i am afraid if Malaysia right now is in such budget constraint, and their plan to raising a Marine brigade will be halt for foreseeable future, and their wishlist plan will be placed in 11th Malaysia Planning programme.
Agreed. There are seven points to note about Sino-ASEAN relations:-
One, beyond COOPERATION 2009 and COOPERATION 2010 bilateral military exercises, in 2012, China sent a pair of giant pandas on a 10-year loan to the Singapore Zoo to boost bilateral ties.
Su Hao, a professor at China Foreign Affairs University, said China and Singapore are interdependent. Singapore has helped China with its economic and administrative management expertise, while China's rapid growth offers investment opportunities for Singapore.
Two, joint bilateral military exercises between China and individual ASEAN countries are not unique to Singapore. Indonesia (eg. Exercise Knife Sharp, anti-terror joint military exercise), Thailand (eg. Exercise Strike, a joint counter-terrorism exercise; and Exercise Blue Strike, an exercise between Thai and Chinese marine units), and
Malaysia have conducted or are going to conduct bilateral exercises with China. Beijing's courtship of Jakarta and Bangkok includes trade agreements, foreign direct investment, market access, technical assistance, and includes offers of military hardware and military cooperation.
Three, the Nine-dotted line was originally an "eleven-dotted-line" first indicated by the then Kuomintang government of the Republic of China in 1947 for its claims to the South China Sea. After the Communist Party of China took over mainland China and formed the People's Republic of China in 1949, the line was adopted and revised to nine as endorsed by Zhou Enlai. It should be noted that regulations approved by
China's Hainan province require foreign fishing vessels in the South China Sea to ask for permission to enter its waters took effect on
1 January 2014. China claims to a U-shaped swathe of the South China Sea that over laps with the EEZ claims of Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The US State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki has said that the passing of these restrictions on other countries' fishing activities in disputed portions of the South China Sea is 'a provocative and potentially dangerous act.' On the other hand,
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said the move is unremarkable. He said, "China is a maritime nation, so it is totally normal and part of the routine for Chinese provinces bordering the sea to formulate regional rules according to the national law to regulate conservation, management and utilization of maritime biological resources."
Four, at times, China’s moves are in response to perceived provocations by other countries, described by some as “reactive assertiveness.” The standoff between vessels from China and the Philippines, which was triggered in April 2102 by Manila’s dispatching a frigate to arrest Chinese fishermen engaged in poaching at Scarborough Shoal. This incident ended with China occupying the Shoal and it also
revealed the Philippines’ misconceived expectations about the role of US and ASEAN.
Five, in early April 2014, Indonesia will host Exercise Komodo, a 18 country multilateral exercise with ADMM Plus members to improve naval cooperation capabilities in disaster relief, in the Riau Islands.
Commodore Amarullah Octavian of the Indonesian Navy Western Fleet said:-
“Currently there has been no claim from China over the Natuna area but we do not want the Sipadan-Ligitan incident to happen again.”
On the side-lines of the planning of this ADMM Plus maritime exercise on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, Amarullah said that the Indonesian Navy would distribute exercise maps that display Indonesian border delineations including Natuna, to ensure that all countries recognize Indonesian borders. This precaution is obviously taken in response to China's muscle flexing and claims in the South China Sea through the so-called nine dotted lines. China claims a U-shaped swathe of the South China Sea under the nine dotted lines, which is administered under the authority of China's Hainan province. This swathe overlaps areas also claimed by several South East Asian nations. While the claim has yet to encroach Natuna waters, observers believe that China will eventually do so.
Six, at the bilateral level, Singapore has attempted to balance a general disposition of deference towards China with firm resolve regarding its own autonomy and the right to assert it. At the regional level, Singapore’s efforts at engaging China have no doubt been complicated by regional circumspection about Chinese motives and power.
Seven, the evolving security landscape has forced Kuala Lumpur to
adopt a nuanced strategy, of courting China while preparing for the worst. In this regard, Malaysia is pursuing a three-fold strategy, as follows:-
(i) Malaysia is engaging in confidence building measures with China, by making an effort to launch direct contact between Malaysia’s Naval Sea Region 2 (which is responsible for the area around the Spratly Islands), and China’s South Sea Fleet.
(ii) It is working with its ASEAN neighbours on the defence and diplomacy track by establishing a maritime cable link between Malaysia’s Naval Sea Region 1, and Vietnam’s Southern Command (i.e. enables the two countries to directly contact each other during potential incidents in the South China Sea).
(iii) It is also strengthening its ties with its Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) partners in Exercise Bersama Lima 2013 and simultaneously improving its ability to respond to new threats via the commissioning of two Scorpène class submarines in 2009. In 2013, Malaysia has also quietly reactivated the base support arrangement with Singapore to enable the cross deployment of fighters on each other's bases. This base support arrangement enables the Malaysian and Singaporean air forces to assist each other should the need arise.
