The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[Feanor]

I'll try for another update this weekend, meanwhile nothing particularly dramatic has happened. Russia continues to inch forward east of the Oskol near Kupyansk, towards the canal east of Slavyansk, deeper into Konstantinovka, north-west of Pokrovsk, and west-ward in eastern Zaporozhye. Ukraine is counter-attacking with some success around Krasniy Liman, in the border area north of Kupyansk, and with considerable success around Stepnogorsk. Russian net gains continue but still at a substantially slower pace than '25 or even the second half of '24. It remains to be seen if these battles lead to any Ukrainian collapses, that would give Russia territorial gains that could off-set current slower pace advances, or if Russia's net annual gains will slow down for the first time since '23.

In general territory remains a secondary factor, with this being a war of attrition,and changes in the nature of the fighting can change territorial patterns without a direct connection to the attrition rate. Unfortunately this doesn't help us see which way things are going. Again I think the macro trends haven't fundamentally shifted, so in principle we're still headed in the same direction. Though on the diplomacy front things have changed. It appears previous efforts at diplomacy, pushing off from the meeting in Anchorage, are effectively done. Russia is openly stating they intend to reconsider the terms they intend to offer Ukraine, likely hardening them. Ukraine meanwhile has openly rejected giving up any territory as part of a peace settlement.

 

[Deus Ex Machina]

This may be a war of attrition but it feels like territory losses are the main pressure mechanism on Ukraine's government to accept bad terms to end the war. A secondary type of pressure is energy infrastructure destruction, especially during the winter. These seem to be the two types of heavy pressure that may get Ukraine to submit diplomatically.

As long as the front is relatively stable the longterm plan to wait out the russsians seems achievable. I mean, weathering the russian campaign until the russian economy collapses or a coup happens or Putin dies or he becomes politically very weak and unpopular and needs to end the war without achieving all the objectives.

This is just my opinion after all these years of war, happy to hear counterpoints.

 

[Feanor]

This may be a war of attrition but it feels like territory losses are the main pressure mechanism on Ukraine's government to accept bad terms to end the war. A secondary type of pressure is energy infrastructure destruction, especially during the winter. These seem to be the two types of heavy pressure that may get Ukraine to submit diplomatically.

Agreed. And I think the pressure is political. I.e. they're using the pressure to get the political concessions they want.

As long as the front is relatively stable the longterm plan to wait out the russsians seems achievable. I mean, weathering the russian campaign until the russian economy collapses or a coup happens or Putin dies or he becomes politically very weak and unpopular and needs to end the war without achieving all the objectives.

This is just my opinion after all these years of war, happy to hear counterpoints.

I think it's a very risky proposition. Either side can collapse, either side can experience a coup. I think on a long enough timeline Ukraine is likelier to collapse than Russia. It's important to note that Russia effectively failed, twice, in their strategic goals of '22, both the initial invasion and the second phase where they attempted to defeat the Ukrainian military in the field. But this didn't lead to Russia retreating or giving up. They switched to a strategic defense posture for ~1 year, built up resources, conducted some local offensive action (most notably Artemovsk/Bakhmut) and weathered Ukraine's offensive efforts in '23 quite well. And then they resumed advances. I think if Russia really does experience resource issues or start to run down, they will once again switch to a defensive posture. I don't think Ukraine can count on an end to the war where Russia actually returns all the territory they've taken. Which raises the question, wouldn't it make more sense to just strike a deal now?

And meanwhile the damage to Ukraine as a country is accumulating. The population keeps leaving, things keep getting destroyed, and territory is still being lost, just slowly. The front has been relatively stable for the past 3.5 years, but in that time Ukraine lost millions in population, hundreds of billions USD worth of infrastructure, and the end is nowhere in sight. At some point the balance sheet has to be that it's more worth it to give Russia the territory they want then to keep paying this kind of cost. That's assuming the calculus is about what's best for Ukraine.

 

[Deus Ex Machina]

, wouldn't it make more sense to just strike a deal now?

How can any ukrainian leader agree to those extreme russian demands? I wouldn't. It seems Russia doesn't really want to end the war. I believe russian leadership has calculated that Ukraine will become a permanent western satellite state with billions pouring in for reconstruction and army rebuilding, making a future war a hard proposition.

And of course you can expect the ukrainians to trample all over the agreements they will have signed about no foreign troops and military alliances. Just like they didn't honor the previous agreements after the Donbass war. And the US+EU will support them because the agreements were unfair and made under duress (sounds stupid to people that follow history and geopolitics but the public opinion will support this)

If I were Putin I would keep the war going until Ukraine has no chance to recover and all those millions of ukrainians never come back. They want to make it a permanent failed state circling the drain that's not worth investing billions into. That's why I believe Russia doesn't *really* want to end the war yet and they make unreasonable demands, like for example a lot of territory with cities in it. Who would accept that? Who COULD accept that at this point?

 

[koxinga]

A negotiation where no one will get everything they want. The question is what does that look like.

The Europeans will said Putin can't be trusted and victory is round the corner while the Russians will argue NATO can't be trusted and they can still be successful. But looking at the way it is going, neither side will get to where they want on the battlefield. Sure both sides can try and wait it out on claims that they other side is about to collapse. But there is just more social and economic damages on both sides.

There's a lot of sunken cost fallacy to overcome on both sides.

 

[Feanor]

How can any ukrainian leader agree to those extreme russian demands? I wouldn't. It seems Russia doesn't really want to end the war. I believe russian leadership has calculated that Ukraine will become a permanent western satellite state with billions pouring in for reconstruction and army rebuilding, making a future war a hard proposition.

Its why they want a demilitarized Ukraine. It's not so much about invading again as it is about making sure that Ukraine cant be turned into a militarized EU/NATO outpost.

And of course you can expect the ukrainians to trample all over the agreements they will have signed about no foreign troops and military alliances. Just like they didn't honor the previous agreements after the Donbass war. And the US+EU will support them because the agreements were unfair and made under duress (sounds stupid to people that follow history and geopolitics but the public opinion will support this)

I think this is why Russia has demanded the handover of the rest of Donetsk region as part of the ceasefire. That way if Ukraine tramples on the agreement and fighting resumes, Ukraine will have given you territory for nothing. It's part of what makes me think Russia is really looking to end the war rather than just pause it for a while.

If I were Putin I would keep the war going until Ukraine has no chance to recover and all those millions of ukrainians never come back. They want to make it a permanent failed state circling the drain that's not worth investing billions into. That's why I believe Russia doesn't *really* want to end the war yet and they make unreasonable demands, like for example a lot of territory with cities in it. Who would accept that? Who COULD accept that at this point?

Maybe. I wouldnt be surprised if thats an option thats on the table. But i suspect Russia would accept a peace where their current terms are met. In fact there's a chance Ukraine is already past that point.

 

[KipPotapych]

Another Oreshnik strike, on Kyiv this time (anyone has a geolocation yet?).

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2058314109574091230

Extremely relevant comment (I mentioned this (the development) after the second use as well, I believe, but now it is a bit more obvious):



It’s a rather big thing.

 

[rsemmes]

That's why I believe Russia doesn't *really* want to end the war yet and they make unreasonable demands, like for example a lot of territory with cities in it. Who would accept that? Who COULD accept that at this point?

What do you mean by yet? Tomorrow, next week? Maybe after summer, the end of the year?
If Ukraine decides to start serious negotiations on Monday, with a high level team and calling in Turkey and the US, do you think Russia is going to say... No, sorry. We want to fight for a couple more weeks.

Of course "unreasonable", you are not going to start any negotiations by giving up everything the other side wants.
What are the "reasonable" Ukrainian demands, when the country does not have the money to wage the war? Istanbul 2022?

It is not who "would", but who has to.
At this point? I don't think that to keep stretching it until it breaks is the best option for Ukraine. How is Zelenski expecting (hoping) to achieve Russia offering the same (+/-) agreement that in 2022?

 

[Feanor]

Another Oreshnik strike, on Kyiv this time (anyone has a geolocation yet?).

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2058314109574091230

Extremely relevant comment (I mentioned this (the development) after the second use as well, I believe, but now it is a bit more obvious):

View attachment 54878

It’s a rather big thing.

It appears Oreshnik hit the airbase near Belaya Tserkov, near Kiev. It's unclear why this target, or what exactly they hit. To the best of my knowledge, the airbase itself doesn't have any major underground facilities, though rumors abound. Also no BDA so far.

 

[swerve]

Its why they want a demilitarized Ukraine. It's not so much about invading again as it is about making sure that Ukraine cant be turned into a militarized EU/NATO outpost.

13 years ago Ukraine was demilitarising of its own volition, at no cost to Russia, & NATO & the EU were saying "Sorry, but you don't qualify for membership".

 

[Feanor]

13 years ago Ukraine was demilitarising of its own volition, at no cost to Russia, & NATO & the EU were saying "Sorry, but you don't qualify for membership".

Well when you've gone and crashed your car, you now have to make great efforts to exit the burning wreck. Arguing that you're not really trying to leave the car because if you wanted that you wouldn't have driven it at 100 mph in the first place is silly. I'm of the opinion, one I've stated here repeatedly, that this war is a mistake of historic proportions for Russia.

EDIT: Something strange happened in eastern Zaporozhye, south-eastern Dnepropetrovsk area. Russian forces have conducted operations in Dobropasovo, a village just south-east of Pokrovskoe. This is theoretically well beyond Ukraine's line of control, and an area Russia hasn't really had control over even before Ukraine's counter-offensive. How Russian forces got there is unclear. Suriyak now draws a giant yellow-colored grey zone to account for it, and this may be correct. I wouldn't be surprised if everything east of the Gaychur, south of the Volch'ya, and north of the Zaporozhye border is one giant grey zone with no real control from either side.

 

[personaldesas]

Which raises the question, wouldn't it make more sense to just strike a deal now?

Genuine question: Why would Russia and its leadership be interested in that? Things seem to go their way, albeit be it slowly.

Its why they want a demilitarized Ukraine. It's not so much about invading again as it is about making sure that Ukraine cant be turned into a militarized EU/NATO outpost.

That seems to be the exact outcome Russia has moved further away from, not closer to.

If the goal was to prevent Ukraine from becoming a heavily armed Western-aligned state, invading it was probably the most effective way to guarantee exactly that. Before the war, NATO membership for Ukraine was politically distant and many European countries were reluctant to spend seriously on defence. Now Ukraine is massively militarized, structurally dependent on Western weapons, and Europe has far more reason to treat Russia as an aggressive military threat.

So I understand the stated Russian rationale, but strategically it looks self-defeating.

 

[Feanor]

Genuine question: Why would Russia and its leadership be interested in that? Things seem to go their way, albeit be it slowly.

I don't think they intend to conquer all of Ukraine. I think they intend to take some and leave the rest as a weak neutral buffer state. So they need a dela of some sort at some point. If they can get what they want now without having to fight for 2-3 more years, why wouldn't they be interested?

That seems to be the exact outcome Russia has moved further away from, not closer to.

Agreed.

If the goal was to prevent Ukraine from becoming a heavily armed Western-aligned state, invading it was probably the most effective way to guarantee exactly that. Before the war, NATO membership for Ukraine was politically distant and many European countries were reluctant to spend seriously on defence. Now Ukraine is massively militarized, structurally dependent on Western weapons, and Europe has far more reason to treat Russia as an aggressive military threat.

Also agreed. I think it was very foolish to make this move.

So I understand the stated Russian rationale, but strategically it looks self-defeating.

Well they obviously thought they were going to win and from appearances go for regime change. When that didn't work out, the whole thing backfired. It was a calculated risk, but man were they bad at math.

 

[rsemmes]

Certainly, it has been a successful counterattack.

https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1V8NzjQkzMOhpuLhkktbiKgodOQ27X6IV&ll=47.629632824786%2C35.45000082103774&z=12

Stepnogirsk is all but back in Ukrainian hands and the Russian advance NE has been eliminated.
Any estimate about how costly it has been for each side? How many corpses is Ukraine going to hand back? It has been just another Russia pulling back?

 

[swerve]

Well they obviously thought they were going to win and from appearances go for regime change. When that didn't work out, the whole thing backfired. It was a calculated risk, but man were they bad at math.

Classic case of a leader ignoring advice he doesn't like, & only listening to those who support what he wants to do.

One could point to another current example . . . .

 

[personaldesas]

Certainly, it has been a successful counterattack.

https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1V8NzjQkzMOhpuLhkktbiKgodOQ27X6IV&ll=47.629632824786%2C35.45000082103774&z=12

Stepnogirsk is all but back in Ukrainian hands and the Russian advance NE has been eliminated.
Any estimate about how costly it has been for each side? How many corpses is Ukraine going to hand back? It has been just another Russia pulling back?

These things always feel less like operationally decisive moves and just like another mechanism for both sides to attrit each other.

Classic case of a leader ignoring advice he doesn't like, & only listening to those who support what he wants to do.

I’ve heard that it may also have been a case of genuinely bad advice. Of course, that still comes back to leadership to some extent: if you build a system where only flattering or optimistic advice reaches you, then “bad advice” and “ignoring reality” start to become the same problem.

 

[personaldesas]

I don't think they intend to conquer all of Ukraine. I think they intend to take some and leave the rest as a weak neutral buffer state. So they need a dela of some sort at some point. If they can get what they want now without having to fight for 2-3 more years, why wouldn't they be interested?

Wouldnt that only really work if the war reaches some kind of equilibrium where both sides believe continuing will not materially improve their position?

Russia would need Ukraine to be worn down enough to accept a deal, but Russia also needs to believe that carrying on would not get it a better deal later. I’m not sure we are near a point where both sides think the current or near-current situation is the best they can realistically get.

To me it still seems that Russia believes it needs at least all of Donbas. Ukraine, meanwhile, seems to believe it can keep inflicting enough pain on Russia’s rear areas, energy system, logistics, and manpower to make the war increasingly unsustainable for Moscow.

 

[Feanor]

Wouldnt that only really work if the war reaches some kind of equilibrium where both sides believe continuing will not materially improve their position?

Russia would need Ukraine to be worn down enough to accept a deal, but Russia also needs to believe that carrying on would not get it a better deal later. I’m not sure we are near a point where both sides think the current or near-current situation is the best they can realistically get.

To me it still seems that Russia believes it needs at least all of Donbas. Ukraine, meanwhile, seems to believe it can keep inflicting enough pain on Russia’s rear areas, energy system, logistics, and manpower to make the war increasingly unsustainable for Moscow.

I don't think Russia "needs" all of the Donbas. I don't think Russia "needs" any of the territory they took in this war. I think they need to be able to claim victory, which is where taking all of the Donbas comes in. I also think Russia believes Ukraine will negotiate in bad faith, hence why they want a territorial concession to go with the negotiation, which would create a significant sunk cost for Ukraine, and therefore discourage bad faith negotiations. So I think the territorial demands will shift after Russia takes the Donbas to be "the rest of Zaporozhye". Or something else. Which brings us to what I think is the real obstacle. I don't think Ukraine's government has any intention of accepting any deal between themselves and Russia. I think they might be open to a deal that involves western backers, but they're also not willing to give up territory. And I think they won't honor any deal that they think they can get away with breaking.

 

[rsemmes]

Ukraine, meanwhile, seems to believe it can keep inflicting enough pain on Russia’s rear areas, energy system, logistics, and manpower to make the war increasingly unsustainable for Moscow.

It is hard for me to understand how anyone in Kiev, at the receiving end of 10.000 missiles, can believe that. On the other hand... "One could point to another current example . . . . "


Then...
First, as a side note, I always found that overuse of the fashionable “operational” a bit annoying, even among the military; even if nowadays the term has it own existence.

After the war, we will learn what were the objectives of this Russian offensive/campaign/operation. The strategic goal of threatening Zsaporishshia, placing it within artillery range? That would be a valuable card in any peace negotiations. Cutting the T0803 at Komishuvaja, to strangle enemy supplies for future operations? Was it the initiative of a battalion commander (or a captain) that was supported by its brigadier? An attack of opportunity that was reinforced because it found a weak spot?
Was there any directive from GHQ Kiev, to counterattack and keep counterattacking? A local commander kept asking for reinforcements because he was successful? Orders to retake Stepnogirsk or to cut the NE advance, both? Any?
Attrition, artillery, drones and patrols, is happening all along the front, but Ukraine is counterattacking here. Russia is not, never was, attacking all along the front, but was advancing N and then NE here. They are not decisive, but Russia is selecting where to attack, to achieve certain strategic goals for the peace negotiations or to improve/develop a tactical situation that will lead to those goals. You don't attack just to kill soldiers.

Even Verdun, even “You attack until the enemy has no more reserves” and even Iran infantry-heavy offensives were aiming at a lot more than that.

 

[Feanor]

Classic case of a leader ignoring advice he doesn't like, & only listening to those who support what he wants to do.

One could point to another current example . . . .

Taking Crimea was a strong move, well executed, and netted something worthwhile. There's also a decent justification for it, the self-determination argument. Getting involved in the Donbas afterwards was a distinctly bad idea. And the Minsk Accords were also a bad idea, though that's a case of hindsight. Back in '14 Russia should have stayed out of the civil unrest in the east altogether. Barring that, they should have coordinated and delivered a decisive defeat, not in just a couple of battles, but in the war. And given both of those options being missed, Russia needed to not go down the path of another escalation in Ukraine. They needed that conflict to stay frozen as long as possible, and if it gets unfrozen, they needed Ukraine to be the one to unfreeze it. I think Putin didn't realize how badly Shoygu had slowed the development of the armed forces during his tenure, and Russian leadership also badly underestimated Ukraine's armed forces. They also didn't realize the impact that western intelligence sharing and ISR would have on the battlefield.