The best strategy to defending Singapore Island

[OPSSG]

Part 3 of 3: Seeking opportunities for Malaysian and Singaporean cooperation

12. A war — a real war, not a proxy war in some distant sandbox — would result in the SAF being used as an instrument of controlled fury. To force the cool headed Singapore Government into war — a war that a Singaporean conscript army wants to avoid — by testing and crossing any of the 3 red-lines would be a mistake. Three main efforts guide the SAF’s modernisation plans from 2020 onwards are as follows:

One, a multi-domain ground maneuver capability, where units would be able to operate on the ground, underground, with organic UAVs in the air, and supported in the cyber domain.​

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Two, upgrading the SAF’s capability for high volume and time sensitive precision strikes.​

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Three, supporting the Next Gen Infantry Battalion maneuver efforts are improvements to force multipliers that ensure intelligence superiority, and continuous functionality under fire.​

Doing this Next Gen transformation too slowly will enable the aggressor to close the qualitative gap—a development the SAF cannot afford. In the past, keyboard warriors in this thread and across the causeway have accused the Singaporean conscript (be it serving the the armed forces, civil defence or the police) as being too soft, too short-sighted, too un-warlike, and so on for war. But when shit hit the fan in a crisis and unthinkable measures and bravery were needed as the response, Singapore consistently demonstrates its ability to execute as #SGUnited.

13. Since the SAF declassified and declared its actual military capability with the acquisition the first battery of 18 HIMARS launchers (2007) from the Americans and first batch of 66 Leopard 2A4s (2006) from the Germans, for the SAF’s 3 combined arms divisions, Malaysian politicians are not longer able to use the country’s armed forces to threaten conventional war for political gain — which is why Singapore’s response to the 2018 provocations by Dr M led government at that time is so mild (when compared to the 1991 response).

14. The Singapore-Malaysia Special Working Committee has also agreed that Malaysians with work permits will continue to be able to work on the island during this period, with appropriate accommodation arrangements, with the transport of goods between Malaysia and Singapore facilitated. As Senior Minister Teo Chee Hean, Coordinating Minister for National Security, shared on 19 Mar 2020, he remains in communication with Malaysia’s Defence Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob on the movement of Malaysians from Malaysia to Singapore during this lockdown period. Teo said:

“We are coordinating the measures between our two countries to facilitate Malaysian workers to continue working in Singapore, and the flow of goods, while safeguarding the health of Singaporeans & Malaysians.”​

15. In addition:

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(i) Singapore is deeply appreciative of the Malaysian Foreign Ministry Wisma Putra and their Embassy in Tehran for going beyond the call of duty to ferry 8 Singaporeans from Iran to Kuala Lumpur. They will be back home once they have completed their quarantine in Malaysia. International and bilateral cooperation has never been more vital than at an uncertain time like this. This is a promising sign of what I hope is a different Malaysian approach.​

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(ii) Malaysia’s 8th Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin and leader of Bersatu was in Singapore to receive medical treatment at Mount Elizabeth Hospital in 2019. According to local media, the former member of UMNO (part of the ex-ruling Barisan Nasional coalition) was discharged on 7 Aug 2019 after spending close to a month recuperating from a July 12 surgery, in which a Singapore doctor saved his life by removing a growth on his pancreas.​

I hope Malaysians will take a step back and reflect on the acts of hostility by a government led by Dr M since Oct 2018 and start a new chapter of cooperation with Singapore starting in March 2020.

16. Open source data puts the size of Singapore’s rice stockpile at 6 months’ supply. Singapore’s POL stockpile is also substantial and this adds to the supplies already maintained at key installations such as Changi Airport and government ministries, which have their own diesel generators to provide an uninterrupted power supply for a certain period to guarantee some degree of self-sufficiency. Singapore’s other food stockpile is generally planned on the basis of a local short-term contingency, the authorities have since reviewed the numbers to take into account the potential disruption to supply chains worldwide and also for a longer period. Every item across the entire ‘table of essentials’ is being looked at, and that goes beyond food. Among the things kept in stock are medicines and personal protective equipment. Not only have supplies been replenished, but some orders — such as for multivitamin pills — were also increased more than a month ago in anticipation of possible disruptions.

17. Today, in a global pandemic with no end in sight, Singapore faces a whole new set of challenges: an ageing population, disruptive technologies, more capable regional competitors, narrowing geopolitical space, growing non-traditional security threats, and evolving citizen aspirations. The strength of Singapore lies in its unity in the face of these challenges.

18. Despite the global pandemic, the country is welcoming home 200,000 Singaporeans from abroad, even though 68 of the 111 imported coronavirus cases had a travel history to the UK (the largest group of imported cases) and the heath care system is now preparing to welcome back even more seriously ill Singaporeans to the end of March 2020 — again demonstrating its ability to execute as #SGUnited.

 

[0bserver]

No insult intended OPSSG, but you might have hit a TL; DR/wall of text limit that might be more turn offing than edifying. Might want to summarise the text.

On a more relevant topic to the original, IMO, there are 2 ways to defend Singapore beyond the geopolitics that have already been covered in great detail.

Option 1: Forward defence, which is the commonly accepted option, where a buffer zone is created by "rushing" the SAF to secure a perimeter, either a land buffer for Malaysia, or a sea buffer for Indonesia and using firepower to break up concentration of enemy troops as they become a threat (then offer to trade back the land for peace ala Israel and the Sinai, but that's a different story).

Option 2: Fortify Singapore itself. While this may not sound like a good option by common logic since any fighting in Singapore damages Singapore's infrastructure, there are actually a lot of points going for a fortified defence, one of which is the utter headache that trying to take such an area would cause. Singapore is for all intents and purposes, a megacity and for those not familiar with it, buildings of 30 to 40 stories tall are common and in all honesty, if you gave me a company of men and told me to clear one of those 40 storey buildings, it's a quick way to ruin my day. Can you imagine running your men up to, for example, the 28th floor, then someone from the building opposite takes a potshot at you? What are you going to do? Run your men down 27 flights of stairs, cross the street and up another unknown number of stairs? He'll be long gone by then and you're left with dead tired men. More likely than not, you'll just respond with deterring fire, maybe 40mm grenades or a LAW then let him run away if he's still alive because you simply can't get to him. Now repeat this throughout an entire city. Even if casualties are minimal, the harassment is enough to drive people nuts.

One other point of note is that while a lot of people say "just artillery the island", it's not that simple. The reason being the same buildings that can cause an infantry headache can also cause an artillery headache. I had a university friend who was involved in an "Airfield Protection Exercise" decades ago and he mentioned that he encountered a very big problem siteing a 120mm mortar. The buildings surrounding the airfield, while relatively low compared to the rest of the island, were still tall enough to seriously impede artillery trajectories and this is from the defender's side where being closer actually makes it "easier" to shoot between the buildings. Now try that from 200km away. It'll be like trying to hit a target between picket fences when the fence can actually stop your bullets. The common counter to this is to bring your artillery a lot closer so that you can lob rounds "over" the intervening terrain but the side effect to this is that artillery so used is in no way even close to their maximum range, you have to get a lot closer just to get a good shot. Now this is only in regards to an airfield, if an infantry company, for example, were to hide in the basements of even a 20 storey buiding, I have my severe doubts that any conventional form of artillery or air support can actually affect them, not without first bringing the whole building down.

Long story short, while it might be a "all or nothing" gamble to fight in Singapore itself, the location of the fight is a real mess and a terrible headache for any invader and should be considered as a possible option provided that supplies can last long enough. If I recall correctly, the paradigm for FIBUA (fighting in built up areas) is 5 men for every one defender, and Singapore can mobilize close to a million men or more (especially if female volunteers join in) and the amount of infantry needed to take it becomes a mind boggling amount (and IMO, the paradigm is low since the formula was developed for small towns and cities and never had the nightmare of fighting in a megacity in mind).

 

[ngatimozart]

No insult intended OPSSG, but you might have hit a TL; DR/wall of text limit that might be more turn offing than edifying. Might want to summarise the text.

On a more relevant topic to the original, IMO, there are 2 ways to defend Singapore beyond the geopolitics that have already been covered in great detail.

Option 1: Forward defence, which is the commonly accepted option, where a buffer zone is created by "rushing" the SAF to secure a perimeter, either a land buffer for Malaysia, or a sea buffer for Indonesia and using firepower to break up concentration of enemy troops as they become a threat (then offer to trade back the land for peace ala Israel and the Sinai, but that's a different story).

Option 2: Fortify Singapore itself. While this may not sound like a good option by common logic since any fighting in Singapore damages Singapore's infrastructure, there are actually a lot of points going for a fortified defence, one of which is the utter headache that trying to take such an area would cause. Singapore is for all intents and purposes, a megacity and for those not familiar with it, buildings of 30 to 40 stories tall are common and in all honesty, if you gave me a company of men and told me to clear one of those 40 storey buildings, it's a quick way to ruin my day. Can you imagine running your men up to, for example, the 28th floor, then someone from the building opposite takes a potshot at you? What are you going to do? Run your men down 27 flights of stairs, cross the street and up another unknown number of stairs? He'll be long gone by then and you're left with dead tired men. More likely than not, you'll just respond with deterring fire, maybe 40mm grenades or a LAW then let him run away if he's still alive because you simply can't get to him. Now repeat this throughout an entire city. Even if casualties are minimal, the harassment is enough to drive people nuts.

One other point of note is that while a lot of people say "just artillery the island", it's not that simple. The reason being the same buildings that can cause an infantry headache can also cause an artillery headache. I had a university friend who was involved in an "Airfield Protection Exercise" decades ago and he mentioned that he encountered a very big problem siteing a 120mm mortar. The buildings surrounding the airfield, while relatively low compared to the rest of the island, were still tall enough to seriously impede artillery trajectories and this is from the defender's side where being closer actually makes it "easier" to shoot between the buildings. Now try that from 200km away. It'll be like trying to hit a target between picket fences when the fence can actually stop your bullets. The common counter to this is to bring your artillery a lot closer so that you can lob rounds "over" the intervening terrain but the side effect to this is that artillery so used is in no way even close to their maximum range, you have to get a lot closer just to get a good shot. Now this is only in regards to an airfield, if an infantry company, for example, were to hide in the basements of even a 20 storey buiding, I have my severe doubts that any conventional form of artillery or air support can actually affect them, not without first bringing the whole building down.

Long story short, while it might be a "all or nothing" gamble to fight in Singapore itself, the location of the fight is a real mess and a terrible headache for any invader and should be considered as a possible option provided that supplies can last long enough. If I recall correctly, the paradigm for FIBUA (fighting in built up areas) is 5 men for every one defender, and Singapore can mobilize close to a million men or more (especially if female volunteers join in) and the amount of infantry needed to take it becomes a mind boggling amount (and IMO, the paradigm is low since the formula was developed for small towns and cities and never had the nightmare of fighting in a megacity in mind).

Or if I was the aggressor and not concerned about collateral damage, as the Americans label it, radiation enhanced weapons combined with biological and chemical weapons attacks will solve most of that problem for me. Depends on how badly I want the city and its assets. Whilst this scenario is at the far end of the scale, never discount it, because it is always possible.

Whilst you focus on Malaysia and Indonesia as your main threats, there are other nations in the region who are also interested in controlling Singapore's strategic location and not all of them have Singapore's interests in mind.

 

[OPSSG]

...IMO, there are 2 ways to defend Singapore beyond the geopolitics that have already been covered in great detail.

@0bserver, conceptually, there is a difference between defending Singapore and defending Singapore’s interests. In the continuum between the two, the SAF gives Singapore escalation options but not in the manner that many like 0bserver thinks.

Let us be clear. The only country that SAF can plan to conduct its forward defence when defending Singapore is Malaysia — and this forward defence option/strategy, will only be used if any of the 3 redlines is crossed. One of the three redlines is Malaysia acting unilaterally to cut off Singapore’s water supply from Johore — that is an act of war — as the water agreements are registered with the UN and form part of the Separation Agreement.

But before war occurs, there are escalation options available, in times of tension. Unless a religious theocracy rules Malaysia, there is:

(i) less than a 0.1% chance that the Malaysian Government will decide to unilaterally cut off its water supply to Singapore;​

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(ii) less than a 1% chance that tensions between the two countries can result in a shooting at sea incident;​

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(iii) a 2% to 5% chance that a ramming incident can occur at sea due to a miscalculation by Malaysia (in Feb 2019, there was collision between Malaysian vessel Polaris and Greek merchant ship Pireas); and​

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(iv) a 100% chance that the Singapore Navy has to deter or encounter and stop pirates, smuggling syndicates and counter attempted maritime terrorism, in its daily patrols.​

It is the higher probability events that I am more interested in exploring.

Option 1: Forward defence, which is the commonly accepted option, where a buffer zone is created by "rushing" the SAF to secure a perimeter, either a land buffer for Malaysia,

It should be ‘...created by "rushing" the SAF to secure a land buffer for the security of Singapore, in Johore, in response to a Malaysian act of war’— there seems to be a mistake in 0bserver’s expression.

The investment in the Leopard 2SG and the Hunter fleet is crucial to retain credibility of the forward defence option. On 20 Apr 2020, ST Engineering said its Land Systems division also won a "Phase 2 contract" from the Singapore’s MINDEF to produce and supply an unspecified number of Hunter AFVs. The company said that under the Phase 2 contract, the value of which was not disclosed, ST Engineering will also provide integrated logistics support including spares, training, and documentation.

...or a sea buffer for Indonesia and using firepower to break up concentration of enemy troops as they become a threat (then offer to trade back the land for peace ala Israel and the Sinai, but that's a different story).

My apologies but this second part of the sentence reflects 0bserver’s sea blindness — it is important to use the correct framework to study an issue. The sea on the west of the Straits of Singapore contains a narrow 800+ kilometre SLOC that connects the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. But the Straits of Malacca is dominated by land (i.e. Sumatra and Peninsular Malaysia), which means you need cooperation from these littoral states. Rather than thinking of the Straits of Singapore as a buffer, it is more accurate to think of the sea as a connector that Singapore has an interest in keeping open (in cooperation with FPDA powers, neutral littoral states or even friendly North East Asian powers like Japan).

With about 5,000 sailors, the navy is the smallest of the 3 services in the SAF but has a role play thousands of kilometres away from the main island. The First Flotilla has 12 vessels, comprising of 6 Formidable Class vessels and 6 Victory Class vessels. If Singapore has to secure its SLOCs, dispute them, or just as importantly exercise in them in the face of an enemy who will contest them, it is not planning to do it alone — as Singapore by itself lacks the naval resources to go alone in all these mission sets.

Speaking in Parliament on Monday (2 Mar 2020) during the Committee of Supply Debates, Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen said that 4 Fearless class patrol vessels will be refurbished and pushed into service in support of the Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF). To be relevant the 12 vessel MSTF Flotilla, comprising of 8 LMVs and 4 refurbished Fearless Class vessels (and not the 1st Flotilla, to be used to secure Singapore’s SLOCs up to 1,000 km away), operating in the Singapore Straits, around Pedra Branca, and the near abroad, must have the ability to secure the littorals, dispute them, or just as importantly exercise in them in the face of an enemy who will contest them.

I will attempt to address the problems with 0bserver’s option 2 on another day.

 

[0bserver]

@OPSSG

1- Wasn't the topic about "Defending Singapore ISLAND" and not "Defending Singapore's Interests"? It's even right there in the topic title.

2- Don't put in words in my mouth that I did not say, especially when you're being hell bent on nitpicking perceived "flaws" in other people's statements. Singapore retains the right of preemptive strike, even without an overt act of war by Malaysia, so massing forces along the border, even on Malaysian territory, while still legal and their right, will unfortunately also raise the tension level and the possibility of pre-emptive defence. This was the doctrine inherited from the Israelis and it's more or less an open secret.

Or if I was the aggressor and not concerned about collateral damage, as the Americans label it, radiation enhanced weapons combined with biological and chemical weapons attacks will solve most of that problem for me. Depends on how badly I want the city and its assets. Whilst this scenario is at the far end of the scale, never discount it, because it is always possible.

Whilst you focus on Malaysia and Indonesia as your main threats, there are other nations in the region who are also interested in controlling Singapore's strategic location and not all of them have Singapore's interests in mind.

It's very rare that someone from a different country has the interests of another country in the forefront of their considerations, so that's pretty much a given. As for WMDs, if the playing field reaches that level, you're kind of screwed anyway because it would also mean that not only has WWIII kicked off, it has already heated up to the stage where people are tossing nukes and chemical warheads. Other than a mass evacuation of the country, I don't see how defending against nukes and VX is going to be a viable solution.

 

[Todjaeger]

No insult intended OPSSG, but you might have hit a TL; DR/wall of text limit that might be more turn offing than edifying. Might want to summarise the text.

On a more relevant topic to the original, IMO, there are 2 ways to defend Singapore beyond the geopolitics that have already been covered in great detail.

Option 1: Forward defence, which is the commonly accepted option, where a buffer zone is created by "rushing" the SAF to secure a perimeter, either a land buffer for Malaysia, or a sea buffer for Indonesia and using firepower to break up concentration of enemy troops as they become a threat (then offer to trade back the land for peace ala Israel and the Sinai, but that's a different story).

Option 2: Fortify Singapore itself. While this may not sound like a good option by common logic since any fighting in Singapore damages Singapore's infrastructure, there are actually a lot of points going for a fortified defence, one of which is the utter headache that trying to take such an area would cause. Singapore is for all intents and purposes, a megacity and for those not familiar with it, buildings of 30 to 40 stories tall are common and in all honesty, if you gave me a company of men and told me to clear one of those 40 storey buildings, it's a quick way to ruin my day. Can you imagine running your men up to, for example, the 28th floor, then someone from the building opposite takes a potshot at you? What are you going to do? Run your men down 27 flights of stairs, cross the street and up another unknown number of stairs? He'll be long gone by then and you're left with dead tired men. More likely than not, you'll just respond with deterring fire, maybe 40mm grenades or a LAW then let him run away if he's still alive because you simply can't get to him. Now repeat this throughout an entire city. Even if casualties are minimal, the harassment is enough to drive people nuts.

One other point of note is that while a lot of people say "just artillery the island", it's not that simple. The reason being the same buildings that can cause an infantry headache can also cause an artillery headache. I had a university friend who was involved in an "Airfield Protection Exercise" decades ago and he mentioned that he encountered a very big problem siteing a 120mm mortar. The buildings surrounding the airfield, while relatively low compared to the rest of the island, were still tall enough to seriously impede artillery trajectories and this is from the defender's side where being closer actually makes it "easier" to shoot between the buildings. Now try that from 200km away. It'll be like trying to hit a target between picket fences when the fence can actually stop your bullets. The common counter to this is to bring your artillery a lot closer so that you can lob rounds "over" the intervening terrain but the side effect to this is that artillery so used is in no way even close to their maximum range, you have to get a lot closer just to get a good shot. Now this is only in regards to an airfield, if an infantry company, for example, were to hide in the basements of even a 20 storey buiding, I have my severe doubts that any conventional form of artillery or air support can actually affect them, not without first bringing the whole building down.

Long story short, while it might be a "all or nothing" gamble to fight in Singapore itself, the location of the fight is a real mess and a terrible headache for any invader and should be considered as a possible option provided that supplies can last long enough. If I recall correctly, the paradigm for FIBUA (fighting in built up areas) is 5 men for every one defender, and Singapore can mobilize close to a million men or more (especially if female volunteers join in) and the amount of infantry needed to take it becomes a mind boggling amount (and IMO, the paradigm is low since the formula was developed for small towns and cities and never had the nightmare of fighting in a megacity in mind).

If the thread title is, "the best strategy to defending Singapore Island," then either I am not understanding the position you are taking, or you have already made a number of assumptions about both the capabilities of the hostile invading force and just as important, their intent.

At this point I also feel that it should be pointed out that there also appears to be a perception problem with your position which is not unlike a recurring issue for decision makers in New Zealand and that perception problem is that unless something is a direct threat of invasion/hostile boots on the ground, issues which are in a nation's interests are not defence issues. If another nation wanted to force Singapore's cooperation on an issue, and was willing to use force to do so, there are other areas where force could be applied other than direct attacks upon Singapore.

Now from my perspective, engaging in building-to-building, block by block fighting within Singapore is tactic of last resort and not something which should be looked at as any sort of primary set of responses. Unless the hostile force is both extremely capable and careful, there is going to be significant collateral damage to both infrastructure and the civilian population, the city-state is just too densely populated and developed for it to be otherwise with that kind of fighting. Further, the kind of fighting you mentioned in your scenario does seem to require the hostile force to want to capture the buildings and infrastructure as well as the civilian population intact. However, it does seem to overlook the very real possibility a hostile force might only be interested in capturing a few key points intact. In such a case, a Singaporean infantry unit taking cover within an office or apartment building might just lead to that and other buildings being targeted with airstrikes and/or artillery barrages to compromise or level the buildings. After all, why bother wasting time and personnel clearing a 20 story building that contained Singaporean troops if the important objective is something else like the airport, or a strategic bridge, fuel depot and tank farm, etc. If it is otherwise of no importance, I would either bypass it or damage/destroy such a structure to deny it's use to defenders.

 

[0bserver]

In such a case, a Singaporean infantry unit taking cover within an office or apartment building might just lead to that and other buildings being targeted with airstrikes and/or artillery barrages to compromise or level the buildings.

This is part of the error I was trying to address. People tend to assume that when hit by artillery or when you just lob a round at a target, the target just vanishes but that is a wrong perception. Concrete buildings are notoriously difficult to destroy, even with 155mm or 227mm. They don't just vanish, the wreckage is still persistant and becomes incredibly annoying cover to dislodge people from, similar to what happens in Monte Cassino during WWII. This is also to address comments that say "Oh once we bring in artillery into (maximum) range, it's all over!!" which totally ignores the fact that intervening terrain generates a "blind spot" behind it (for example, trying to shoot a target behind a building requires you to lob the round high up and have it come almost straight down to get into the blind spot), massively reducing the range a gun/rocket can standoff from.

I'm not addressing the defence needs in terms of politics, that is a different field that requires reams of pages to describe, but in terms of simple PHYSICS that "just bomb Singapore" is something that is more easily said than done. Or to be more precise, EFFECTIVE bombing and shelling is easier said than done, you can easily toss rounds into the facade of buildings but getting them to hit something important is a different story.

 

[ngatimozart]

This is part of the error I was trying to address. People tend to assume that when hit by artillery or when you just lob a round at a target, the target just vanishes but that is a wrong perception. Concrete buildings are notoriously difficult to destroy, even with 155mm or 227mm. They don't just vanish, the wreckage is still persistant and becomes incredibly annoying cover to dislodge people from, similar to what happens in Monte Cassino during WWII. This is also to address comments that say "Oh once we bring in artillery into (maximum) range, it's all over!!" which totally ignores the fact that intervening terrain generates a "blind spot" behind it (for example, trying to shoot a target behind a building requires you to lob the round high up and have it come almost straight down to get into the blind spot), massively reducing the range a gun/rocket can standoff from.

I'm not addressing the defence needs in terms of politics, that is a different field that requires reams of pages to describe, but in terms of simple PHYSICS that "just bomb Singapore" is something that is more easily said than done. Or to be more precise, EFFECTIVE bombing and shelling is easier said than done, you can easily toss rounds into the facade of buildings but getting them to hit something important is a different story.

Planning a defence for any country is not one dimensional. It's multidimensional and is geostrategic and strategic. You are looking at things on the macro, meso and micro scales simultaneously. They all inform each other, but that's just one part of it. There is also the geopolitical and domestic political dimension, plus the economic dimension to consider. You have to determine and define what your national strategic assets are and how you will defend them. At the same time you have to define what your area of national strategic interest is and how you will operate in it and defend it.

Lobbing shells of any calibre into high rise buildings in Singapore is a rather spurious question and ignores the reality of the defence of Singapore. OPSSG and others have been attempting to explain this too you. We are quite happy to help people learn, but if they are going to be stubborn and not be willing to learn then we won't bother wasting our time because we all have better things to do.

I SUGGEST THAT YOU TAKE NOTE OF WHAT OPSSG AND OTHER POSTERS ARE EXPLAINING TO YOU. THIS IS HOW YOU LEARN .

 

[0bserver]

We are quite happy to help people learn, but if they are going to be stubborn and not be willing to learn then we won't bother wasting our time because we all have better things to do.

I so totally agree. Pity some people are not interested in the mechanics of the issue and seem to only focus on the politics. Guess I'm off to do better things.

 

[Todjaeger]

This is part of the error I was trying to address. People tend to assume that when hit by artillery or when you just lob a round at a target, the target just vanishes but that is a wrong perception. Concrete buildings are notoriously difficult to destroy, even with 155mm or 227mm. They don't just vanish, the wreckage is still persistant and becomes incredibly annoying cover to dislodge people from, similar to what happens in Monte Cassino during WWII. This is also to address comments that say "Oh once we bring in artillery into (maximum) range, it's all over!!" which totally ignores the fact that intervening terrain generates a "blind spot" behind it (for example, trying to shoot a target behind a building requires you to lob the round high up and have it come almost straight down to get into the blind spot), massively reducing the range a gun/rocket can standoff from.

I'm not addressing the defence needs in terms of politics, that is a different field that requires reams of pages to describe, but in terms of simple PHYSICS that "just bomb Singapore" is something that is more easily said than done. Or to be more precise, EFFECTIVE bombing and shelling is easier said than done, you can easily toss rounds into the facade of buildings but getting them to hit something important is a different story.

I would suggest that you do a bit of research on what happens to people inside a concrete/steel structure that gets damaged sufficiently to cause structural compromise or even structural collapse. Or even consider looking into the topic USAR or Urban Search and Rescue. The quick answer to it is that they tend to either get killed outright, injured, entrapped, or a combination thereof.

Yes, the ruins and rubble of a concrete and steel building could indeed provide some cover to forces which take shelter, but those ruins and rubble also can on it's own shift and injure, kill, or entrap personnel.

All of this is also ignoring any concerns for civilians who would normally be occupying such a structure and what would happen to them if the attacking force was not concerned with collateral damage or civilian casualties.

As a side note, there is an enormous difference in the effects of a single artillery round vs. artillery barrages and/or airstrikes, both of which consist of multiple rounds of ordnance hitting. Look at some of the imagines of Grozny to get an idea of what the cityscape of Singapore might start to look like if the defending strategy was to permit hostiles to close with Singapore proper, and then having defending forces take shelter and engage those hostiles from buildings.

 

[ngatimozart]

I so totally agree. Pity some people are not interested in the mechanics of the issue and seem to only focus on the politics. Guess I'm off to do better things.

THERE'S NO NEED TO BE SULKY AND SNARKY ABOUT MODERATORS DOESN'T WIN YOU ANY MATES. NONE OF THE REPLIES TO YOU WERE ABOUT POLITICS. IF YOU THINK THAT THEN YOU NEED TO REEVALUATE YOUR DEFINITION OF POLITICS.

SINCE YOU APPEAR TO BE RATHER FIXATED WE CAN ARRANGE FOR YOU TO HAVE A HOLIDAY FROM HERE. YOU ARE STARTING TO EXUDE THE SMELL OF A TROLL. WE HAVE NO TIME FOR TROLLS HERE. IT'S UP TO YOU TO PROVE TO US WHETHER OR NOT YOU ARE WORTHWHILE FOR US TO CONTINUE INVESTING TIME IN YOU.

CHOOSE CAREFULLY YOUR RESPONSE BECAUSE THAT WILL DETERMINE YOUR FUTURE ON HERE.

 

[OPSSG]

If the thread title is, "the best strategy to defending Singapore Island," then either I am not understanding the position you are taking...

@Todjaeger, thanks for your comprehensive responses in multiple replies that is much more effective than mine.

At this point I also feel that it should be pointed out that there also appears to be a perception problem with your position which is not unlike a recurring issue for decision makers in New Zealand and that perception problem is that unless something is a direct threat of invasion/hostile boots on the ground, issues which are in a nation's interests are not defence issues. If another nation wanted to force Singapore's cooperation on an issue, and was willing to use force to do so, there are other areas where force could be applied other than direct attacks upon Singapore.

I really did not understand the objective of 0bserver’s post. As you explained, protecting Singapore’s interests is also part of defending Singapore.

Option 2: Fortify Singapore itself. While this may not sound like a good option by common logic since any fighting in Singapore damages Singapore's infrastructure, there are actually a lot of points going for a fortified defence, one of which is the utter headache that trying to take such an area would cause.

Sorry but I am clueless about intent of the post by 0bserver.

Q1: Was 0bserver saying that Singapore should elect option 2?​

Ans to Q1: Of course you can sterilise parts of a city and covert it into a fortified objective. But is it wise to sit back and take punches via fortification? If option 2 is choice, then Singapore would not need such a capable air force or continue to grow the navy’s capabilities

I agree that when a building has collapsed you get rubble that can serve as cover. But why would the conscript platoons deploy and sit in rubble in Singapore as part of option 2? In actual fact, the ECA will determine the Ops deployment plan.

Notionally, shouldn’t the SAF take the fight to the enemy and fight in their housing estates and convert enemy homes into rubble? This works best if the SAF’s rules of engagement is impressively capable of carnage (and it is not*). We can adopt an unrealistic view and think that the focus is thus on kill, and destroy. If the enemy is indiscriminately shooting artillery at a city (without targeting clearance from the division strike centre), he obviously does not care if a building has collapsed. But that would neglect how terrifying it would be for an army to have such loose rules of engagement, where the intent is to commingle with and attack civilians in a battlespace.

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*Fyi, the SAF in its deployments into Iraq and Afghanistan have restrictive rules of engagement.

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Q2: How realistic are the war games when applied in the projected area of operations (AO)?​

Ans to Q2: Large scale war games like Exercise Ulysses is played without the presence of the million-plus civilians in the AO and the thousands of vehicles that could conceivably choke off highways. In large scale exercises, we try by having a handful of soldiers play civilians but it is not that realistic. Excise Forging Sabre is impressive not because of amount of the munitions used. The more interesting aspect of this war game is the mix the synthetic and the real to simulate what-if situations, supported by AI, to a frightening level of detail and realism, giving division Ops planners the thought-drivers they need.

Singapore is for all intents and purposes, a megacity... if you gave me a company of men and told me to clear one of those 40 storey buildings, it's a quick way to ruin my day. Can you imagine running your men up to, for example, the 28th floor, then someone from the building opposite takes a potshot at you? What are you going to do? Run your men down 27 flights of stairs, cross the street and up another unknown number of stairs?

If someone shoots at you, take cover or shoot back or call for support from your M110 equipped Company Marksmen Team, who have attended a 2 week course at the Sniper Wing (to suppress the enemy or provide counter sniping support). But a city/urban fight also means to section and cordon off parts in each Brigade sector and thereafter to defeat localised enemy in detail. The building of SAFTI city is to enable the deployment of a brigade to train there. Two additional points to note:

One, Singapore is not a mega city. A megacity is a very large city, typically with a population of more than 10 million people​

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Two, the building of underground bunkers and bomb shelters is about resilience to attack.​

There is no attempt to create a fort because that is not the plan to defend Singapore. Using a decision-making model based on PESTEL (Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, and Legal) analysis, AHP (Analytical Hierarchical Process), and game theory, it would be clear that fortification is not a viable strategy for Singapore.

Likewise, the Malaysians themselves have a published master’s level game theory thesis for the 2013 Lahad Datu conflict, wherein foreign intruders occupied a village. The Malaysian government, ultimately, launched a military operation to clear the area. The focus of their study is the decision-making processes of the two rational actors in this case—the Malaysian Prime Minister and the Sultan of Sulu. Game theory and AHP provided structured framework for investigation, particularly in subjective assessment. Each player is assessed by a particular set of criteria independent from the other’s criteria. To support these tools, and they analyzed available literature to formulate PESTEL attributes, which could affect both parties’ payoffs in the construct. The combined application of these tools—PESTEL analysis, AHP, and game theory—demonstrates how they mitigate each other’s weaknesses. The utility of this model is twofold:

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(1) it makes the analysis of decisions taken in the past more insightful; and​

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(2) it provides a framework for choosing the optimal course of action when making a decision.​

Now from my perspective, engaging in building-to-building, block by block fighting within Singapore is tactic of last resort and not something which should be looked at as any sort of primary set of responses.

Agreed.

In most cases, an army would want to let civilians evacuate the battlespace. And provide aid through civil military relations battalions for such displaced persons (and I know the CO of a SAF civil military relations battalion). As David Boey had shared in 2014:

​

“It is reassuring to nurse the opinion that Civil Military Relations (CMR) have matured in the SAF to such an extent that a number of battalions which is not small have been earmarked for dedicated CMR duty. Remember that every battalion that performs CMR is one battalion less on the front line. And this calculus illustrates how seriously the SAF views the issue of non-combatants in an AO.​

...​

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Indeed, one Malaysian military professional has indicated to this blog that the population in Johor will not be evacuated... but left in place as a strategic burden.. In peace and war, civilians in Johor will need food and water, power for their homes and offices and a sewer system that works... In addition to all this, civilians in war will need some sense when the madness will subside. If the occupying force cannot provide the succour Johor residents will need, you can bet your last dollar that civil disorder will break out.”​

 

[CheeZe]

On a silly note, the infamous Russian hand puppet commissar has made a video on a hypothetical Malaysia vs. Singapore.

Here it is so you can all have a laugh.

It seems really unrealistic and overly simplistic. The comments are, well, YouTube comments. But if I'm wrong in my judgment, do let me know and why!

 

[OPSSG]

...the infamous Russian hand puppet commissar has made a video on a hypothetical Malaysia vs. Singapore.

1. This Binkov's Battlegrounds video:

(i) wrongly assumes that both causeways will be blown up without being rebuilt (the Woodlands Causeway, pipes in raw water from Johor) and the Singapore Army can easily cross the Strait of Johor — with its Terrex ICVs and the MG3s joined as rafts to carry MBTs;​

​

(ii) illogically assumes Singapore will take a week1 to establish a forward defence sector in the west of Johor — Binkov's Battlegrounds basic battle geometry is wrong. Singapore’s forward defence forces have to secure the causeway (plus the water catchment area in Johor and pump stations) and then flow forces to other ancillary lines of effort;​

(iii) disrespectfully and without basis assumes that the Singapore Army’s forward defence divisions, namely, the 3rd, 6th, 9th, 21st (AOR) and 25th (AOR) divisions are incompetent;​

(iv) grossly underestimates the SAF’s demonstrated amphibious capability at Ex Trident; plus RSN’s fleet of Fast Craft Equipment & Personnel (FCEP) and Fast Craft Utility (FCU) can easily fight across and ford the Singapore Straits.​

The 27m x 6.8m FCU can carry up to 30 tons (a Hunter IFV or a Bionix II) and the 43m x 6.8m FCU can carry up to 75 tons (a Leopard 2 SG);​

​

(v) conveniently and without basis assumes that Singapore’s 21st Division, supported by 3 squadrons of troop lift helicopters (32 Super Pumas and 15 CH-47Ds/CH-47SDs) and four 7,600 ton Endurance Class LPDs (each carrying ten 13m FCEPs, four 27m FCUs and FBS sections) are tactically incompetent — Binkov's Battlegrounds illogically assumes that the SAF’s heliborne operations would insert Guardsmen less than 18km into the enemy’s depth (when it has confirmed that the SAF is capable of deep battle*2). A heliborne brigade can be inserted into LZs that are over 200km from the forward edge of the battlefield;​

(vi) strangely and without basis assumes that the Malaysian Army will be given time to send reinforcements, a month after fighting has commenced or that a stalemate can occur in Johor (as Binkov's Battlegrounds does not understand the SAF’s actual mobilisation speed or its force structure designed for regional overmatch); and​

(vii) ignores the strategic value of the SAF holding at risk all three northwards axis of advance, via a “thunder run”, as a phase 2 plan after an initial forward defence sector is established. The essence of a 357km “thunder run” is the intent to deal a psychological blow to the defenders of Putrajaya and to avoid a prolonged fight in Johor. To do this, Singapore’s Leopard 2SG and Hunter/Bionix armoured battalions, attacking as Singapore Armoured Brigades, namely, the 4th, 8th, 54th or 56th SABs (tasked as necessary), would target strategic objectives instead of street-to-street fighting.​

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*1 On 14 Jan 2003, the tabloid providing a dramatization of Dr. Tim Huxley's book "Defending the Lion City", has the following war scenario, as wild imaginings of The Malay Mail writers:​

"It's 4am. The early morning calm is suddenly shattered by the deafening screams of low-flying jets. Seconds later, Kuantan air base is rocked by multiple explosions, followed by "secondaries" as Malaysia's air assets in aircraft shelters and revetments are obliterated. Klaxons blaring, pilots are scrambled to whichever aircraft that are still air-worthy, but it's useless. The runways had been cratered. In the ensuing confusion, reports start streaming in. It seems that this is not an isolated case. Butterworth checks in and reports that its entire complement of F/A-18D Hornets are now smoking, twisted hulks out on the tarmac.​

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And the entire Third Division which has overall command over Johor and Malacca had also been annihilated.The National Power Grid had not been spared, plunging the entire country in darkness, adding to the chaos and confusion. Reports also indicated that the Ministry of Defence building in Jalan Padang Tembak, Kuala Lumpur, had been hit by at least six GBU-31 1,000-pound JDAMs (Joint Direct Attack Munitions). Even the KLCC had been struck with such ferocity that only the Maxis Tower was left standing. On Bukit Nanas, only a blackened stump is left of what used to be the Kuala Lumpur Tower. Down in Johor and Malacca, the situation is much worse. A torrent of armoured vehicles, including tanks, are hogging all the roads linking Johor Baru to Muar and Kota Tinggi, disgorging armed soldiers who took over all the towns.​

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Senai airport, captured in a pre-dawn attack was being used by the helicopters and planes taking part in the on-going offensive. On the North-South Expressway, main battle tanks and armoured fighting vehicles together with towed artillery with fighter jets and attack helicopters providing close support were going north, destination unknown. Reports of troops landing from helicopters were coming in from all over Johor, from Mersing to Muar. By noon, Johoreans find themselves under Singapore military rule."​

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*2 Teo Chee Hean, speaking in 2008 as the then Minister of Defence said:​

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“...This exercise confirms the SAF's capability to have comprehensive awareness and precision strike on multiple targets.... This is done by integrating a network of sensors and shooters.... What this means is that the SAF division now has the capability to see first and to strike first well into the division's depths and that means that the division is able to influence the battle well into the depth.”​

2. With 7 facts, assumptions and strategic thinking, wrong, it is hard for the analysis by Binkov's Battlegrounds to be seen as credible.

It seems really unrealistic and overly simplistic.

3. I agree and I think the scenario drawn by Binkov's Battlegrounds lacks respect for the Malaysians. The Malaysian Army has motorised divisions (eg. operates 48 PT-91Ms, 211 ACV 300s, and 257 AV-8s) and is capable of Network Centric Operations. The Malaysian 3rd Division and the 10th Parachute Brigade, as the first to fight, would want to engage the SAF in motti or pocket battles, by using terrain and strong points keep Singaporean troops headed north, road bound and cut them off into isolated pockets from logistic support and mutual support.

4. Using a decision-making model based on PESTEL (Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, and Legal) analysis, AHP (Analytical Hierarchical Process), and game theory, it would be clear that the video is unrealistic and overly simplistic.

5. The Malaysians are capable of conducting their own game theory analysis to determine the weaknesses of Singapore’s forward defence strategy. Their plan is to use terrain to select motti battles to trade space for time — plus using their divisional reserves and their 6 ASTROS II artillery batteries, judiciously — to prolong the dispute/fighting. We must assume that the Malaysians are tactically competent and not act in an illogical manner. I believe that the Malaysians will not disregard their own PESTEL and AHP models (as suggested the scenario set in Binkov's Battlegrounds) as it is against their interest.

The comments are, well, YouTube comments. But if I'm wrong in my judgment, do let me know and why!

6. I was initially tempted to explain what was wrong with the war plans illustrated in this Binkov's Battlegrounds video but realised that such explanation at that level of detail will lead to numerous disputes within this thread. It is better choose the more simple route. In my first point, I chose to explain what is wrong by pointing out the 7 mistaken facts, assumptions and strategic thinking rather than detail what is wrong with his proposed war outcome.

7. I trust my debunking of some the assumptions is a useful thinking aid to help you construct your arguments against the silly scenario set in Binkov's Battlegrounds. I will be interested to hear what you think.

 

[CheeZe]

FWIW, I enjoyed reading your post!

I noticed several flaws in the video's premise myself.

1. Binkov doesn't seem to understand the construction and modification of roadways into ad-hoc airstrips in Singapore. He seems to be assuming that the RSAF's landing strips will be quickly neutralized and that those formal airbases are the only ones Singapore could ever use.

2. The video assumes that the infantry on both sides are equally skilled, trained, and equipped. In addition, that they fight in the same manner. I question that assumption, since it is well known that the SAF relies on technology as a force multiplier.

3. The RSN plays a relatively minor role in the ground conflict compared to the Army and RSAF. I would think that the RSN adds to the SAM network protecting Singapore and can add naval gunfire support. In addition, I noticed that the video chose to omit the Independence and Invincible classes, which would add even more teeth to the RSN.

4. I am in agreement with you about how flawed the video believes the SAF's amphibious capability is. It was absolutely nonsensical how the video portrayed that capability as limited.

5. The Malaysian armour was particularly neglected. I was surprised by the fact that the only mention of them was really as improvised artillery. While T-72 derivatives are considered "less capable" than a modernized Leopard 2A4, I still wouldn't want to be the infantryman coming up against them.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 1 of 2: What others wrote on defending the Lion City

@CheeZe, thank you for raising 5 flaws in the Binkov's Battlegrounds video premise. Given 0bserver’s responses in the prior page, let me raise some points, a few of which I previously shared in another 2014 thread for context:

1. The SAF is not called the Singapore Defence Forces — because other than 2PDF — all other army divisions are forward deployment forces. This is why the SAF's mission in furtherance of Singapore's forward defence posture is as follows:-

"To enhance Singapore's peace and security through deterrence and diplomacy, and should these fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory over the aggressor."​

​

2. I see Singapore's current defence strategy as developing escalation options and a certain level of resilience to attack — where the SAF can take an attack, defend against it and conduct a rapid counter offensive. If a US or a PLA general was asked to defend Singapore, within Singapore, the hypothetical general may tell you that such a plan is foolish or that it cannot be done effectively. Hence the need to take the fight outside of Singapore (also called a pre- emptive strike), as a defender confined to only within Singapore is at a tactical disadvantage.

3. In geographic terms, the defence of Malaysia-Singapore is indivisible. If a hostile aggressor invades West Malaysia, the SAF cannot stand idle, and Singapore will be drawn into the conflict. Further, West Malaysia is a peninsular with a limited width in the frontage, hence the terrain is only suitable for the deployment of a division+ or at max 2 divisions. There are items to clarify, as follows:-

One, the SAF's ability to respond within hours and with decisive force on an act of aggression pre-disposes a regional challenge geared towards either an asymmetric or non-state action;​

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Two, I am also of the view that it is very unlikely that Malaysia would attack Singapore or cross any of the 3 redlines — as such acts are unambiguous acts of war — these are acts for which the SAF will punish — which would have negative consequences for Malaysia; and​

​

Three, other powers, much more powerful than Singapore may intervene in coalition with the SAF to remove the threat to a key port that serves the Indo-Pacific region.​

​

4. Insights from a NBR Analysis (Vo. 14, No. 2, Aug 2003) titled: "Theater Security Cooperation in the U.S. Pacific Command: An Assessment and Projection" by Sheldon W. Simon, from over 17 years ago, reinforce some of the core issues discussed here. As the Americans noted in this report, Singapore believes defense is our own responsibility. While the SAF desires inter-operability with other forces it is also designed to operate on it's own, if need be. I quote a small section of what he wrote and in particular, what he said about Singapore:

"Of America’s three closest Southeast Asian security partners... only Singapore’s armed forces are sufficiently technologically proficient to interact with U.S. forces in a manner comparable to Japan, the ROK, and Australia...​

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Singapore’s defense concerns focus entirely on its own neighborhood... Singapore is the only Southeast Asian military to have an active rapid deployment force, which operates in an integrated manner with the navy and air force...​

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While the city-state prefers U.S. defense technology because of its superiority and logistical advantages, Singapore also maintains a complex system of licensed production, assembly, and technology agreements with Britain, France, Italy, Israel, Thailand, Sweden, and Taiwan...​

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The United States has solidified its security ties to Singapore with a logistics facility, which provides a surge capacity during crises... Moreover, the new Changi Naval Base, with its deep-water capability, permits the berthing of U.S. Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. Despite these close ties, Singapore is not completely satisfied with its U.S. defense relationship. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) desires full technology release on all systems it purchases. That is, Singapore wishes to have the right to modify U.S. technology to fit its own needs...​

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At bottom, Singapore believes defense to be essentially its own responsibility. What it wants from the United States, therefore, is increased technology transfer to enhance its independent military capability...​

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...although some anti-piracy cooperation occurs among the littoral states, obstacles remain... This is a particular problem when pirates flee into Indonesian waters among that country’s thousands of islands..."​

5. With the induction of the Terrex (2009) and Belrex (2016), the SAF has progressively become more mechanized.

6. Singapore's training standards, especially for its Army Deployment Force, is intense and high. The SAF is hard to fight against because it proficient in integrating and using the technology acquired to optimise its platforms within its force structure.

7. Over the last 2 decades, the Singapore Army has changed the way and methods it uses for training. In Dec 2004, Chief of Army witnessed the symbolic handover of the sub-units of 1 PDF to TRADOC and other divisions — the Command HQ of 1 PDF was closed. Given the declining birth rate the solution is to improve the capability of the Army by opening the Force Preparation Centre (FPC), under the Peace Support Operations Development Group (PSO-DG) to better train and support troops deployed abroad. For lessons:

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(i) affecting current operations in support of CTF-151 or in Iraq (or past operations in Afghanistan), PSO-DG collaborates with partners to review, refine and develop new Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), to ensure that feedback from troops in-theatre are kept updated for the next batch being deployed; and​

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(ii) relevant for the Singapore Army, TRADOC becomes involved. An example of this type of change, has been the Army wide change in the way our soldiers are trained for urban warfare.​

9. In the book, ‘Defending the Lion City’, Dr. Tim Huxley chronicles the evolution of Singapore's strategy. In the early years, Singapore used the analogy of a 'poisonous shrimp' (small but indigestible by predators) to define its military strategy. The idea was that any aggressor would find that the costs of attempting to invade and occupy Singapore outweighed any conceivable benefits. By the 1990s, the emphasis it grew from a 'poisonous shrimp' to enabling the SAF to achieve a 'swift and decisive victory' over aggressors. This was because the 'poisonous shrimp' strategy was deficient in that it merely offered Singapore a choice of 'suicide or surrender'. According to Dr. Tim Huxley:

"the key to understanding Singapore's strategy, is that the SAF's clear capability to inflict severe damage on Malaysia (by implication creating serious political and economic repercussions for Singapore) is not intended to be used. The capability is a deterrent...”​

10. The last amphibious assault that is relevant to Singapore’s force modernisation efforts is Operation Sutton (21–25 May 1982), where the Royal Navy (RN) was required to conduct a landing without air superiority (except for certain window periods with only 28 Sea Harriers and 14 Harrier GR3s); resulting in significant shipping losses to air attacks.

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(i) Establishing the Beach Support Area (BSA) took longer than expected because after the first air attack at San Carlos, stores ships were withdrawn with only those unloading allowed in the area. The enemy action had an effect on the build up in a way that was simply not envisaged. These delays meant RN vessels had to endure more punishment in Bomb Alley.​

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(ii) The inability to build up the BSA at speed had a real impact on losses — a lack of palletisation and poor-quality packing materials created many needless delays. The Argentine air attacks proved devastating. In May 1982 the air attacks sank 2 destroyers, 2 frigates, a landing ship, and the Atlantic Conveyor. Nine other ships would have been lost had the bombs that hit them detonated.​

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(iv) In addition to the air attacks on British fleet, the Argentine air force attacked the beach head which was defended by Rapier surface to air missiles. The Rapiers were also intended to protect the British naval ships around San Carlos. Once ashore, three Skyhawks dropped twelve bombs on the brigade maintenance area, killing six men, wounding twenty-seven, and starting a major fire in 45 Commando’s heavy weapons ammunition dump. Brigadier Thompson visited the area, profoundly alarmed. The entire brigade’s operations had been planned on the assumption of keeping its logistics afloat. The [Argentine’s] air assault had forced them to instead to create huge dumps [on land] at Ajax Bay.​

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(v) Unsurprisingly, many of the  amphibious and logistics  issues faced by the RN in 1982 remain as valuable lessons learnt for the SAF.​

 

[OPSSG]

Post 2 of 2: Thinking about gaps in this analysis

11. Beyond acquiring the best in class military platforms with appropriate technology inserts for a war fighting edge, like:

(i) placing an order for the American designed STOVL Lockheed Martin F-35B (equipped with a Helmet Mounted Display made by a JV between Elbit Systems and Rockwell Collins Vision Systems to fully utilise the Distributed Aperture System in the F-35). A STOVL capability ensures sustained sortie generation in the event of attacks on Singapore's airbases. STOVL aircraft can be dispersed, hidden and can use alternate runways when an airbase is made unavailable;​

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1047745307289812992

(ii) choosing the French designed H225M medium lift helicopter from Airbus Helicopters (equipped with the Thales TopOwl helmet-mounted display to reduce pilot workload) to replace its fleet of Super Pumas. Figures released by Airbus Helicopters in Jan 2017 indicate that Singapore has placed an initial order of 16 H225Ms (with deliveries starting in 2020);​

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(iii) specifying Israeli designed ELK-1891 Ku-band SATCOM from IAI/ELTA and the All-in-Small aircraft self-protection system from Ebit Systems for Singapore’s 16 brand new CH-47F Chinooks made by Boeing (to be acquired by direct commercial sale from the US) and it’s 20 upgraded AH-64D Saraf Apaches. Under the US$103 million contract, Elbit Systems will fit the customer’s helicopters with complete EW suites, including countermeasure systems. Elbit says the EW suites will provide the helicopters with advanced protection to achieve the customer’s operational requirements;​

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(iv) integrating the ELTA ELM-2311-based Safari Weapon Locating Radar on the Bronco, giving the SAF’s forward defence divisions a CRAM (Counter Rocket, Artillery, Mortar) capability. Details SAFARI’s performance was not revealed. However, the performance should be an improvement on the Swedish ARTHUR WLR that was deployed by the SAF in 2009 to provide force protection for ISAF personnel in Tarin Kowt; with a 100% detection rate over its 15 month long deployment in Afghanistan. The ARTHUR WLR has a detection range of up 60 km and can be brought into action with 5 minutes by a crew of 11 men;​

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1192023313956163586

(v) working with Airbus to achieve fully automatic air-to-air refuelling (A3R) operation on its 6 newly acquired A330MRTTs. The A3R system requires no additional equipment on the receiver aircraft and is intended to reduce air refuelling operator workload, improve safety and optimise the rate of air-to air refuelling transfer in operational conditions. It was announced during the Singapore Airshow 2020 that the Singapore will provide a A330 MRTT tanker take part in the ongoing development, flight test campaign and final certification program, with it being the first customer to sign up to the A3R program; and​

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(vi) customising the four 2,200 ton TKMS Type 218SGs from Germany to SUBSAFE, MIL-STD-882E and local requirements. DSTA’s Integrated Programme Management Team (IPMT) based in Germany adopted a safety framework that incorporates the Naval Sea System Command SUBSAFE programme and MIL-STD-882E. These submarines have the option to employ the Callisto B submarine communication system, the FL1800U electronic warfare system and the TAU 2000 torpedo countermeasures system — with four launch containers, each with up to ten discharge tubes,​

the SAF is also an adaptive and learning organisation.

12. Recognising that the face of the likely battlefield has changed, the country is building a new SAFTI city (scheduled to open progressively from 2023). SAFTI City will have simulated battlefield effects and interactive targets — where a soldier's reactions can be tested in various scenarios. It could include attacks from enemy artillery strikes or snipers. Battlefield instrumentation, video cameras will track exercise troops’ performance in real time. And how they perform, whether individually or as a unit will allow them through after action review to learn from their mistakes. SAFTI City’s layout can be pre-configured so that the right lessons are learnt by the exercise troops.

13. Further, there five things to note about preparing for forward defence, that I am sure you are aware of:-

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1243009137669103617

(i) the most dangerous war may not be the most likely (the chance of occurrence of an event be it 0.1%, 1% or higher). I expect that any attack on Singapore will start with a deniable action — similar to the torpedo attack on ROKS Cheonan occurred on 26 March 2010;​

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(ii) you can only fight where your logistics reach; and the reach where it matters is the last mile. More important than the front-line fighting vehicles, the progressive upgrading and customisation of SAF's logistics vehicle fleet holds important clues of actual defence science and operational capability — including the weight, space and power reserves on the platform to add the SAF’s selected APS system (choice made in 2011) — the use of DSO’s locally developed transparent armour (at a materials science level) in the windows and windshield to provide multi-hit resistance capability;​

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(iii) there may be little room for ground maneuver with certain terrain features in an AO that must be captured; and once a SAF unit is deployed within an urban area, to achieve specific national objectives, it is stuck there until resupply or relief in place arrives;​

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(iv) just because the SAF wants to meet in decisive battle does not mean that the enemy will do so; and​

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(v) just because Singapore wants to stop the war (and declare mission accomplished, after a 'swift and decisive victory'), it does not mean that the enemy will stop fighting because the enemy gets a vote.​

14. Having been dealt a geo-strategically disadvantaged hand at the country's formation on 9 August 1965 in the mist of tension with its ambitious neighbours, Singapore has to build military capabilities that it needs, first, and that has been the country's singular focus since August 1967, when the law for universal conscription of male citizens was passed.

15. As Lee Kuan Yew once said, a small country like Singapore seeks a maximum number of friends, while maintaining the freedom to be itself as a sovereign and independent nation. Both parts of the equation – a maximum number of friends and freedom to be act — are equally important and inter-related.

 

[Bozoo2]

Please excuse my intrusion into this thread, but I really need some input.

I have for the last 40 years buildt a defence force in H0 Scale establishing a defence force that, presumably, would function in real life. To see what this is about, please check Midtguardia Defence Forces in Military Models. The thing is, I am currently establishing the recon Batallion of the Midtguardian 1. division and I am a little bit at a loss as to how to organize this.

Looking through this thread it seems that the Singapore Armed Forces are very much comparable to that of the Midtguardian, although Midtguardia seems to have about half the military Power of SAF, but somewhat more Space to fight.

The question is how to organize and equip the recon BN. It would serve the 1. division With about 12.000 personell organized as 8 infantry BN's, an armoured BN, air-defence, arty, engineer, transport, signals, maintenance and some smaller units.

The current organization is 8 Luchs armoured recon cars, 8 M41 Walker Bulldog light tanks With ground radar and Three UAVs of indeginous design.

There are some recon Resources specifically tied to Div HQ (Fox armoured cars), some specifically tied to engineer BN (Fennecks used for engineer recon) and some With the MP BN (route recon). There is a recon liasson unit at Div HQ that ties in With 2. div Military Intelligence BN, the CIPC ( Central Intelligence Proscessing Centre, and air-force recon With RF4G recion jets. There are also an IADS system With four AN/TPS-74 search radars and AN/TPQ 36 and 37 fire finding radars.

Finally there is a fully fledged combat recon squadron in the 2. div. armoured Brigade With 9 IVIS M1A2 MBTs and 12 Fennecks With UAVs, but this is outside the 1. division organization.

How is this organized in the SAF? Any suggestions?

 

[Lone Ranger]

If not mistaken, SAF used to have Armoured Recce battalion at the Divisional level. However with its 3G evolution, Armoured Recce battalion was dropped in favor of a new "C4I" unit and this was implemented across higher echelon HQ, ie all Brigade and Divisional HQs. The information on this is fluid but it is suspected to have at least 2 different setups, and within each there might be minor differences among them.

In general, most of them are make up of a HQ coy with 4 operation coys, namely Signal/C4 coy, SATCom coy, RSTA coy and a Tactical UAV coy.

You might want to check out this facebook link for their first evaluation. (Many lessons were learned after this )

 

[Bozoo2]

In general, most of them are make up of a HQ coy with 4 operation coys, namely Signal/C4 coy, SATCom coy, RSTA coy and a Tactical UAV coy.

You might want to check out this facebook link for their first evaluation. (Many lessons were learned after this )

The Midtguardian 1. division has a dedicated signals BN which Connects the various BN's to Div HQ and other batallions through the Ptarmigan II MSE com system that also provides Satcom. As far as I understand there is no need for Signals coy in the Recon BN as this service is provided by the Signals BN.

There would have to be a BN HQ of coarse to task the BNs recon Resources in coherence With Div HQ requirements, but I don't beleive its necessary to Field a dedicated Signals coy, although there will be signals BN units present in the Recon BN HQ.

As far as I can understand, the Recon BNs missions would mainly be to establish visuial contact With the enemy, keep up this contact and report enemy movements to BN HQ while avoiding skirmishing as far as possible. I also foresee the need to quickly approach specific locations during an advance in front of own forces to occupy special positions in advance, and in defence/retreat to stay in Visual contact With enemy forces and report on these.

There is also the need to establish the specifics of enemy deployment before engaging own forces in an attack.

I am thinking on the lines of two 12 vehicle strong recon coys with drone equipped Fenneck armoured recon vehicles, as well as a foreward recon HQ. Does this sound sensible? For your information, 2. div SpecOps has two long range recon teams that may be used when availiable.

What does RSTA mean?