISIS-K) – but it later acknowledged that civilians were killed and Austin personally apologised.''
 
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76mmGuns

Active Member
An example of how the US uses it's economic strength in defence. I posted this in the Indonesian defence thread too


I have membership, and have pasted the article here. If this is against rules, mods, please delete relevant parts/whole article

Indonesia’s $22 Billion Purchases of US, French Fighter Jets: How Russia’s Su-35 Lost Out
Indonesia’s about-face from a deal with Russia to new purchase agreements with the U.S. and France highlights the potency of U.S. sanctions.

Within 24 hours on February 10-11, $22 billion worth of purchases by the Indonesian Defense Ministry of Western fighter jets were announced under two major contracts. The first was an $8.1 billion deal for 42 Rafale twin engine lightweight fighter jets from France, and the second a $13.9 billion deal for 36 F-15 Eagle heavyweight fighters from the United States.

The Indonesian Air Force currently fields 49 fighters in four squadrons, indicating that the new 78 aircraft will not only replace all fighters in service but will also expand the country’s fleet with new squadrons. The backbone of the fleet is currently comprised of 33 F-16 and F-5 lightweight fighters, which are expected to be replaced by the Rafales, while the elite is formed of 16 Russian Su-27/30 heavyweights, which are likely to be replaced by the F-15s.

The Indonesian acquisitions are notable, first, for their scale, with $22 billion worth of purchases being a tremendous sum even for larger arms importers such as Saudi Arabia or Japan and representing a major escalation of defense spending. At the same time, the new deals also reflect the success of U.S. efforts to expand the market share of Western armaments using threats of economic sanctions.

In February 2018 the Indonesian Defense Ministry had announced a $1.1 billion contract for the acquisition of 11 Russian Su-35 heavyweight fighters, with deliveries expected to begin by the end of 2019 and additional purchases considered likely. Intervention by the United States however, using the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), effectively stalled and then cancelled the deal. Signed into law in August 2017, CAATSA leveraged the United States’ place at the heart of the global financial system to influence global arms sales by threatening any client for a major Russian weapons package with economic warfare. It was first applied in September 2018 against China for its orders of $4 billion worth of Russian Su-35s and S-400 air defense systems, placed in 2015.

1 of 2, con't below
 

76mmGuns

Active Member
2 of 2.



The act effectively ensures that although a core of countries deeply invested in Russian military hardware such as Algeria, Vietnam, and India will likely continue their acquisitions, those countries that have sought to hedge between Russian and Western arms – such as Indonesia, Egypt, the Philippines, or Malaysia – can be swayed toward giving Western producers Russia’s market share.

Indonesia had from the late 1960s looked only to the United States for acquisitions of fighter aircraft, purchasing F-5 and F-16 lightweight jets and planning further F-16 acquisitions in the 1990s. The perceived threat of U.S. moves to block spare parts for the fleet in the 1990s, which materialized in 1999 in response to alleged human rights abuses in what was then Indonesian East Timor, led Jakarta to diversify its fleet by acquiring Russian Su-27 and later Su-30 fighters. Acquiring Russian and American fighters in parallel, the former providing smaller numbers of elite heavyweights and the latter larger numbers of low maintenance lightweights, was expected to continue to shape Indonesian acquisitions plans, with Su-35s potentially being supplemented by new F-16 Block 72 aircraft from the United States.

Washington had long pressured clients for Russian arms to look to the West, in part as a means to undermine Russia’s heavily export reliant defense sector, but CAATSA escalated this considerably and, in Indonesia’s case, appears to have proven decisive.

The Indonesian government initially released defiant statements against U.S. sanctions threats, with Defense Minister Riamizard Riachudu stating in October 2018: “Never cancel. We are continuing the implementation of the contract.” This came two months after Director General of the Indonesian Trade Ministry Oke Nurwan lamented, “While we are in the process of the barter trade with Russia, the U.S. is trying to intervene.” Russia’s willingness to accept payment in commodities, and later to offer Indonesia heavily customized variants of the Su-35, appeared to be desperate efforts to salvage the deal. Nevertheless, it was announced in December 2021 that the Su-35 acquisition plans had been cancelled, with the primary beneficiary appearing to be France.

Indonesia appears to have replaced Russia with France as its secondary supplier of fighters. With only Russia and the United States producing heavyweight fighters for export, Jakarta changed its plans for U.S. acquisitions from light F-16s to heavy F-15s and purchased Rafales in place of the F-16s. Sales by France notably benefit the United States not only by undermining Russia, but also by strengthening the often-struggling defense sector of Washington’s NATO ally – a particularly salient point after French anger over the cancellation of a major submarine deal with Australia. It will also yield some revenues for U.S. firms, which alongside multiple non-French European firms produce significant inputs for the Rafale.

While Indonesia’s new acquisitions place it in the clear in terms of avoiding sanctions, this has come at a very considerable cost. Even the lightweight Rafales will be acquired for approximately $193 million each, while the heavier F-15s are among the most expensive fighters ever exported at $386 million each – compared to just $100 million for the Su-35. When China bought a larger number of two dozen Su-35s they were sold at approximately $83 million each, and for an order of 36 to 42 fighters it is highly plausible that the price would fall to under $80 million.

Meanwhile, the Su-35 is 180 percent as heavy and has 190 percent the engine power and a far higher endurance than the Rafale, which has the weakest engines of any fighter in production in the world. The Russian fighter integrates thrust vectoring engines, has a higher endurance, and notably uses three radars where its Western competitors field only one. The Su-35 fighter’s R-37 air-to-air missiles are fast and can shoot much further at 400 km – around double the range of the Rafale’s Meteor missile and more than double that of the F-15’s AIM-120D.

This is not to say that the Su-35 is necessarily better, with the F-15 in particular being a peer level competitor to it albeit at nearly five times the price, but rather that the massive discrepancy in cost is very difficult to explain by a performance advantage of Western systems. A number of factors, most notably the dollar’s much higher purchasing power in Russia, largely explain the price difference favoring the Su-35. Had Indonesia acquired 78 Su-35s instead of 78 Rafales and F-15s, the cost would have been little over $6 billion instead of $22 billion, with the fighter’s operational costs being similar to those of the F-15, although higher than those of the lighter Rafale.

Indonesia’s decisions illustrate the potency of U.S. economic sanctions threats, with the result being provision of much needed revenues to Western defense industries, a much more expensive and arguably less potent defense capability for clients, and denial of revenues to the Russian defense industry as part of broader Western efforts to undermine the country’s economy. Indonesia’s case is far from unique. A notable preceding example in the region is the Philippines, where the Defense Ministry cited CAATSA threats as the reason for acquiring Black Hawk helicopters from the United States after initially showing a strong interest in Russian Mi-171. Similar trends are expected to continue to shape global arms sales unless changes in the world economy weaken the potency of U.S. sanctions and undermine Washington’s ability use economic and political pressure to influence acquisitions decisions.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Apparently Raytheon can’t source parts for Stingers as it hasn’t really seen much production for years. Nobody envisioned a need for hundreds being fired per day I guess. Javelin production is current but considering the rate of use, one has to wonder about dwindling inventory.

 

swerve

Super Moderator
Apparently Raytheon can’t source parts for Stingers as it hasn’t really seen much production for years. Nobody envisioned a need for hundreds being fired per day I guess. Javelin production is current but considering the rate of use, one has to wonder about dwindling inventory.

Well, there are other MANPADS in production. Perhaps the USA should buy one. It could open a US production line. I expect the French, Poles, etc. would be willing. Even the Japanese might agree to sell, or allow US production.
 

Terran

Well-Known Member
It’s not like the US stocks will empty out tomorrow morning. The problem is valid but not pressing. It’s the backfill issue.

It sounds like the main technical problem is lack of vintage microprocessor chips based. There is said to have been production of new Stingers but for an export buyer whom apparently supplied the vintage chips. how they got them who knows.

I remember reading that the Space shuttle got a processor upgrade based on chips found in IBM computers bought at swap meet and garage sales.
So the first solution is to work integrating new chip sets into the Stinger. Of course right now that’s going to be a pain. The Logistics system is still trying to reboot and microprocessor chips are among the most wanted and most difficult to source in a secure manner.

The Army also has programmed a Stinger replacement program. That replacement though has to fit a Stinger tube so it can be fitted to any existing Stinger launch platform like the IM Shorad, Avenger, Apache and Viper etc…
 
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