Yep! Stretch out the build to cut spending in the short-term, thus putting up the total cost (blame Gordon Brown), then switch from STOVL to cat & trap without checking the price or the implications for build times (blame Liam Fox, a politician who so consistently displays extraordinarily bad judgement that he must have some serious dirt on a lot of people to keep getting Cabinet posts), & reverse that when the bill arrives. How much did that lot cost? A billion?
The Royal Navy Discussions and Updates
- Thread starter overlander
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t68
Well-Known Member
Not intending to be political, but it seems history does repeat.
Thatcher warned of defence cuts dangers before Falklands war
A superficial Guardian article that does not fully explain the pressure and massive costs they were under with respect to Trident and having to deal with the economic crisis of the late 1970's in which the threat of IMF intervention and a financial meltdown looming large. Also the plan to hatch the capture of the Falklands was not a goer until Galtieri took over in December 1981 after that Trident commitment had taken place. Something had to give then - which is not necessarily the same as now.
Actually Maggie was in the process of cutting back the fleet when the Falklands blew up. The Invincible was just about to be sold to Australia. The escort fleet was also in a pretty dire state. Outdated and poorly equipped Argentine aircraft operating at the limits of their range and mostly just armed with free-fall bombs managed to regularly penetrate the RNs air defences. The navy was totally ineffectual at defending themselves against anti-ship missiles and was lucky that the Argentinians only had a handful of them at their disposal. Their lack of decent air defences and AEW could have cost them dearly.The problem also is that Theresa May is no Maggie Thatcher.
Whatever some may think of her, Maggie was a leader, decisive, had charisma and got things done. Thatcher was Great Britain. May is Little Britain. No Maggie government would have been left the UK armed services in this bad a shape. And if it was something that she would have inherited, she have would have sorted it out and sorted out those who would get in her way with her handbag swinging, a steely gaze and a resounding NO NO NO!
I would like to say that the British learned from these experiences ... but I don't think they have. They still seem to want to persist with lightly armed ships and are still a few years away from having any AEW capability for its carriers. The Americans and even Australian's seem to have taken more from the combat experiences gained from the Falklands war than the British have.
TheType 31 is just a bad idea. It would suffer the same fate as the Type 21 did during the Falklands.
Even the Type 26 looks too lightly armed compared to its Australian counterpart.
The only real option for fixing the RNs current problems is to spend more money.
Care to expand / explain the remark ?
I appreciate that AUS & UK run some different weapons systems (Torpedoes & Decoy counter measures spring to mind), but I believe both classes will use a 5" Gun, VLS & Phalanx ?
The big difference will be the Aegis weapons system.
Furthermore, there was the 25000 soldiers in Northern Ireland maintaining security (A real terror threat) and a further 55000 in Germany - a massive expense on top of the Trident commitment coming into to Parliament right on the 1979 2nd Oil shock and the North Sea dividend not yet kicking in. So it is all very well to bag Thatcher for having to make some stark and choices. The 1981 Defence White Paper written by the officials and John Lott (she did not write it ) predicted that there would be little requirement for amphibious operations, that the RN would focus on ASW within the NATO context as Carrier operations (degraded in the preceding decade under Heath-Wilson- Callaghan) were curtailed and by that stage limited - Ark Royal went in 78. Maggie took the best advice at the time, including from the Exchequer - thus I bet all of you would have taken the same advice under the known strategic conditions, and severe financial straits to have a Navy orientated to NATO contributions in the North Atlantic and Med. Yes Francis Pym wanted more - but there was no more to give.
Yes Maggie reduced the fleet size by taking out ancient warships like the County and Leanders - but she did sign off with replacing them with a build programme that gave the RN the Type 22 and 23. Was it entirely her responsibility to predict that the accession to power in December 1981 would led to Galtieri catching the world napping? The JIC found it difficult to believe that the potential aggressor Argentina prior to Galtieri would indeed find the use of force politically acceptable. The MI-6 had few humint assets in South America - it was really a CIA watch and they were too busy focusing on Cold War issues to bother too much what the Argie junta were up to.
Boatteacher
Active Member
Thank you for the different perspective.
My historical reading had been similar to Hauritz; cut backs under the Nott report, and especially the withdrawal of the local patrol ship, emboldened the Argentinians to have a go, assuming Britain would be unable to respond. I think that may have come both from reading at the time and from "The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy"
Nice to see it from a more holistic point of view
Ten years ago there was the Future Surface Combatant where they were going to have 18 Frigates - 10 C1 (Type 26) and 8 C2 (Type 27) plus 6 Type 45's in commission by 2020. Those kind of numbers won't happen again and the kind of numbers the UK needs in a more complex post Brexit world - it kind of does my head in as someone of a maturing age who remembers in my NZ youth the mighty days of Buccs and F-4's flying off Ark Royal in the BBC series Sailor, squadrons of Leanders ploughing the Atlantic hunting Soviet subs in Warship.
I don't know how to say it .. it is just wrong!!
Yes, those, but not only them. Also, they believed that new British nationality laws which removed the right of Falklanders to settle in the UK & the shelving of the Shackleton Report were signals of lack of British interest in keeping the Falklands, & they tested British responses, e.g. by the scrap metal collectors on South Georgia.
I recall it all happening, & the Argentinean expressions of bafflement when the reaction wasn't what they expected. "But you kept sending us signals that you wouldn't act!" They interpreted everything through the filter of their own expectations, & their view of what was important.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Consider also the role Operation Journeyman had in at least postponing conflict between the UK and Argentina. Also I disagree that Argentinian actions were a result of a change in power in December 1981. In hindsight at least the construction of Corbeta Uruguay on Thule Island, South Sandwich Islands in November 1976 made Argentinian intentions clear.
Indeed.
The big change between Journeyman & 1982 was that the British government stopped paying attention to what Foreign Office staff were trying to tell it about Argentina. Argentinean actions dropped below the British political horizon, & unfortunately, the soldiers running Argentina didn't understand that. They assumed - wrongly - that Argentina was thought about when the British government made decisions about the Falklands, while in reality they were all driven by domestic considerations.
The big change between Journeyman & 1982 was that the British government stopped paying attention to what Foreign Office staff were trying to tell it about Argentina. Argentinean actions dropped below the British political horizon, & unfortunately, the soldiers running Argentina didn't understand that. They assumed - wrongly - that Argentina was thought about when the British government made decisions about the Falklands, while in reality they were all driven by domestic considerations.
Just as a side note think of how the Falklands war affected Australia's own defence planning.
Had the Falklands not happened Australia would have replaced the Melbourne with the Invincible. In all probability, we would have eventually purchased the Sea Harrier as well. The British offered up the Hermes instead but Australia was never interested in buying a 25 year old carrier and the change of government in Australia effectively ended Australia's aircraft carrier ambitions.
Ironically the Hermes outlasted the entire Invincible class ... but that is another story.
Had the Falklands not happened Australia would have replaced the Melbourne with the Invincible. In all probability, we would have eventually purchased the Sea Harrier as well. The British offered up the Hermes instead but Australia was never interested in buying a 25 year old carrier and the change of government in Australia effectively ended Australia's aircraft carrier ambitions.
Ironically the Hermes outlasted the entire Invincible class ... but that is another story.
Ten years ago there was the Future Surface Combatant where they were going to have 18 Frigates - 10 C1 (Type 26) and 8 C2 (Type 27) plus 6 Type 45's in commission by 2020. Those kind of numbers won't happen again and the kind of numbers the UK needs in a more complex post Brexit world - it kind of does my head in as someone of a maturing age who remembers in my NZ youth the mighty days of Buccs and F-4's flying off Ark Royal in the BBC series Sailor, squadrons of Leanders ploughing the Atlantic hunting Soviet subs in Warship.
I don't know how to say it .. it is just wrong!!
We were spending 4.5% of our GDP on defence - that kind of explains a lot
Boatteacher
Active Member
I clearly remember a comic in the Australian press at the time showing Fraser (Australian PM) and Thatcher discussing Invincible in terms of "That's alright, you keep it." and "No, no, you have it." It may not have been accurate because I think the general perception was the UK had revised the wisdom of selling it; but was amusing just the same.
John Newman
The Bunker Group
We were spending 4.5% of our GDP on defence - that kind of explains a lot
It certainly does, less than half of that in GDP terms today.
I also read an interesting comment on the Save the Royal Navy website the other day (article about the suspension of the T31e project):
Royal Navy Type 31e frigate programme abruptly suspended – but not dead in the water
One of the comments by 'Andy' was interesting:
"Out of the 32 billion defence budget 4 billion is spent on MI5/6 and GCHQ another 2 billion is spent on the deterrent and a further 1.6billion on pensions. Which leaves a paltry 25 billion to spend manning , logistics ,maintenance and new kit. It is a big lie we spend 2% on defence we actually spend 1.6% and it is falling."
Now being here in Oz, I don't know what is (or isn't) included in the UK's Defence Budget, but if the above is accurate, then approx. 1.6% of GDP actually going to defence certainly makes it very hard.
Cheers,
The FO diplomats in South America were concerned but more credence was given by the Intel from the CIA through to the JIC. The CIA relationship with the Argies had two goals – the Argies continuing assistance to them via influence in a number of Central American issues and keeping them firmly within the DC orbit and a local counter to Brazil who were seeking a nuke capability and getting involved in middle east politics.
Viola the President from 1980 until December 1981 was the reformer within the Junta who put greater stock into economic changes than the simmering nationalism over the Falklands issue in which he was advocating a go slow with negotiations with Lord Carrington. Viola was also receptive to a Soviets offer of an economic package – his thinking an economic shot in the arm would stabilise the Junta more than appealing than the nationalist approach of taking the Falklands to consolidate popular domestic support. His Junta rivals arch anti communists Anaya and Galtieri were active in support of the CIA’s efforts in Nicaragua and both regarded Viola as weak (his health was failing at the time), they were the main protagonists of a renewed assertive position on the Falklands and made their move.
Even post December 1981 there was a view that due to the US influence over Galtieri and Anaya, enunciated by Argy FM Costa Mendes that though the rhetoric from Buenos Aires would involve sabre rattling an actual invasion was not imminent and that the US would act as a restraining influence on them.
The US adopted a tactic of diplomatic flattery towards Buenos Aires rather than “Don’t go there” with respect to Argy ambitions over a potential invasion. The Argies miscalculated this flattery. The British also miscalculated that by providing US access to Ascension Island that would be enough of a security guarantee in light of their planned reduced presence of UK assets in the South Atlantic.
What was going on in Whitehall at the time is cogently outlined in this paper by Japanese MOD defence academic Kenichiro Kotani.
http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/event/forum/pdf/2013/09.pdf
It will clear up some confusion and place into context about events as they played out amongst players within Whitehall in the timeline prior to April 1982.
You have to look at Type 31e for what it is which is a large ocean going patrol ship, perfect for anti piracy and that sort of mission, it's not intended to go into hot zones as it's being built.
And neither was T21 but when the proverbial hits the fan in a small force each unit is expected to contribute to full on warfighting.
T31 is a luxury the RN can't afford, unless that is, it receives weapons, combat systems and sensors commensurate to a full duty escort.