The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Ukraine hit the locomotive depot in Ilovaysk, Donetsk region.


Ukraine hit the Debal'tsevo rail station, possibly targeting a locomotive.


Ukraine hit Melitopol'. Targets include the meat processing plant.


Ukraine hit Uglegorsk, Donetsk region. Targets were rail infrastructure.


Ukraine hit Donetsk. Targets include a truck parking area, burning down 22 trucks, and the Donetsk airport where despite Ukrainian strikes Russia has continued to launch drones from, and even expanded launch facilities.


Ukraine hit a 5-story apartment building in Gorlovka, collapsing a section of it. 3 civilians are reported killed.


Ukraine hit a market in Tokmak with a drone strike, injuring civilians. Reportedly 5 civilians were killed and 18 wounded. Warning graphic footage.


Ukraine hit a bus with civilians near Yenakievo, killing 7 and wounding 11.


Ukraine hit a passenger train from Lugansk to Lantratovka, no civilians were injured.


Ukraine attempted to hit Votkinsk with Flamingo cruise missiles but they were all brought down. Russian sources claim AEW was key to this success.


Allegedly some Ukrainian Flaminog missiles detonated during a failed launch from Odessa.


More footage of Russia's new Citadel AAA in action using programmable shells. Targets are being engaged at ranges from 800-1200m, with an average of 3 shells to take out a target. As many have pointed out, stationary AA positions become targets themselves, and of course the logical thing would be not to invent a whole new complex, but to modernize the Pantsyr with this capability. Instead a self-propelled version of the Citadel is under development.


Russia's new Zubr drone defense HMG station in action.


Russian Kalitka drone defense turret, and Zveroboy automated drone interceptor system in action. Zveroboy uses an interceptor drone with some sort of machine vision technology. The Kalitka reportedly averages 37 rounds per target.


Russian drone defense teams bringing down a Ukrainian inbound near the port of Kavkaz, Krasnodar region.


Russian drone defense teams in action.


Russian police in Moscow training for drone defense duties.


Russia continues to mount Pantsyr-SMD on rooftops in Moscow.


Boat based drone defense setup, somewhere in Russia.


A French Rafale brings down a Ukrainian drone over Latvia.


A new BARS Moscow is being formed for drone defense purposes, advertising one year contracts, that can be counted in place of conscript service in the regular military.


Interesting bits.

It appears Russia shot down a Ukrainian MiG-29 over Poltava. Russian jets regularly take long range potshots at Ukrainian jets, usually with no results. However there was always the likelihood of eventual success.


Russia has lost a Ka-52, context unclear.


There has been a pattern of Russian bomb accuracy going down in recent weeks. We've seen this before EW disrupting their guidance and Russia adjusting their guidance systems to overcome this. It remains to be seen if that's what will happen here.


Russian Mi-28NM have been spotted with self-defense EW suites, presumably for drone defense.


A new Russian Molniya drone variant with 50km range and 120kgs of payload has been deployed.


Russia upgrading a DP-27 with a rail mounting system. This raises serious questions.


An interesting Ukrainian modification of the Strela-10 with a beam-riding missile.


We have evidence of Ukraine using a domestically produced gliding bomb in strikes.


Ukraine's 160th Mech Bde with Chinese FN-16 MANPADS and an M1 Abrams with a robust drone cage.


A Ukrainian Bogdana-BG towed howitzer with drone cages.


Ukraine has apparently rebuilt damage at the Uman' airbase with new hangars and new air defense positions.


We finally have a look at Ukraine's coastal AShM inventory. We see RBS-15s, Harpoons, and NSMs on various truck-mounted launchers.


Reportedly Ukraine is getting 30 new Cockerill turrets with 105mm guns for Leo-1 tanks.


There are reports that the German Skynex didn't do very well in Ukraine.


An interesting Ukrainian underground fuel storage facility. It's likely both sides will resort to this wherever feasible, if things continue the way they are.


Russia and Ukraine did 2 POW exchanges, one 160 for 160 and another 185 for 185.


A video, one of many, but I think it's instructive. We have Ukrainian TCC personnel grabbing a person of the street. They use pepper spray on him, and then drag him into the van. By-standers then attack the TCC personnel, also using pepper spray and throw things at the vans damaging two of them. One of the TCC personnel fires his gun in their direction. Meanwhile multiple by-standers are filming and cheering on the attack. Irony of ironies, the loudest yelling complimenting the civilians on their efforts is in Russian. This is not a one-off incident, this is the reality of Ukraine's mobilization campaign. We have had many conversations about willingness to fight on the part of Ukraine, and about who can hold out in this war the longest. I think keeping this reality in mind is important to that discussion.

 

rsemmes

Active Member
I wouldn't call a 7'62 HMG even if it's fixed; it (Zubr) doesn't say "heavy".
Now that Russia has invented the Flakvierling 38, they could start deploying (a lot of) them on the front lines, the drone threat is going to be (likely a lot) less dangerous.
There is an obvious difference between the chips in this system and the chips in every drone.

More than a campaign, like against the power stations (and they are still generating power), it looks a bit chaotic, like different generals fighting their own private wars. Targets of opportunity, like those Patriots/Mig-29 make sense, but what about locomotives and yards, all petrol stations close to the front line, Jarkov... The same targets have to be hit repeatedly for a, more often than not, long period.
Has every AD, factory, rail, power station and oil depot in Kiev been hit and destroyed?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I wouldn't call a 7'62 HMG even if it's fixed; it (Zubr) doesn't say "heavy".
You're right, I somehow had it in my head that it's a 12.7mm. MMG is more like it.

Now that Russia has invented the Flakvierling 38, they could start deploying (a lot of) them on the front lines, the drone threat is going to be (likely a lot) less dangerous.
There is an obvious difference between the chips in this system and the chips in every drone.
I don't know that this system is designed to defeat FPV drones. It's a very different exercise to engage FPV drones vs larger long range drones flying a predictable path. I think systems like the Zubr and Citadel are designed against the latter, not so sure about the former. There's unconfirmed info that the Arena-M variant currently being fielded can engage FPV drones, and we've seen a demonstration of it bringing down a Javelin. In fact I keep waiting to see these on the attack. At this point we've seen both the T-72B3A and the T-90M (2?) in the rear with Arena-M and most recently one case of a T-72B3A doing indirect fire, probably in Ukraine. The thing I suspect will cause them problems is the small number of counter-munitions.

There is a possibility that something like the Citadel or Zubr could be used to keep observation drones out of the sky, and the stray FPVs that get through could be engaged by Arena. But it would require quite a bit of complex coordination.
 

rsemmes

Active Member
I don't know that this system is designed to defeat FPV drones.
Well, I couldn't find any specifications about the Zubr radar, but I think they were using trench radars (MSL 20045) since the very beginning; they just need that one in this system. Probably is more about not enough of them, a huge investment in attack drones and never enough in counter measures; not to mention that a factory building tanks (or a refinery) has a higher value than the actual tank.

Trench mortars and now trench radars, funny. I knew them (or something similar) as counter-mortar radars.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Pain can rally people while they believe a war is winnable and worth its cost, but just as much can turn them against it once it stops feeling that way. Look at what triggered the 1905 revolution, what toppled the Tsar in 1917, why the USSR pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989, and why Russia signed a peace deal in the First Chechen War.
1905 and 1917 were a completely different animal. While wars were contributing factors, the main driver was to collapse an obsolete system and to change the centuries-old “regime”. The pain was never directed at the external factors as much as at the internal rot. Nothing even remotely similar exists in Russia today. Prigozhin checked the validity of the theory a couple of years ago, rest in peace.

Afghanistan is from a different category again. Some far-land of questionable friends in need of support in exchange for thousands dead Soviets, etc. The war was of never sold to the Soviet population as some kind of necessity either, but almost a taboo instead.

Chechnya? Well… A struggling country in the middle of a shock-therapeutical treatment (an experiment of historic scale, really, and only just over 30 years ago, fyi), sending thousands of late teens and young adults to be slaughtered by the Chechens, piss-poor management from Yeltsin who was mostly drunk and highly unpopular, chaos on the streets (newly emerged gangsters, division of the turf, the upcoming oligarchs, and street wars that came with it, etc) an so on. Then came the second Chechen war, with the dude currently in power being the prime-minister and then president, and see how that worked out.

These are not relevant comparisons, I don’t think. In this case, while the pain causes some internal tensions and demand for resolution of the problems, there will also be an increased demand (much more so, in my opinion) for stronger actions against Ukraine and punishment of the “Winston Churchill” (aka Zelensky) personally and “co” and people in general (much less so). We are a looong way from something different. And Russians do not believe they are losing the war either. In fact, they are fighting against the entire “western alliance” (and winning). A bit more on that below. To add here, however, and I think it is important, the current crisis is likely temporary in nature, though time will tell. Currently, the cause is not the Russian war against Ukraine, but Ukraine that needs to be dealt with and dealt with not by ending the war, which absolute majority prefers (on Russian terms), but by inflicting more pain (to accept the Russian terms and end the war). This is basically the gist of it.

While here and talking about punishing Ukrainians, as mentioned above. However weird, almost every Russian (as in currently in Russia, not locals) I asked the question of civilian casualties in Ukraine and suffering says, genuinely, that it is too bad and it is not people’s fault (they wish there was none of it). To the question of why not use “harsher measures” (like nukes, for example), the answer is always the same - it is not people’s fault so they don’t deserve it. The question is to feel things out, by the way; it is not suggestive. Anyway, weird stuff, but I thought I would throw this anecdote out there while on topic. These thoughts will change when the pain hits home. You can bet your last on it. Also relevant: “we have the means to end Ukraine, literally, and we have been investing in these means up the wazoo for decades, so why are we losing and why not use the said means?”

As far as i can tell, by looking at the Levada polls: Support for considering nukes isn't climbing and has never been a majority: roughly 29% in 2023, a 39% peak in November 2024, then down to 24% by June 2025, below where it started.
Another way to interpret these polls is to say that Russians strongly believed (more so than they do today?) they are winning the war in June 2025, Ukrainian Kursk adventures are over and miserably and decisively so, some “epic” gains by the Russian forces, “we can do it”, etc. The peak in November 2024 likely lined up with the beginning of the wrap-up of the Kursk adventures or some such, maybe North Koreans departure and the “we are with you” or “you are not alone”, etc. This is in spite of Ukes at the time claiming 40,000-50,000 dead Russians per month (pretty sure it was (also, lol) then). To note here, just a couple of months prior, Ukrainians also killed a whole bunch of young Russians (who weren’t supposed to fight in the war) with GMLRS filled with tungsten balls when they hit the column on the way to respond to the invasion.

Another point, third of the country (!) was in favour of use of nuclear weapons at the time they thought that there was a chance they would lose the war (when in 2023 is the data point and has it fluctuated much over the year? 2022?). Yet again, at a relatively good time of June 2025 it is still a quarter of the country, not insignificant any way you slice it.

Overall, I believe the small dataset you provided reinforces my point. The higher the pain, the higher the perception of losing the war, the higher the public pressure to nuke Ukraine. And like I mentioned, not tomorrow, but down the road and we are nowhere near that point yet. In other words, the mood follows the perceptions and actual events.

Some examples to consider: the US lost Vietnam in 1975 and Afghanistan in 2021, the USSR lost Afghanistan in 1989, France lost Algeria in 1962, and China in Vietnam 1979. All cases of a nuclear power failing against a non-nuclear opponent and leaving its territory, and in none of them did the arsenal come out of the silos.
To point out first, the idea of “never before” was not mine, but a thinker’s from one of the tanks - I tried to remember who it was, but no can do. In his defence though, none of the cases you mentioned resulted in a battlefield defeat of the nuclear power. Furthermore, the Nam took place at the time of (or on the way to) the higher end of nuclear capabilities build up by the US and the Soviets. And it is not like there were no deliberations of the possibility. However, using nukes would also not solve any of the issues the US was having in the war. Not like they could nuke Saigon in order to end the war, for instance.

Afghanistans were idiotic endeavours by both, the Soviets and the Americans. There is nothing the nukes would solve there either and would not have provided any advantage or induce any form of capitulation by the opponent.

French did more than enough shit to the Algerians. Nukes would serve no purpose. Yet, other forms of WMDs were implemented.

China in Vietnam? Soviet Union stood behind Vietnam. Probably part of the reason the war ended as quickly as it did. My history is not even remotely as strong in this case as it should be to even be debating though, so I welcome a different opinion. The way I see it, there was no way China could nuke Vietnam with the Soviets behind them. China was a “child” at the time. And again , they didn't lose per se.

But I will come back to the point I made. The celebration by the author of the idea is completely insane. The reason I mentioned it is because this is a widespread belief and among the populace too. In my (somewhat educated) opinion, there will be no nuclear power defeated on the battlefield here. Some strategic defeat, sure, perhaps (dependent on the interpretation). The reasons are plenty.

First, regardless of what one believes, consider that what the Russians keep claiming is true (as it should be when making serious assessments): they are not fighting some nonsensical or imperial war on another continent, but an existential (security) war at their border. As in preventing a bigger, actually existential, war. That’s the claim. The calculus is entirely different here. There is a reason why the risk of Ukraine being nuked was assessed as 50/50 by the US intelligence in late 2022. There is no joke here, lemming celebrations notwithstanding (including the think tanker). The risks are real and they are not insignificant. Where we go from there is equally is murky.

Second, beyond erasing Kyiv (which is highly unlikely and serves no purpose, I think), nukes would actually change the game here. First and foremost, the Russians would be able to nearly isolate the eastern Ukraine (left of Dnipro), where the actual fighting is taking place, from the rest of the country, as well as bordering suppliers. Those bridges are still standing not because of some good will but because of the retarted approach at the start of the war and likely the current inability to take them all down. This is a big thing with significant consequences for the Ukrainian military and their ability to defend/operate.

Furthermore, tactical nukes can erase the remaining energy infrastructure, completely stalling production within the country, shutting down the nuclear plants, etc. The production facilities that have been targeted numerous times in the war, but still appear to be operational, would cease their production for good. Nothing significant can operate on generators for any relevant length of time. Especially when there is no fuel.

And so on. “Conclusion” in the post below (ran over the character limit, apparently).
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
The use of nuclear weapons can provide a huge advantage here to the Russian war effort, if not ensure the total “victory” in relatively short period of time, comparatively speaking. Most definitely significantly reduce total combat losses. Sure, there are consequences. Yet, there exists a point when the (potential) consequences are not as significant when compared to the alternative. Also, dropping a few dozens tactical nukes is not Hiroshima and Nagasaki type of event. It would open a new era of warfare (that will come regardless) and end the era of nuclear nonproliferation, but we are as close to the latter as we hade ever been anyway. Response? In my opinion probability of some kinetic response from NATO or individual members is virtually zero: you have to be insane to attack Russia when the nukes are already flying. Chinese “condemnation” and whatnot is, in my opinion, overstated. The advertised “fact” that China prohibits Russia from it is nonsense. Again, there exists a point… One can say that it is almost surprising this option has not yet been implemented given where things are today.

So I will wrap this up here with the strikes on the UA facilities that have been hit before but still operate today (well, did before yesterday):


Reports also suggest that no visible air defences were operating for a good chunk of the strike. Most of the missiles sent by the Russians landed (somewhere, intended or not), including some of the intercepted Kh-101s. At least one Patriot missile hit something on the ground shortly after launch. Zero ballistic missiles were intercepted.

IMG_5791.jpeg
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
From the same article:

American intelligence assistance has also played a role, aiding Kyiv in charting the best paths for its drones and helping to skirt air defences, senior Ukrainian officials told the FT.

Fully independent though.

Also independent:

With no PAC-3 interceptors in reserve, all Ukrainian air defense crews could do was watch as all 23 ballistic missiles and all six 3M22 Zircon missiles slammed into the city and surrounding oblast.


The guy believes they can produce PAC-3s all on their own (enough for everyone!) and the only obstacle is licensing:

IMG_5797.jpeg

I mean you have to be really dense to believe that.

Also:

The Ukrainians learned to often fire just one interceptor at incoming ballistic missiles instead of the usual two or more because of shortages of the expensive American-made weapons.

NYT vis the archive: https://archive.is/7S2yj

I mean you can also learn “to often fire” zero interceptors instead of the usual 2+. The article also mentions (again) the air-defence units on rooftops, who are probably targeted.

Russia is also scaling the use of jet-powered drones that are apparently beyond the reach of the “Ukrainian” interceptor drones, raising the requirement for various missiles:


Skynex appears to be a dud for now too:

The Ukrainian military concluded that the equipment showed low readiness for use and worked "extremely unreliably". The document states that the actual parameters of the complex did not correspond to the declared technical specifications of the manufacturer.

From: В українських Skynex є технічні проблеми — Stern. Would have to use translate of some kind from Ukrainian, but here is the main part, after the above quote:

The reasons for the equipment's failure were malfunctions in the hydraulic system, the failure of the tracking radar, as well as the jamming of the charging mechanism. In the end, only two of the eight guns were able to provide stable escort of the enemy air object.

In the end, the only drone to be shot down managed to hit the target as intended.

In the meantime, Ukraine is trying to scare Putin into negotiations:

To a Slavic ear, 40 days is no accidental deadline. In Russia as in Ukraine, the 40th day after death is when the soul departs. So when Volodymyr Zelensky took to social media on June 25th to announce a new drone surge to “compel” Russia to negotiate for peace, he seemed to be telling Vladimir Putin he was already finished. With blunt messages like these, the Ukrainian president has lately been beating Mr Putin in the war of words.

The Economist, via the archive: https://archive.is/2lkQQ

Imagine being this dense. Not sure if it refers to the author or Zelesnky in this case. Perhaps both.

Rutte, in the meantime, says that no one has a clue as to what it wound take to make Putin to come to the negotiating table.


Perhaps, stopping demanding shit that is incompatible even with the beginning of negotiations would be a step in the right direction.

Logistics targetting:


And yet, in the meantime, Monaco and French authorities are suspecting the SBU being behind the blast in Monaco targeting the ex-Ukrainian oligarch:


They are defending themselves though, nothing to see here.

But Zelesnky says he will appoint the Euro negotiator:


Ok, the end here. Lots more to post, alas… If you are not following the Ukrainian-Polish relations, you should. The complete oblivion of the Ukrainians is fascinating. Especially provided all the advertised ingenuity. Consider also that no leaders of (or anyone of significance from) the free world are commenting on it. I will comment on it, at some point. Fascinating stuff.
 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
First, regardless of what one believes, consider that what the Russians keep claiming is true (as it should be when making serious assessments): they are not fighting some nonsensical or imperial war on another continent, but an existential (security) war at their border. As in preventing a bigger, actually existential, war. That’s the claim.
Complete nonsense. russia is not fighting an existenstial war at their border. Nobody was threatening russia in 2013. if they decide to stop the attacks on Ukraine the war will stop immediately.

If russia is stupid enough to use nukes, this will finally wake up those European leaders still asleep, and it would not end well for russia.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
See, I think that ^ is nonsense and completely so. What do you think Russians think?

Whether it will end well or not, I don’t know; but I will reiterate (call it double down): there will be no kinetic (re)action against Russia in response to the Russians using nukes in Ukraine.
 

tonnyc

Well-Known Member
See, I think that ^ is nonsense and completely so. What do you think Russians think?

Whether it will end well or not, I don’t know; but I will reiterate (call it double down): there will be no kinetic (re)action against Russia in response to the Russians using nukes in Ukraine.
If by kinetic you mean war or a military attack, you're probably right. That will just invite more nuclear strikes. Instead. I think the world will respond by trying to impoverish Russia so that they can no longer afford to maintain their nuclear weapons. And this is something that I believe China will be glad to participate in. Not out of any altruistic belief in world peace, but because Russia as a vassal state is very useful and prestigious to China. And when Russia is a de-facto vassal state, China will not need Russian nuclear weapons. They have nukes already. And even if they want them, it's easier to just take over Russia's nuclear arsenal with some face-saving excuse rather than allowing Russia to keep them where it's not under China's direct control.
 

rsemmes

Active Member
Complete nonsense. russia is not fighting an existenstial war at their border. Nobody was threatening russia in 2013. if they decide to stop the attacks on Ukraine the war will stop immediately.

If russia is stupid enough to use nukes, this will finally wake up those European leaders still asleep, and it would not end well for russia.
Maybe we shouldn't tell Russia what "an existential war" is.

“Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all redlines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle-draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putin’s sharpest liberal critics, I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests.”
Burns, then the American ambassador to Moscow, wrote to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2008.
"The Western view is that the Kremlin is supposed to understand and accept that the alliance’s activities, among them war games replete with American tanks staged in nearby Baltic states and rockets stationed in Poland and Romania – which the U.S. says are aimed at Iran – in no way present a threat to Russian security."

We shouldn't tell Russia what to consider a threat, as Russia doesn't tell Germany what to consider a threat: “Anything that enables Russia to continue its war of aggression against Ukraine also represents a threat to our security.” German foreign ministry.
It is not what we think Russia thinks, it is not what we think Russia should think, it is what Russia thinks.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
Maybe we shouldn't tell Russia what "an existential war" is.

“Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all redlines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle-draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putin’s sharpest liberal critics, I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests.”
Burns, then the American ambassador to Moscow, wrote to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2008.
"The Western view is that the Kremlin is supposed to understand and accept that the alliance’s activities, among them war games replete with American tanks staged in nearby Baltic states and rockets stationed in Poland and Romania – which the U.S. says are aimed at Iran – in no way present a threat to Russian security."

We shouldn't tell Russia what to consider a threat, as Russia doesn't tell Germany what to consider a threat: “Anything that enables Russia to continue its war of aggression against Ukraine also represents a threat to our security.” German foreign ministry.
It is not what we think Russia thinks, it is not what we think Russia should think, it is what Russia thinks.
But NATO as a whole was opposed to letting in Ukraine - until Russia invaded. Putin could have had Ukraine as a permanent buffer, if he'd been clever.

By invading Ukraine, Putin proved to all the former Warsaw Pact members that their arguments for joining NATO were correct. Sun & North Wind . . . .
 

rsemmes

Active Member
First and foremost, the Russians would be able to nearly isolate the eastern Ukraine (left of Dnipro), where the actual fighting is taking place, from the rest of the country
From a tactical (mind, no need to use "operational") and strategic (to win the war) point of view, it makes perfect sense to use tactical nuclear weapons to destroy those bridges. Sadly, they tend to be in cities but, what is a war without some collateral damage?
In 1938 the GB and US governments protested about the bombing of civilians in China and Spain.
 

rsemmes

Active Member
But NATO as a whole was opposed to letting in Ukraine - until Russia invaded. Putin could have had Ukraine as a permanent buffer, if he'd been clever.

By invading Ukraine, Putin proved to all the former Warsaw Pact members that their arguments for joining NATO were correct. Sun & North Wind . . . .
69. We reiterate the decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Ukraine will become a member of the Alliance with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as an integral part of the process.

I may be wrong, but I think that 2021 was before the invasion.
 

personaldesas

Active Member
69. We reiterate the decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Ukraine will become a member of the Alliance with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as an integral part of the process.

I may be wrong, but I think that 2021 was before the invasion.
The Bucharest formula was a fudge from day one: the US pushed for MAP in 2008, Germany and France blocked it, and the compromise was aspirational language with no mechanism, no timeline, and no MAP. NATO then ritually copy-pasted that paragraph into every summit communiqué for 13 years while doing precisely nothing to advance actual membership. Germany, France and Hungary remained opposed in practice right up to 2022.
 
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KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
And yet, in the meantime, Monaco and French authorities are suspecting the SBU being behind the blast in Monaco targeting the ex-Ukrainian oligarch:


They are defending themselves though, nothing to see here.
A woman suspected of carrying out a bomb attack in Monaco last week that seriously injured a Ukrainian-born businessman has been found ‌dead in Ukraine, and a military intelligence officer has been arrested in connection with her murder, authorities said on Tuesday.[…]

The HUR employee had confessed to killing 39-year-old Berezovska with the other defendant, the prosecutor general's office said.

"He also said that he had not informed his superiors about his contacts with Berezovska, the money transfers, or any of his other actions, and had acted on his own initiative," the statement said.


 

rsemmes

Active Member
The Bucharest formula was a fudge from day one: the US pushed for MAP in 2008, Germany and France blocked it, and the compromise was aspirational language with no mechanism, no timeline, and no MAP. NATO then ritually copy-pasted that paragraph into every summit communiqué for 13 years while doing precisely nothing to advance actual membership. Germany, France and Hungary remained opposed in practice right up to 2022.
"NATO as a whole was opposed to letting in Ukraine". Maybe you could explain the difference to swerve.

"Doing precisely nothing to advance actual membership"... but copy and paste; NATO didn't copy and paste: “Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all redlines".
It seems that NATO did nothing to make that point clear to Russia either, if you are talking for NATO.

Edit.
NATO didn't have to do that, but Russia made the point clear to NATO.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
If by kinetic you mean war or a military attack, you're probably right. That will just invite more nuclear strikes. Instead. I think the world will respond by trying to impoverish Russia so that they can no longer afford to maintain their nuclear weapons. And this is something that I believe China will be glad to participate in. Not out of any altruistic belief in world peace, but because Russia as a vassal state is very useful and prestigious to China. And when Russia is a de-facto vassal state, China will not need Russian nuclear weapons. They have nukes already. And even if they want them, it's easier to just take over Russia's nuclear arsenal with some face-saving excuse rather than allowing Russia to keep them where it's not under China's direct control.
I highly doubt this would be the outcome. “Condemnation” is more likely. Basically, what we see today more or less.

China will understand the development. It would also untie its hand to act in the same manner if needed.


From a tactical (mind, no need to use "operational") and strategic (to win the war) point of view, it makes perfect sense to use tactical nuclear weapons to destroy those bridges. Sadly, they tend to be in cities but, what is a war without some collateral damage?
In 1938 the GB and US governments protested about the bombing of civilians in China and Spain.
They can knock on roofs and proceed with a clear conscience.
 
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