The best strategy to defending Singapore Island

[OPSSG]

One thing I personally find very surprising is the work of the Singapore defense industry. They have impressive domestic R&D capability... It shows a persistent political will and commitment of resources, especially in the post-Cold War era when many other nations consistently cut their defense spending.

Thanks for your kind words. Let me share the trade-offs and decisions made by the defence eco-system:

1. The roots of this R&D and defence industrial base efforts goes back to 1972, when Dr Goh Keng Swee, then Minister for Defence, handpicked three newly graduated engineers to study Electronic Warfare (EW), for a naval platform. The group of 3 called themselves the Electronics Test Centre (ETC) and started the path towards developing defence technologies for Singapore. Beyond cultivating close defence ties with foreign suppliers and giving thanks to Oman, Thailand, UAE and UK for buying Singapore made weapons and ships, the eco-system is also grateful to external institutions like:

(i) the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California, which was instrumental in training our personnel to help Singapore integrate the E-2Cs into the Republic of Singapore Air Force’s command and control information systems, whose origins can be traced to the mid-1980s. Further, 12 engineers from DSO were attached to the then Grumman Corporation to participate in the design, development, coding and testing of the E-2C’s software — this was a building block for the C2 software development in MINDEF. This significant investment would later pay off in the E-2C upgrade and Frigate C2 development for the RSN and helped kick start DSTA’s system of systems engineering approach; and​

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(ii) ONERA Supelec (Ecole Supérieure d'Electricité - France), which joined with the National University of Singapore (NUS) and DSO (Singapore’s national defense R&D organization), to create SONDRA a joint France-Singapore laboratory. At SONDRA, a Singaporean-French team of researchers will focus and conduct defence R&D in the areas of advanced electromagnetics and radar. In the future, research may be expanded to other areas of mutual interest.​

2. These linkages are like seeds that grow into trees for Singapore’s limited but focused efforts on defence procurement, EW and R&D. More importantly, these institutional linkages enable many of our scientists and engineers to get the necessary science and engineering foundation and their continuing education after they start work. As you correctly noted, Singapore is committed to investing and developing its defence industrial base, R&D base, EW capabilities and acquisition expertise; but is not doing it alone. Working in defence science partnerships with the Americans, the French, the Germans, the Swedes, the Israelis and others, enable Singapore to go further than travelling alone. The goal is to collaborate to go far; not just go fast. For example, in conjunction with the launch of RSS Invincible (Type 218SG), DSTA signed a MOU with the manufacturer thyssenkrupp Marine Systems to open up new avenues for technology collaboration. Under the MOU, both organisations will explore the use of additive manufacturing as an innovative and cost-effective method for producing submarine spare parts.

3. Over the longer term, these investments in DSO and DSTA will enable Singapore to spend less over the life cycle of a platform (be it a ship, aircraft or any other platform) by deciding where innovation is required upfront/at IOC, what features to permanently forgo and what to delay in implantation (while waiting for the technology to mature). For example:

• The ‘Design for Support’ approach was also incorporated upfront to deliver a Littoral Mission Vessel (LMV) that is easy to manage, operate, maintain and train. DSTA implemented a Swedish made composite topside and stacked-mast for the RSN. Inspected by the Försvarets materielverk (Swedish Defence Materiel Administration) before delivery to Singapore, the stacked mast reduces topside weight, maximises sensor coverage while providing an enclosed environment for the equipment, thereby improving equipment and system reliability. The ease of access to the equipment allows maintenance to be carried out more efficiently without the need for erecting external staging, compared to traditional open mast designs. Further, to optimise manpower required to operate the LMV for maritime security operations, DSTA integrated and co-located the three distinct control areas, namely the Bridge, Combat Information Centre and Machinery Control Room into a single location.
  
• There are no details on whether the RSN has elected to install the NG MICA on the LMV. French DGA is due to give its approval for production in 2026 (enabling the RSN to retire the cost effective anti-missile capability provided by the Barak 1 on the upgraded Victory class). More specifically, the NG MICA infrared seeker will use a matrix sensor providing greater sensitivity. Meanwhile the radio frequency seeker will use be AESA, enabling smart detection strategies. The reduced volume of electronic components within MICA NG will allow it to carry a larger quantity of propellant, increasing range. Utilising a new double-pulse rocket motor will also provide additional energy to the missile at the end of its flight to improve its ability to intercept targets at long range. The integration of the NG MICA with the Thales NS100 will be a spiral upgrade for the LMVs that requires French support at their instrumented range.
• The UAV pilot and payload operator were previously segregated roles which required separate training. To achieve greater flexibility in employing the limited manpower resource, the Singapore team required Israel Aerospace Industries to integrate the two roles through a unified flight and payload training programme. DSTA broke new ground in the development of the Ground Control Station (GCS) software and the datalink system for the Heron 1 UAV. The GCS software specification is key to reducing operating and training costs.
• The F-15SG acquisition team anticipated that a newer version of the aircraft’s engine would be available soon. As the newer General Electric F110 engine requires one less overhaul cycle during its lifetime, the F-15SG acquisition team recommended to hold the purchase of spare engines and to acquire the most advanced version in the market, at a later date. This achieved a total cost savings of more than US$10 million per life cycle for spare engines.

4. The Hunter Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) Team, comprising members from DSTA, Singapore Army and ST Engineering, clinched the 2019 DTP Team (Engineering) Award for designing and developing the Singapore Army’s first fully digitalised fighting platform that has the option of being equipped with the Trophy Active Protection System on the SAMSON Turret. The team adopted a new model-based systems engineering and design to create the first-of-its-kind Integrated Combat Cockpit, which would enable the Hunter AFV’s crew to collaborate effectively with one another and engage targets rapidly. The five Hunter variants - Combat, Command, Bridgelayer, Recovery and Armoured Engineer - have features that make this new class of AFV unique. Sensors on the Hunter give the crew a 360-degree view around the vehicle. At the heart of the digitalised combat platform is the battlefield management system, ARTEMIS that improves the Hunter's situational awareness in all weather and for non-line of sight (NLOS) applications, given that the Hunter has 2 NLOS missiles in the SAMSON Turret supplied by Rafael.

5. The Hunter AFV’s successful development in Singapore, with its Integrated Combat Cockpit, has triggered Israel to launch the Carmel armored fighting vehicle project under its Weapons Development Administration (known in Hebrew by its acronym Mafat). As part of the program, the Mafat gave Elbit, Rafael and Israel Aerospace Industries — the task of testing the feasibility of a closed tank that is operated by only two soldiers, instead of the current four, and encouraged them to integrate as many “automatic and autonomous systems as possible” in order to function as a “third soldier” of sorts, the ministry spokesperson said.

6. Most importantly, the Singapore defence ecology dares to dream and take some risk, with ST Engineering competing for contracts in the US, Europe and Middle East. They are also paying for and integrating systems without a launch customer for Europe (based on their understanding of the market) — the Bronco 3, paired with the 120 mm Super Rapid Advanced Mortar System Mk II along with IAI’s Green Rock C-RAM, is a good example of this incremental risk taking approach.

 

[OPSSG]

Singapore’s evolving approach to the cyber domain and counter terrorism

1. Defending Singapore has moved to improving defence of and mitigation measures, should a successful attack occurs, in the cyber domain. Malicious cyberattacks can and do debilitate entire systems, disrupt the economy and daily lives, and even lead to injury and death. The December 2015 cyberattack on Ukraine’s power grid left 230,000 people without electricity for up to 6 hours, in the middle of a winter night. In 2017, the WannaCry ransomware attack crippled the operations of about one-third of public hospitals in the UK and caused over 19,000 appointments to be cancelled. What happened in Ukraine and the UK could just as easily happen in Singapore. The very connectivity that Singapore relies on for economic growth and efficient public services, also leaves the country vulnerable to threats from the digital domain. Hybrid operations involving hostile information campaigns and the spread of deliberate online falsehoods are an especially pernicious threat. They can foment distrust between ethnic and religious communities, weaken social cohesion, and trigger violence. Deliberate online falsehoods pose a particularly serious threat to Singapore given our high Internet penetration and multi-ethnic, multi-religious society.

2. Increasingly any SAF operations conducted, even for peace support missions, will need support in the cyber domain. In Feb 2017, Der Spiegel first reported that German soldiers stationed in Lithuania were target of false rape claims. Emails claiming that German soldiers had raped an underage Lithuanian girl were sent to the president of the Lithuanian parliament and various Lithuanian media outlets on 14 Feb 2017. Lithuanian authorities investigated the charges and found no evidence that any of the claims made in the emails were true. Beyond information campaigns, the SAF has a C4ISR system and databases to protect. Fact Sheet: MINDEF and the SAF's Cyber Defence Training. The role of training MINDEF/SAF's cyber defenders is undertaken by two units –

(i) the SAF Cyber Defence School (CDS), established in 2018, which conducts cyber courses and workshops to develop MINDEF/SAF's cyber workforce and to strengthen cyber awareness and cyber hygiene across the organisation — The SAF CDS has commenced the Cyber Defence Operator Course and the Cyber Specialist Cadet Course after it received the pioneer cohort of cyber NSFs (Full-time National Servicemen) in 2018. The school is currently developing its curriculum to extend training to the Command, Control, Communications and Computers Expert (C4X) vocation and the Defence Cyber Executive (DCX) job specialisation.; and​

(ii) the Cyber Defence Test and Evaluation Centre (CyTEC), stood up in 2015, which provides the cyber range facility for the conduct of advanced cyber defence training and exercises — It is able to simulate malware and attacks on networks and cybersecurity appliances, in a virtual sandbox environment, which is segregated from actual operational networks. CyTEC is also able to simulate cyber-attacks with varying intensity and sophistication to test cyber defenders' skillsets and responses in realistic scenarios. Such training sharpens the proficiencies of cyber defenders operating in the Cyber Security Operations Centres and in the Computer Incident Response Teams.​

3. The Defence Cyber Organisation (DCO) leads and drives cybersecurity across the Defence Sector, comprising six sub-sectors- the SAF, MINDEF, DSTA, DSO, Defence Industry and MINDEF-Related Organisations (MRO). See: Malware Incidents at HMI Institute of Health Sciences Pte Ltd and ST Logistics Pte Ltd. The weak link seems to be at the MRO level — in 2 data incidents:

• the HMI Institute of Health Sciences said that it discovered a file server to be encrypted by ransomware on 4 Dec 2019. The affected server, which primarily contained backup information, was immediately taken offline and isolated from the Internet and internal network, HMI Institute said in a media advisory. The institute added that its learning management system was not impacted and that daily operations were “unaffected and continued as usual”. Preliminary investigations indicated that the likelihood of a data leak to external parties was low, MINDEF said, adding that the affected system contained personal data of 120,000 individuals. This included the full names and NRIC numbers of about 98,000 MINDEF and SAF personnel who previously attended a cardiopulmonary resuscitation and automated external defibrillation (AED) course.

• the personal data of 2,400 MINDEF and SAF personnel may be affected by a potential ST Logistics personal data breach. ST Logistics said in a media release on 21 Dec 2019 that the potential breach was a result of a recent series of email phishing activities involving malicious malware sent to its employees’ email accounts.
  The company operates several logistics services, including an eMart retail and equipping servicefor MINDEF and SAF personnel since 1999.

4. The 26 Nov 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai, and the 21 Sep 2013 attack Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya demonstrates the use of bold, complex, terror tactics to target civilians in mass casualty events (see this 2016 RSIS article: Cities under siege). In both cases, the response was slow, piecemeal, and confused. The various agencies involved in responding to the terrorist assault were unable to coordinate with one another. Moreover, the police units that initially responded were simply outgunned due to inadequate training and lack of requisite firearms. Further on 13 Nov 2015, eight IS operatives divided into three teams attacked seven different locations in Paris, murdering at least 130 and wounding at least 352 in less than 60 minutes. The attacks targeting a stadium, multiple restaurants, and a concert hall in Paris demonstrated a great degree of coordination and use of multiple tactics, resulting in higher casualties. The attackers were equipped with assault rifles and explosive-laden suicide belts, and operated in a manner reflecting prior training. They maintained a high degree of operational security. The attack was planned in Belgium, giving the terrorists opportunities to discuss operational details free of surveillance by French intelligence, which despite its failures in thwarting the terrorist operation is large, more proactive. During a terrorist commando assault of the 3 incidents mentioned, there is no intent by the attackers to take hostages or negotiate with law enforcement. The longer the attackers remain operational, the more victims will be killed or injured in the attack. Rapid response by available law enforcement and security forces, even if disorganised as seen in the initial response in both Nairobi and Mumbai, saves lives during the early phase of an active shooter attack. First responders to an attack of this type must consider the possibility of advanced tactics by the terrorists including:

(i) ambushes targeted on first responders;

(ii) supporting sniper fire;

(iii) the possibility of remotely controlled improvised explosive devices emplaced near command posts or staging areas; and

(iv) diversionary explosions in vehicles or in public places designed to distract and divert security forces.​

5. Learning from these 3 prior terror attacks, the Special Operations Command Centre (SOCC) was commissioned in Dec 2019 to provide the SAF’s Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) with the capability to centrally plan, monitor and manage multiple Counter-Terrorism operations. The SOCC is capable of processing large amounts of data and information from sensors employed and from the cyber domain, to provide a quick assessment of the situation to help commanders decide on the best course of action.

• The SOCC is able to process information from multiple sources including Whole-of-Government sensors, the SAF's internal sources and last-mile surveillance assets such as drones to collate a synchronised situation picture. The integrated structure allows seamless access and sharing of information between SOTF and other government agencies, strengthening cooperation during joint operations.

• The SOCC is also linked with homeland security, the Police and other civil defence related agencies, so that the country can act in concert with the rest of the government when called upon. The networked centre leverages technology to support operational planning and coordination, that includes the cyber domain for improving sense-making for better situational awareness.

The SOCC harnesses technology such as data analytics and artificial intelligence. It provides SOTF planners with an integrated platform to collect, analyse, fuse and make sense of mission essential information. This enables the SOCC to derive richer operational insights by analysing various sources of information and recommending possible courses of action.

 

[OPSSG]

The complicated nature of Taiwan and Singapore relations

1. In 1967, as Lee Kuan Yew (LKY) recounted in his memoirs, From Third World to First, the Singapore government found itself confronted with a pressing need for the military and a lack of space to build up an air force. The Israelis did not have the space and facilities to meet such an unique Singaporean need. LKY was keen that Singapore did not end up completely dependent on the Israelis for military training either. Cue the entry of Taiwan. As Singapore transitioned from a largely British-made aircraft to American aircraft types entailed much adaptation in maintenance practices, tooling, documentation practices and concepts. In view of this, the Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) was invited to help after the British withdrawal as they were one of the more experienced air force in Asia and they operated many US-made aircraft. For example, the ROCAF operated one of the largest fleet of F-5 aircraft then. ROCAF officers and SNCOs were inducted into Singapore airbases to provide the necessary experience in support of its rapid build-up from an air defence command to a fully fledged air force.

2. Over the years, the RSAF took pains to learn from other more established air forces. From an air engineering perspective, in the initial years most of the learning was from the Royal Air Force. This was followed by a period when the ROCAF provided the lead. There were also various periods which saw senior seconded personnel from the US Navy, the US Air Force, the Royal Australian Air Force, the Royal New Zealand Air Force and the Israeli Air Force serving as exchange officers or advisors. In the early days, Taiwan had sent a top-level representative to Singapore to meet with LKY and then defence minister Dr Goh Keng Swee. The exchange of trade missions occurred as far back as 1969, while the signing of “Exercise Starlight” — the agreement that allows Singapore to train infantry, artillery, armour and commando units in Taiwan — occurred in 1975. Taiwan’s Colonel Liu Ching Chuan was once Commander RSAF (renamed as Chief of Air Force), while former Taiwanese officer Khoo Eng An once held the post of Commander RSN (retitled as Chief of Navy). As recent as Oct 2019, Taiwan's Defense Minister Yen De-fa said that Exercise Starlight will continue to operate despite the Oct 2019 signing of the enhanced Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security Cooperation (ADESC) which formalises activities between MINDEF and PLA including port calls, bilateral exercises, mutual visits and cross-attendance of courses. The original ADESC was signed in 2008.

3. Over the last 40 plus years, Beijing could have responded robustly about Singapore's unilateral training in Taiwan, but did not do so. This inaction could not have arisen from ignorance, as the annual training exercises and these command appointments were widely known. The appointments have also been chronicled in SAF coffeetable books. So China’s reticence was done by choice. As David Boey noted, the following incidents were reported by Singapore media and are open source:

• In August 1993, two soldiers from 2 Singapore Infantry Regiment who were riding a motorbike skidded and landed in a drain during a night ride. Both were evacuated by a RSAF C-130 aeromedical flight. One of the soldiers later died from severe head injuries.
• In April 1994, all four persons on board an RSAF 125 Squadron Super Puma on a predawn flight died after the helicopter crashed into a mountain in Taiwan. The crash was so severe that dental records had to be used as a means of identification. Complicating the Mindef news release was the presence of a Taiwanese military officer aboard the helicopter.
• In June 1995, two full-time National Servicemen (NSFs) from 3 Signals died after their vehicle went off a hill in Taiwan.
• In May 2007, two NSFs were killed when a twin-seat Taiwanese F-5F jet fighter crashed into a storeroom located within a Taiwanese military base. Two other NSFs warded at the Taipei Tri-Service Hospital were repatriated aboard a RSAF KC-135R configured as a flying hospital. One of the NSFs died 17 days later in Singapore General Hospital.
• In June 2009, an SAF regular was found motionless in his bunk at a Taiwanese military facility. He was pronounced dead in a hospital in Taiwan. The ammunition technician was in Taiwan to support the SAF’s unilateral training there.
• In Dec 2019, a NSF sustained a cervical spine injury during unilateral parachute training conducted in Taiwan. He was immediately evacuated to the nearest tertiary hospital, where he underwent surgery on 19 & 21 Dec 2019, without complications and is currently stable.

Throughout these dark moments, Beijing maintained a dignified silence, which is appreciated in Singapore. In all the years of SAF activities overseas, Beijing’s acquiescence has been reciprocated by the Lion City’s delicate handling of the matter out of respect to the Middle Kingdom. This approach extends to the Nov 2016 Hong Kong Terrex episode, where all Mindef statements on the matter have left out the very pertinent point of the origin of the shipment. The Nov 2016, China seizure of nine Terrex vehicles shipped through Hong Kong on their return from a training exercise on Taiwan marked a low point in Singapore’s relationship with China

4. In Oct 2017, Ralph Jennings writing for VOA suggested that "Singapore can balance China against Taiwan, an act most countries do not try, because Beijing officials want good relations with [Singapore]." In 1975, when Taiwan helped Singapore, the tiny city state did not have choice for its training locations, unlike today with:

(i) 4 RSAF training detachments in the US, further training detachments in Australia and in France; and

(ii) long term access to army training areas in 10 countries, including Australia, NZ, Thailand, India, Germany and the US.
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I think Jenning’s approach of reading Taiwan-Singapore relations is without insight, slightly misleading, and ahistorical (without consideration of past baggage). Taiwan-Singapore relations are low key but not problem free.

5. OTOH, I see the Beijing- Singapore consideration of sensitivities and past baggage, as mutual, and seeking win-win outcomes to advance the relationship. IMHO, the greatest hinderance to continued good Taipei-Singapore relations lies with its win-lose mentality and it’s illogical local politics. This is why Singapore has been active in reducing its reliance on Taiwan for military training areas.

6. Diplomacy aside, one important dividend that Beijing has cashed in from discrete Taiwan-Singapore relations comes from inculcating its position to tens of thousands of Singaporeans who have trained in Taiwan. This comes about from security briefings to those bound for Taiwan not to talk about SAF training there. For the average Singaporean, who is usually apathetic about regional affairs, a trip to Taiwan downloads the essence of Beijing’s strategic narrative: That there is only one China. That Taiwan is viewed as part of the motherland. And that foreign nationals are not to dabble in Chinese affairs. The dividend China has reaped from such awareness is impossible to quantify. David Boey has suggested that Chinese officials would probably quietly acknowledge it has been invaluable as Beijing reaps the spin-offs for doing virtually nothing.

 

[Lone Ranger]

Follow-on to the above post, I would like to share this infographic, it provides a summary on Hunter's capabilities. What captured my attention is the large unmanned turret (SAMSON RWS ALL-IN-ONE) covering the overhead of both crews and AI compartment, it provides good protection against top attack ammunition for the members in the vehicle.

 

[ngatimozart]

@Lone Ranger one thing to keep in mind is that a lot of armies, especially NATO & other western, have been fighting insurgencies in the last 20 years, so tanks have not been at the forefront of their minds. It's only in the last 12 months that the US Army has suddenly realised that it has a couple of peer competitors, quite capable of giving it a bloody nose, and it's still in COIN mode with 1980s and 1990s gear.

 

[Lone Ranger]

@ngatimozart , agrees with you. Beside focusing on fighting the insurgencies, "peace dividend" from the 90s also led to some countries cutting back their defence posture and shrinking of their armoured forces, creating the gap.

With regards to armoured threat from peer competitors, although there are projects and initiatives (eg Rheinmetall NG 130 mm tank gun) aim to bridge the gap, I suspect the answer may not lies with having another new MBT. For years, many countries (like UK, US and others) are finding ways to revolutionize how battle is fought, and now with battlefield-digitization as witness from the rolling out of Ajax, Hunter and Carmel projects together with system like Fire Weaver, this has open up solutions beyond a single approach - ie armour vs armour. As @OPSSG suggested, Bronco 3 with UAV and loitering munition to support armoured forces can also be a possibility. My humble take.

 

[CheeZe]

Part 1

1. @CheeZe, the 1st question I would ask is:

Q1: Why would Singapore want to spend billions to develop a new MBT (when there are many world class manufacturers to choose from)?​

A: I don't know. Why would Singapore spend billions to create things like the Bionix, Primus, Terrex, Hunter, etc. when there are many world class manufacturers to choose from? I ask from a place of ignorance. Your response comes across as rhetorical as if I would know the answer. Why build its own warships when they could keep buying from Germany or France? Why manufacture the SAR-21 and BR-18 if you can just buy "insert modern 5.56 rifle/carbine here"? If, as you are trying to hint with questions as answers, that it is illogical to develop an MBT because there are already plenty of good options, then so too are all the other local developments listed above. Why bother with weapons R&D at all when you can leave it to the bigger countries with established and experienced arms industries?

There's obviously an answer to why Singapore is bothering to develop and produce platforms domestically. But for some reason, you aren't saying it explicitly and expecting me to either know it already or read your mind. I came looking for an explanation or clarification. If it can't be or done or makes no sense to be done, say so and explain.

2. The 2nd question I would ask is:

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Q2: Where is the low hanging fruit for potential export success in the armoured vehicle market?​

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3. The very expensive Japanese MHI Type-10 tank with a crew of three, and an automatic ammunition loading system, is close to (but does not meet), Singapore’s requirements to replace the AMX-13S1. The 44 to 48 ton MHI Type-10 tank is armed with a 120 mm smoothbore gun, made by Japan Steel Works. The MHI Type-10 autoloader is located in the turret bustle and fires newly developed armor-piercing ammunition that is compatible with all standard 120 mm NATO tank ammunition. MHI Type-10 main battle tank is also fitted with a state-of-the-art semi-active hydropneumatic suspension. The tank can "sit", "stand", "kneel" or to "lean" in any direction. This feature gives a number of advantages, especially operating in mountainous terrain, with some tanks also fitted with a front-mounted dozer blade.

Is the point of weapons development by MinDef for export purposes? Or is it to develop platforms which are tailored to the SAF's needs? I had presumed the latter but your comment, again trying to hint at something which isn't clear to me, indicates that Singapore does want to export its hardware now.

4. The 3rd question I would ask is:

Q3: What is Singapore’s core competence in tank design going to be?​

Is it: the MTU MB-837 Ka501 engine pack (where Germany is the world leader), the gun system and its sights, or the active protection system (where Israel is the world leader)?

5. Given that Singapore imports all our steel (as there is no local steel forge), I hold the view that it is not necessary for the SAF to build our own main battle tanks (MBTs) — the Japanese (MHI Type-10), the Koreans (K2), Indians (Arjun Mk. 2) and Turks (Altay) have their own MBT designs but zero export success. IIRC our tank range on Singapore is so small that we can only fire a sub-caliber for the 120mm main gun and the SAF would have to do all live-fire testing of a new MBT’s main gun and sights overseas.

Wasn't that also true in the 90s when they developed the Bionix? Zero experience but they still did it. If the underlying assumption is, "We can't do it because there are good enough platforms out there already," then why did Singapore even bother embarking on developing its own armaments industry?

6. The 4th question I would ask is:

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Q4: Where would a made Singapore tank stand in the international arms market?​

IIRC 62 of the Leopard 2A7Q was supplied to Qatar for USD2.2 billion between 2013 to 2018. This tank has a number of changes, that are not found of the Danish (44), German (250 to 328) and Hungarian (44) Leopard 2A7 tanks. If you look at the international MBT arms market today, it is so small and competitive. Buyers are spoilt for choice.

7. In today’s market, even UK, the original inventors of tank warfare, would struggle to win a single order for their latest version of the Challenger 2. UK first introduced tanks to the battlefield at the Somme on 15 September 1916.

8. The SAF is the process of buying the 120 mm Super Rapid Advanced Mortar System Mk. II (SRAMS Mk. II) for its motorised infantry battalions that is installed in the Belrex Protected Combat Support Vehicle. Compared to the original SRAMS Mk. I (that fires over the rear arc with elevation limits from +45° to +80°, and a traverse of 40° left and right), the Mk. II will have an all-electric 180 degree traverse and elevation hydraulic system— this is a great product with with a high sales potential.

9. The focus is not on a single platform, rather, it is on delivering a capability for Singapore (supported by ISR, a range of sympathetic platforms, like the Bronco, the Belrex Protected Combat Support Vehicle and so on). If you ask me, in the next 5 years, I would rather the SAF spend the money to buy the Bronco 3 (and develop these as a UAV and loitering munition carrier) to support the Hunter IFV equipped armoured battalions or develop a replacement to the now dated SAR-21. It is difficult enough to retain Singapore’s sovereign capability to make all our own 155mm guns, with the Advanced Mobile Gun Systems project that is still ongoing. IMHO, better to have some focus in arms developmental efforts.

You seem to be very condescending in your reply. I do not know if that is your intention but that is how I perceive it. As far as the international market is concerned, I repeat again that I was unaware that Singapore cared about its presence in the international market. The Japanese Type 10, which you referenced earlier, can stand as an example - the Japanese know they're not going to be exporting it because of (to my knowledge) existing laws prohibiting arms sales. So, it is more likely going to be a Japanese tank for the JGSDF. Could not the same logic apply to the SAF's developments? Isn't that how the Israelis treat the Merkava? The perfect tank for Israel's needs.

Again, if there are so many wonderful choices out there as you claim, and there is no domestic steel production, why has Singapore bothered making the Formidable-class or the Hunter? If the idea is to develop arms and platforms that are tailored for the SAF's evolving needs, wouldn't an eventual replacement to the Leopard 2 be required? Or is your implication that the MBT market is so small that Singapore would never need to bother with a designing replacement because you assume someone else will create a "good enough" platform in the future? That is the problem with answering my questions with more questions. I don't know what point you're trying to drive.

 

[CheeZe]

Part 2

@CheeZe , based on the timeline released by Mindef, the next Army project to be unveiled is likely to be either Next Generation Howitzer or Next Generation Infantry Battalion.

For the MBT, beside considering the technical perspective, there are also opportunity/market perspective (@OPSSG covered extensively), procurement perspective (cost effectiveness) and operation/strategic perspective.

IMO, Hunter, given its drive-by-wire design, fully digitized platform with open architecture allowing new capability to be added with ease, is more sophisticated than the original Leo2A4 that the SAF has acquired. Should there be a long term requirement for MBT; Singapore is likely and able to come up with one that is decent, given the level of industry collaboration that Singapore Defence Tech Community can muster. Hence the challenge is more on establishing the needs and requirement of the SAF, ie is there a real need for MBT or is MBT the Armour's future?

Let assume there is a requirement or need, the next consideration will be which is the most cost effective options available to the SAF? Commercial-of-the-Shelf (new/upgrade) or in-house development? Taking the Leo2A4 “fire sale” from Germany as an example, my take is, it provides the SAF with a low cost opportunity to bring up Armour’s capability and maintain its deterrence posture while buying time for the SAF to develop the Armour Next Generation - one that can take advantage of the digital space.

Now let takes a look at the trend for AFV in general. By comparing the new MBT model vs new IFV model in the Western world, we can have a rough picture, ie there is no new MBT introduced since the 90s (other than Russian’s) but for IFV, there are CV90, ASCOD, Puma, Ajax, Lynx, and not to mention the 8x8s. This tells us Armour doctrine is changing and IFVs are likely the main stay, why put resources in area whereby everyone (if not most) are cutting back. Just my 2 cents.

Lastly, Singapore Armour is basically an IFV heavy formation, not tank or MBT heavy. This can also be noted from one of the Hunter’s introduction video, Chief Armour Officer said, "the Hunter AFV, the centerpiece of our Army Next Generation transformation…..", i.e. to say Hunter, not a MBT or Leo2SG, will form the main thrust of the Army.

However, should there be extra resources and a need for big calibre gun to provide low cost demolition capability, instead of MBT, I would like the SAF to look into Fire Support Vehicle that share the same weight class as Hunter. Having 2 difference weight-classes in a manoeuvre formation is not ideal; especially if the support group is heavier than the main body.

My 2 cents.

@Lone Ranger - Thank you. Your reply was far more informative. I am certainly not proposing that the SAF create a replacement for the Leo 2SG anytime soon. I was asking on the theoretical side whether such an undertaking was feasible, given that Singapore has built larger or similar platforms already. It seems the answer is "Yes it could, but modern armour trends make it unlikely."

So, if a future MBT is not required while a big-gun fire support vehicle is, would the SAF buy something off the self or simply develop off the Hunter or whatever the current IFV platform of the day is? OPSSG's roundabout answer isn't very clear since he seems to be trying to hint that Singapore doesn't have the steel to build tanks or the land to test them. At the same time, Singapore is very obviously domestically developing IFVs (which must be tested SOMEWHERE) and maintains a MBT fleet at present. We must getting the steel from someone if we're producing our IFVs locally, so it can't be too much of a constraint in the R&D side.

Again, I reiterate, if there is a point to OPSSG's post, it is not clear to me and he needs to clarify it with statements and explanations. Asking me questions which I cannot answer doesn't answer my original questions. So, I really don't know what his point is.

EDIT: On a totally different note - are we not allowed to send other members or staff members personal messages anymore? I can't seem to figure that out after being away for some time.

 

[OPSSG]

@CheeZe, no intention to be condescending — it’s just a discussion. I am certain that you don’t start from a place of ignorance. Once you think carefully on the constraints — the manufacturer will prefer to choose the most profitable or least expensive route to success. You can’t wish away reality — that Singapore makes weapons on the hope that the domestic demand/requirements can trigger international sales (with a bit of customisation).

1. To maintain sovereign capability, we should make what we need most and buy what we choose not to make — every dollar we spend in development is a dollar less from production (unless we win in export sales — like the Bronco 2 that served in IED rich Afghanistan, with zero fatalities). Where should the priority be? For every 50 MBTs Singapore acquires, the SAF needs to be supplied with another:

(i) 90 to 180 IFVs (be it Hunter or Bionix) and another 45 to 90 support vehicles (like Bronco) for armoured infantry guys; and​

(ii) 180 to 360 ICVs (Terrex) and another 200 to 400 protected vehicles (Belerax). The unique SAF requirement for the Terrex (that we can’t buy as military off-the-shelf), is that it must be heavily protected and yet able to swim — and this capability was demonstrated for the US Marines (up to sea state 3). This swim capability is enabled by Kinetics Drive Solutions’ infinitely variable transmission technology (IVT). IVT is also used in the Trailblazer, Counter-Mine Vehicle, that enables the vehicle to switch power to the mine flail system. A subsidiary of Singapore Technologies owns a patent to IVT and it is paid when others use IVT in their platform.

2. If it is an exotic demand (for a secret edge), such as making our own 155mm guns, the SAF has to pay a huge premium for it to be made in Singapore (but tested abroad). Making artillery pieces locally is a LHL vanity project on lean manning — the FH88 is problematic. I spoke to the arty guys — it was unreliable and the design was poor. But the Singapore arty design team learnt from these failures and kept trying to improve the design which resulted in the FH-2000. The FH-88 is an example of product failure. As I mentioned earlier in this thread, the size of Singapore’s defence industry should be determined by:

(i) the size of domestic defence market for products made by these companies in their relevant market segment (which is affected by a country's defence spending levels); and​

​

(ii) the export potential for the product made (which is determined by how much tech is inside the product).​

3. In my prior post, I am conducting a SWOT analysis of the MBT market and simply saying that Singapore tends to build for local needs, with export potential in mind. For both the Bionix and Terrex, they were designed with export potential in mind. And both platforms did compete for the US market — in both cases they lost in the respective competitions. I have a good engineer friend who did systems design work for the Bionix (but has since moved away from the defence sector for greener pastures).

4. The trick to export success is to keep improving the product. Don’t try to do everything and focus on improving existing products until it is compelling for foreign buyers.

5. You asked can Singapore make it? The answer must be yes. If I gave a one word reply, would you be happier?

6. Instead of simply replying yes or no, I asked you why. Why does Singapore have to make it?

7. To have a conversation, we must clarify the context and talk about actual considerations. Likewise do me the courtesy and try to answer that question.

8. If our enemy kills a Leopard 2SG, how many Singapore sons die? The answer is 4. If our enemy kills a M113 or Bionix, how many Singapore sons would die? The answer is at least 10. The SAF’s goal is to reduce casualties — it cannot be surprising that Singapore decided to place priority on building our own IFVs and ICVs, first. I would not be surprised if a Hunter 2 is in our plans. Serial development is key to out foxing the enemy, who is constantly trying to develop counter measures to any new weapon system made by Singapore.

 

[ngatimozart]

@CheeZe part of the reasoning for Singapore building its own military vehicles and naval ships is sovereign capability, which @OPSSG has already touched on. Part of it is costs, because sometimes it can be cheaper to build your own if your labour costs, overheads etc., are lower than say a European and North American manufacturer. Part of it is also you can build bespoke items that a foreign manufacturer may not be suitable to manufacture because of security reasons, or they don't want to do a bespoke short run etc. Part of it is pure politics playing to domestic political narratives.

If you look at Singapores IFVs there is a political and foreign policy dimension at play. Say it decided to acquire 300 German IFVs plus ancillary equipment all sourced from Germany. Normally no problems because Singapore and Germany have a good relationship. However one day the PRC does something to really annoy Singapore so Singapore decides to invade the PRC in order to give it a good thrashing and teach it a lesson in manners. Germany chokes on its beer, is very put out by Singapores actions, and slaps an arms embargo on Singapore, meaning no ongoing support of any kind for its 300 German built and maintained IFVs. Hence these expensive examples of high quality German engineering are parked up, about as useful as electric coat hangers and Singaporean Army is short 300 IFVs. Most of the scenario is fantasy apart from the fact that Germany does slap arms embargoes on nations that it believes are in the wrong, such as committing aggressive war, abusing human rights etc. Saudi Arabia is its favourite target at the moment. So by building it's own IFVs etc., it negates most of those problems. That's just one example.

 

[Todjaeger]

Another, significant factor to consider (which has also been mentioned previously on the forum) is the significant R&D costs and infrastructure required to efficiently design and build modern, front line MBT's. Even more so if a nation does not have an already established R&D complex for designing an MBT AND developing the major components like the armour composition.

The costs associated with modern MBT development and production, at least for MBT's comparable to the M1 Abrams, Leo 2, Challenger 2, Ariete and Leclerc, etc. are significant to the point that of these listed designs, AFAIK only the M1 Abrams and Leo 2 were produced in sufficient numbers to have reached the break even point. If the serial production runs for the UK, France, and Italy were too small to permit much in the way of economies of scale, then Singapore with both a smaller defence budget and requirement for MBT's would be hard pressed to justify spending the kind of coin required to design and then build a domestic modern MBT. France, Italy and the UK did engage in what were sort of prestige projects to maintain their existent domestic MBT design and production capabilities.

Singapore could engage in the development of the systems required for a modern MBT and then design and produce one, however the total cost of such a programme would likely be significantly higher per MBT than what Singapore paid for the Leo 2's. There would also be the matter of either losing the R&D and production capabilities once production was completed, or finding/placing more orders than needed for the orbat to keep things running. To get some additional perspective, the Leclerc production line (~800 tanks built) was closed in 2008 with the lines for the Challenger 2 and Ariete were both closed in 2002 or nearly two decades ago. WIth all that in mind, I just do not see Singapore making effective use of limited defence funding by a domestic MBT build.

 

[Lone Ranger]

@CheeZe, many of us are on the same page, just different ways of expression.

Todjaeger brought up a good point, many countries pursuit domestic MBT design, to some extent, for prestige . As it is regarded to be the pinnacle of land system. However that is not the way Mindef conduct its doing. It doesn’t aim to collect “trophy”, but to build capabilities for tomorrow, ie DSTA does not aim to build everything (in Singapore) but to be a smart buyer and smart system integrator - Leo2SG is a great example.

Modern warfare with all the high tech stuff, during peace time, is a resource burning affair. To ensure Singapore can stay head of peers, Mindef need to know its limits and work smart.

For the Fire Support Vehicle, actually ST Eng and SAIC (US) participated in US Army’s MPF (Mobile Protected Firepower) programme using Hunter’s hull as the baseline, but couldn’t make it to the selection. Given it is built on Hunter's platform and with a ready blue print, I hope to see a version of it in the SAF Armour’s orbat. It will be a capability much desired. IMO.

 

[OPSSG]

@Lone Ranger, that you for educating me on the choices and MINDEF’s thinking process but I do suspect that the American Mobile Protected Firepower vehicle (including APS) program will fail.

I will explain why I suspect it will not survive US DOD infamous “night court” budgeting process another day. As US Secretary of Defense Esper said, “I’m looking for programs that don’t have as much value relative to another critical war-fighting capability, absolutely.”

Looking at the evolution of urban warfare since 2006, I am inclined to believe that the way forward is developing a systems approach to even more precise killing supported by the greater use of armoured combat engineers to section off parts of city before the arrival of loitering munitions —The SAF has had a close up view of the 2017 Battle of Marawi and immediately stocked up or purchased certain types of ammo, including 2,000 XM395 Accelerated Precision Mortar Initiative (APMI) rounds. The American made APMI rounds have a CEP of 5 metres as a stop gap measure. By 2019, ST Engineering Land Systems introduced a new munition called the PM120 precision-guided mortar bomb (PGMB), with option warheads including the Extended Range High Explosive (ERHE), ER Infrared Red Phosphorous (IRRP), and ER Illuminating. The new PM120 munition has a CEP of 10 metres.

Hamas's strong performance during the 50 day, Operation Protective Edge in 2014, appears to be its emulation of the tactics of Lebanese Islamist group Hizbullah. The IDF suffered 67 fatalities and another 463 soldiers were wounded during the operation. As a result, Fire Weaver was developed and demonstrated in 2018 at a battalion level exercise and is scheduled to become operational in 2022 — it provides the tactical forces with a GPS-independent geo-pixel-based tactical common language among all the sensors and shooters — it calculates the optimal shooter for each target, while minimizing collateral damage.

For background on the Mobile Protected Firepower vehicle program, I note that General Dynamics Land Systems (GD) and BAE Systems have to begin delivering 12 prototypes at end of 1Q2020. BAE Systems will use a M8 Buford Armored Gun System (using a 105 mm M35 gun) with new capabilities and components. GD submitted an offering that puts a version of its latest Abrams turret together with a chassis that uses past work on the United Kingdom’s AJAX program.

 

[SouthernSky]

If you look at Singapores IFVs there is a political and foreign policy dimension at play. Say it decided to acquire 300 German IFVs plus ancillary equipment all sourced from Germany. Normally no problems because Singapore and Germany have a good relationship. However one day the PRC does something to really annoy Singapore so Singapore decides to invade the PRC in order to give it a good thrashing and teach it a lesson in manners. Germany chokes on its beer, is very put out by Singapores actions, and slaps an arms embargo on Singapore, meaning no ongoing support of any kind for its 300 German built and maintained IFVs. Hence these expensive examples of high quality German engineering are parked up, about as useful as electric coat hangers and Singaporean Army is short 300 IFVs. Most of the scenario is fantasy apart from the fact that Germany does slap arms embargoes on nations that it believes are in the wrong, such as committing aggressive war, abusing human rights etc. Saudi Arabia is its favourite target at the moment. So by building it's own IFVs etc., it negates most of those problems. That's just one example.

A fair amount of time spent in the rum store required if I'm to get my head around this scenario.

 

[Lone Ranger]

@OPSSG, if major programs like Future Combat System, Ground Combat Vehicle and Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle can be canned, so can MPF (Mobile Protected Firepower) and I won't be surprised. I just find that they are still kinda lost on how they want to fight their next war, at least on paper. Their vision and tech space just don't seem to meet.

Urban warfare will be heavily weighted in the next phase of the SAF development and I shared your view. It will likely be a system approach whereby the focus will be placed on integrated-network-precision strike. System like FIRE WEAVER (not sure if there will be a SAF version) and autonomous vehicles (both land and air) will likely be some of the enablers. Precision strike ammunition (SPIKE LR2, XM395 & ST PM120) with limited collateral damage will be weapons of choice as they will allow more freedom of action.

Now I am curious, how will the Next Gen Infantry Battalion look like and how it will effects other formation like Armour.

 

[OPSSG]

A fair amount of time spent in the rum store required if I'm to get my head around this scenario.

@SouthernSky and @ngatimozart, no need to drink or think hard on the near impossible scenario. Lol.

1. Singapore is not going to fight China. By geography, there is only 1 country where the SAF can conduct its forward defence — only if they miscalculate and cross any of the 3 red lines that make war inevitable.

2. There are too many of the SAF’s German made trucks (in the thousands) in service, including:

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(i) the Rheinmetall MAN HX45M wheeled recovery vehicles; and​

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(ii) the 500 strong fleet of MAN Light Transporters under Project Ethan (derivatives of the civilian MAN TGM 18.280 twin-axle, 4x4 cargo truck), are of German origin. A key difference from the SAF’s older MAN 5-tonners is the noticeably longer wheelbase. This allows the MAN Light Transporters - known as Ethans by army personnel - to carry a 20 foot container with ISO twist-locks on its cargo bed.​

An arms embargo by the Germans would in the medium term cripple our army’s logistics arm, until an alternative is stood up. More important than 200 Leopard 2 tanks acquired thus far (that were locally upgraded), is the life-time support required for the 4 new Invincible-class (Type 218SG) submarines that Singapore is in the process of acquiring. Any hint of a German arms embargo will see the Singapore Navy crawling back to Sweden.

3. For a vehicle fleet, there are 3 considerations to manage. One, short term embargo risk, to be mitigated by spare parts stocking and having local repair facilities. Two, medium to long term sustainment risk. Lastly, obsolescence risk. Some of the short term embargo risk is managed by stocking enough spares.

4. Diversification of suppliers is another form of risk management, for the medium to long term.

(i) As part of this diversification efforts, in Sept 2018, South Africa's Paramount Group and Singapore's ST Engineering Land Systems arm announced a commitment to joint marketing of the 20 ton weight class Belrex (4x4) family of wheeled Mine Resistant Ambushed Protected (MRAP) vehicles.​

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(ii) Each vehicle of this MRAP family is powered by a Cummins ISBe4-300 Diesel engine and the family comprises 10 variants (namely, security, engineer, reconnaissance, logistics, fuel, medical, mortar, signal, maintenance and mortar ammunition carrier) and is based on the Paramount Marauder (4x4) MRAP.​

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(iii) The 10 Belrex variants leverage ST Engineering experience in the design, development and production of armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) mobility platforms as the Belrex Protected Combat Support Vehicle (PCSV), which was officially commissioned into the Singapore Army in November 2016. Paramount delivered twelve vehicles to Singapore between 2013 and 2014 for trials and system integration by ST Kinetics.​

5. Beyond embargo risk management, vehicle fleet life-cycle management is also about keeping obsolescence risk at bay. This means Singapore needs to have unrestricted rights to resell old vehicles into the international market. For example, the Singapore Army's fleet of IVECO 90-17 WM 3 tonners have been retired, repainted blue and resold for commercial use.

6. Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) is prepared to move forward with product development and weapon system projects should Western embargoes limit those efforts, the CEO told Defense News. “We have signed more than 25 agreements with foreign partners, so we have multiple opportunities to acquire alternative technologies from other partners where there are no limitations. There is no risk that any limitation of a single country or government can block Saudi Arabia from getting a full localized portfolio of products,” Andreas Schwer said during the Dubai Airshow in Nov 2019. To that end, in Jun 2019 SAMI signed a MoU with ST Engineering that will entail introducing the 8x8 Terrex 2 platform to the Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF), developing a next-generation Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) for RSLF, and exploring partnership in MRO capability for commercial and military customers. In addition, it will include building ships and naval crafts, examining scope for participation in C-130 upgrade and development of a new transport aircraft, and helping modernize the Saudi electronics manufacturing industry.

 

[CheeZe]

Thank you to everyone who posted in reply to my questions. My apologies for any brusqueness or offense caused, @OPSSG. I find it difficult sometimes to tell tone on internet forums.

I hadn't heard about the Next Gen Infantry Battalion and second @Lone Ranger 's question. And may I ask what are the three red lines which must not be crossed? I think I can guess two of them (water and independence) but I can't think of a 3rd off the top of my head.

 

[OPSSG]

Thank you to everyone who posted in reply to my questions. My apologies for any brusqueness or offense caused, @OPSSG. I find it difficult sometimes to tell tone on internet forums.

I hadn't heard about the Next Gen Infantry Battalion and second @Lone Ranger 's question. And may I ask what are the three red lines which must not be crossed? I think I can guess two of them (water and independence) but I can't think of a 3rd off the top of my head.

You are correct that cutting off water supply from Johor is 1 of the 3. More importantly, directly cutting off water supply from Johor gives Singapore Casus belli — a right to war. The Malaysians do try to test the redline below the threshold for war and regarding the supply of water, they have done a variation of this, by allowing pollution levels to rise to the extent that PUB stopped the import of raw water. See: PUB's Johor River Waterworks temporarily shut down in 7 pollution incidents since 2017: Masagos

Before I stop going further off-topic, let me share 4 additional points for context, to assist your understanding.

One, if you don’t mind, I don’t want to express all 3 redlines in an open source matter — just in case a radical/terror group in Malaysia wants to be deliberate in crossing it to force war — by Aug 1991, the Malaysian Government under Dr M understood roughly where these 3 redlines were and did not dare to cross any of them (based on their own understanding).

Two, independence is the 2nd core foreign policy principle, rather than a redline (but you are close) — DIPLOMACY OF LITTLE RED DOT: PAST AND PRESENT

Three, as you are well aware, on 23 May 2008, the ICJ ruled that Singapore had sovereignty over Pedra Branca, while Middle Rocks was awarded to Malaysia and South Ledge belonged to the state in whose territorial waters it is located. There are developments after the ICJ ruling that you may not have noticed.

​

(i) I note that Malaysia filed two applications after the ruling - one on 2 Feb 2017, and a second on 30 Jun 2017, where Malaysia sought an interpretation of the same ICJ judgment (that they have since discontinued). It requested that the ICJ declare the waters surrounding Pedra Branca to be Malaysia’s and in turn, the sovereignty of South Ledge belongs to Malaysia – a move that Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs described as “puzzling”, “unnecessary and without merit”.​

​

(ii) It is the second application that concerns me — where Malaysia is engaging in lawfare. Lawfare is not something in which persons engage in the pursuit of justice; rather it is a negative undertaking and is a counter-productive perversion of the law. The essence of the issue with lawfare arguments is the misuse of the legal system and its principles in an attempt to damage or delegitimise them, by tying up their time or trying to win a public relations victory.​

Four, to prevent further Malaysian attempts at lawfare over Singapore’s port waters off-Tuas, the Singapore Government filed a declaration under Article 298(1)(a) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on 12 Dec 2018. This declaration means that other States Parties to UNCLOS cannot unilaterally commence third party arbitration or adjudication against Singapore in respect of maritime boundary disputes. Singapore likewise cannot unilaterally commence third-party arbitration or adjudication against other UNCLOS States Parties for such disputes.

 

[OPSSG]

Part 1 of 3: Learning lessons from mistakes of others

“Nations do not have permanent friends or enemies, only interests,” which was a phrase most often attributed to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger but was originally uttered by Henry John Temple, twice British Prime Minister in the mid-1800s.

1. We should keep the above phrase in mind when looking at the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar that Singapore can learn from.

​

(i) Three years ago, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt conducted an economic boycott of Qatar that had tremendous repercussions on the economy of Qatar.​

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(ii) Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar were members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) before the Saudi decision to cut diplomatic and trade ties with Doha.​

​

(iii) Tensions with Qatar have revolved around its support for political Islamic movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as complaints about the Al Jazeera Media Network, which is based in Doha. These tensions were exacerbated by the Arab Spring in 2011 when Saudi Arabia and Qatar were seen as backing different sides.​

2. The trigger for the economic boycott occurred on 23 May 2017. Hackers posted false statements attributed to Qatar's emir on the Qatari state news agency's website — which is an effective use of cyber warfare by Qatar’s adversaries to provide the smoking gun to Doha’s double dealing. The fake remarks, praising Iran and criticising US foreign policy, were picked up and aired on several UAE and Saudi-owned television networks.

​

(i) On 5 June 2017, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt issued statements announcing the severing of diplomatic relations with Qatar. Saudi Arabia then shut its land border with Qatar, and together with three other countries imposed a land, sea and air boycott on its neighbour.​

​

(ii) The four neighboring countries point to Qatar’s non-compliance with the Riyadh agreements (a series of deals between the six Persian Gulf nations of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain that were signed in 2013 and 2014). In those handwritten agreements, the countries pledged to support stability in Egypt, cease support for terrorist groups and not support “antagonistic media,” a reference to Al Jazeera, the state-funded news station based in Qatar.​

​

(iii) Qatar likes to call this economic boycott, a blockade, as part of its lawfare strategy — with the economic boycott having sea, land and air dimensions. Qatar asked the ICJ to allow the United Nations’ ICAO to “address the merits of these time-sensitive disputes” — in Qatar’s challenge to an airspace ‘blockade’ imposed by its neighbours who not only canceled all flights between their countries and Qatar, but also forbade Qatari planes from flying over their airspace. This aerial blockade forced Qatar Airways to take circuitous routes that not only added to flight times, boosted fuel costs, and enabled Oman and Iran to charge Qatar extra for flying over their airspace.​

How a less prepared small country like Qatar survives under an economic boycott of its neighbours is instructive for Singapore as additional lessons to re-learn on its Economic Defence strategy.

3. By way of background, on 2359 hours of 17 Mar 2020, Malaysia closed the causeway to the prevent the free movement of its own people with a day’s notice (on a 14 day movement control order) due to the outbreak of coronavirus. Food deliveries from Malaysia to Singapore have continued and Singaporeans are still allowed to leave Johor (but cannot re-enter until 31 Mar 2020). Malaysia’s decision to impose a Movement Control Order to combat the spread of COVID-19 is not surprising, as many other countries have already imposed similar lockdowns. This poorly thought through Movement Control Order lacked a FAQ, to help the general public of both countries understand the extent of the curbs by Malaysia. This resulted in Lee Hsien Loong, the Prime Minister of Singapore having to clarify to the public that the movement of food supplies from Malaysia to Singapore was not affected. As Lee Hsien Loong noted on 17 Mar 2020, on Facebook:

​

“... Meanwhile, I am happy to see that in the supermarkets, while the queues are longer than usual, people are taking it in their stride and only buying what they need. We need not worry, as we have prepared for such an eventuality, and have plans in place to cope.”​

4. As John Lam has noted on Facebook, a few hours prior to the Prime Minister’s clarification (on the Malaysian stance after calling his counterpart):

​

“... First of all Singapore has at least 3 months worth of food supplies in government warehouses. Even if there is not a single morsel of food entering Singapore for the next 2 weeks due to Malaysia’s lock down, Singapore will not starve. (For those who are mathematically challenged, 3 months is about 6 times longer than 2 weeks).​

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Secondly, Malaysia is just one of the sources of food produce. There are 11 other countries who are not on lock down where food can be sourced from.​

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Thirdly, Singapore has domestic production capabilities in a number of food items such as eggs (27%), vegetables (13%), fish (10%), canned goods, infant powder and many more. We may not be fully self sufficient but we are not entirely dependent on imports either.​

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Fourthly, Malaysian food exporters will probably be hurt more than consumers in Singapore if they cannot export their food produce. Even if Malaysia’s lockdown applies to food exports, this cannot go on indefinitely without affecting their own local industries. Eventually trade will find a way.​

​

Finally, Singapore has topped the Global Food Security Index for 2 years in a row over the past 2 years. This means that according to the experts at the Economist Intelligence Unit, you are more likely to run out of food anywhere else in the world than in Singapore.”​

5. This is not the first time Singapore has faced a short term disruption of the free movement of goods (or people, in this case) through the causeway with Malaysia. Singapore has planned for food supply disruptions for years, putting in place a comprehensive strategy after the food crisis of 2007 and 2008, which saw the global prices of food shoot up dramatically due to rising oil prices and food stocks diverted to produce biofuels. As the Prime Minister noted, it pays to be prepared for supply disruptions. While food and other essential items have successfully made it across the Causeway into Singapore on 18 Mar 2020 (Wed), some companies delivering non-food materials told TODAY that their cargos were not allowed over the border on the first day of Malaysia's lockdown. Ms Stella Moh, assistant business development manager at trading company Glorreich, said that two lorries containing her company’s goods were being turned away at Malaysia’s checkpoint. Her company brings in packaging materials, such as carton boxes and pallets, for third-party logistics providers to pack their own goods before shipping them out.

6. As I shared previously, Singapore’s Total Defence strategy comprises of 6 pillars: Military, Civil, Economic, Social, Digital and Psychological Defence. Psychological Defence. John Lam’s post and Chan Chun Sing’s posts are good examples of Psychological Defence in action.

 

[OPSSG]

Part 2 of 3: Demonstrating Singaporean capability at Total Defence

7. Economic Defence at work with the quick activation of drawer plans — Chan Chun Sing, Singapore’s Minister for Trade and Industry, shared a Facebook post on 19 Mar 2020, at Changi airport (for the supply by air of eggs from Thailand), just 2 days after Malaysia (by being unclear of their new Movement Control Order policy’s effect on food supply to Singapore), created uncertainty in supply of Malaysian supplies of food to Singapore:

“Was at Changi Airport this afternoon to receive a very special cargo - more than 300,000 eggs meant for domestic consumption.​

About a quarter of the eggs we consume are produced locally and a significant number come from Malaysia. However, we also have many other source countries which we have identified over the years and are able to activate them quickly when the need calls for it. This applies not just to eggs but other food products and essential items.​

We managed to activate this option in a matter of two days and I would like to express my appreciation to Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources (MEWR), the Singapore Food Agency (SFA), Singapore Airlines and SATS for helping us to bring the eggs in so quickly.​

These efforts to secure and diversify our food supply have been developed and strengthened through the years. Even though we have a robust plan in place, we do not take it for granted and reassess it regularly to test its robustness against different scenarios...​

#SGUnited”​

8. As part of the collective response to combat COVID-19, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Myanmar, New Zealand and Singapore released a joint ministerial statement that they are committed to maintaining connected supply chains and work closely to identify and address trade disruptions with ramifications on the flow of necessities.

9. Having the correct processes and systems in place to respond to actionable intelligence, Singapore is able to respond to multiple threat vectors at the same time. No medium sized city in the world, is as well led and prepared as Singapore in relation to crisis contingency plans — the health system is preparing for a spike in coronavirus infections, before the end of March, as more and more Singaporeans return from abroad. Singapore’s inter-ministerial coronavirus task force led by Minister Lawrence Wong (supported by Gan Kim Yong, the Minister of Health) has started transferring the less seriously ill coronavirus patients to select private hospital wards (so that the better equipped government hospitals can host the more critically ill returning Singaporeans).

10. Regarding the military front of Total Defence, on 17 Mar 2020, co-operation between Singapore and Indonesian navies ensured the pirates would be caught regardless of which waters they were in. At 0511 hours the Singapore received a report from a bulk carrier, Sam Jaguar, that pirates had boarded the ship in the waters east of Pulau Karimun Kecil, Indonesia. The Singapore Navy immediately began close monitoring of the shipping vessel and dispatched RSS Independence and Police Coast Guard craft towards the location. The incident was resolved when criminals were locked up in the engine room by the crew and subsequently handed over to the Indonesians for prosecution.

11. Regarding the civil defence front of Total Defence, on 18 Mar 2020, 180 SCDF firefighters deployed in 45 emergency vehicles were able to put out blaze with the aid of 12 foam jets, and 2 Unmanned Firefighting Machines (UFMs). An Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was also deployed to conduct aerial monitoring of the fire at Tuas Avenue 18. The fire, the size of about one and half football fields, had engulfed two warehouse about five storeys in height. It largely involved drums of flammable substances such as diesel and cleaning agents.