The Indian Tejas
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Aliph Ahmed
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India's Light Combat Aircraft: When duds begin to fly
Rajiv Singh
18 February 2008
The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the R&D arm of India's defence ministry, is not one of the most transparent organisations in the country. Involved as it is in development of military hardware of the future, it perhaps cannot really open up all its secrets for friend and foe to see.
That's the story of defence R&D organisations all over the world.
This compulsion to keep things under wraps can work against an organisation. It does, against the DRDO sometimes, because the DRDO is unable to rise to the bait and provide details to refute newspaper stories based on ignorance, bias or sheer motivation.
That these stories begin to fly around the time when a major aerospace or defence exhibition is held makes one wonder whether some of these reports are indeed motivated by a desire to please deep-pocketed global defence equipment companies that are desperate to sell their materiel to the Indian armed forces.
A year ago, before the Aero India 2007 show in Bangalore in February, a series of articles referring to ''DRDO's duds'', run almost like a campaign, adorned the pages of a national daily, hammering the DRDO with some truths and some half-truths. This year, just before the DefExpo2008 in New Delhi, beginning 16 February, we see another attack on the DRDO for its supposedly miserable performance in developing the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), the Tejas in another leading national daily.
A recent report in a leading national daily calls upon defence minister A K Antony to ''take a close look at the fighter which typifies all that is wrong with defence projects in India''. Then it proceeds to list ''all that is wrong with defence projects in India''.
The article points out that the LCA project was sanctioned in 1983 at a cost of Rs.560 crore; now, 25 years later, the cost has escalated to Rs.5,489.78 crore, even as the fighter remains another four years away from becoming fully operational.
That is damning. Sanctioned in 1983 and still not done! The conclusion that people are left to draw is that it was a complete waste investing in the indigenous development of the LCA. It would have been far simpler, cheaper, and safer (from the point of view of India's current defence needs) to have imported the aircraft from an American or European company – or maybe the Russians.
But that's not all. Intended or not, these campaigns end up drumming into our national psyche the stereotype of the inferior, shoddy, third-world DRDO versus technologically sophisticated Western aerospace companies.
So let's take a look at how some of these global defence companies have fared with their projects.
Take the Eurofighter Typhoon, one of the most ''advanced'' fighter aircraft projects in the world, and also a bidder for the Indian Air Force's medium range multi role combat aircraft (MMRCA) tender. The Typhoon owes its genesis to a European Combat Aircraft (ECA) study group formed in 1979. Development began officially in 1983 and the deadline set for commissioning it was fixed as December 1998. This deadline was then extended to December 2001. The induction of the Tranche1 versions into the UK's Royal Air Force was made in 2003 – fully two decades after an official start, more if you go back to1979.
The Tranche 2 version was inducted into service in 2005, another two years later. Now, in 2008, 25 years down the line (or three decades if you take 1979 as the starting point), the Eurofighter programme is yet to field a fully developed Tranche 3 multi-role version – the version that all the partner nations have actually been waiting for.
This is how it is with not one but several European nations that can pump in resources way above anything India and the DRDO can manage. The Eurofighter programme is a project of a consortium that includes British, Germans, Italians and Spanish governments and companies.
The irony is that by the time the Tranche 3 multi-role version finally enters squadron service, the American stealth fighters, the F-22 Raptor and the JSF-35 Lightning II, would have made their entry in sufficiently large numbers to put the Eurofighter in the shadow.
Since the Typhoon wouldn't really like to go up against either of these aircraft on a one-on-one basis you can say that obsolescence is built into the design of the Typhoon!
So what is the big deal about the Typhoon? The fact is that development of the Typhoon has given European aerospace industries a depth of experience and expertise that they wouldn't have missed out on for anything.
In terms of functionalities, the Eurofighter Typhoon combines the capabilities of the American F-15 Eagle and the F/A-18 Hornet in one compact platform. Some experts argued that the Europeans could have saved a lot of time, grief and money by opting for a mix of these American aircraft early on in the game.
However, the Europeans refused to make off-the-shelf purchases of these American fighters. Why? Because they did not want to lose out on the design expertise and the building of a sophisticated manufacturing base that the development of such an aircraft would result in.
Almost three decades later they are still lumbering on.
Cost overruns
Let's see how the Eurofighter has fared in terms of cost overruns. In 1988, the UK's secretary of state for defence told the House of Commons that the European Fighter Aircraft would cost the UK about £7 billion. The figure soon ballooned to £13 billion. By 1997 the estimated cost was £17 billion, and by 2003 it was £20 billion. Since 1993, the UK ministry of defence has refused to release updated cost estimates on the grounds of 'commercial sensitivity.'
Now, a late January 2008 press report says that the Eurofighter consortium has informed partners that the project cost has escalated by another £7.5 billion or so. That too, only for partners; ''clients'' will have to shell out even more.
However, these figures are subject to change, if the UK, for example, should back out of its commitments for Tranche 3 aircraft, of which it is committed to receive 88. Costs per unit of the Eurofighter would go up accordingly.
The Eurofighter consortium argues that its cost increases and delays compare favourably with those of the US F-22 Raptor programme. According to the Eurofighter consortium, the Typhoon is apparently only 14 per cent over-budget and just 54 months late, as compared to the Raptor, which is 127 per cent over-budget and 117 months late!
So, if the Europeans haven't been very efficient with their project it appears the Americans haven't been managing all too well either with their famed Raptor. This, in spite of their deep, deep pockets and the vast experience and arms producing infrastructure that they have.
Not indigenous …
The litany doesn't stop with complaints about the cost overruns. The article on DRDO's failures points out that when the IAF eventually inducts an LCA squadron, around 2012 or so, it will be powered by American GE-404 engines and Israeli radars, besides several other 'foreign' parts. Hardly 'indigenous', wouldn't you say?
This only betrays ignorance about the way in which R&D is done worldwide. The Eurofighter is a classic example of how Europe has gone about trying to negate American dominance in the field of fighter technology.
Everything about it - engines, armaments, airframes, et al - is a collaborative venture. The left wing, to provide one instance, will be manufactured by the Italian firm Alenia Aeronautica, and the right wing by Spain's EADS CASA. The aircraft's EJ200 engine has been developed by Eurojet GmbH, owned jointly by Rolls Royce, MTU Aero Engines, Fiat Aviazione and ITP.
Such collaboration applied to the US too. Several suppliers are involved in programmes identified with any one company. A Lockheed project, for instance, would easily have a competitor like Boeing or Northrop Grumman, or other companies, involved in the manufacture or integration of specific systems – and nobody's perishing of shame because of that.
So, if American GE-404 engines power our first lot of LCAs no need for any Indian to perish of shame because of that.
As for Israeli radars, there are any number of top-of-the-line, hush-hush projects where the Americans access Israeli technology and expertise, and vice versa. Why should we have a problem with their radars?
India recently launched Israel's state-of-the-art TecSAR spy satellite into 'pinpoint' orbit. According to ISRO chairman G Madhavan, the Israelis were very specific about the kind of orbit they wanted the TecSAR to achieve, which ISRO met flawlessly. Our boys are proud of their achievement, and so far, no Israeli appears to be blushing with shame.
As the decade rolls by there will be much of Israel that we shall be using, and not just radars. For that matter there is much that Israel will use, which it would have jointly developed with India.
Decades of development
The report concedes that developing a supersonic fly-by-wire fighter jet from scratch, with international sanctions in place, can be an extremely complex task, but says that taking almost three decades is ''criminal'', it implies.
Is the three decades of development for the Eurofighter also criminal? As for the Americans, the F-22 Raptor programme, for instance, was initiated in 1986, after years of initial study. It achieved 'full operational clearance' (FOC) only on 12 December 2007 - a full 21 years after the requests for proposals were issued. Is 21 years criminal or slightly less than criminal?
A distant FOC …
The article also takes a dim view of the defence ministry's happiness at the LCA conducting a successful test firing of an air-to-air missile. The ministry's proclamation of it as a ''historic event'' marking the beginning of the 'weaponisation' of the LCA seems inappropriate to the author.
The author of the above-mentioned article points out the repeated rescheduling of the initial operational clearance and final operational clearance of the Tejas: ''As things stand now, IOC is projected by 2010 and FOC by 2012.'' Well, the Eurofighter still has to assume its final Tranche 3 avatar, so it will actually complete three decades before it achieves FOC itself. And, as pointed out earlier, the F-22 Raptor achieved FOC on 12 December 2007, a full 21 years after project sanction.
Changing requirements
The article says that blame for the delay in the LCA programme needs to be apportioned equally between various agencies involved, such as ''the Aeronautical Development Agency, Defence Research and Development Organisation, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd, and even the IAF, which has frequently changed requirements of weapons and electronic warfare midway, have to share the blame''.
Sure, playing the blame game is so easy. But what happens worldwide? What do similar organisations around the world, such as the USAF or US Navy or US Army do with their programmes?
The question is, why not? Life is dynamic - scenarios change overnight. War strategies and battlefield scenarios have changed dramatically since 1983. Should the DRDO have stuck to the scenarios as they existed 25 years ago, and rendered the LCA obsolete even before it went into production?
Obsolescence
The article points out that the IAF has placed an order for only 20 aircraft even though early projections were for 220 aircraft for the IAF and the Indian Navy. It also says that the IAF is worried whether ''the LCA will be a top-notch fighter once it is ready.''
The 20 limited series production aircraft order from the Indian Air Force is an initial order. Any order for a new fighter aircraft is invariably for at least 40. A naval version is also under development and an initial order from the Indian Navy is also very likely. A naval version will allow our Air Defence Ship, currently under construction at the Kochi shipyards, to carry a larger complement of fighters onboard, as compared to the larger Mig-29Ks that are currently scheduled to operate only from the INS Vikramaditya (ex-Admiral Gorshkov).
As for worries about the LCA not being a top-notch fighter when finally ready, how different is this predicament that from the Eurofighter? By the time the Tranche 3 Eurofighter achieves full operationalisation, America's F-22 and JSF-35 programmes will already have overtaken it technologically. So, no surprises if the same is true for the LCA.
The point of trying to develop the LCA indigenously was not merely to supply aircraft to the IAF and the navy. Just as the Europeans have used the Eurofighter to develop their technologies for next generation projects, the Indian defence R&D establishment has sought to use the LCA as a platform on which to develop several technologies for the future.
The Europeans know that if there is a political rift with the Americans, they will find themselves up a creek without a paddle. The development of top-notch technology through the Typhoon programme gives them independence from US hegemony.
It would, therefore, be wrong to look upon the LCA merely as a fighter-manufacturing programme. It is in fact a unique test bed for the development of aerospace technologies that will take us to an acceptable level of competence in this field. It is a fighter programme, a technology demonstrator and a technology generator, all at the same time.
Upon maturity, the programme may serve the purpose it was designed for, which is to fight - or it might not. That wouldn't matter. By then it would have developed enough technologies to provide a technology base for our own medium combat aircraft (MCA) programme.
The MCA is India's own fifth generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) programme. Though we have a pact with the Russians to co-develop an FGFA with them, the MCA is our fallback. If and when the Russians act tough and repeat a Gorshkov on this programme, we shouldn't find ourselves scrounging around for the required technology.
By the time the LCA achieves maturity it would have already paid back in full, by way of technologies and expertise that it would have generated over the life of its programme.
For that matter, domestic orders aren't the only option for such a project. Pompous though it may sound, there is a possibility that smaller countries may opt for something like the LCA, which for them may well be a more comfortable, manageable aircraft, both in terms of cost and technology. Not every country will be interested in the F-22 Raptor, purchasing a squadron of which could very likely wipe out half, or more, of some national economies.
If India builds its own technology capabilities, who loses? It's the arms merchants of the world. So, come events like the DefExpo in New Delhi, they would love to have some mainline newspapers do some DRDO bashing. That can reinforce some myths about Indian R&D and help them sell some of their wares. But there is no reason we should fall for these ploys.
http://www.domain-b.com/aero/20080218_duds01.html
Amazing efforts by India in fixing the LCA is sure starting to show results.
Rajiv Singh
18 February 2008
The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the R&D arm of India's defence ministry, is not one of the most transparent organisations in the country. Involved as it is in development of military hardware of the future, it perhaps cannot really open up all its secrets for friend and foe to see.
That's the story of defence R&D organisations all over the world.
This compulsion to keep things under wraps can work against an organisation. It does, against the DRDO sometimes, because the DRDO is unable to rise to the bait and provide details to refute newspaper stories based on ignorance, bias or sheer motivation.
That these stories begin to fly around the time when a major aerospace or defence exhibition is held makes one wonder whether some of these reports are indeed motivated by a desire to please deep-pocketed global defence equipment companies that are desperate to sell their materiel to the Indian armed forces.
A year ago, before the Aero India 2007 show in Bangalore in February, a series of articles referring to ''DRDO's duds'', run almost like a campaign, adorned the pages of a national daily, hammering the DRDO with some truths and some half-truths. This year, just before the DefExpo2008 in New Delhi, beginning 16 February, we see another attack on the DRDO for its supposedly miserable performance in developing the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), the Tejas in another leading national daily.
A recent report in a leading national daily calls upon defence minister A K Antony to ''take a close look at the fighter which typifies all that is wrong with defence projects in India''. Then it proceeds to list ''all that is wrong with defence projects in India''.
The article points out that the LCA project was sanctioned in 1983 at a cost of Rs.560 crore; now, 25 years later, the cost has escalated to Rs.5,489.78 crore, even as the fighter remains another four years away from becoming fully operational.
That is damning. Sanctioned in 1983 and still not done! The conclusion that people are left to draw is that it was a complete waste investing in the indigenous development of the LCA. It would have been far simpler, cheaper, and safer (from the point of view of India's current defence needs) to have imported the aircraft from an American or European company – or maybe the Russians.
But that's not all. Intended or not, these campaigns end up drumming into our national psyche the stereotype of the inferior, shoddy, third-world DRDO versus technologically sophisticated Western aerospace companies.
So let's take a look at how some of these global defence companies have fared with their projects.
Take the Eurofighter Typhoon, one of the most ''advanced'' fighter aircraft projects in the world, and also a bidder for the Indian Air Force's medium range multi role combat aircraft (MMRCA) tender. The Typhoon owes its genesis to a European Combat Aircraft (ECA) study group formed in 1979. Development began officially in 1983 and the deadline set for commissioning it was fixed as December 1998. This deadline was then extended to December 2001. The induction of the Tranche1 versions into the UK's Royal Air Force was made in 2003 – fully two decades after an official start, more if you go back to1979.
The Tranche 2 version was inducted into service in 2005, another two years later. Now, in 2008, 25 years down the line (or three decades if you take 1979 as the starting point), the Eurofighter programme is yet to field a fully developed Tranche 3 multi-role version – the version that all the partner nations have actually been waiting for.
This is how it is with not one but several European nations that can pump in resources way above anything India and the DRDO can manage. The Eurofighter programme is a project of a consortium that includes British, Germans, Italians and Spanish governments and companies.
The irony is that by the time the Tranche 3 multi-role version finally enters squadron service, the American stealth fighters, the F-22 Raptor and the JSF-35 Lightning II, would have made their entry in sufficiently large numbers to put the Eurofighter in the shadow.
Since the Typhoon wouldn't really like to go up against either of these aircraft on a one-on-one basis you can say that obsolescence is built into the design of the Typhoon!
So what is the big deal about the Typhoon? The fact is that development of the Typhoon has given European aerospace industries a depth of experience and expertise that they wouldn't have missed out on for anything.
In terms of functionalities, the Eurofighter Typhoon combines the capabilities of the American F-15 Eagle and the F/A-18 Hornet in one compact platform. Some experts argued that the Europeans could have saved a lot of time, grief and money by opting for a mix of these American aircraft early on in the game.
However, the Europeans refused to make off-the-shelf purchases of these American fighters. Why? Because they did not want to lose out on the design expertise and the building of a sophisticated manufacturing base that the development of such an aircraft would result in.
Almost three decades later they are still lumbering on.
Cost overruns
Let's see how the Eurofighter has fared in terms of cost overruns. In 1988, the UK's secretary of state for defence told the House of Commons that the European Fighter Aircraft would cost the UK about £7 billion. The figure soon ballooned to £13 billion. By 1997 the estimated cost was £17 billion, and by 2003 it was £20 billion. Since 1993, the UK ministry of defence has refused to release updated cost estimates on the grounds of 'commercial sensitivity.'
Now, a late January 2008 press report says that the Eurofighter consortium has informed partners that the project cost has escalated by another £7.5 billion or so. That too, only for partners; ''clients'' will have to shell out even more.
However, these figures are subject to change, if the UK, for example, should back out of its commitments for Tranche 3 aircraft, of which it is committed to receive 88. Costs per unit of the Eurofighter would go up accordingly.
The Eurofighter consortium argues that its cost increases and delays compare favourably with those of the US F-22 Raptor programme. According to the Eurofighter consortium, the Typhoon is apparently only 14 per cent over-budget and just 54 months late, as compared to the Raptor, which is 127 per cent over-budget and 117 months late!
So, if the Europeans haven't been very efficient with their project it appears the Americans haven't been managing all too well either with their famed Raptor. This, in spite of their deep, deep pockets and the vast experience and arms producing infrastructure that they have.
Not indigenous …
The litany doesn't stop with complaints about the cost overruns. The article on DRDO's failures points out that when the IAF eventually inducts an LCA squadron, around 2012 or so, it will be powered by American GE-404 engines and Israeli radars, besides several other 'foreign' parts. Hardly 'indigenous', wouldn't you say?
This only betrays ignorance about the way in which R&D is done worldwide. The Eurofighter is a classic example of how Europe has gone about trying to negate American dominance in the field of fighter technology.
Everything about it - engines, armaments, airframes, et al - is a collaborative venture. The left wing, to provide one instance, will be manufactured by the Italian firm Alenia Aeronautica, and the right wing by Spain's EADS CASA. The aircraft's EJ200 engine has been developed by Eurojet GmbH, owned jointly by Rolls Royce, MTU Aero Engines, Fiat Aviazione and ITP.
Such collaboration applied to the US too. Several suppliers are involved in programmes identified with any one company. A Lockheed project, for instance, would easily have a competitor like Boeing or Northrop Grumman, or other companies, involved in the manufacture or integration of specific systems – and nobody's perishing of shame because of that.
So, if American GE-404 engines power our first lot of LCAs no need for any Indian to perish of shame because of that.
As for Israeli radars, there are any number of top-of-the-line, hush-hush projects where the Americans access Israeli technology and expertise, and vice versa. Why should we have a problem with their radars?
India recently launched Israel's state-of-the-art TecSAR spy satellite into 'pinpoint' orbit. According to ISRO chairman G Madhavan, the Israelis were very specific about the kind of orbit they wanted the TecSAR to achieve, which ISRO met flawlessly. Our boys are proud of their achievement, and so far, no Israeli appears to be blushing with shame.
As the decade rolls by there will be much of Israel that we shall be using, and not just radars. For that matter there is much that Israel will use, which it would have jointly developed with India.
Decades of development
The report concedes that developing a supersonic fly-by-wire fighter jet from scratch, with international sanctions in place, can be an extremely complex task, but says that taking almost three decades is ''criminal'', it implies.
Is the three decades of development for the Eurofighter also criminal? As for the Americans, the F-22 Raptor programme, for instance, was initiated in 1986, after years of initial study. It achieved 'full operational clearance' (FOC) only on 12 December 2007 - a full 21 years after the requests for proposals were issued. Is 21 years criminal or slightly less than criminal?
A distant FOC …
The article also takes a dim view of the defence ministry's happiness at the LCA conducting a successful test firing of an air-to-air missile. The ministry's proclamation of it as a ''historic event'' marking the beginning of the 'weaponisation' of the LCA seems inappropriate to the author.
The author of the above-mentioned article points out the repeated rescheduling of the initial operational clearance and final operational clearance of the Tejas: ''As things stand now, IOC is projected by 2010 and FOC by 2012.'' Well, the Eurofighter still has to assume its final Tranche 3 avatar, so it will actually complete three decades before it achieves FOC itself. And, as pointed out earlier, the F-22 Raptor achieved FOC on 12 December 2007, a full 21 years after project sanction.
Changing requirements
The article says that blame for the delay in the LCA programme needs to be apportioned equally between various agencies involved, such as ''the Aeronautical Development Agency, Defence Research and Development Organisation, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd, and even the IAF, which has frequently changed requirements of weapons and electronic warfare midway, have to share the blame''.
Sure, playing the blame game is so easy. But what happens worldwide? What do similar organisations around the world, such as the USAF or US Navy or US Army do with their programmes?
The question is, why not? Life is dynamic - scenarios change overnight. War strategies and battlefield scenarios have changed dramatically since 1983. Should the DRDO have stuck to the scenarios as they existed 25 years ago, and rendered the LCA obsolete even before it went into production?
Obsolescence
The article points out that the IAF has placed an order for only 20 aircraft even though early projections were for 220 aircraft for the IAF and the Indian Navy. It also says that the IAF is worried whether ''the LCA will be a top-notch fighter once it is ready.''
The 20 limited series production aircraft order from the Indian Air Force is an initial order. Any order for a new fighter aircraft is invariably for at least 40. A naval version is also under development and an initial order from the Indian Navy is also very likely. A naval version will allow our Air Defence Ship, currently under construction at the Kochi shipyards, to carry a larger complement of fighters onboard, as compared to the larger Mig-29Ks that are currently scheduled to operate only from the INS Vikramaditya (ex-Admiral Gorshkov).
As for worries about the LCA not being a top-notch fighter when finally ready, how different is this predicament that from the Eurofighter? By the time the Tranche 3 Eurofighter achieves full operationalisation, America's F-22 and JSF-35 programmes will already have overtaken it technologically. So, no surprises if the same is true for the LCA.
The point of trying to develop the LCA indigenously was not merely to supply aircraft to the IAF and the navy. Just as the Europeans have used the Eurofighter to develop their technologies for next generation projects, the Indian defence R&D establishment has sought to use the LCA as a platform on which to develop several technologies for the future.
The Europeans know that if there is a political rift with the Americans, they will find themselves up a creek without a paddle. The development of top-notch technology through the Typhoon programme gives them independence from US hegemony.
It would, therefore, be wrong to look upon the LCA merely as a fighter-manufacturing programme. It is in fact a unique test bed for the development of aerospace technologies that will take us to an acceptable level of competence in this field. It is a fighter programme, a technology demonstrator and a technology generator, all at the same time.
Upon maturity, the programme may serve the purpose it was designed for, which is to fight - or it might not. That wouldn't matter. By then it would have developed enough technologies to provide a technology base for our own medium combat aircraft (MCA) programme.
The MCA is India's own fifth generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) programme. Though we have a pact with the Russians to co-develop an FGFA with them, the MCA is our fallback. If and when the Russians act tough and repeat a Gorshkov on this programme, we shouldn't find ourselves scrounging around for the required technology.
By the time the LCA achieves maturity it would have already paid back in full, by way of technologies and expertise that it would have generated over the life of its programme.
For that matter, domestic orders aren't the only option for such a project. Pompous though it may sound, there is a possibility that smaller countries may opt for something like the LCA, which for them may well be a more comfortable, manageable aircraft, both in terms of cost and technology. Not every country will be interested in the F-22 Raptor, purchasing a squadron of which could very likely wipe out half, or more, of some national economies.
If India builds its own technology capabilities, who loses? It's the arms merchants of the world. So, come events like the DefExpo in New Delhi, they would love to have some mainline newspapers do some DRDO bashing. That can reinforce some myths about Indian R&D and help them sell some of their wares. But there is no reason we should fall for these ploys.
http://www.domain-b.com/aero/20080218_duds01.html
Amazing efforts by India in fixing the LCA is sure starting to show results.
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by the way there is every chance that the lca tejas will get the milds an/aar-60 missile warning systems,which is to be tested in four months.
here is the link and article:
http://www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=546379
IAF's missile warning system to be tested in four months
NEW DELHI, FEB 19 (PTI)
A missile warning system, being jointly developed by the Indian Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE) and European defence and aerospace consortium EADS for the Indian Air Force, will be tested in the next four months.
"The deliveries are complete, the integration tests in DARE's multi-sensor self protection suite have already been conducted and will be tested in several platforms. The tests will be terminated in the course of the next four months," EADS' Head of Communications Theodor Benien told PTI in the ongoing Defence Expo here.
The partners are developing jointly the missile warning system based on EADS' proven warning sensor MILDS AN/AAR-60 and integrated into the existing multi-sensor warning system of the Indian armed force.
As part of the agreement, EADS in a first step is delivering 36 sensors for further integration and development.
"India is a priority country for EADS offers market potential and solid aerospace and defence competences. This project is a clear signal of commitment to India, not only as a market but also as an industrial partner.
"EADS and Indian government are poised to strengthen their cooperation in the highly sensitive field of electronic warfare," he said.
The MILDS AN/AAR-60 is an advanced, passive imaging sensor which detects and tracks the UV emissions of approaching missiles, including the most prevalent threat of heat seeking shoulder launched Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS).
The system provides full coverage, a low false alarm and maximum warning time to enable the deployment of counter- measures such as chaff/flares. With a very low false alarm rate and fast detection combined with automatic initiation of counter-measures, MILDS AN/AAR-60 relieves the pilot's workload in time critical situations and ensures the safe return of both crew and aircraft. The sensor has been sold in more than 5,600 units across the globe and is in service aboard a huge variety of rotary wing and wide body aircraft, a version of fighter aircraft is under development.
here is the link and article:
http://www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=546379
IAF's missile warning system to be tested in four months
NEW DELHI, FEB 19 (PTI)
A missile warning system, being jointly developed by the Indian Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE) and European defence and aerospace consortium EADS for the Indian Air Force, will be tested in the next four months.
"The deliveries are complete, the integration tests in DARE's multi-sensor self protection suite have already been conducted and will be tested in several platforms. The tests will be terminated in the course of the next four months," EADS' Head of Communications Theodor Benien told PTI in the ongoing Defence Expo here.
The partners are developing jointly the missile warning system based on EADS' proven warning sensor MILDS AN/AAR-60 and integrated into the existing multi-sensor warning system of the Indian armed force.
As part of the agreement, EADS in a first step is delivering 36 sensors for further integration and development.
"India is a priority country for EADS offers market potential and solid aerospace and defence competences. This project is a clear signal of commitment to India, not only as a market but also as an industrial partner.
"EADS and Indian government are poised to strengthen their cooperation in the highly sensitive field of electronic warfare," he said.
The MILDS AN/AAR-60 is an advanced, passive imaging sensor which detects and tracks the UV emissions of approaching missiles, including the most prevalent threat of heat seeking shoulder launched Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS).
The system provides full coverage, a low false alarm and maximum warning time to enable the deployment of counter- measures such as chaff/flares. With a very low false alarm rate and fast detection combined with automatic initiation of counter-measures, MILDS AN/AAR-60 relieves the pilot's workload in time critical situations and ensures the safe return of both crew and aircraft. The sensor has been sold in more than 5,600 units across the globe and is in service aboard a huge variety of rotary wing and wide body aircraft, a version of fighter aircraft is under development.
niteshkjain
New Member
Wish what you said come true asap. But agencies have get there act togeather and make the fighter truly INDIAN by incorporating more components which are truley "MADE IN INDIA"
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/002200802251654.htmThe Hindu
Monday, February 25, 2008: 1715 Hrs
AESA Radar technology offered for installation on board LCA
New Delhi (PTI): In what could turn out to be a major technology leap for the country's indigenous Light Combat Aircraft, European Aerospace Defence and security Major, EADS, has offered AESA Radar technology for installation on board LCA.
"We have offered to co-develop the Active Electronically Scanned Array(AESA) E-Copter radars with DRDO-LRDE," CEO of the company Stefan Zoller told reporters here.
If India takes up the offer, it would mean a giant technology leap, as US companies Raytheon and Northop Grumann, which pioneered the technology, are still awaiting Pentagon clearance on offering technology transfer on such radars.
AESA radars which are fitted on board the US frontline fighters like F-16, F-5
The Technology Transfer of the radars is one of the key demands raised by India in Request For Proposals circulated to six major companies bidding for New Delhi multi-billion contract to purchase 126 Multi Role Combat aircraft.
Well if they have offered this JV, its very unlikely that DRDO will go down that path, considering they are already in a JV with the Israel for the MMR.
And I thought the US firms had a clearance for the ASEA radars? Seems that the article is missing some points or is using dated information.
A AESA radar right now might not be the best thing for the Tejas LCA considering that its going to be under intense load to be inducted in the numbers, a mid life upgrade may be when most AESA systems are mature, or a JV to develop one when the time comes seems all right.
What advantages will AESA systems have over the current MMR, strictly in “Tejas LCA” terms?
What is this E-Copter?
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niteshkjain
New Member
one bargain chip that we get here is that Elta could be forced to open up more [assuming they were trying withhold some tech before]. Maybe by bringing in EADs we can force them to open up more.
CAPTOR as fitted to current production Typhoons is designed to be easily convertible to AESA. CAESAR (CAPTOR AESA Radar) is the development programme for E-CAPTOR. Been underway for quite a while. First test flight (after lots of ground tests) two years ago, & flew in a Typhoon last May.
Will send you some links soon...
CAPTOR as fitted to current production Typhoons is designed to be easily convertible to AESA. CAESAR (CAPTOR AESA Radar) is the development programme for E-CAPTOR. Been underway for quite a while. First test flight (after lots of ground tests) two years ago, & flew in a Typhoon last May.
Will send you some links soon...
niteshkjain
New Member
- Well that radar seems to be in the later stages of its development, dont see why DRDO/LRDE will go for it. The 200 fighters must be the next big thing to the MMRCA considering the profits that will come out of the engine/radar JVs that are going on.
- Elta itself is tied up with quite a few programs in India, they can hardly gain anything by arm twisting on tech which is so available in the market (apparently), their only advantage will be lost in my opinion.
- Indian ministry of defence will like to see the MMR both in "numbers" and in "years of service" before another development of the DRDO/LRDE radar comes into action, after all they have invested in the program with what ever funds they were sanctioned.
Why this offer, why now, i can not see it assisting in any related program either(MMRCA for example), except perhaps going towards a show of the will/capability to comply with the ToT (may be).
- Elta itself is tied up with quite a few programs in India, they can hardly gain anything by arm twisting on tech which is so available in the market (apparently), their only advantage will be lost in my opinion.
- Indian ministry of defence will like to see the MMR both in "numbers" and in "years of service" before another development of the DRDO/LRDE radar comes into action, after all they have invested in the program with what ever funds they were sanctioned.
Why this offer, why now, i can not see it assisting in any related program either(MMRCA for example), except perhaps going towards a show of the will/capability to comply with the ToT (may be).
Hey - you're quoting me!
niteshkjain
New Member
Sorry swerve
anyway finally some good news
http://www.hindu.com/2008/03/09/stories/2008030958701000.htm
Ashok Parthasarathi and Raman Puri
The facts with regard to perceived cost and time overruns and performance shortfalls in perspective
There have been several articles in the press critical of projects of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) in general, and specifically the programme relating to the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), now named Tejas, and the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme. Indeed, whenever a significant event that involves indigenous R&D, particularly defence-related, occurs, or a crucial decision is set to be taken, articles originating from within the defence “system,” or from vendors who see their business prospects threatened, appear. The real facts relating to the programme need to be put in context.
The two issues on which the LCA project is criticised are cost and time overruns, and performance shortfalls. As regards the so-called time overruns, when the zero/go date for the project is taken as 1983, the critics fail to mention that what was sanctioned in 1983 was an ad hoc Rs.560 crore, pending full preparation of the Project Definition Document (PDD) — which is a fundamental step even to start the design and development process. The costs were to be finalised based on the PDD. This required the setting up of infrastructure in a hundred academic institutions and R&D laboratories and building up expertise to undertake the fundamental and application-oriented R&D required, and harnessing the design and engineering effort available largely in the public sector units for such a complex, state-of-the-art aircraft. The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) discussed with Air Headquarters the Air Staff Requirement (ASR). Air Headquarters had requirements added to what was originally to be a replacement for the MiG-21. As a result, the ASR that was finalised was practically that for a Mirage 2000. But in the public perception the LCA remained as a replacement for MiG 21.
It look seven years, till 1990, to formulate the PDD. Based on this the ADA, in a report to the Ministry of Defence in 1990, gave a time-frame of seven years to develop the LCA and projected a financial requirement of Rs.4,000 crore. This included the building of four prototypes also. There had been a 25-year gap since the only fighter aircraft ever indigenously designed, developed and manufactured, namely the HF-24 Marut, had entered squadron service. So the period of seven years to set up a more advanced R&D infrastructure and build up even the core personnel needed to develop the technologies that the LCA’s ASR and PDD called for, was modest.
After consideration, including by special committees, the Indian Air Force and the government gave the real operational go-ahead only in late-1993. Even that “go-ahead” covered the development of only two Technology Demonstrator Aircraft (TDA) without weaponisation. The funding approved was only of Rs.2,000 crore — half the amount requested for full-scale development. The first TDA flew in 2001, eight years from the real operational ‘go’ date, despite much additional R&D work that had to be undertaken due to the U.S. sanctions imposed in 1998.
Comments appeared in the media in 2001 quoting IAF sources to the effect that what the ADA had achieved was just a flying machine that was yet to be weaponised. Considering the nature and scope of the approval accorded in 1993, what else was to be expected? Using the money sanctioned for two TDAs, the ADA built four. Full-scale development, for which another Rs.2,000-plus crore was finally sanctioned, thus started only in late-2001. Some 1,200 hours of flight testing was to be undertaken to secure Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) from the IAF.
At that point, apart from the weaponisation requirements the project had to undergo extensive redesign to accommodate an air-to-air missile chosen by the IAF, which was considerably heavier and longer than what had been specified till 2000. The IAF had again changed its mind. This necessitated the complete redesign of the wing structure, using only composite materials in order to keep the weight within limits. The period of this redesign was also utilised to upgrade the avionics, to a completely open architecture.
Consequently, in “generational terms” the LCA is a fourth generation-plus aircraft with full networking capabilities. This made it more than comparable to anything the IAF had, and possibly would have, even after it acquires the 126 Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) now on tender, with first deliveries due eight years hence.
On the engine
It is true that the Kaveri engine for the LCA that the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) of the DRDO has been developing for 12 years has not yet met its technical performance targets and requires redevelopment. So far the GE 404 engine from the U.S., which powers the F-16 fighter-bomber, has been used to power the LCA. The problems the GTRE has with the Kaveri are not unusual in a complex fighter aircraft engine project being undertaken for the first time. Moreover, the financial sanction of about Rs.320 crore given for engine development was possibly only to cover the Project Definition Phase and some high-risk technology development effort. We do not know of a first-of-type high-technology fighter aircraft engine being developed anywhere in less than a multi-billion dollar programme and a 20-year-plus development cycle. Even Snecma, the sole fighter aircraft engine manufacturer in France, despite decades of experience in developing and manufacturing engines for Mirage III, V and F-1, took about a decade and $2.2 billion to develop the M-88 engine for the Mirage 2000. The development of the Kaveri is unlikely to cross $1 billion.
The LCA with a GE 404 engine has done 800-plus hours of flight-testing. Even with that engine the performance has been not only vastly superior to that of even the recently upgraded MiG 21 BIS (the IAF is operating almost 400 of the series), but it has shown itself to be comparable in many critical parameters to the Mirage 2000. Modifications to the aircraft structure are under way to reduce weight and improve engine performance. When the GTRE’s joint venture with a leading foreign engine manufacturer for further development is completed in the next four years, the Kaveri will be brought up to a performance level, superior to the GE 404. Fitted with it, the LCA will be truly comparable to the Mirage 2000 and in many respects even superior. And all this in an aircraft much lighter than the Mirage 2000.
As for network-centric capability, which intrinsically needs indigenous systems for secrecy, security and inter-operability, it is superior in the LCA compared to any aircraft in the IAF’s inventory.
So it is a fallacy to think that we can continue the importing spree and still have such network-centric capability.
As recently as in 2005, the IAF’s requirement for 126 new aircraft was only for an upgraded Mirage 2000. At Rs.120 crore to Rs.140 crore a plane, compared to at least double that amount for any of the aircraft types now bidding for the 126 MRCA, is not the LCA a highly cost-effective fighter for volume induction into the IAF?
As for development costs, the LCA has remained well within the sanctioned $1.2 billion — which is about the lowest anywhere. Time overrun in the strict sense is only by a year or two, despite the sanctions. A first-of-type aircraft of this degree of complexity has not been developed anywhere in the West or in Russia in less than two to three decades.
The F16 series that was inducted into the U.S. Air Force in 1975 is today at Mark 60. That is how aircraft of this level of complexity are improved after induction. That this imperative applies even more to the LCA has to be recognised.
It is for the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister to ensure that this effort is not belittled or scuttled, and that the LCA programme is given all-out support — as successive Prime Ministers have ensured for our atomic energy and space programmes.
(Ashok Parthasarathi was Science Adviser to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Vice- Admiral (retired) Raman Puri was Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to the Chairman, Committee of Service Chiefs, remaining closely involved with the inter-service weapons acquisition process from October 2003 to February 2006).
anyway finally some good news
http://www.hindu.com/2008/03/09/stories/2008030958701000.htm
Ashok Parthasarathi and Raman Puri
The facts with regard to perceived cost and time overruns and performance shortfalls in perspective
There have been several articles in the press critical of projects of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) in general, and specifically the programme relating to the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), now named Tejas, and the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme. Indeed, whenever a significant event that involves indigenous R&D, particularly defence-related, occurs, or a crucial decision is set to be taken, articles originating from within the defence “system,” or from vendors who see their business prospects threatened, appear. The real facts relating to the programme need to be put in context.
The two issues on which the LCA project is criticised are cost and time overruns, and performance shortfalls. As regards the so-called time overruns, when the zero/go date for the project is taken as 1983, the critics fail to mention that what was sanctioned in 1983 was an ad hoc Rs.560 crore, pending full preparation of the Project Definition Document (PDD) — which is a fundamental step even to start the design and development process. The costs were to be finalised based on the PDD. This required the setting up of infrastructure in a hundred academic institutions and R&D laboratories and building up expertise to undertake the fundamental and application-oriented R&D required, and harnessing the design and engineering effort available largely in the public sector units for such a complex, state-of-the-art aircraft. The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) discussed with Air Headquarters the Air Staff Requirement (ASR). Air Headquarters had requirements added to what was originally to be a replacement for the MiG-21. As a result, the ASR that was finalised was practically that for a Mirage 2000. But in the public perception the LCA remained as a replacement for MiG 21.
It look seven years, till 1990, to formulate the PDD. Based on this the ADA, in a report to the Ministry of Defence in 1990, gave a time-frame of seven years to develop the LCA and projected a financial requirement of Rs.4,000 crore. This included the building of four prototypes also. There had been a 25-year gap since the only fighter aircraft ever indigenously designed, developed and manufactured, namely the HF-24 Marut, had entered squadron service. So the period of seven years to set up a more advanced R&D infrastructure and build up even the core personnel needed to develop the technologies that the LCA’s ASR and PDD called for, was modest.
After consideration, including by special committees, the Indian Air Force and the government gave the real operational go-ahead only in late-1993. Even that “go-ahead” covered the development of only two Technology Demonstrator Aircraft (TDA) without weaponisation. The funding approved was only of Rs.2,000 crore — half the amount requested for full-scale development. The first TDA flew in 2001, eight years from the real operational ‘go’ date, despite much additional R&D work that had to be undertaken due to the U.S. sanctions imposed in 1998.
Comments appeared in the media in 2001 quoting IAF sources to the effect that what the ADA had achieved was just a flying machine that was yet to be weaponised. Considering the nature and scope of the approval accorded in 1993, what else was to be expected? Using the money sanctioned for two TDAs, the ADA built four. Full-scale development, for which another Rs.2,000-plus crore was finally sanctioned, thus started only in late-2001. Some 1,200 hours of flight testing was to be undertaken to secure Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) from the IAF.
At that point, apart from the weaponisation requirements the project had to undergo extensive redesign to accommodate an air-to-air missile chosen by the IAF, which was considerably heavier and longer than what had been specified till 2000. The IAF had again changed its mind. This necessitated the complete redesign of the wing structure, using only composite materials in order to keep the weight within limits. The period of this redesign was also utilised to upgrade the avionics, to a completely open architecture.
Consequently, in “generational terms” the LCA is a fourth generation-plus aircraft with full networking capabilities. This made it more than comparable to anything the IAF had, and possibly would have, even after it acquires the 126 Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) now on tender, with first deliveries due eight years hence.
On the engine
It is true that the Kaveri engine for the LCA that the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) of the DRDO has been developing for 12 years has not yet met its technical performance targets and requires redevelopment. So far the GE 404 engine from the U.S., which powers the F-16 fighter-bomber, has been used to power the LCA. The problems the GTRE has with the Kaveri are not unusual in a complex fighter aircraft engine project being undertaken for the first time. Moreover, the financial sanction of about Rs.320 crore given for engine development was possibly only to cover the Project Definition Phase and some high-risk technology development effort. We do not know of a first-of-type high-technology fighter aircraft engine being developed anywhere in less than a multi-billion dollar programme and a 20-year-plus development cycle. Even Snecma, the sole fighter aircraft engine manufacturer in France, despite decades of experience in developing and manufacturing engines for Mirage III, V and F-1, took about a decade and $2.2 billion to develop the M-88 engine for the Mirage 2000. The development of the Kaveri is unlikely to cross $1 billion.
The LCA with a GE 404 engine has done 800-plus hours of flight-testing. Even with that engine the performance has been not only vastly superior to that of even the recently upgraded MiG 21 BIS (the IAF is operating almost 400 of the series), but it has shown itself to be comparable in many critical parameters to the Mirage 2000. Modifications to the aircraft structure are under way to reduce weight and improve engine performance. When the GTRE’s joint venture with a leading foreign engine manufacturer for further development is completed in the next four years, the Kaveri will be brought up to a performance level, superior to the GE 404. Fitted with it, the LCA will be truly comparable to the Mirage 2000 and in many respects even superior. And all this in an aircraft much lighter than the Mirage 2000.
As for network-centric capability, which intrinsically needs indigenous systems for secrecy, security and inter-operability, it is superior in the LCA compared to any aircraft in the IAF’s inventory.
So it is a fallacy to think that we can continue the importing spree and still have such network-centric capability.
As recently as in 2005, the IAF’s requirement for 126 new aircraft was only for an upgraded Mirage 2000. At Rs.120 crore to Rs.140 crore a plane, compared to at least double that amount for any of the aircraft types now bidding for the 126 MRCA, is not the LCA a highly cost-effective fighter for volume induction into the IAF?
As for development costs, the LCA has remained well within the sanctioned $1.2 billion — which is about the lowest anywhere. Time overrun in the strict sense is only by a year or two, despite the sanctions. A first-of-type aircraft of this degree of complexity has not been developed anywhere in the West or in Russia in less than two to three decades.
The F16 series that was inducted into the U.S. Air Force in 1975 is today at Mark 60. That is how aircraft of this level of complexity are improved after induction. That this imperative applies even more to the LCA has to be recognised.
It is for the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister to ensure that this effort is not belittled or scuttled, and that the LCA programme is given all-out support — as successive Prime Ministers have ensured for our atomic energy and space programmes.
(Ashok Parthasarathi was Science Adviser to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Vice- Admiral (retired) Raman Puri was Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to the Chairman, Committee of Service Chiefs, remaining closely involved with the inter-service weapons acquisition process from October 2003 to February 2006).
Ozzy Blizzard
New Member
Just one point, GE 404 power the F/A-18 E/F not F-16 which is powered by the F110 or F100 poweplant's.
one step for fighter technology one giant step for indian aerospace
Like most of you - I have been following the progress of tejas with the expectations not unlike an eager parent.
True - took a longer time to take off then "anticipated" - the fault may also be in the anticipation that we will build an advanced aircraft from scratch without a significant commercial or military industry capability to date.
This plane will evolve over time - to better avonics , better sensor integration , better flight parameters, and will have better weapons which will be developed to suit a light fighter than the other way round.
While in hindsight - it is easy to comment - we may have adopted a parallel program of collaborating with the russians in building a plane in addition to the LCA - which would have evolutionary rather than "revolutionary" technology "jumps" .... which would mean that we would be insulated from the current shortage of planes....
However, we need to now to prioritise our R&D focus - divide our effort into three domains -
A. idigenising technology - use the indian industry
B. Building programs to catch up on others - i.e. working on existing technology like BVR, AESA etc, OPERATIONALISING the LCA production - using indian industry once again
C. Tomorrow's technology like plasma stealth, Next gen EW, Laser wepons and other TRANSFORMATIONAL programs - DRDO
Form centres of excellence to manage standards , integration protocols, facilitation of tech transfer ... one for aircraft design..., one for avonics, one for Air to ... arnaments, One for aircraft engines, one for sensors etc.
These centres will work with all of A,B,C to make things happen
Do you all agree ?....
Like most of you - I have been following the progress of tejas with the expectations not unlike an eager parent.
True - took a longer time to take off then "anticipated" - the fault may also be in the anticipation that we will build an advanced aircraft from scratch without a significant commercial or military industry capability to date.
This plane will evolve over time - to better avonics , better sensor integration , better flight parameters, and will have better weapons which will be developed to suit a light fighter than the other way round.
While in hindsight - it is easy to comment - we may have adopted a parallel program of collaborating with the russians in building a plane in addition to the LCA - which would have evolutionary rather than "revolutionary" technology "jumps" .... which would mean that we would be insulated from the current shortage of planes....
However, we need to now to prioritise our R&D focus - divide our effort into three domains -
A. idigenising technology - use the indian industry
B. Building programs to catch up on others - i.e. working on existing technology like BVR, AESA etc, OPERATIONALISING the LCA production - using indian industry once again
C. Tomorrow's technology like plasma stealth, Next gen EW, Laser wepons and other TRANSFORMATIONAL programs - DRDO
Form centres of excellence to manage standards , integration protocols, facilitation of tech transfer ... one for aircraft design..., one for avonics, one for Air to ... arnaments, One for aircraft engines, one for sensors etc.
These centres will work with all of A,B,C to make things happen
Do you all agree ?....
niteshkjain
New Member
sir
thanks a lot for clarifying,
but can you please guide that which engine is more powerful, or why they are using F18 engine which is designed more from navy needs?
thanks a lot for clarifying,
but can you please guide that which engine is more powerful, or why they are using F18 engine which is designed more from navy needs?
Ozzy Blizzard
New Member
F100/F110 is plenty more powerfull, but its HUGE. F414 is in the 22000lb thust class, were F100 is in the 30000lb thrust class. However the F100 meter longer, has wider diameter by 11 inches and is significantly heavier. Their thrust/weight ratio's stand at 7.8:1 for the F100 and 9:1 for the F414. They are very different engines in different classes so its hard to compare in terms of which one is more powerfull. It all depends on the size and weight of the airframe your puting it in. Considering the Tejas is designed to be a light platform the F414 is probably the better choice.
Aliph Ahmed
Banned Member
Panel to scout for engine for Tejas
Ravi Sharma
BANGALORE: India’s two-decade quest for an engine that will power the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas has taken another twist with the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) setting up a committee that will scout worldwide for an engine.
The formation of the committee is also an admittance that the indigenous Kaveri combat aircraft engine, which is under development by the Bangalore-based Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) to be the eventual Tejas’ power plant, will, in its present design configuration, not be able to do so.
Headed by K.V.L. Rao, a former director with the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), the committee has representatives, including from the Air Force, the ADA and the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited.
The ADA, the defence laboratory which is designing the Tejas, has also been told that it might have to accommodate an alternate engine that can provide the Tejas with the required levels of power if it is to match the Air Force’s air staff requirements (ASR).
Air Force order
The Tejas programme, which is still short of its initial operational clearance, has already received an order from the Air Force for 20 aircraft.
The half-a-dozen Tejas aircraft that have been produced and flying as part of the programme are powered by the General Electric manufactured GE F404 engines. But India would like to have its own indigenous combat aircraft engine.
Under development since April 1989 by the GTRE, the Kaveri is meant to be comparable with contemporary combat aircraft engines such as the Eurojet EJ200, Snecma M88, General Electric F414 and Pratt and Whitney F119.
Initially expected to be a 93-month programme, costing Rs. 382 crore, the Kaveri project’s development cost, according to the Cabinet Committee on Security, has been revised to Rs.2,839 crore.
The inability of the GTRE to come up with the Kaveri has now forced the formation of the new committee. But the GTRE’s task has also been complicated by the fact that with the Tejas overweighing by well over a tonne, a Kaveri engine developed as per specifications originally spelt out (when the Tejas was within its design weight) will not be capable of providing a heavier aircraft with the thrust that can satisfy the Air Force’s ASR.
The Air Force had pointed out that neither of the co-development offers of France’s Snecma and Russia’s NPO Saturn was good enough to meet the ASRs.
Hence, the DRDO had to reassess the situation and go ahead with the new committee.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/newsrf.php?newsid=9936
Under development since April of 1989 and at a development cost of Rs. 2,839 crore to date and still far from being completed makes me wonder if the DRDO scientists are really qualified for the job ?
Ravi Sharma
BANGALORE: India’s two-decade quest for an engine that will power the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas has taken another twist with the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) setting up a committee that will scout worldwide for an engine.
The formation of the committee is also an admittance that the indigenous Kaveri combat aircraft engine, which is under development by the Bangalore-based Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) to be the eventual Tejas’ power plant, will, in its present design configuration, not be able to do so.
Headed by K.V.L. Rao, a former director with the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), the committee has representatives, including from the Air Force, the ADA and the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited.
The ADA, the defence laboratory which is designing the Tejas, has also been told that it might have to accommodate an alternate engine that can provide the Tejas with the required levels of power if it is to match the Air Force’s air staff requirements (ASR).
Air Force order
The Tejas programme, which is still short of its initial operational clearance, has already received an order from the Air Force for 20 aircraft.
The half-a-dozen Tejas aircraft that have been produced and flying as part of the programme are powered by the General Electric manufactured GE F404 engines. But India would like to have its own indigenous combat aircraft engine.
Under development since April 1989 by the GTRE, the Kaveri is meant to be comparable with contemporary combat aircraft engines such as the Eurojet EJ200, Snecma M88, General Electric F414 and Pratt and Whitney F119.
Initially expected to be a 93-month programme, costing Rs. 382 crore, the Kaveri project’s development cost, according to the Cabinet Committee on Security, has been revised to Rs.2,839 crore.
The inability of the GTRE to come up with the Kaveri has now forced the formation of the new committee. But the GTRE’s task has also been complicated by the fact that with the Tejas overweighing by well over a tonne, a Kaveri engine developed as per specifications originally spelt out (when the Tejas was within its design weight) will not be capable of providing a heavier aircraft with the thrust that can satisfy the Air Force’s ASR.
The Air Force had pointed out that neither of the co-development offers of France’s Snecma and Russia’s NPO Saturn was good enough to meet the ASRs.
Hence, the DRDO had to reassess the situation and go ahead with the new committee.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/newsrf.php?newsid=9936
Under development since April of 1989 and at a development cost of Rs. 2,839 crore to date and still far from being completed makes me wonder if the DRDO scientists are really qualified for the job ?
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niteshkjain
New Member
Mr. Aliph who the hell are you to say what other persons are qualified for
why dont you go and design the engine, restrain yourself from making such nonsense comments
anyway in hurry you had missed one point, that LCA is overweight by 1 TON What did the extra 1 ton go for ? . Even the Tejas TDs were within that weight limit and they had done a weight reduction exercise to bring down the weight by a significant amount from that. Plus the LSPs will have no test instrumentation and every subsystem and component would have been weight budgeted. So what did the extra 1 ton empty weight go ? I wonder.
The Gripen's empty weight is 6620 Kg according to Wikipedia. So the LCA is in the Gripen's ball park and with the GE F404 IN 20, has better T:W ratio than the Gripen. But all the same, there were no complaints on "overweight" LCA until now. Who knows maybe 6500 WAS the design weight and 5500 was misconception.
why dont you go and design the engine, restrain yourself from making such nonsense comments
anyway in hurry you had missed one point, that LCA is overweight by 1 TON What did the extra 1 ton go for ? . Even the Tejas TDs were within that weight limit and they had done a weight reduction exercise to bring down the weight by a significant amount from that. Plus the LSPs will have no test instrumentation and every subsystem and component would have been weight budgeted. So what did the extra 1 ton empty weight go ? I wonder.
The Gripen's empty weight is 6620 Kg according to Wikipedia. So the LCA is in the Gripen's ball park and with the GE F404 IN 20, has better T:W ratio than the Gripen. But all the same, there were no complaints on "overweight" LCA until now. Who knows maybe 6500 WAS the design weight and 5500 was misconception.
niteshkjain
New Member
http://www.livemint.com/2008/05/05234057/Tejas-set-for-hot-weather-tria.html
Bangalore: India’s light combat aircraft Tejas will fly over the deserts of Rajasthan later this month for hot weather trials.
The trials, in which the airplane and its systems will be tested in the summer heat, begin a crucial phase for the fighter before the Indian Air Force (IAF) inducts it into its fleet. “Because we are doing it for the first time, we are very very careful,” says P. S. Subramanyam, head of the Tejas programme at Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) the aircraft development arm of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).
The designers of Tejas have till 2010—four years behind schedule—to achieve initial operational clearance, a milestone it has to cross before meeting IAF standards. These two years will be the toughest because the aircraft will be stretched to the limits of its performance, and any mistake could endanger the project.
ADA has appointed Boeing Co., which makes the F-18 fighter, as a consultant to help in flight trials till the certification.
When compared with the US or Russia, India’s fighter development programme is still taking baby steps despite its air force being a large buyer of military aircraft.
IAF is buying 126 fighters in a global tender valued at more than Rs42,000 crore to replace the ageing Russian-built MiG fighters in its fleet.
Testing times: A file photo of a Tejas technology demonstrator on a test flight in Bangalore.
The Tejas project is India’s second fighter development programme. In the 1960s, the country tried to build a fighter aircraft—the HF-24 Marut—that failed to take off after failing to meet the air force’s expectations.
Tejas was conceived in the 1980s. It is a single-engine supersonic, fly-by-wire fighter that has delta wings and no tail. Fly-by-wire technology enables a pilot to control the plane electronically through computers.
Although the project officially kicked off in 1989, ADA says the inital fund of Rs2,188 crore to develop technology demonstrators arrived only in 1993. After its first flight in January 2001, the govermnent sanctioned an additional Rs3301.78 crore to build five prototype aircraft, including trainers, and equip them with weapons. These were scheduled to enter service by 2006.
The Tejas fleet of six aircraft, including two technology demonstrators, powered by US-made General Electric 404 engines, have flown 865 sorties so far.
In 2006, IAF ordered 20 Tejas aircraft to be manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd, or HAL, in addition to 8 limited series production planes.
The Tejas project did not meet its deadline, prompting IAF to appoint Air Vice Marshal B.C. Nanjappa to hasten its development and draw a plan for delivery.
IAF’s suggestions included design expectations that are yet to be proved in simulation or wind tunnel tests. Nanjappa declined to comment on the matter.
“That is why (we ) should be careful, because it could lead to unrecoverable situations if it (the aircraft) is not controlled properly,” says T. Tamilmani, chief executive of Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification, an independent regulating agency under the DRDO.
There have been several instances of mishap in aircraft development globally. In India, a prototype airborne early warning and control system developed by the Centre for Airborne Systems, a Bangalore lab of DRDO, crashed in 1999.
Tamilmani says he does not see a challenge in certifiying the Tejas for safety standards. “The challenge is in complying with the air staff requirements set by the IAF.”
Air Marshal (retd) P. Rajkumar, a former head of the fighter project, says he can understand why DRDO has been careful in pushing the limits of the aircraft. “I would rather have an aircraft that meets all safety requirements a few years late, than an unreliable one tomorrow.” Rajkumar has written a book—The Tejas Story—on the light combat aircraft programme.
Analysts say going slow due to a learning curve is only to be expected, but the delays in getting the radar, weaponisation and finally, a homegrown Kaveri engine for the fighter, are worrying signs.
“It is not just being cautious. They also have to reach the technical specifications within the time frame,” says A.K. Saxena, a former managing director of HAL, the manufacturer of Tejas. “That is not happening”.
Bangalore: India’s light combat aircraft Tejas will fly over the deserts of Rajasthan later this month for hot weather trials.
The trials, in which the airplane and its systems will be tested in the summer heat, begin a crucial phase for the fighter before the Indian Air Force (IAF) inducts it into its fleet. “Because we are doing it for the first time, we are very very careful,” says P. S. Subramanyam, head of the Tejas programme at Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) the aircraft development arm of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).
The designers of Tejas have till 2010—four years behind schedule—to achieve initial operational clearance, a milestone it has to cross before meeting IAF standards. These two years will be the toughest because the aircraft will be stretched to the limits of its performance, and any mistake could endanger the project.
ADA has appointed Boeing Co., which makes the F-18 fighter, as a consultant to help in flight trials till the certification.
When compared with the US or Russia, India’s fighter development programme is still taking baby steps despite its air force being a large buyer of military aircraft.
IAF is buying 126 fighters in a global tender valued at more than Rs42,000 crore to replace the ageing Russian-built MiG fighters in its fleet.
Testing times: A file photo of a Tejas technology demonstrator on a test flight in Bangalore.
The Tejas project is India’s second fighter development programme. In the 1960s, the country tried to build a fighter aircraft—the HF-24 Marut—that failed to take off after failing to meet the air force’s expectations.
Tejas was conceived in the 1980s. It is a single-engine supersonic, fly-by-wire fighter that has delta wings and no tail. Fly-by-wire technology enables a pilot to control the plane electronically through computers.
Although the project officially kicked off in 1989, ADA says the inital fund of Rs2,188 crore to develop technology demonstrators arrived only in 1993. After its first flight in January 2001, the govermnent sanctioned an additional Rs3301.78 crore to build five prototype aircraft, including trainers, and equip them with weapons. These were scheduled to enter service by 2006.
The Tejas fleet of six aircraft, including two technology demonstrators, powered by US-made General Electric 404 engines, have flown 865 sorties so far.
In 2006, IAF ordered 20 Tejas aircraft to be manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd, or HAL, in addition to 8 limited series production planes.
The Tejas project did not meet its deadline, prompting IAF to appoint Air Vice Marshal B.C. Nanjappa to hasten its development and draw a plan for delivery.
IAF’s suggestions included design expectations that are yet to be proved in simulation or wind tunnel tests. Nanjappa declined to comment on the matter.
“That is why (we ) should be careful, because it could lead to unrecoverable situations if it (the aircraft) is not controlled properly,” says T. Tamilmani, chief executive of Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification, an independent regulating agency under the DRDO.
There have been several instances of mishap in aircraft development globally. In India, a prototype airborne early warning and control system developed by the Centre for Airborne Systems, a Bangalore lab of DRDO, crashed in 1999.
Tamilmani says he does not see a challenge in certifiying the Tejas for safety standards. “The challenge is in complying with the air staff requirements set by the IAF.”
Air Marshal (retd) P. Rajkumar, a former head of the fighter project, says he can understand why DRDO has been careful in pushing the limits of the aircraft. “I would rather have an aircraft that meets all safety requirements a few years late, than an unreliable one tomorrow.” Rajkumar has written a book—The Tejas Story—on the light combat aircraft programme.
Analysts say going slow due to a learning curve is only to be expected, but the delays in getting the radar, weaponisation and finally, a homegrown Kaveri engine for the fighter, are worrying signs.
“It is not just being cautious. They also have to reach the technical specifications within the time frame,” says A.K. Saxena, a former managing director of HAL, the manufacturer of Tejas. “That is not happening”.
I would take many comments from the media about the Tejas with a grain or rather a bucket of salt. Ravi Sharma for eg now claims that the Tejas is overweight by 2 tonnes but doesnt talk about design aims and how they have moved per IAF requirements!
First, lets be clear - the Tejas design plan now includes a lot of gizmos and gear that it didnt have earlier - this includes a completely new IFR fit, plus a comprehensive internal EW fit. This has increased weight. Furthermore, the design aims of the MMR have ballooned in terms of desired performance, and hence a lightweight radar wont do. We are talking of MMRs in 150-200 kg class now, rather than the earlier 100 kg (upper limit) plan.
The airframe itself has had to be beefed up because the IAF wants more pylons to be dual use and able to carry heavy loads, from fuel tanks to missiles.
All in all, the ASRs have been thoroughly revised, leading to an increase in weight, from the earlier point defence interceptor intended to replace the MiGs to a fully multirole aircraft.
First, lets be clear - the Tejas design plan now includes a lot of gizmos and gear that it didnt have earlier - this includes a completely new IFR fit, plus a comprehensive internal EW fit. This has increased weight. Furthermore, the design aims of the MMR have ballooned in terms of desired performance, and hence a lightweight radar wont do. We are talking of MMRs in 150-200 kg class now, rather than the earlier 100 kg (upper limit) plan.
The airframe itself has had to be beefed up because the IAF wants more pylons to be dual use and able to carry heavy loads, from fuel tanks to missiles.
All in all, the ASRs have been thoroughly revised, leading to an increase in weight, from the earlier point defence interceptor intended to replace the MiGs to a fully multirole aircraft.
niteshkjain
New Member
Feels like Ravi Sharma is gaining the weight so he is increasing the weight of Tejas
Nitesh; no one liners, especially which are irrelevant. I am letting this one go so let it be the last one.
- SABRE
Nitesh; no one liners, especially which are irrelevant. I am letting this one go so let it be the last one.
- SABRE
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