You're not doing much to dissuade my previously established beliefs about you, you know.
BTBT
@StobieWan: I will post up a larger answer since you asked, but I''ll have to get it at home, if that's alright.
Surface Warfare Training
- Thread starter Peace4ever20
- Start date
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BTBT
@StobieWan: I will post up a larger answer since you asked, but I''ll have to get it at home, if that's alright.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
As alluded to initially, what is the point of your initial question, since it seems you have already made up your mind on what the answer is?
You still have not established what you consider to be "adequate" training to provide any sort of baseline, or any methodology to test said baseline.
Given these factors, and the fact that people who would know have disagreed with your position and you have effectively told them they are wrong... it does indeed appear that you are asking a question to elicit a response or reaction, and not to learn, discuss or debate anything. That or you are attempting to direct traffic to a particular USNI blog.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
I too would be interested in your response, whenever you can post it.
Whenever you can, I'll be very interested.
Just a few I was personally involved in planning or execution:
SEASWITI
Joint Warrior
Valiant Shield
RIMPAC
If those terms are gibberish to you, feel free to do a search.
And those are just high level joint, coalition, composite unit exercises.
And you don't even get to come out and play in those until you prove in more systematic training that you can fight tactically on an individual level.
If there are any other navies that periodically conduct training at that level (obviously other than Coalition partners that participate in them, and possibly the PLAN at a regional level) I'd sure love to hear about it.
SEASWITI
Joint Warrior
Valiant Shield
RIMPAC
If those terms are gibberish to you, feel free to do a search.
And those are just high level joint, coalition, composite unit exercises.
And you don't even get to come out and play in those until you prove in more systematic training that you can fight tactically on an individual level.
If there are any other navies that periodically conduct training at that level (obviously other than Coalition partners that participate in them, and possibly the PLAN at a regional level) I'd sure love to hear about it.
Find one reliable comment or link from USNI stating tactical training does not periodically happen. Complaining not enough happens is not the same as saying it doesn't happen at all.
Seriously? You haven't worked out yet that the people with blue tags are those who have a clue as they've been on the job in some form or fashion?
DefProfs continue to learn from each other - as do most normal curious posters.
You seem to be travelling a path where you're readily inclined to challenge and question people who do this or have done these things for a job - and yet you yourself admit to no service experience or relevant "industry" experience.
That to me rings alarm bells as it indicates that your motives for asking the questions are less than pure - ie that your question tone is not about learning, its about confirming established bias no matter how many times and how many different people who respond (and now on multiple forums) that you ask or pitch a variation of the same question.
On another note, there are quite a few people in here who are "green" tagged senior members but who also have a very relevant background
If you're here to learn, then its worth your while to change the way you engage - if you're on a mission then you're wasting your time as people who may have been inclined to give you a fair go will write you off as a stirrer with an agenda
If you choose option 2, then you're on short finals
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Peace4ever20
New Member
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #27
Let me be completely straight with you, okay? I'm sorry for offending you. I didn't know that you actually served in the Navy, and I apologize for that misinformed assumption.
I am not a troll, nor am I trying to direct traffic to another website. I am genuinely interested in this topic, so don't think that I am trying to deliberately annoy you.
To answer the original question:
measure that: the field (or sea, as it were) of battle. Fortunately, the US Navy of the 1970s/80s never got to find out.
Generally, training is found to be inadequate for war, but was thought to be adequate prior to the war based on the understanding of the how the war would be fought. The Navy thought it was doing okay in training in the late 1930s (although the Fleet Problems did expose some weaknesses that needed to be addressed). Then they discovered something called the Long Lance torpedo. The Royal Navy probably thought it was doing adequate training in the 1910s (perhaps some of the Brits on the board can comment further on this). Then they found out there was something wrong with their bloody ships today.
Granted, there were people in the 1930s who noted that training was more about meeting doctrinally-established than actually stressing people to perform tactics...but hey, what are you going to do in peacetime in a country that was militantly non-interventionist (though our President was starting to get us prepared).
As far as the 1970-80s go, I guess we could try and frame the question as what kind of battle the naval part of WW3 was supposed to be (which would have influenced the tactics)? First off, everyone would have lost because it would have gone nuclear quick-the Soviets knew they could not win a long war against NATO, and viewed nukes as the equalizer. They had major sustainment issues for the fleet, and their fair share of quality control issues in their fleet.
In another forum that I'm on for USN SWOs (and I think CB90 is as well), there's a guy who's now a professor of history. He's argued that the the battle that most shaped post WW2 US Navy strategic thought and planning for how to fight The Next War was actually the Battle of Okinawa, and that idea of setting up a sea base and then having to defend it against combined air/subsurface attack was going to become the concept of offensive sea control. Of course, they still would have had to have fought the USSR's submarine fleet and keep open the SLOCs much like was done in the Battle of the Altantic.
This kinda gets to a larger point, however-the USN in the 1970s and 1980s couldn't win the war single-handedly (though eliminating Bastions for the Bear would have had a major impact)...but they could lose it if they tried. There was no need for Battle off Samar level heroics or ever even Cape St. George-level thoroughness; all they had to was keep the Soviets at bay to get the reinforcements through.
Probably consequently, the need for the surface navy itself to dominate was neither wanted nor desired (going stick vs stick against Soviet ships of the 70s and 80s was a losing bet anyway, for the matter). It needed to work with the aviation world to be able to protect the fleet and go to coordinated WAS (War At Sea) as necessary, which, it turned out, they were pretty good at, judging by Libya and Praying Mantis.
Quality for people (especially on the enlisted side) would have been an issue in the 1970s; this was the Hollow Force, after all. You probably would have had fewer training exercises, as well. That would have gotten better in the 1980s and the buildup to the 600-Ship Navy. However, there was still a lot of talent in that 1970s Surface Navy; many of the senior officers and senior enlisted leaders would have done tours on the gun line off of Vietnam, so they would have had combat experience (even if not in fleet v fleet engagements-the North Vietnamese did try and attack the USN ships out there, though not with any real degree of success), and the rest would have spent chasing around the Soviets. That's another thing to remember about the quality of tactical training-even if ships didn't spend time rehearsing it in exercises, they spent time rehearsing it against Ivan Actual at sea.
Finally, a word about the value of culture: there's an old and most likely apocryphal quote usually attributed to the Soviets that goes along the lines of "the most dangerous thing about the American Navy is that they neither know nor follow their own tactics." Victor Davis Hanson will tell you that the most dangerous culture to fight against is Western democratic society, since they will have the technological advantage on their side (since technology won't be subservient to religion/dogma) and their leaders will be free to change their tactics and doctrine as they need (as opposed to more rigidly militaristic cultures, which aren't as free to do so).
The Soviets knew our doctrine; they had spies (speaking of which, AMF to John and Arthur Walker, who both died in the last two months) and copies of our manuals (and we theirs). What always drove them crazy was that they knew what we were supposed to do...but we'd never end up doing that. Even if our tactics didn't work, we would have changed them-that's actually a hallmark of American fighting. We start slow but learn quick.
BTBT
Like CB90, I've done my fair share of exercises (a FRUKUS, two ANNUALEXes, several SHAREMs/SURFREMs, a tactical [that is, not a technical] MISSILEX, and more exercises with the ROKN than I can even hope to remember. Yes, I'm deliberately using acronyms to make a point). I've also done some great coalition real-world ops in Lebanon in '06 (that was fun). I've seen lots of navies operate. Some of them are pretty good at the tactical stuff and the support side (the maintenance side is as important as the tactical-knowing how to use great equipment is great, unless you can't make that equipment work in the first place), but even the good ones generally can only be good at one or two things due to a lack of bench depth and support.
Some of them can definitely hold their own. Heck, some are even better than the US in a few areas they specialize in (they generally have to make sacrifices outside of those areas, however).
Some of them are okay. They get by on the effort vice skill, or by being very limited in what they choose to be "good" at (even more so than the first cohort).
Some of them get by on just reputation; they'd rather look good than be good.
Some of them are just there to beg us for bandwidth and assets so they can even follow what's going on.
No one can match us in our ability to be good in as many areas as the US. None. You don't have to be perfect in this business...just better than the other guy. And I'm confident that we are.
As far as "adequa[cy]" of training goes, there is really only one way to
measure that: the field (or sea, as it were) of battle. Fortunately, the US Navy of the 1970s/80s never got to find out.
Generally, training is found to be inadequate for war, but was thought to be adequate prior to the war based on the understanding of the how the war would be fought. The Navy thought it was doing okay in training in the late 1930s (although the Fleet Problems did expose some weaknesses that needed to be addressed). Then they discovered something called the Long Lance torpedo. The Royal Navy probably thought it was doing adequate training in the 1910s (perhaps some of the Brits on the board can comment further on this). Then they found out there was something wrong with their bloody ships today.
Granted, there were people in the 1930s who noted that training was more about meeting doctrinally-established than actually stressing people to perform tactics...but hey, what are you going to do in peacetime in a country that was militantly non-interventionist (though our President was starting to get us prepared).
As far as the 1970-80s go, I guess we could try and frame the question as what kind of battle the naval part of WW3 was supposed to be (which would have influenced the tactics)? First off, everyone would have lost because it would have gone nuclear quick-the Soviets knew they could not win a long war against NATO, and viewed nukes as the equalizer. They had major sustainment issues for the fleet, and their fair share of quality control issues in their fleet.
In another forum that I'm on for USN SWOs (and I think CB90 is as well), there's a guy who's now a professor of history. He's argued that the the battle that most shaped post WW2 US Navy strategic thought and planning for how to fight The Next War was actually the Battle of Okinawa, and that idea of setting up a sea base and then having to defend it against combined air/subsurface attack was going to become the concept of offensive sea control. Of course, they still would have had to have fought the USSR's submarine fleet and keep open the SLOCs much like was done in the Battle of the Altantic.
This kinda gets to a larger point, however-the USN in the 1970s and 1980s couldn't win the war single-handedly (though eliminating Bastions for the Bear would have had a major impact)...but they could lose it if they tried. There was no need for Battle off Samar level heroics or ever even Cape St. George-level thoroughness; all they had to was keep the Soviets at bay to get the reinforcements through.
Probably consequently, the need for the surface navy itself to dominate was neither wanted nor desired (going stick vs stick against Soviet ships of the 70s and 80s was a losing bet anyway, for the matter). It needed to work with the aviation world to be able to protect the fleet and go to coordinated WAS (War At Sea) as necessary, which, it turned out, they were pretty good at, judging by Libya and Praying Mantis.
Quality for people (especially on the enlisted side) would have been an issue in the 1970s; this was the Hollow Force, after all. You probably would have had fewer training exercises, as well. That would have gotten better in the 1980s and the buildup to the 600-Ship Navy. However, there was still a lot of talent in that 1970s Surface Navy; many of the senior officers and senior enlisted leaders would have done tours on the gun line off of Vietnam, so they would have had combat experience (even if not in fleet v fleet engagements-the North Vietnamese did try and attack the USN ships out there, though not with any real degree of success), and the rest would have spent chasing around the Soviets. That's another thing to remember about the quality of tactical training-even if ships didn't spend time rehearsing it in exercises, they spent time rehearsing it against Ivan Actual at sea.
Finally, a word about the value of culture: there's an old and most likely apocryphal quote usually attributed to the Soviets that goes along the lines of "the most dangerous thing about the American Navy is that they neither know nor follow their own tactics." Victor Davis Hanson will tell you that the most dangerous culture to fight against is Western democratic society, since they will have the technological advantage on their side (since technology won't be subservient to religion/dogma) and their leaders will be free to change their tactics and doctrine as they need (as opposed to more rigidly militaristic cultures, which aren't as free to do so).
The Soviets knew our doctrine; they had spies (speaking of which, AMF to John and Arthur Walker, who both died in the last two months) and copies of our manuals (and we theirs). What always drove them crazy was that they knew what we were supposed to do...but we'd never end up doing that. Even if our tactics didn't work, we would have changed them-that's actually a hallmark of American fighting. We start slow but learn quick.
BTBT
Like CB90, I've done my fair share of exercises (a FRUKUS, two ANNUALEXes, several SHAREMs/SURFREMs, a tactical [that is, not a technical] MISSILEX, and more exercises with the ROKN than I can even hope to remember. Yes, I'm deliberately using acronyms to make a point). I've also done some great coalition real-world ops in Lebanon in '06 (that was fun). I've seen lots of navies operate. Some of them are pretty good at the tactical stuff and the support side (the maintenance side is as important as the tactical-knowing how to use great equipment is great, unless you can't make that equipment work in the first place), but even the good ones generally can only be good at one or two things due to a lack of bench depth and support.
Some of them can definitely hold their own. Heck, some are even better than the US in a few areas they specialize in (they generally have to make sacrifices outside of those areas, however).
Some of them are okay. They get by on the effort vice skill, or by being very limited in what they choose to be "good" at (even more so than the first cohort).
Some of them get by on just reputation; they'd rather look good than be good.
Some of them are just there to beg us for bandwidth and assets so they can even follow what's going on.
No one can match us in our ability to be good in as many areas as the US. None. You don't have to be perfect in this business...just better than the other guy. And I'm confident that we are.
Peace4ever20
New Member
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #29
Thank you so much! I really appreciate your response, and I am very happy that you managed to put my mind at ease. I am almost completely satisfied now, but I do want to ask you just one more question. If you judge the current USN to be really good, would it be reasonable to assume that it was just as good, if not a bit better in the 1980s? I would imagine so, since the USN would have trained and practiced immensely due to the fact that it actually had a potential enemy to fight.
Sure, yeah, why not. Everything was better in the old days, just go down to the VFW Hall if you want more proof.
You haven't offended me. However, I would recommend you pay attention to the advice the mods are giving you, read site rules, read sticky threads and learn to ask better questions. When someone takes the time like Blackshoe has done to create a very long and detailed response to your questions, it's courteous to pay close attention to what they are saying.
Peace4ever20
New Member
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #32
The Virtue of Being a Generalist, Part 1
The Virtue of Being a Generalist, Part 2: Are All Nuggets Created Equal?
The Virtue of Being a Generalist, Part 3: Viper and the Pitfalls of 'Good Enough'
Sorry, I've been busy for the past couple of weeks, so I haven't had time to respond. You told me that I should learn to ask better questions. I've thought about this thread long and hard, and I realize that I really should have clarified and phrased my question much better. Before I totally drop this thread, I just wanted to show you the articles that inspired me to create this thread in the first place.
Nothing that you have offered up is about a deficiency in training - its about service cultural issues
and to be blunt - they don't have anything to do with supporting an argument that the USN is deficient or has been indolent in training its officers to be effective at the warfighting level
one could offer similar pieces on RN, USN, RAN and Dutch submariners
training and performance is not just about service centric issues
and to be blunt - they don't have anything to do with supporting an argument that the USN is deficient or has been indolent in training its officers to be effective at the warfighting level
one could offer similar pieces on RN, USN, RAN and Dutch submariners
training and performance is not just about service centric issues
are you being deliberately pedantic - I'm kind of losing my sense of humour on this as you appear to be taking a pretty obtuse line
you have an opinion piece - even though he is a qualified officer - it is nonetheless, an opinion piece which is still equiv to an informed letter to the editor etc....
opinions are like sphincter muscles - everyone has one, and his opinion is just that.
the end state is how people perform - and I see nothing which indicates that training is deficient.
and I have read all three articles. I wouldn't be wasting my time responding if I haven't done you the courtesy of reading what you posted in the first place.
no offence, but you have a particular focus that's come up in a few threads here and elsewhere where serving officers have offered you alternative views (but uniformly consistent) which you don't appear to want to absorb as it conflicts with already cherished opinions. I have read a raft of responses to you in other forums where people have become visibly less tolerant but are also informed operators who do have a clue. There is a pattern that's forming
that's not the way to learn off people who have something worthwhile and direct to contribute.
Thread closed.
The Mod Team notes that Peace4ever20 started a thread called 'How truly capable is the United States Navy?' and our members, in good humour and patience responded with concise and detailed replies over three pages. Yet he has ignored or disregarded all relevant information provided in them.
His posts in this new thread, shows that Peace4ever20 has learned nothing from those prior replies. In fact, it is clear that he has also learned nothing from the replies in this thread. The only thing that is clear, is his ability to ignore all information that does not fit his preconceived paradigm.
Our patience with him is not unlimited and the Mod Team will not allow this pattern of behaviour to continue. He is on short finals.
2nd Warning issued.
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