The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Twain

Active Member

This is 3 days old article from NYT. There's none in NYT fiber that remotely pro Russian. They are from time to time more frequently become Ukranian mouth piece. So for NYT putting article on problematic condition on Ukranian conscription, for me shown the real problem already more significance.

This is why I always looking on both sides information sources. Both sidesnow are full of propaganda BS that continue clouding real conditions. This is atrition war, thus both sides try to cover real problem on their logistics. However for Ukraine, asside from small arms, Man power is mainly the thing they still can source indigenously.

Western sources try to picture Russian have problem with their man power supplies. Thus they begin to do 'psudo' conscription, which Western sources shown will decrease Russian population moral. However there're no solid proof Russian already doing that, and the conscription coming from both Donbas Republics population.

What's increasing shown proof is Ukrainian own conscription problem, which even NYT shown increasingly become problematic for their own moral level in the front. Again this is war of attrition, and 3 months in the War even Ukranian them selves aknowledge their own MIC practically collapse and they are fighting with Western supplies first ex warsaw pact inventories and some Western equipment.

Will remain to be seen if the West can supply all Ukranian war equipment at par with what Russian can bring. Some Western sources that claim what Collective West can do is similar with what US and UK supply done in WW2 toward USSR. Forgeting that even they help USSR a lot, but the main USSR supply come from their own MIC which Ukranian now does not have it.

It is debeatable how far M270 and HIMARS can do more to Russian supplies line compare to BM-30 and other Russian MLRS and Guns done to Ukranian supplies. Is HIMARS can really weaken Antonivsky bridge structure (Ukraine and some in West claim) or only create problem on upper deck road portion (Pro Russian claim), remain to be seen. Personally I have doubt any MLRS system can bring down the large bridge like that. Historically shown putting down bridge on that size need combination of Artilery and Air Power attack at minimum. Something Ukranian does not have.

In the end all in this war will be determine on how far the attrition cost will effect Ukraine and Russia. This is that each sides try to cover the real situation on their supplies.
Look up a few posts, the antonovskiy bridge was taken out last night, apparently by himars strikes. The roadbed is trashed and at looks like at least one girder is damaged beyond repair, At one point the girder tensioning cables are exposed and severed. To repair it would require at least one new girder, new cables put in and tensioned and a new roadbed for that section. Engineers are saying that under optimal conditions that's a 6-8 week job, under war time conditions? who knows.

As to the NY times, people see what they want to see, Ukrainians and Pro Ukrainian individuals are close to hating it.

 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Some reports.
The War Zone report on the Antonivskyi bridge attacks Ukraine Situation Report: Strategic Russian-Held Bridge Out Of Action From HIMARS Strike (thedrive.com). Doesn't add much to what we already know, apart from the Ukrainian POV.

Another War Zone article questioning the continued viability of stocks of PGM for HIMARS and other MLRS WRT their consumption in Ukraine Are There Enough Guided Rockets For HIMARS To Keep Up With Ukraine War Demand? (thedrive.com). It's definitely something that will be of concern in Washington, London and other capitals.

The BBC is reporting that Ukraine is beginning to ramp up its operation for the liberation of Kherson from Russia. Kherson: Ukraine stepping up counter offensive to retake city - sources - BBC News. It's early days yet and if they are able to drop enough artillery rounds on the river to destroy the Russian pontoon bridges, then they may have a good chance of initial success. But the plan is only relevant until first contact with the enemy.

ISW Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.
July 27, 7:30 pm ET
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 27 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)

Main Points.
  • Russian forces currently appear able to sustain only two significant offensive operations in Ukraine, both in Donetsk Oblast, and the Russian offensive remains likely to culminate before seizing additional significant population centers.
  • Ukrainian forces may have launched a localized counterattack southwest of Izyum.
  • Russian forces attacked settlements east of Siversk and northeast and southeast of Bakhmut.
  • Ground fighting is ongoing north of Kharkiv City.
  • Ukrainian forces struck the Antonivskyi Bridge for the third time in ten days on July 27, likely rendering it unusable.
  • The Mari El Republic north of Kazan sent two volunteer battalions to train and is forming a third battalion to deploy to Ukraine.
  • Russian occupation authorities are importing Russians to work in occupied territories due to a lack of Ukrainian collaborators.
  • Mariupol occupation authorities continue withholding humanitarian aid to force civilians to cooperate with and work for the occupation administration.


Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian forces appear able to sustain only two significant offensive operations in Ukraine at this time, one attempting to seize Siversk and the other advancing on Bakhmut.
These operations have focused on advances in the Siversk, Donetsk Oblast, direction from Verkhnokamianka and Bilohorivka and in the Bakhmut direction from the areas of Novoluhanske and the Vuhlehirska Thermal Power Plant since the end of the operational pause on July 16.[1] Russian forces have committed enough resources to conduct near-daily ground assaults and to seize territory on these two axes but have been unable to sustain a similar offensive operational tempo or to make similar territorial gains elsewhere in Ukraine. The Russian offensive, therefore, remains likely to culminate before seizing any other major urban areas in Ukraine.

Full article at link above. The pdf can be downloaded here.
 
Last edited:

Ananda

The Bunker Group
few posts, the antonovskiy bridge was taken out last night, apparently by himars strikes. The roadbed is trashed and at looks like at least one girder is damaged beyond repair,
I already see that, even the video of the attack.

However saying that bridge can be taken out completely by HIMARS still very debatable. Save to say they are currently taken out of operation, but still intact. Russian preparing emergency measures to keep the 'civilian' traffic going. However to soon to say they are completely taking out only by HIMARS. Ukrainian need to do more than just relied on HIMARS to completely taking out the bridge, or other bridges in that area.

Russian claim that most of their military supplies use railways (which so far shown some consistency on how they're moving most of military supplies. Russian channel claim the railway bridge still operational.


the NY times, people see what they want to see, Ukrainians and Pro Ukrainian individuals are close to hating it.
Pro Ukrainian hate it just recently. They are not able to accept the pro Ukrainian mainstream media like NYT can put something that not agreeable with them. Shown mentality of pro Moscow and Pro Kyiev channel are same. Either media come with them or against them.


It's early days yet and if they are able to drop enough artillery rounds on the river to destroy the Russian pontoon bridges, then they may have a good chance of initial success. But the plan is only relevant until first contact with the enemy.
Yes, that's what really the test will be. Is the Russian already prepared enough defense for any on slaught from Ukranian ? Is Ukranian able to storm Russian defense. This's different situation, the Ukranian mostly do the defense and wait to ambush the Russian, not the other way around. This represent different level of preparation and logistical support.
 

Big Slick

New Member
Could a mine laying munition like FASCAM be used to mine the approaches to the Kherson bridges in order to impede repairs?I believe there are some systems that can be launched from GRAD, also some 155mm. Not aware of mine laying munitions for HIMARS.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Could a mine laying munition like FASCAM be used to mine the approaches to the Kherson bridges in order to impede repairs?I believe there are some systems that can be launched from GRAD, also some 155mm. Not aware of mine laying munitions for HIMARS.
Ukraine definitely has remote minelaying capability, and allegedy has used it against Russian-held areas in Lisichansk, and in Kharkov region. Presumably this could be done. However Russia definitely has modern EOD, and has deployed it to Ukraine, so presumably they could clear the road relatively quickly. On the flip side, I don't know that Russia's response will be to repair the bridge. They might simply opt for multiple pontoon bridges at different locations to make it work. Russia has also shot down inbounds before, and presumably could again. So you would need quite a lot of inbounds to guarantee success. Finally Russia has launched a campaign of strikes against Ukrainian positions and artillery in the region using loitering munitions, so it's plausible that the best approach is to simply continue to pound away at the bridge until its thoroughly unusable, instead of trying to complicate repairs by laiyng mines.

Also, Russia appears to be using civilians to do the repairs (at least that's what it looked like in recent footage) I have to wonder how well it would sit with some construction crew from Kherson that they hit a landmine placed by Ukraine while being commandeered to repair a bridge by Russia.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I don't have the bandwidth to post an update, but it appears there's movement on Avdeevka. My assessment is that having encountered unexpectedly strong resistance around Seversk-Bakhmut, Russia has slowed there, and is taking more time to hit targets, and instead focus has shifted on taking Avdeevka, and potentially push Ukrainian artillery further from Donetsk. Russia has greatly intensified strikes there, there are reports of a movement south of Avdeevka (the city is already partly cut off from the north), and Russian helos are seen more active there in recent days. It appears Russia may be attempting to encircle the town. Given the relatively slow pace of Russian movements in recent offensive, it's likely Ukrainian forces will once again be compelled, and able, to withdraw. Nonetheless this will matter since it will push Ukrainian artillery further back from Donetsk where shellings drastically intensified in the past 2 weeks. It also somewhat highlights the futility of stubborn defenses around the Seversk-Artemovsk/Bakhmut line Russia simply shifts their attention to other targets for advance.

 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Some updates:
1659081156966.png

1659081285189.png

The role of Wagner is interesting and are they being used as stand alone units, or are they being used to bolster existing army units? UK Defence Intelligence suggest that the Russian Army now "... has a major shortage of combat infantry", and that creates significant problems for them because you can't use your armoured forces without infantry support. That's just asking for trouble and significant losses of armour. That's been proven time and time again.

Ukraine Situation Report: Russians Cede Bridgehead Into Occupied Kherson (thedrive.com)

Ukraine war: Russia hits Kyiv area as Ukraine seeks to retake south - BBC News

Russia-Ukraine updates: Russian missiles hit outskirts of Kyiv | News | DW | 29.07.2022

These three reports are basically saying the same thing that the Ukrainians have started their offensive and have prevented the Russians moving heavy reinforcements across the Dnieper River to Kherson city itself and beyond. The Russians will be able to set up and use pontoon bridges, but they haven't had stellar experiences with combat bridging during this war, and the Dnieper in the Kherson region isn't exactly a small river.

ISW Updates.
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
July 28, 7:30 pm ET
Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)

Main Points.
  • Russian forces in Donetsk Oblast likely seek to capitalize on recent marginal territorial gains around Bakhmut and may deprioritize efforts to take Siversk.
  • Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults northwest of Slovyansk and northeast and southwest of Bakhmut.
  • Russian forces may be intensifying offensive operations around Avdiivka to reduce Ukrainian strikes in and around Donetsk City.
  • Russian forces may be setting conditions for renewed offensive operations toward Kharkiv City.
  • Russian forces attempted a limited ground offensive on the Southern Axis but are likely facing territorial losses in Kherson Oblast.
  • Russian forces are attempting to preserve their ground lines of communication over the Dnipro River connecting Kherson City to rear areas in eastern Kherson Oblast.
  • The Kremlin continued measures to compensate for officer and manpower losses in Ukraine.
  • The Kremlin is continuing to institutionalize its occupation administrations in occupied parts of Ukraine to prepare for sham referenda, annexation, and integration into Russia.
  • Russian occupation forces are continuing to pressure Ukrainian civilians in occupied areas to use Russian rubles and passports and to attend Russian-run schools, setting conditions for longer-term social control in occupied territories.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Russian grouping in Donetsk Oblast is likely seeking to capitalize on recent marginal gains southeast of Bakhmut by continuing to attempt to advance in that area. Russian forces may be de-emphasizing attempts to take Siversk in order to concentrate on Bakhmut, but it is too soon to tell.
Russian forces continued efforts to advance northward on Bakhmut from recently gained positions around Novoluhanske and the Vuhlehirska Power Plant while pursuing southwestward advances along the T1302 highway from recently captured positions in Berestove. By contrast, Russian forces have been struggling to make concrete gains around Siversk and have not made any confirmed advances toward the city since the capture of the Luhansk Oblast Administrative border in early July. Russian command is likely, therefore, seeking to maintain momentum around Bakhmut, potentially at the expense of continued pressure on Siversk. Russian forces remain unlikely to take Bakhmut itself, despite recent incremental advances in its direction.

Putin replaced Colonel-General Gennady Zhidko as deputy defense minister and head of the Main Military-Political Directorate on July 28.[1] Putin signed a decree appointing Colonel-General Viktor Goremykin to Zhidko’s position and has not publicly announced the appointment of Zhidko to a new position.[2] ISW previously reported that Zhidko would become the overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, a report that appears to have been incorrect.[3]

Full article at link above. The pdf can be downloaded here.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Some updates:
View attachment 49550

View attachment 49551

The role of Wagner is interesting and are they being used as stand alone units, or are they being used to bolster existing army units? UK Defence Intelligence suggest that the Russian Army now "... has a major shortage of combat infantry", and that creates significant problems for them because you can't use your armoured forces without infantry support. That's just asking for trouble and significant losses of armour. That's been proven time and time again.

Ukraine Situation Report: Russians Cede Bridgehead Into Occupied Kherson (thedrive.com)

Ukraine war: Russia hits Kyiv area as Ukraine seeks to retake south - BBC News

Russia-Ukraine updates: Russian missiles hit outskirts of Kyiv | News | DW | 29.07.2022

These three reports are basically saying the same thing that the Ukrainians have started their offensive and have prevented the Russians moving heavy reinforcements across the Dnieper River to Kherson city itself and beyond. The Russians will be able to set up and use pontoon bridges, but they haven't had stellar experiences with combat bridging during this war, and the Dnieper in the Kherson region isn't exactly a small river.

ISW Updates.
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
July 28, 7:30 pm ET
Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)

Main Points.
  • Russian forces in Donetsk Oblast likely seek to capitalize on recent marginal territorial gains around Bakhmut and may deprioritize efforts to take Siversk.
  • Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults northwest of Slovyansk and northeast and southwest of Bakhmut.
  • Russian forces may be intensifying offensive operations around Avdiivka to reduce Ukrainian strikes in and around Donetsk City.
  • Russian forces may be setting conditions for renewed offensive operations toward Kharkiv City.
  • Russian forces attempted a limited ground offensive on the Southern Axis but are likely facing territorial losses in Kherson Oblast.
  • Russian forces are attempting to preserve their ground lines of communication over the Dnipro River connecting Kherson City to rear areas in eastern Kherson Oblast.
  • The Kremlin continued measures to compensate for officer and manpower losses in Ukraine.
  • The Kremlin is continuing to institutionalize its occupation administrations in occupied parts of Ukraine to prepare for sham referenda, annexation, and integration into Russia.
  • Russian occupation forces are continuing to pressure Ukrainian civilians in occupied areas to use Russian rubles and passports and to attend Russian-run schools, setting conditions for longer-term social control in occupied territories.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Russian grouping in Donetsk Oblast is likely seeking to capitalize on recent marginal gains southeast of Bakhmut by continuing to attempt to advance in that area. Russian forces may be de-emphasizing attempts to take Siversk in order to concentrate on Bakhmut, but it is too soon to tell.
Russian forces continued efforts to advance northward on Bakhmut from recently gained positions around Novoluhanske and the Vuhlehirska Power Plant while pursuing southwestward advances along the T1302 highway from recently captured positions in Berestove. By contrast, Russian forces have been struggling to make concrete gains around Siversk and have not made any confirmed advances toward the city since the capture of the Luhansk Oblast Administrative border in early July. Russian command is likely, therefore, seeking to maintain momentum around Bakhmut, potentially at the expense of continued pressure on Siversk. Russian forces remain unlikely to take Bakhmut itself, despite recent incremental advances in its direction.

Putin replaced Colonel-General Gennady Zhidko as deputy defense minister and head of the Main Military-Political Directorate on July 28.[1] Putin signed a decree appointing Colonel-General Viktor Goremykin to Zhidko’s position and has not publicly announced the appointment of Zhidko to a new position.[2] ISW previously reported that Zhidko would become the overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, a report that appears to have been incorrect.[3]

Full article at link above. The pdf can be downloaded here.
Russia is using mercenaries and irregular formations of light infantry for objective-specific tasks, with support from regulars in the form of armor, artillery, and air. At this point I question calling them PMCs, as they're clearly mercenaries. They're being hired to openly engage in major combat operations outside of any regular security role.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
At this point I question calling them PMCs, as they're clearly mercenaries. They're being hired to openly engage in major combat operations outside of any regular security role.
I get the point you're driving at but at which point does one cease being a PMC and become a mercenary? In Angola and Sierra Leone was Executive Outcomes [which operated with regular forces] a PMC or a mercenary outfit? When Blackwater was hired by a state or a commercial enterprise to perform certain roles was it a PMC?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I get the point you're driving at but at which point does one cease being a PMC and become a mercenary? In Angola and Sierra Leone was Executive Outcomes [which operated with regular forces] a PMC or a mercenary outfit? When Blackwater was hired by a state or a commercial enterprise to perform certain roles was it a PMC?
I'm not well enough familiar with the details there to delineate those particular cases. In my opinion a PMC becomes a mercenary outfit when it's acting as a de-facto combatant in a war, carrying out military operations, instead of just security functions. If you're assaulting enemy towns, you're a mercenary. If you're guarding oil wells you're a PMC. If you're raiding suspected insurgent houses, you're a mercenary. If you're protecting a wealthy client in a dangeours area you're a PMC. If you're providing EOD services to clear UXO from an oil refinery after the fighting is done, you're a PMC.

The obvious question might be, what if that oil well is on the front lines of a war? You might plausibly dig trenches, put in land mines and c-wire, set up machinegun and ATGM positions, to prepare for an attack on your position. I don't have a simple answer. There is probably a grey area. However in this conflict Russia is well outside any grey area for use of mercenaries vs. PMCs. They're taking towns and strong points.
 
If you guys remember some weeks ago I posted an interview published in a Spanish newspaper of a Spanish sniper fighting for Ukraine.

Today they have published another story about this same person. Apparently he was leading a battalion in Kherson, and they were set up in an abandoned school at one side of a river with the mission of holding Russians at the other side. They received constant shelling but the building provided cover until one time when the shell went through the window and exploded 20m from him. He got translated to a military hospital in Ukraine and got a medal by Zielinsky himself.

Link: Un ex legionario español, herido en combate en Jersón: «Me rodeó una nube negra y roja; parecía el infierno» (larazon.es)

His instagram: (@legionario_en_ucrania) • Instagram photos and videos
 

Aerojoe

Member
Some updates:
View attachment 49550

View attachment 49551

The role of Wagner is interesting and are they being used as stand alone units, or are they being used to bolster existing army units? UK Defence Intelligence suggest that the Russian Army now "... has a major shortage of combat infantry", and that creates significant problems for them because you can't use your armoured forces without infantry support. That's just asking for trouble and significant losses of armour. That's been proven time and time again.

Ukraine Situation Report: Russians Cede Bridgehead Into Occupied Kherson (thedrive.com)

Ukraine war: Russia hits Kyiv area as Ukraine seeks to retake south - BBC News

Russia-Ukraine updates: Russian missiles hit outskirts of Kyiv | News | DW | 29.07.2022

These three reports are basically saying the same thing that the Ukrainians have started their offensive and have prevented the Russians moving heavy reinforcements across the Dnieper River to Kherson city itself and beyond. The Russians will be able to set up and use pontoon bridges, but they haven't had stellar experiences with combat bridging during this war, and the Dnieper in the Kherson region isn't exactly a small river.

ISW Updates.
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
July 28, 7:30 pm ET
Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)

Main Points.
  • Russian forces in Donetsk Oblast likely seek to capitalize on recent marginal territorial gains around Bakhmut and may deprioritize efforts to take Siversk.
  • Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults northwest of Slovyansk and northeast and southwest of Bakhmut.
  • Russian forces may be intensifying offensive operations around Avdiivka to reduce Ukrainian strikes in and around Donetsk City.
  • Russian forces may be setting conditions for renewed offensive operations toward Kharkiv City.
  • Russian forces attempted a limited ground offensive on the Southern Axis but are likely facing territorial losses in Kherson Oblast.
  • Russian forces are attempting to preserve their ground lines of communication over the Dnipro River connecting Kherson City to rear areas in eastern Kherson Oblast.
  • The Kremlin continued measures to compensate for officer and manpower losses in Ukraine.
  • The Kremlin is continuing to institutionalize its occupation administrations in occupied parts of Ukraine to prepare for sham referenda, annexation, and integration into Russia.
  • Russian occupation forces are continuing to pressure Ukrainian civilians in occupied areas to use Russian rubles and passports and to attend Russian-run schools, setting conditions for longer-term social control in occupied territories.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Russian grouping in Donetsk Oblast is likely seeking to capitalize on recent marginal gains southeast of Bakhmut by continuing to attempt to advance in that area. Russian forces may be de-emphasizing attempts to take Siversk in order to concentrate on Bakhmut, but it is too soon to tell.
Russian forces continued efforts to advance northward on Bakhmut from recently gained positions around Novoluhanske and the Vuhlehirska Power Plant while pursuing southwestward advances along the T1302 highway from recently captured positions in Berestove. By contrast, Russian forces have been struggling to make concrete gains around Siversk and have not made any confirmed advances toward the city since the capture of the Luhansk Oblast Administrative border in early July. Russian command is likely, therefore, seeking to maintain momentum around Bakhmut, potentially at the expense of continued pressure on Siversk. Russian forces remain unlikely to take Bakhmut itself, despite recent incremental advances in its direction.

Putin replaced Colonel-General Gennady Zhidko as deputy defense minister and head of the Main Military-Political Directorate on July 28.[1] Putin signed a decree appointing Colonel-General Viktor Goremykin to Zhidko’s position and has not publicly announced the appointment of Zhidko to a new position.[2] ISW previously reported that Zhidko would become the overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, a report that appears to have been incorrect.[3]

Full article at link above. The pdf can be downloaded here.
Looking at the map of southern Ukraine and the indication of insurgent activity, what is the urban centre this is centred around - Melitopol? How active is this insurgent activity and does it have a strategic significance?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Looking at the map of southern Ukraine and the indication of insurgent activity, what is the urban centre this is centred around - Melitopol? How active is this insurgent activity and does it have a strategic significance?
I don't think that geography is accurate. There is activity in the form of attempts to assassinate civil heads of Russia's administration in the occupied areas. There have been attacks on rail lines. There has been a very high level of activity by Russian security forces that routinely detain groups of what they claim to be Ukrainian infiltrators, but may very well be local insurgents. However this happens from Kherson to Berdyansk, and everywhere in between. It's not at all limited to that area. It's also not entirely clear if these are insurgets, Ukrainian intelligence agencies, or both.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
There's a video circulating on the news sites of a Ukraine POW being castrated by Russian captors
https://www.news.com.au/world/europ...d/news-story/b6dc57a7b47bed04ac0f48cb674bef49

This is hardly going to help the Russian cause.
It will harden even further the views against Russia and make their enemy fight even harder, since capture seems a pointless outcome.
I saw that story earlier this arvo published here in the NZ Herald. According to the BBC:
The Russian soldier filmed carrying out the attack in the town of Severodonetsk was identified as a member of a unit belonging to Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. Ukraine war: UN and Red Cross should investigate prison deaths, says Ukraine - BBC News.​
So in a way that doesn't surprise me unfortunately. I prefer the BBC version over the news.co.au because the BBC don't tend to sensationalise like the news.com.au have. I would prefer to leave it here as well because a POW has allegedly been brutally tortured and maimed and that tends to get a lot of people wound up, especially us veterans because he was a brother, albeit in another force. We tend to take things like this a tad badly. The Ukrainians have called for UN and Red Cross investigations into the attack and fire at the same complex and whilst I hold little hope of those being allowed, I am sure that justice, in some form, will prevail in the end.
 

Hone C

Active Member
I get the point you're driving at but at which point does one cease being a PMC and become a mercenary?
The definition is laid out in Article 47 of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention.

In your example EO were mercenaries because they were specifically recruited abroad to take a direct part in hostilities, recieved material compensation substantially in excess of the armed forces of the party to the conflict, and were not nationals of the party to the conflict or part of its armed forces.

In the case of this conflict I wouldn't consider Russian irregulars as mercenaries, despite their non-standard (?) employment status they are nationals of a party to the conflict, and form an organised armed force or unit under the command/direction of the Russian armed forces. If Wagner or other PMCs are bringing in foreign contractors that is a different situation.

This also means that Russia is responsible for the conduct of these units, castrated POWs for example.
 

kato

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Germany has decided to supply a "NBC Defense Package" to Ukraine. The package consists of "six vehicles within a HEP 70 decontamination system worth 860,000 Euro". Ukrainian soldiers have been trained in its use.

a) I served with exactly that system on exactly those vehicles. 23 years ago.
b) Six of these vehicles are sufficient to operate a single HEP70 decontamination site.
c) The vehicles called "E-Kfz" are MAN 7-ton trucks have two 1500-l tanks, two pumps, a heater and various piping installed.
d) These trucks were originally procured 1978-1981. The Bundeswehr got rid of most of them around 2009 when replacing HEP70 with HEP90 (... with a 10-year delay).
e) The claimed price of 143,000 Euro per unit? Sure, maybe in 1978 when they were new.
f) The package includes "a significant initial stock of decontamination agents". Meaning we just got rid of a whole lot of toxic waste for free.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Apparently Ukrainian partisans in Kherson have been providing public service announcements for the Russians. "Can't leave? HIMARS will help you" Kherson’s partisans tell the Russians: ‘Can’t leave? Himars will help you’ (telegraph.co.uk). I am sure that the Russian soldiers will appreciate the community minded spirit of the Ukrainian partisans; yeah, nah.

ISW Updates.
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
July 29, 8:00 pm ET
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 29 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)

Main Points.
  • A kinetic event killed and wounded scores of Ukrainian POWs in Russian-occupied Donetsk Oblast on July 28. Ukraine and Russia are blaming each other for the attack. Available visual evidence appears to support the Ukrainian claim more than the Russian, but ISW cannot independently assess the nature of the attack or the party responsible for it at this time.
  • Ground fighting continued north of Kharkiv City with no significant change in control of terrain.
  • Russian forces attempted a limited ground assault in Kherson Oblast and continued conducting combat operations without creating strike groups along occupied lines.
  • Russian regional outlets reported the recruitment and establishment of an additional volunteer battalion in the Republic of Buryatia and the formation of a reserve battalion in Novosibirsk.
  • Members of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party travelled to occupied Ukrainian territories to promote an organization called “We Are Together with Russia,” likely to present the façade of a “grassroots” call for the Russian annexation of occupied Ukraine and to prepare for falsified annexation referenda.
  • Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
  • Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian Troops in the Cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
  • Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City
  • Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis
  • Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas


Click hereto see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

A kinetic event killed and wounded scores of Ukrainian POWs in Russian-occupied Olenivka, Donetsk Oblast, on July 28.[1] Ukraine and Russia are blaming each other for the attack and available visual evidence appears to support the Ukrainian claim more than the Russian, but ISW cannot independently assess the nature of the attack or the party responsible for it at this time.
The Russian Defense Ministry asserted that Ukrainian forces deliberately struck the Olenivka pre-trial detention center holding Ukrainian POWs including Azov Regiment servicemen using Western-provided HIMARS, killing at least 40 and wounding 75 POWs.[2] Kremlin-sponsored news outlet “RIA Novosti” published videos of the detention center, which showed fire damage but not the sort of damage that a HIMARS strike would likely have caused.[3] RIA Novosti also released footage of HIMARS missile fragments but provided no evidence that the fragments were recovered at Olenivka.[4] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Ambassador to Russia Leonid Miroshnik claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the pre-detention center to eliminate the evidence of Ukrainian surrenders and prevent POWs from speaking out against the Ukrainian government.[5]

The Ukrainian General Staff said that Russian forces conducted the attack as a false flag operation to cover up Russian war crimes, disrupt the supply of Western weapons, discredit Ukrainian forces, and stoke social tensions within Ukrainian society.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that a deliberate explosion occurred near the newly-constructed penal colony, to which Russian forces had transferred Ukrainian POWs a few days earlier. The Ukrainian General Staff also noted that Ukrainian analysis of the damage to the building, intercepted phone conversations between Russian servicemen, the lack of reported shelling in Olenivka, and the absence of casualties among Russian personnel serving at the penal colony all point to a Russian deliberate “terrorist act” as the cause of the incident.[7] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) accused Wagner Group head Yevgeny Prigozhin of ordering the “terrorist act” without consulting with the Russian Defense Ministry, to conceal the embezzlement of funds allocated for the maintenance of Ukrainian POWs before an official inspection on September 1.[8] The Ukrainian Office of the General Prosecutor reported that the explosion killed at least 40 and wounded 130 Ukrainian POWs.[9]

ISW is unable to assess the nature of the event or the party responsible for it with any confidence at this time. We will update our assessment as more information becomes available.

Full article at link above. The pdf can be downloaded here.



EDIT: Add UKMOD Defence Intelligence Update.

UKMOD Defence Intelligence Update.
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Friendly Stranger

New Member
Do you guys think the M777 is too slow and needs to be replaced with a more mobile system?

Russia Says It Has Destroyed Two U.S. Howitzers in 'Counter-Battery Fight' (newsweek.com)

M777 Howitzer On The Receiving End Of Russian Counter Battery Fire (funker530.com)

Video recorded by Ukrainian troops shows the result of Russian counter battery fire against a US-delivered M777 howitzer position. The full extent of the damage cannot be determined from the short clip, but it's likely the artillery piece has been permanently removed from the fight. A large pile of charge containers lying near the destroyed cannon suggests the gun team stayed in one spot too long which allowed the Russians to locate and target their position.


Don't know why everyone hasn't made the switch to something like this:

 
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