Reference the combat vs. training argument. UK army commanders are growing more concerned about the lack of training by UK combined arms battle-groups. With constant rotations through Afghanistan and Iraq, UK tank / infantry / artillery units are not getting the opportunity to train under realistic conditions normally practiced on a large scale in Canada and Poland. Activity in Iraq and Afghanistan though intense still revolves around patrolling, relatively small unit activity (platoon / company strength plus support) manning of key points etc., but does not involve large-scale coordinated battle-group activity associated with the early stages of Gulf War I&II.
Though combat experience tests equipment, tactics, resolve and leadership to the limit, it can also reduce the overall effectiveness of fighting soldiers if they are suddenly expected to take on a different role (conventional as apposed to counter-insergency) without having the opportunity to train as a cohesive unit first utilising revised tactics.
This is also becoming a major issue with U.S forces also for a large scale conflict scenario. This becomes a major issue when you do not have sufficient light forces augemented into your military ground forces that can specialize in police style actions and urbanized conflicts which the U.S and UK for the most part had to learn the hard way on how to conduct such operations.
Hopefully this will change with the U.S adding two to three light infantry divisions.