Part 1 of 2: Buying strategic depth
Singapore is a founding member of the Forum of Small States (
FOSS), a grouping of small & micro states — many FOSS members are also weak states. By land size, Singapore is the smallest state in ASEAN — smaller than Brunei (as a micro-state). As a small city state, Singapore does not fit the definition of a micro-state nor does it have the armed forces a typical of a small state.
(a) To manage regional security threats & to secure our SLOCs, the Govt has invested between 3% to 3.5% of the country’s GDP to raise, train & sustain the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). With a 2023 defence budget of SGD17. 98 billion (USD13. 4 billion), on a per capital basis, each year, Singapore invests more on defence than the average defence budget of many countries in Europe. The IISS estimates that, if all promises are kept, the average level of defence expenditure among NATO’s European members will be 1.8-1.9% of GDP by 2032, compared with 1.6% in 2022 and 1.3% in 2014.
(b) As host of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore uses defence diplomacy or the peaceful application of military resources to support a rules based order & to achieve outcomes. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, erodes the rules based order. We know that in the real world, a small & weak state gets to manoeuvre from a weak position into another weaker position.
(c) When under pressure from larger states, certain small states with lesser diplomatic and military capability than Singapore end up in a position of doing self harm to their own credibility. This is why recently, Cambodia on behalf of China, sought to sink Indonesia’s proposed joint ASEAN naval drills. Indonesia proposal for first-ever bloc exercises in South China Sea met vocal resistance from China’s pawn, Cambodia.
(d) In 2012, Singapore also watched with concern as definitive force was used by the Chinese Coast Guard & PLA Navy to create a fait accompli — the conversion of the South China Sea into a Chinese lake, against the wishes of the Philippines. Beijing’s actions at the 2nd Thomas Shoal falls within James Cable’s concept of gunboat diplomacy. If one were to read up on the numerous Haiyang Dizhi sagas against Malaysia & Vietnam, Beijing keeps the level of tension in the South China Sea managed with no desire for shooting.
Despite the fact that Canada is acquiring 88 F-35As in a US$14.2 billion deal announced by the Ottawa government, a WSJ editorial noted: "Canada PM Justin Trudeau was in Lithuania this week for the annual NATO summit, but it’s too bad there wasn’t a junior table where he could sit. That’s where his country belongs based on Ottawa’s feeble commitment to alliance defense." Thanks to superior execution, I am grateful that the US & our FPDA partners cannot accuse Singapore of being a free rider on defence.
Unlike Canada, whose weapons procurement processes is mired in dysfunction, the Defence Science & Technology Agency (
DSTA) of Singapore has a track record of efficiently implementing defence technology plans, acquiring defence material & developing defence infrastructure.
(a) Since 1987, the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) became superior in the air when compared to any other ASEAN air force.
(b) Interestingly, in Jun 2021, Malaysia said it sent a diplomatic protest to Beijing & summoned the Chinese ambassador after the military detected 16 Chinese aircraft in its airspace off the Borneo coast. While the Malaysia protests a PLAAF intrusion into their Borneo airspace, a Malaysian Government AW-139-9M helicopter was also caught intruding into Singapore airspace on Sept 11, 2021. This triggered a RSAF fighter scramble & the Malaysian High Commissioner to Singapore was summoned for this hostile act.
Many in America, Canada, & Europe, are not aware that Singapore:
(a) operates more fighters (60 F-16s & 40 F-15SGs) than Finland (64 F-35As);
(b) is committed to replace its 60 strong F-16V fleet with F-35s, to ensure that the air force has the largest & most capable fighter fleet in ASEAN;
(c) has a small but capable navy with a range of built in Singapore vessels that enable the navy to secure our SLOCs (up to 1,000km away);
(d) has acquired from Germany, 4 Type 218SGs to match or exceed the underwater warfare capability of Canada (as NATO member, & middle power).
The average troll on Twitter will never understand the difference between actual capability & bullsh!t, when they are so full of it — just as they will never understand the difference in training & standards between different types of forces using helicopters & specialist boats like the CCL to insert & recover forces for distributed operations, like:
(a) Commandos;
(b) ADF & Guards (both from 7SIB); &
(c) combat swimmers / divers from the NDU’s Special Warfare Group.
Singaporean troops are trained to operate in coalition with others in the FPDA but our citizen-soldiers view our country’s defence as our responsibility. Unlike some countries who rely only on others to do the heavy lifting, it is important for the SAF to develop relevant capability to meet our regional threat matrix.
(a) Developing the SAF’s weapon platforms & buying weapons, munitions & technology abroad (from our American, French, German, Israeli & Swedish counterparts), to gain strategic depth, would not be possible without DSTA’s good management of the weapons procurement process.
(b) Locally developed weapon platforms include the V15 mUAV, Terrex ICV, Bronco 3 ATTC, Hunter AFV, Primus SPH, Independence class LMVs & Endurance class LPDs, to name a few. The Singapore Army’s V15 mUAV in particular, is designed for concurrent operations with the RSAF’s Heron 1 UAV, to aid in sense & strike operations for the division strike centre.