Surface Warfare Training

[Peace4ever20]

During the the Cold War, the USN usually prioritized naval aviation and nuclear submarines over its surface fleet. This persisted, at least until Admiral Zumwalt became CNO and instituted changes that helped strengthen the surface fleet. Apart from accelerating the development of the Aegis Combat System and Tomahawk Missile Project, he also laid the foundations for SWOSDOC, a six month course designed for newly commissioned JO's. Throughout the 1980s, IIRC, SWOSDOC mostly received positive feedback from the fleet, as some people thought that surface warfare was becoming a prideful profession again. This lasted until the 1990s and early 2000s, when SWOSDOC was disestablished and replaced by another training system that is apparently not working well with the fleet.

During the Cold War, especially throughout the 1970s and 1980s, did the USN adequately train and practice surface warfare tactics? I have heard from a couple of navy veterans on the USNI Blog that surface warfare training and tactics were inadequate in the USN throughout most of the Cold War. Did the USN adequately train its surface forces for war?

 

[Todjaeger]

During the the Cold War, the USN usually prioritized naval aviation and nuclear submarines over its surface fleet. This persisted, at least until Admiral Zumwalt became CNO and instituted changes that helped strengthen the surface fleet. Apart from accelerating the development of the Aegis Combat System and Tomahawk Missile Project, he also laid the foundations for SWOSDOC, a six month course designed for newly commissioned JO's. Throughout the 1980s, IIRC, SWOSDOC mostly received positive feedback from the fleet, as some people thought that surface warfare was becoming a prideful profession again. This lasted until the 1990s and early 2000s, when SWOSDOC was disestablished and replaced by another training system that is apparently not working well with the fleet.

During the Cold War, especially throughout the 1970s and 1980s, did the USN adequately train and practice surface warfare tactics? I have heard from a couple of navy veterans on the USNI Blog that surface warfare training and tactics were inadequate in the USN throughout most of the Cold War. Did the USN adequately train its surface forces for war?

No offense, but given how similar the question and tone is within this post is to the other USN question thread you started, one wonders if you either did not understand the responses there, or have an axe to grind.

There are a number of problems with the basic question itself. Amongst the problems, there is no definition of what is "adequate" training. There is also no method of determining or testing such training, nor is there any real, specific fleet or navy-wide examples either provided or AFAIK available to determine adequacy. The question completely ignores the fact that the USN surface fleet would not operate 'in a vacuum' against an enemy.

Lastly, like the other USN thread, the tone and intent appear quite similar to a vs. question, which are banned because they add nothing to a debate, attract (or get started by...) trolls, and often degenerate into chest-thumping by people with opposing POV's instead of a reasoned discussion. Assuming that the threads do not start out at that level already of course.

 

[Blackshoe]

I might post more on this later (since this is very relevant to my interests), but I'll just note that you'll pardon me if I suspect that someone who keeps posting leading questions in the same general area and has the handle of "Peace4ever20" is not asking these questions out of pure goodwill and curiosity.

 

[Peace4ever20]

No offense, but given how similar the question and tone is within this post is to the other USN question thread you started, one wonders if you either did not understand the responses there, or have an axe to grind.

There are a number of problems with the basic question itself. Amongst the problems, there is no definition of what is "adequate" training. There is also no method of determining or testing such training, nor is there any real, specific fleet or navy-wide examples either provided or AFAIK available to determine adequacy. The question completely ignores the fact that the USN surface fleet would not operate 'in a vacuum' against an enemy.

Lastly, like the other USN thread, the tone and intent appear quite similar to a vs. question, which are banned because they add nothing to a debate, attract (or get started by...) trolls, and often degenerate into chest-thumping by people with opposing POV's instead of a reasoned discussion. Assuming that the threads do not start out at that level already of course.

There is no axe to grind. I completely understand the responses in the other thread I created, so I am well aware that my perceptions of naval exercises were misinformed. This is not meant to be a vs. question. I'm not asking if the USN surface fleet could "defeat" or be "defeated" by any other navy. In fact, this question specifically refers to the Cold War (1980s) USN, not the current one. Because of the predominance of aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, I just wondered if the USN's surface fleet received the same degree of TACTICAL TRAINING as the other areas of the USN. This means: can the cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and the sailors who man them be depended upon to adequately protect themselves w/o REQUIRED support from carriers and/or submarines.

 

[Todjaeger]

There is no axe to grind. I completely understand the responses in the other thread I created, so I am well aware that my perceptions of naval exercises were misinformed. This is not meant to be a vs. question. I'm not asking if the USN surface fleet could "defeat" or be "defeated" by any other navy. In fact, this question specifically refers to the Cold War (1980s) USN, not the current one. Because of the predominance of aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, I just wondered if the USN's surface fleet received the same degree of TACTICAL TRAINING as the other areas of the USN. This means: can the cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and the sailors who man them be depended upon to adequately protect themselves w/o REQUIRED support from carriers and/or submarines.

This paragraph IMO is rather telling. First, it ignores the question of what is considered "adequate" training. Second, it ignores how the USN fights, or would have fought in the 70's, 80's, and 90's. Third, there is still the little matter of a lack of a benchmark to test or determine adequacy.

In the 80's, there are a handful of examples of where USN surface vessels were attacked or damaged. The USS Stark and USS Samuel B. Roberts being examples. Both vessels did not sink, as a result of the type and location of damage, as well as the actions of the crews, but the circumstances of the incidents offer little indication of USN competence or lack thereof, apart from the skills at damage control. There is also no real example of any USN surface actions from the time period. In short, the question is entirely subjective without any parameters.

It would like like asking "how long is a piece of string?"

 

[Peace4ever20]

This paragraph IMO is rather telling. First, it ignores the question of what is considered "adequate" training. Second, it ignores how the USN fights, or would have fought in the 70's, 80's, and 90's. Third, there is still the little matter of a lack of a benchmark to test or determine adequacy.

In the 80's, there are a handful of examples of where USN surface vessels were attacked or damaged. The USS Stark and USS Samuel B. Roberts being examples. Both vessels did not sink, as a result of the type and location of damage, as well as the actions of the crews, but the circumstances of the incidents offer little indication of USN competence or lack thereof, apart from the skills at damage control. There is also no real example of any USN surface actions from the time period. In short, the question is entirely subjective without any parameters.

It would like like asking "how long is a piece of string?"

1.) Adequate Training - Did USN surface ships (Destroyers, Cruisers, Frigates, etc.) train and practice tactics during the Cold War? I'm not asking about their damage control abilities or their abilities to keep the ship running. I just want to know if tactics were regularly practiced in the USN's surface fleet at this time. That's it.

2.) How would the USN fight?

3.) Other than Operation Praying Mantis, there are no examples of USN surface ships fighting other surface ships during the Cold War. So, it really is difficult to determine how good the surface fleet was in this period. However, I have read articles from the USNI's blog, and I've found some former and retired SWO's who have complained that tactical training is lacking in today's navy. USNI Blog » Blog Archive » What the Professional Naval Conversation is Missing

However, I want to know about the USN's surface fleet during the Cold War. Did the surface fleet of the 70s and 80s suffer from the aforementioned tactical training problems? Or was it better?

BTW: I don't have an axe to grind, nor am I trolling. I am just seeking information to satisfy my curiosity. This has nothing to do with Thompson's work. His work didn't even include anything about surface warfare anyway. If you guys answer my questions, then I promise I will never post here or bother you guys again.

 

[StobieWan]

I might post more on this later (since this is very relevant to my interests), but I'll just note that you'll pardon me if I suspect that someone who keeps posting leading questions in the same general area and has the handle of "Peace4ever20" is not asking these questions out of pure goodwill and curiosity.

I'd be very interested if you would post anything so if you're inclined, please, by all means do so.

 

[CB90]

1.) Adequate Training - Did USN surface ships (Destroyers, Cruisers, Frigates, etc.) train and practice tactics during the Cold War? I'm not asking about their damage control abilities or their abilities to keep the ship running. I just want to know if tactics were regularly practiced in the USN's surface fleet at this time. That's it.

2.) How would the USN fight?

3.) Other than Operation Praying Mantis, there are no examples of USN surface ships fighting other surface ships during the Cold War. So, it really is difficult to determine how good the surface fleet was in this period. However, I have read articles from the USNI's blog, and I've found some former and retired SWO's who have complained that tactical training is lacking in today's navy. USNI Blog » Blog Archive » What the Professional Naval Conversation is Missing

However, I want to know about the USN's surface fleet during the Cold War. Did the surface fleet of the 70s and 80s suffer from the aforementioned tactical training problems? Or was it better?

BTW: I don't have an axe to grind, nor am I trolling. I am just seeking information to satisfy my curiosity. This has nothing to do with Thompson's work. His work didn't even include anything about surface warfare anyway. If you guys answer my questions, then I promise I will never post here or bother you guys again.

1) Yes
2) Awesomely
3) I'm not that old.

You still haven't really set any sort of benchmark in defining "adequate."

 

[ASSAIL]

NATO navies (RAN) all practised surface warfare extensively in those times. SAGEX (Surface Action Group) was a constant in training periods.
However, the threats then were more defined during the Cold War, they consisted of;Sverdlov Class cruisers, fast PB's carrying SSN-1 Styx and or simulated Exocet defence.
Asymmetric threats were usually dealt with during Operation Awkward (protecting an anchored ship against underwater swimmer attacks or small craft attacks)

 

[Peace4ever20]

1) Yes
2) Awesomely
3) I'm not that old.

You still haven't really set any sort of benchmark in defining "adequate."

Okay, let me just show you my sources.

USNI Blog » Blog Archive » What the Professional Naval Conversation is Missing

Navy Matters: Peacetime Commanders - Prepared for War? (Even though this source is from someone who is probably a bit biased, the quote from Admiral Stavridis's book is interesting.)

 

[gf0012-aust]

You seem enthusiastically focussed on supporting your own research than by "listening" to people who are well placed to have experience at the operational level....

or am I missing something?

look long and hard enough and anyone can hoover up material to support their own opinions......

my curiosity is piqued because threads of this nature have been popping up with a frequency that challenges the normal stats....

a small factoid - letters to the USNI are no different to a letter to the editor in a newspaper - being published garners no weight on credibility as they are just an opinion piece.

I'm a life member of the USNI and I can tell you that I had read some absolute eye bleeders.

Its not the articles that have weight, its the follow on letters to the editor of the USNI from other members that become worth reading. I have seen some articles absolutely dismembered by follow on respondents

 

[CB90]

Okay, let me just show you my sources.

USNI Blog » Blog Archive » What the Professional Naval Conversation is Missing

Navy Matters: Peacetime Commanders - Prepared for War? (Even though this source is from someone who is probably a bit biased, the quote from Admiral Stavridis's book is interesting.)

OK...tactical training happens. Periodically.

Could there be more of it? Always would be nice if there was.

Is it adequate? Well, that would depend on the situation wouldn't it? There are so many ways to measure a response to that question (and you've already highlighted 2 completely different criteria) that it becomes a meaningless question.

 

[StobieWan]

You seem enthusiastically focussed on supporting your own research than by "listening" to people who are well placed to have experience at the operational level....

or am I missing something?

look long and hard enough and anyone can hoover up material to support their own opinions......

my curiosity is piqued because threads of this nature have been popping up with a frequency that challenges the normal stats....

a small factoid - letters to the USNI are no different to a letter to the editor in a newspaper - being published garners no weight on credibility as they are just an opinion piece.

I'm a life member of the USNI and I can tell you that I had read some absolute eye bleeders.

Its not the articles that have weight, its the follow on letters to the editor of the USNI from other members that become worth reading. I have seen some articles absolutely dismembered by follow on respondents

Very much so - read the letters to Warships International to give you an idea of what kind of ill-informed f*ckwittery you can get from even former RN people who've been out for twenty years. As you say, the letter or article in isolation isn't always going to be instructive, but the peer review often is.

 

[Todjaeger]

From my POV, one of the most important and telling lessons about surface naval warfare was learned by the RN in the Falklands War.

In some respects, the most valuable lessons learned were by the planners responsible for doctrine and force development, and not by the actual RN crews.

For instance, much of the RN fleet of escort vessels were designed for operations against the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact forces in the North Atlantic, providing an ASW screen for troop and material convoys from North America to Europe in the event the Cold War became a hot war.

The Sea Dart SAM of the day was designed more for medium to high altitude interception of inbound aircraft and/or AShM, since those were the flight profiles of Soviet aircraft and AShM. While Sea Dart did successfully manage to intercept some Argentinian aircraft, it would likely have done better had the design envelope bit a broader in scope.

RN air defence tended to be split between two difference classes of vessel, with the Type 42 and Type 82 destroyers armed with Sea Dart for the medium to long-ranged and medium to high altitude targets. The Type 22 frigates armed with Sea Wolf and Type 21 frigates armed with Sea Cat were intended to handle the close ranged, low-altitude targets. The escorts also tended not to have CIWS and the Type 22 frigates (Batch 1) were not fitted with a naval gun and therefore unable to perform NGS. This was all based off assumptions planners made about who the RN would be fighting against, where they would be fighting, how they would fighting, etc.

It also reinforced the point about the value of organic air, as well as organic AEW support.

Also on the political side, it brings to mind the point about being careful whom ones has dealings with, since Argentina was familiar with the capabilities of the Sea Dart, having a pair of Type 42 destroyers in their navy at the time.

Lastly, the Falklands War is AFAIK the most recent war involving combat from and against naval vessels from a major power since WWII.

 

[Peace4ever20]

OK...tactical training happens. Periodically.

Could there be more of it? Always would be nice if there was.

Is it adequate? Well, that would depend on the situation wouldn't it? There are so many ways to measure a response to that question (and you've already highlighted 2 completely different criteria) that it becomes a meaningless question.

No, it does not happen periodically. From what I've read on the USNI blog and Naval Matters, the US Navy's cruisers, destroyers, and frigates rarely conduct and practice tactical training. In fact, if you look at the first article I posted and actually read the comments, you will find USN veterans complaining about the lack of tactical discussions in the wardrooms of the surface fleet. Most discussions revolve around maintenance of the ship, engineering, or anything unrelated to actual war-fighting. Even in the few instances of tactical training, the training scenarios are unrealistic at best. Even Admiral Stavridis, a former destroyer captain, complained about the lack of realistic combat training in his book Destroyer Captain: Lessons of a First Command. If you don't believe me, then kindly refer to the second article I posted.

While it is true that the USN is the largest navy in the world, size is not an indicator of true strength. True strength involves utilizing assets to their fullest extent and applying them to conduct successful operations in a combat environment. Think about it like this: suppose you give a man an AK-47 and a another man an M1911. The man may possess an inferior weapon, but suppose that he is a well-trained marksman who has received extensive training. The other man, on the other hand, has received no such training. Now, who would be more effective in this scenario? I would definitely bet on the guy with the M1911.

The same principle applies to naval combat. If a navy does not receive enough tactical training to execute effective tactics in war, then it will be at a serious disadvantage, regardless of size. Another example: Battle of Trafalgar. Even though the French and Spanish navies combined surpassed the Royal Navy in size, they were soundly beaten in a very lop-sided manner. Do you know why? Training and effective tactics

 

[RobWilliams]

No, it does not happen periodically. From what I've read on the USNI blog and Naval Matters, the US Navy's cruisers, destroyers, and frigates rarely conduct and practice tactical training.

Probably picked one of the worst people to disagree with on this topic.

Just sayin', blue tags are handed to people with industry or armed service links.

 

[gf0012-aust]

The same principle applies to naval combat. If a navy does not receive enough tactical training to execute effective tactics in war, then it will be at a serious disadvantage, regardless of size. Another example: Battle of Trafalgar. Even though the French and Spanish navies combined surpassed the Royal Navy in size, they were soundly beaten in a very lop-sided manner. Do you know why? Training and effective tactics

I'd be incredibly cautious telling CB90 about training and technique issues.

as for the comment about effective training and tactics, I'm pretty sure I have reinforced this with you elsewhere, its about training before its about technology.

The USN/USMC trains and exercises with more countries and their navies than all other navies combined.

They are the only ones who have regular planned atlantic, pacific, indian ocean, south american, african, mediteranean and caribbean ocean exercises with navies that are fisheries management capable to first strike nuclear capable . that means that have more disparate navy experience than anyone else - period

 

[StobieWan]

No, it does not happen periodically. From what I've read on the USNI blog and Naval Matters, the US Navy's cruisers, destroyers, and frigates rarely conduct and practice tactical training. In fact, if you look at the first article I posted and actually read the comments, you will find USN veterans complaining about the lack of tactical discussions in the wardrooms of the surface fleet. Most discussions revolve around maintenance of the ship, engineering, or anything unrelated to actual war-fighting. Even in the few instances of tactical training, the training scenarios are unrealistic at best. Even Admiral Stavridis, a former destroyer captain, complained about the lack of realistic combat training in his book Destroyer Captain: Lessons of a First Command. If you don't believe me, then kindly refer to the second article I posted.

While it is true that the USN is the largest navy in the world, size is not an indicator of true strength. True strength involves utilizing assets to their fullest extent and applying them to conduct successful operations in a combat environment. Think about it like this: suppose you give a man an AK-47 and a another man an M1911. The man may possess an inferior weapon, but suppose that he is a well-trained marksman who has received extensive training. The other man, on the other hand, has received no such training. Now, who would be more effective in this scenario? I would definitely bet on the guy with the M1911.

The same principle applies to naval combat. If a navy does not receive enough tactical training to execute effective tactics in war, then it will be at a serious disadvantage, regardless of size. Another example: Battle of Trafalgar. Even though the French and Spanish navies combined surpassed the Royal Navy in size, they were soundly beaten in a very lop-sided manner. Do you know why? Training and effective tactics

May I ask - do you have *any* naval experience other than sitting in the bath with rubber duck, chucking sponges at it and yelling "peeow..peoow.." ?

Because some of the people you're busy telling how it really works, well, they've been there, done that and may have more directly relevant experience than you as a result.

I suspect you're on short finals pal...

 

[Peace4ever20]

Probably picked one of the worst people to disagree with on this topic.

Just sayin', blue tags are handed to people with industry or armed service links.

Does he have any experience serving in the USN? If he does, then I will be more inclined to believe him.

BTW, the USNI articles I posted were written by current and former USN surface warfare officers, just sayin'.

 

[RobWilliams]

Yes. In the area you're talking about as it happens. So how about listening to what he's got to say?

Plus, as has been pointed out before, being published in USNI isn't exactly breathtaking, I've seen some utter crap written by former servicemen who can't accept their time in the service is different to modern times.

Can't seem to let up in the quest to hear 'the USN is overrated' or WTTE, not just here either.