The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
Europe fought the war in Afghanistan for more than 20 years. Ukraine is in Europe, not a "far-away" place. Thus the motivation for supporting Ukraine is much stronger. In addition; in Afghanistan European soldiers were killed and wounded. Still Europe kept at it for more than 20 years.

Make no mistake: If necessary, Europe will support Ukraine for far longer than we staid in Afghanistan. I wonder when Russia will realize this?

Nobody can predict the future of course but I will be surprised if this war lasts more than 10 years., I am guessing it will last 5-10 years. This is significant since more and more countries are now guaranteeing support to Ukraine for a 10-year period. As I said before 2024 will be very tough for Ukraine however from 2025/2026 and onwards the European weapons manufacturing will really start to scale up. Training will also start to scale up. If Russia cannot end this war by the end of 2024 I think Russia will be in a very difficult situation.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
@Vivendi As you say it is hard to predict the future but Russia’s window of opportunity is wider than the end of 2024. Depending on the US election (both process and results), the possible chaos could last into 2026. Then there is China’s ambitions for Taiwan and who knows what other stuff could arise.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
The second thing to consider is that the Russians have reserves that they haven’t committed yet. Ukraine has none. According to the reports cited here previously (among many, many others), thighs are pretty tough and manpower is lacking greatly. Rules for mobilization still haven’t been finalized. Long story short, they may end up with a lot of unwilling and poorly trained men that need to be thrown in to the front in order to keep the Russians from exploiting a breakthrough somewhere. This is the reality.
This part gets really interesting when you realize Ukraine has (according to the last info I've seen ) 1.1 million men under arms. Russia has ~600 000 in Ukraine and this includes rear units. Ukraine still has a number advantage, but is complaining about insufficient forces, and lack of reserves. Let's assume for a moment both facts are true. What does it say when you have a number advantage and insufficient manpower at the same time?

By the way, I'm not sold that Ukraine really has no reserves. There is at least 1 Ukrainian Mech Bde riding M1 tanks that we haven't seen in combat. Also Ukraine's 82nd Para-Assault hasn't shown up on the front lines since Rabotino. Their very conspicuous Strykers and Marders are not being sighted. So Ukraine likely has some reserves, just not enough.

You assume that most of the equipment sent by the West was lost. if it was the case, Russians would be in Kiev as we speak. Some equipment have been lost but not most of it.
It's more that the Russians have been able to increase their forces on the ground. Ukes complain of lack of ammos, not of vehicles,
Ukraine's total losses in kit from the start of the war are comparable to the total equipment provided by the West. Note they're not literally the same kit, but they're quite significant. Ukraine's TerDef Bdes have complained about lack of armor and artillery support too.

Europe fought the war in Afghanistan for more than 20 years. Ukraine is in Europe, not a "far-away" place. Thus the motivation for supporting Ukraine is much stronger. In addition; in Afghanistan European soldiers were killed and wounded. Still Europe kept at it for more than 20 years.

Make no mistake: If necessary, Europe will support Ukraine for far longer than we staid in Afghanistan. I wonder when Russia will realize this?

Nobody can predict the future of course but I will be surprised if this war lasts more than 10 years., I am guessing it will last 5-10 years. This is significant since more and more countries are now guaranteeing support to Ukraine for a 10-year period. As I said before 2024 will be very tough for Ukraine however from 2025/2026 and onwards the European weapons manufacturing will really start to scale up. Training will also start to scale up. If Russia cannot end this war by the end of 2024 I think Russia will be in a very difficult situation.
What happens when Ukraine starts running out of population and the will to fight begins to crumble? Forcible returning of Ukrainian refugees to the war zone? Polish soldiers replacing Ukrainian ones? I think Ukraine, if they're willing to suffer the costs, and they will be quite nasty, has one more shot at a major counter-offensive in late 2024 or in 2025, but that's it. And even a victory at that point will likely leave Ukraine a significantly, and irrecoverably, weakened country compared to the same country pre-2022. At this point the question has to be, are the human losses from casualties sure, but mainly from people leaving the country, worth fighting over some mostly empty Zaporozhye steppes and at this point a mostly hostile Donbas?
 
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vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
This part gets really interesting when you realize Ukraine has (according to the last info I've seen ) 1.1 million men under arms. Russia has ~600 000 in Ukraine and this includes rear units. Ukraine still has a number advantage, but is complaining about insufficient forces, and lack of reserves. Let's assume for a moment both facts are true. What does it say when you have a number advantage and insufficient manpower at the same time?
Given the opaqueness of the situation, we cannot discard the possibility that UKR is playing a deception game, and that they actually have adequate forces available to counter any serious RU advances. As Feanor said, several units are not firmly located on the front, along with some elements of western aid hardly being seen at all.

That might be a bit optimistic, but I havnt seen any hard evidence that UKR is about to crumble. Barring the deception possibility, I dont see them launching a serious offensive this year, either.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Given the opaqueness of the situation, we cannot discard the possibility that UKR is playing a deception game, and that they actually have adequate forces available to counter any serious RU advances. As Feanor said, several units are not firmly located on the front, along with some elements of western aid hardly being seen at all.

That might be a bit optimistic, but I havnt seen any hard evidence that UKR is about to crumble. Barring the deception possibility, I dont see them launching a serious offensive this year, either.
Ukraine may be better off holding on with strictly defensive actions preserving critical kit and personnel until after the US election. A hostile US administration means drastic reductions in military aid thus some kind of unpleasant settlement might be the best option. Many seem to think that smarter and knowledgeable people will steer Trump to do the right thing but the first thing he will do is purge these people. Loyal useful idiots will be the sole criterion for his second administration.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
This article on Russia's wartime economy and its production abilities of materials more than suggest that Russia has positioned itself to keep this war going , certainly if you can get high paid jobs in the production and restoration and avoid the draft to Ukraine, it would be an easy choice, It would be easy to believe the war will be lost or won on which side has the the resources to sustain its efforts ,Russia may have the advantage of a command economy in this but this is seen as as being largely being supported by its oil and gas wealth and prior savings ,which themselves have been subject to to sanctions
 

Larry_L

Active Member
Mette Frederiksen has stated that Denmark will donate all it's artillery to Ukraine. She further encouraged other countries to contribute whatever they are not using at the moment. Denmark is a small country. I have no idea how much they have to contribute.



ISW apparently stated that Russia gained local Air superiority at least temporally in the Avdivka area. There are reports that they lost 4 aircraft there in the last few days so this was not without cost.





 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Mette Frederiksen has stated that Denmark will donate all it's artillery to Ukraine. She further encouraged other countries to contribute whatever they are not using at the moment. Denmark is a small country. I have no idea how much they have to contribute.



ISW apparently stated that Russia gained local Air superiority at least temporally in the Avdivka area. There are reports that they lost 4 aircraft there in the last few days so this was not without cost.





Quick point. If you look at where in Lugansk region Dyakovo is, it becomes obvious that Ukraine didn't down the Su-35S in question (and it has nothing to do with Avdeevka). Russian sources confirm the loss, and the rescue of the downed pilot, but claim friendly fire, which given the location is by far the likeliest explanation. Ukrainian sources talked about downing Russian Su-34s but no evidence has emerged, whereas for the Su-35S we have footage of the downing, footage of the rescue, and confirmation. Most notably Fighterbomber dismisses it as false, and he has been a great source for confirming losses in the past. On a side note some Russian social media sources claimed Russia had gained air superiority over Avdeevka and was able to drop non-gliding bombs as well on the targets. I never saw any confirmation, but it's interesting that ISW is saying as much. I wonder how they know.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
This part gets really interesting when you realize Ukraine has (according to the last info I've seen ) 1.1 million men under arms. Russia has ~600 000 in Ukraine and this includes rear units. Ukraine still has a number advantage, but is complaining about insufficient forces, and lack of reserves. Let's assume for a moment both facts are true. What does it say when you have a number advantage and insufficient manpower at the same time?

By the way, I'm not sold that Ukraine really has no reserves. There is at least 1 Ukrainian Mech Bde riding M1 tanks that we haven't seen in combat. Also Ukraine's 82nd Para-Assault hasn't shown up on the front lines since Rabotino. Their very conspicuous Strykers and Marders are not being sighted. So Ukraine likely has some reserves, just not enough.
They have been providing different numbers for their millitary but keep calling it a “million men army” or something like that. Zelensky said there are 800 some thousand people in the forces. Podolyak stated that there are about 200-300 thousand actively fighting (quite a spread!). So they just have to find what the remaining hundreds of thousands do and where they are and then decide on the number required to be mobilized. Or something silly like that. I don’t want to spend my time looking for the UA or western sources on this, so I am going to provide a RU article that has links to basically everything mentioned above:


And a couple of quotes via google translate:

200-300 thousand people are actively involved in hostilities in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), said on February 9 on the air of the telethon, Advisor to the head of the office of the Ukrainian President Mikhail Podolyak. He noted that following the results of the audit, the new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Alexander Syrsky will have to conduct a fair rotation of the military.

"The President of [Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy] said another thing - for example, talking about the renewal of the leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, he says: "We have almost 1 million mobilized." And on the front line... it's 200-300 thousand. Others were very far from the war, but they are. Therefore, it seems to me that one of Syrsky's key tasks is to conduct an audit: where, how and who is. And after that to say what other additional amount [need]," the portal "Main in UA" quotes him.

Podolyak added that the mobilization should be constant, but not momentary, and Syrsky, in his opinion, should say where and how the mobilized people were or will be used.

The adviser to the head of Zelensky's office noted that at the front "someone is 24/7", and so that there is no break with those who did not fight, Podolyak proposes to build logistics correctly, to prepare people who will go to rotation and equipment. To do this, it is necessary for the military registration and enlistment offices to work differently.

"Mobilization, rotation and demobilization are problems that need to be solved," he summed up.

On January 28, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in an interview with the German TV channel ARD that up to 880 thousand people serve in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, calling it the "million" army of the country.


My opinion… there are, of course, lies being told. Which lies and to what extent, lol, we do not know. I agree with your assessment.

Yes, they have reserves, you are right. My apologies for the hyperbole (funny, because I hate hyperbole). At least two brigades that we know of, a total of about 5K people? Pretty sure I saw reports in the summer that the 82nd was about 2,000 men, however (un)reliable the reports were. Make it 10K in total of trained and equipped personnel. How many more, we do not know. Maybe they are honest and they have hundreds of thousands of mobilized men unaccounted for, lost in the country.


Given the opaqueness of the situation, we cannot discard the possibility that UKR is playing a deception game, and that they actually have adequate forces available to counter any serious RU advances. As Feanor said, several units are not firmly located on the front, along with some elements of western aid hardly being seen at all.

That might be a bit optimistic, but I havnt seen any hard evidence that UKR is about to crumble. Barring the deception possibility, I dont see them launching a serious offensive this year, either.
Funny because I had the same thought more times than I care to admit in the short past while. Why? Because something just doesn’t seem to make sense and “smells fishy”. But every time I come to my senses because:

A) If Ukraine had this secret sufficient force of trained and equipped men that were ready for battle, they would commit them (at least a good chunk of them) to their summer offensive because it was crucial for them to come up with result. Not only because they want to show their ability to achieve result to the rest of the world and the backers in particular, but also because they do not have the time or personnel/equipment to spare. Instead, put very lightly, they came up short. In other words, no one in their right mind would hold these reserves if they thought they could make a difference in achieving their goals. Therefore, these reserves do not exist or they are not nearly sufficient to make a difference in the crucial moment (we have been told that the RU defences were about to crumble if not today then the day after at the time).
B) Since A) strongly suggests that these reserves didn’t exist at the time or were not nearly sufficient, it leaves us 2-3 months for Ukraine to come up with these men, put them to training (likely outside of the country), and find equipment that is not readily available. That puts us into the realm of fantasy.
C) The analysts and experts I follow, all (with no exception) agree that Ukraine has a serious problem with personnel or lack there of, as well as average age, ailments, etc.

Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the situation is what it looks like and what doesn’t add up or makes sense and “smells fishy” is the reports of the Ukrainian officials and Zelesnky in particular.

I agree, they aren’t currently crumbling. Well, I am not sure if we can state that with the absolute certainty either, depending on the definition of crumbling. I think the next few months will certainly be a good indicator of what is going to happen next. One of the issues I see, and I thought but hesitated to put it as C) or D) above, is that they are still constructing their defense lines and there has also been reported a shortage of men and equipment to do so. While, ironically, they have been trying to basically copy the “Surovikin line” that was laughed at by some (and Ukrainians in particular) last year, most experts agree that these lines would not be nearly as effective as they were for the Russians if the FABs aren’t taken care off and that is not likely to happen and quite the contrary would be a reasonable expectation - we may see more of these in the future.

Most notably, however, there have been reported talks among the western leaders and top brass for the past couple of months and these talks have been pretty pessimistic (perhaps realistic) about the future strategy. There was an article in the NYT in December (I think) talking about the Americans possibly shifting to an outlook that the best strategy is to hold the line and prevent the Russians from taking more territory and now that would be the upper hand for Ukraine to negotiate from. Here is the article:


Some in the U.S. military want Ukraine to pursue a “hold and build” strategy — to focus on holding the territory it has and building its ability to produce weapons over 2024. The United States believes the strategy will improve Ukraine’s self-sufficiency and ensure Kyiv is in a position to repel any new Russian drive.

The goal would be to create enough of a credible threat that Russia might consider engaging in meaningful negotiations at the end of next year or in 2025.


Another interesting bit from that article and furthering the point I made previously:

Many Ukrainian leaders do not realize how precarious continued U.S. funding for the war is, American officials said. These Ukrainian generals and senior civilian officials have unrealistic expectations about what the United States will supply, they said. They are asking for millions of rounds of artillery, for example, from Western stockpiles that do not exist.

There is definitely more interesting stuff there, but I am probably running out of space (yet again) and still want to add a couple of things. In regard to the last quote, note how a couple of days ago in Munich Zelesnky called it an “artificial shortage”, which further demonstrates his complete disconnect with the reality (though not the worst example by far).

Another thing I want to add here is this article from The New Yorker. I wish it was written earlier and I saw it earlier as it discusses a good chunk of I talked about in some of my recent posts but in a more coherent way. It is a very good read and I would recommend it to everyone:


This one finally touches on the subject of what winning may mean too. I am really “impressed” that we are here, a few days short of two years into this war and everyone still talks about winning without having any idea what it actually entails. Add to that the definition of “upper hand” as discussed in the NYT article cited above.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I haven't had time for a proper update, but a quick note, Russia has begun an offensive in Zaporozhye, inside the Rabotino salient. Reportedly Russian forces have seized positions west, south, and east of Rabotino, and are now pushing into Rabotino itself. Given the state of the village, it itself will be hard to hold. There are also reports of less significant attacks west of Verbovoe, and an unsuccessful attack eastward out of Kopani. There is considerable fog of war, I suspect the situation will clear up more tomorrow.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Out of space again, lol and damn it! So part two, I guess.

Another article in regard to the future plan was hanging at the very top of the Politico (com) website pretty much all day:


The cliffs?

The plan now, as detailed or lamented in interviews with eight U.S. lawmakers and five foreign officials, is to just keep the Ukrainian military from collapsing.

Long story short, none of this sounds like there are any substantial secret reserves waiting for their time to strike and the situation appears to be pretty dire.

Since I ran out of space anyway, I will add a couple more things. One is the defense lines that are being constructed by Ukraine. This has got to be on Zaluzhny at least as much as on anyone else. And again, back to decisions made on very poor assumptions from the very beginning and, clearly, later into the war and still. I still think it was a mistake to discharge him from his duties though.

@Fredled, no, I was not assuming that most of the equipment was destroyed. I was referring to what Feanor said in his post above. In addition, however, the equipment that was supplied specifically for the summer offensive was partially (and a good chunk of it) destroyed, but may certainly be (and is likely) replaceable. But, that equipment was not sufficient to achieve the goal of a breakthrough. Neither was the number of troops. While the equipment that was lost may be replaceable, additional quantities needed are likely not readily available; neither are the people to operate and ride it and these people not only need to be found but also trained to use the very equipment.

If you say that there had been zero effect on the economy and finances of Europe, I believe you are greatly uninformed on the subject. The consequences are very significant and have been discussed by me here previously (search through my posts). Since then, what I posted has been validated to a great degree and more developments took place, not for the better. This is my cup of tea and I am fairly good at it. Europe is paying dearly for it. There is no question about it; the actual measurable magnitude can be argued, but the fact that it is very significant is just that, a fact. In case of Germany, here is one example from the recent days:

 

Fredled

Active Member
Feanor said:
This part gets really interesting when you realize Ukraine has (according to the last info I've seen ) 1.1 million men under arms. Russia has ~600 000 in Ukraine and this includes rear units.
Yes and no. Some of the 600K Russian soldiers are rear and logistic units but not all. Most of the rear units are far inside Russia. Just consider the air force. Russia in total has 2.2 million men and it doesn't include recent mobilisation and mercenaries. They plan to rise this number to 2.5M in the near future.

Ukraine had 1.1M men on paper, before 2022. The actual number is certainly much lower after all those who were wounded, dead, evaded duty, retired etc are in much higher number than those who were effectively mobilised. And this, forcibly includes the rear (if something such as rear still exists in Ukraine), administration, intelligence, air forces, etc.
It's interesting to note that less than a year ago, an Uke Army spokesman said that they had plenty of men, that's what the only thing they had enough.

Feonor said:
Ukraine's total losses in kit from the start of the war are comparable to the total equipment provided by the West.
I agree. It doesn't mean that only equipment from the West was lost. First was lost Soviet era equipment from the original Ukrainian army.

Feanor said:
I think Ukraine, if they're willing to suffer the costs, and they will be quite nasty, has one more shot at a major counter-offensive in late 2024 or in 2025, but that's it.
I agree if we consider active actions in the current situation. The goal is to make Russians suffer the cost even better so that they decide to leave by gesture of good will.
So far the Russian army has lost its most expandable component: jailhouse recruits, volunteers, professional Russian mercenaries, foreign mercenaries, khadirovites, Buriats, etc. Now they are going to start to lose the good young Russians who have nothing to do with this war. How far Putin can go, bleeding his nation?
 

Fredled

Active Member
KipPotapych said:
If Ukraine had this secret sufficient force of trained and equipped men that were ready for battle, they would commit them (at least a good chunk of them) to their summer offensive
Yes and No. No because there was no summer offensive. It was aborted after 3 weeks of attempts to only remotely approach the Surovikin Line. Then the Russian had launched their own counter-offensive in Kupiansk, Lyman and Avdiivka.

It should be kept in mind that along the entire front line, there are constant fightings, with important casualties, in many places that we never heard of. This war is not just about a few spots or a few positions. It's a continuous battlefield stretching over 1000 miles.

Yes because what you say is obvious. Had Ukrainians had more forces to engage they would have engaged them. They probably still have significant forces on the northern border to protect Kiev.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Yes and no. Some of the 600K Russian soldiers are rear and logistic units but not all. Most of the rear units are far inside Russia. Just consider the air force. Russia in total has 2.2 million men and it doesn't include recent mobilisation and mercenaries. They plan to rise this number to 2.5M in the near future.

Ukraine had 1.1M men on paper, before 2022. The actual number is certainly much lower after all those who were wounded, dead, evaded duty, retired etc are in much higher number than those who were effectively mobilised. And this, forcibly includes the rear (if something such as rear still exists in Ukraine), administration, intelligence, air forces, etc.
It's interesting to note that less than a year ago, an Uke Army spokesman said that they had plenty of men, that's what the only thing they had enough.
You make some of the strangest claims, that don't tend to be supported by anything. Pre-war the Ukrainian Armed Forces had a strength of ~250k. Where do you get the 1.1M before 2022? Ukraine mobilized massive numbers of people for the past two years, fielding a force that consistently outnumbered Russia. Russia similarly started to increase their force strength after the Ukrainian attacks in Kharkov region broke through Russian lines.

I agree if we consider active actions in the current situation. The goal is to make Russians suffer the cost even better so that they decide to leave by gesture of good will.
That would require a significant reversal of Russia's position on the battlefield. Russia's gestures of "good will" so far were all tied to major problems in the war. And it's highly unlikely Russia will leave Donetsk, Lugansk, or Crimea as "good will". Which opens the question of the land bridge to Crimea...

So far the Russian army has lost its most expandable component: jailhouse recruits, volunteers, professional Russian mercenaries, foreign mercenaries, khadirovites, Buriats, etc. Now they are going to start to lose the good young Russians who have nothing to do with this war. How far Putin can go, bleeding his nation?
How you arrive at this conclusion is beyond me. What evidence do you have about the composition of Russian losses? Because from where I sit Russia already lost many of their pre-war professional army. And there's no reason to think Buryatia, Yakutia, or Tyva, is suddenly out of population for the war. However you can't fight a war with them alone, you never could. And I suspect jailhouse recruiting hasn't stopped. Shtorm-Z units are still around. Who's filling them?

Yes and No. No because there was no summer offensive. It was aborted after 3 weeks of attempts to only remotely approach the Surovikin Line. Then the Russian had launched their own counter-offensive in Kupiansk, Lyman and Avdiivka.
This is complete b.s. Ukraine continued attacks and even gained some ground well past the first 3 weeks. Ukraine also breached what was thought to be the first Surovikin line near Verbovoe, ~3 months into the offensive. Ukraine continued to take significant casualties and making significant efforts to advance towards Tokmak through Rabotino, eventually capturing Rabotino itself and approaching the outskirts of Novoprokopovka and Verbovoe. What evidence do you have that the offensive was aborted after 3 weeks?
 

Fredled

Active Member
Feanor said:
Ukrainian Armed Forces had a strength of ~250k. Where do you get the 1.1M before 2022?
You'r right. I mixed up the numbers and dates in my head. My memory doesn't serve me well lately. ;)


I said:
The goal is to make Russians suffer the cost even better so that they decide to leave by gesture of good will.
You said:
That would require a significant reversal of Russia's position on the battlefield.
Yes, of course. But this reversal will come only after the Russians will be fed up with the war and Russian soldiers not willing to fight anymore. Not by the ability of the Ukrainian army to break through Russian lines.

If the Ukrainian army is able to inflict losses on Russian occupiers at the same rate as they did so far, this will definitely happen, even if they don;t progress geographically.

I said:
So far the Russian army has lost its most expandable component
You said:
What evidence do you have about the composition of Russian losses?
It's well known that for a while, Vagnerites have been doing many of the frontal infantry assaults. About the Khadyrovites, it's less clear what their role was, but they were there, and they don't seem to be very visible anymore.

Of course Russia lost also many of regular, professional and elite soldiers. Yet, for the worse jobs, they had expandable recruits which now become less and less available.

I mentioned the Buriats, because they were over represented at the beginning of the war and locals started to complain. Putin used ethnic resources to conceal the war burden from the Russian population. But this doesn't work anymore since it reached a critical limit and people started to notice.

I said:
No because there was no summer offensive. It was aborted after 3 weeks
I said:
This is complete b.s.
It's open to interpretation. To me it was clear that after 3 weeks or so, the battle plan had changed from a breakthrough en masse toward Berdiansk into continuous efforts to find an elusive weak spot along the Surovikin Line and secure the small initial gains. Yes, these efforts continues for months and were important, but it was not the big counter-offensive as advertised.
I mean, the Ukrainian headquarter already knew that they will not make it through (literally) quiet early at the beginning of the counter-offensive.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Yes, of course. But this reversal will come only after the Russians will be fed up with the war and Russian soldiers not willing to fight anymore. Not by the ability of the Ukrainian army to break through Russian lines.

If the Ukrainian army is able to inflict losses on Russian occupiers at the same rate as they did so far, this will definitely happen, even if they don;t progress geographically.
What happens if Russia is able to progress geographically?

It's well known that for a while, Vagnerites have been doing many of the frontal infantry assaults. About the Khadyrovites, it's less clear what their role was, but they were there, and they don't seem to be very visible anymore.

Of course Russia lost also many of regular, professional and elite soldiers. Yet, for the worse jobs, they had expandable recruits which now become less and less available.

I mentioned the Buriats, because they were over represented at the beginning of the war and locals started to complain. Putin used ethnic resources to conceal the war burden from the Russian population. But this doesn't work anymore since it reached a critical limit and people started to notice.
These are vague general statements. Do you have any actual proof on the structure of Russian losses to support the dynamic you suggest? You're arguing that initially losses were disproportionately distributed towards ethnic minorities, prisoners, and Chechen fighters. That requires data to prove. You're also stating this has now shifted. That also requires data. Do you have any evidence?

It's open to interpretation. To me it was clear that after 3 weeks or so, the battle plan had changed from a breakthrough en masse toward Berdiansk into continuous efforts to find an elusive weak spot along the Surovikin Line and secure the small initial gains. Yes, these efforts continues for months and were important, but it was not the big counter-offensive as advertised.
I mean, the Ukrainian headquarter already knew that they will not make it through (literally) quiet early at the beginning of the counter-offensive.
Ukraine rushed company formations into the Rabotino salient late into the offensive. They lost an entire mech coy riding BMP-1s with a T-72 tank platoon supporting, and this is not the only such instance. The famous "Alesha" incident where a Russian T-80 shot up an entire Ukrainian mech coy riding MRAPs, and with at least one supporting also happened later into the offensive. Ukraine tried major company+ sized assaults during many points in their counter-offensive. What they knew and what they didn't know is unclear. It may have been your opinion that no breakthrough was coming, but it very much looked like they were trying to achieve that breakthrough right up to the end. They even tried to commit battle group Marun to the fight to see if they can finally get to Tokmak but when that formation started taking heavy losses and made no gains, they aborted, and that was the end of the offensive. Your claim that there was no counter offensive is just plain wrong.
 

Fredled

Active Member
KipPotapych said:
Germany’s Days as an Industrial Superpower Are Coming to an End
I couldn't read the article but I guessed what it was talking about,
You are talking about the surge in gas prices following the sanctions on Russian energy imports. Higher energy prices are the result of self-inflicated sanctions, I mean a decision to take this burden in order to reduce liquidity flows to Russia. It's true that it caused a big inflation on top of the already very big inflation following the post-covid insanely massive quantitative easing. It was a double-whammy for inflation in Europe. Gas and oil prices have tamed a little bit since, but are still high. As a consequence, the West European manufacturing became even less competitive on the global market, and the East manufacturing also to a less extent. This trend was not new. Western Europe had been losing its industrial power for over 30 years. The last events were only a last nail on the coffin.

About all this, I agree, but it's not related to the military aid we send to Ukraine. Moreover, the energy situation had stabilised, the double inflation shock is over. I would say that the post-covid inflation was much worse than the gas sanction inflation. And now it's business as usual again.

Russians, on the other hand, are only at the beginning of their pain.
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
These are vague general statements. Do you have any actual proof on the structure of Russian losses to support the dynamic you suggest? You're arguing that initially losses were disproportionately distributed towards ethnic minorities, prisoners, and Chechen fighters. That requires data to prove. You're also stating this has now shifted. That also requires data. Do you have any evidence?
There are studies on the distribution of RU casualties:


Although this one is a little dated. I saw one more recently on the Project Owl Discord, but I will have to find it.
 

Fredled

Active Member
Feanor said:
What happens if Russia is able to progress geographically?
Well. Of course, if Russians win the war, they win the war. I was just saying what's the most probable way Ukraine could win the war. Not that they will. Time will tell.

You said:
That also requires data. Do you have any evidence?
Do you think that Russia keeps an updated database available to the public? :p
 
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