Post 1 of 2: Some inchoate reflections
What do people think about the hypothesis about Xi from the former Putin advisor?
1. Throwing every Russian able-bodied male in uniform and shipping them out can get Putin more BTGs, but this does not get give the Russian Army capable BTGs to fight and win in the decisive terrain in Eastern Ukraine. Especially in modern warfare, where physically-massing ground forces isn't a strength but a liability. The PLA knows this, which is why China reduced troop count by 300,000 to have money reallocated to buy advanced gear.
(a) The hastily trained Russian replacements are headed for a tragic future in a meatgrinder of a war for both sides. The Russians have always deserved better leaders than they have had, whether tsars, or presidents — the issue is not the time lag for the mobilisation to produce trained troops — the issue is that mobilisation at best can result in a stalemate in Northeast Ukraine (where the Ukrainian Army has won back Kharkiv) or even cause Russia to be defeated, eventually.
(b) The decisive terrain in east Ukraine is the convex line running from Izyum through Siverskyi Donets to the Severondontsk Salient; and this portion of the Donbas front is the key to victory or defeat in Ukraine’s Eastern offensive.
(c) Putin’s mobilisation in part is to avoid immediate defeat in the line of contact in Eastern Ukraine — the Russians have decided to defend Lyman and there is a risk of encirclement of Russian troops in Lyman — will need to see how this part of the Ukrainian Army offensive works out. Meanwhile, we need to keep in mind that Ukraine has secured bridgeheads on the east bank of the Oskil River, which Russian troops tried to integrate into "a consolidated defensive line.
2. Sensing the risk to a possible Russian defeat, Xi probably told Putin that Chinese support the Russian invasion of Ukraine is not as unconditional as presented to the West; and that he needs to mobilise and ‘end’ this war on Russian terms before Europe gets more serious about decoupling the Russian economy with Europe’s (and due China’s stance on future Taiwanese reunification by coercion, there is a risk that Europe may decouple their future from China). Right now, China needs to manage its differences with the US and Japan. The last thing China needs is a united Europe backing the US and Japan over their geopolitical concerns with China.
(a) IMO, China’s prior use of coercive tools against Australia, the Philippines and Korea have shifted the geopolitical landscape. Xi’s miscalculation has helped:
(i) provide the justification for AUKUS — a trilateral security pact between Australia, the UK, and the US; and
(ii) increase hedging behaviour from a wide range of actors beyond the Quad. Korea, Indonesia and Singapore are increasing their engagement to position themselves in an increasingly multilateral world order.
(b) Chinese scholar Zhou Bo said that the US should do what China wants (i.e. force Taiwan to recognize 1992 Consensus and stop visits to Taiwan). He thinks this will avoid the next Taiwan Crisis but the boat has sailed, with the US Congress threatening to up-end Biden’s desire to keep the status quo. Both the US and China miscalculated over the stupid Pelosi visit.
I would not think that it is in Xi's interest to support a view that a referendum can change a state's Nationality. It would seem like a very bad precedent for him to support.
3. This is the most sensible take on Xi & the CCP to refute the senseless and illogical speculation by Andrei Illarionov.
4. People who believe this nonsense by Andrei Illarionov can’t understand China (and not just don’t understand). The war in Ukraine has not only created a set of precedents that is not in China’s interests, it is creating the conditions and accelerating US plans (at DIME levels) for the 5th Taiwan Straits Crisis.
