South China Sea thoughts?

[STURM]

I also cannot imagine Western forces having Chinese ROEs or behaving like Chinese idiots who use lasers to interfere with Australian helicopter operations in a routine RAN exercise.

As a commenter in an article mentioned some time back; it’s typical of a new power still unsure of itself and still finding its way about.

This is why the PLA(N), despite its huge size and global reach, has only few friends like the North Korean and Pakistani Navies

The question is does China actually want friends/allies/partners in the truest sense of those words or does it merely want subservient partners of convenience?

Surprisingly; North Korea hasn’t always been the subservient Chinese partner it’s often made out to be be.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

The question is does China actually want friends/allies/partners in the truest sense of those words or does it merely want subservient partners of convenience?

I don't think it cares either way, but what it does want is lots of attention. The CCP desperately craves international validation, as it wants to recreate the idea of the Middle Kingdom where countries from around the world come to pay tribute.

I expect that OPSSG means that at the moment the PLAN doesn't have friends or subservient naval partners of any real consequence.

 

[STURM]

I expect that OPSSG means that at the moment the PLAN doesn't have friends or subservient naval partners of any real consequence.

Yes but does China actuality want it any other way? Whether with countries or navies per see is China is actually interested in a long term collective partnership with others?

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

Yes but does China actuality want it any other way?

I think it does want things to be different. Whether it wants a long-term partnership is a red herring. As I said, it wants validation. It can't have that validation if it has neither friends nor vassals.

 

[OPSSG]

Yes but does China actuality want it any other way? Whether with countries or navies per see is China is actually interested in a long term collective partnership with others?

1. China and its navy wants to be able to report to the CCP that it can secure China’s overseas investments and commercial shipping by protecting its SLOCs but as long as it’s trade needs to pass through the 3 choke points that it shares with Indonesia onwards to the Indian Ocean region or onwards to Australia, it has a dilemma.

2. The PLA(N) needs both the Thai and Singaporean Navies to have a littoral state veto (with the support of JMSDF and the US Navy) over any threat by the Indian or Indonesian Navies on closing any of these Straits, including the Straits of Malacca — which these ASEAN members do (as the No. 2 and No. 1 most capable air forces within ASEAN and as capable navies by ASEAN standards), the PLA(N) need friends to secure their SLOCs.

I think it does want things to be different. Whether it wants a long-term partnership is a red herring. As I said, it wants validation. It can't have that validation if it has neither friends nor vassals.

3. Agreed.

 

[STURM]

Hence the term the “Melaka Straits dilemma” in reference to its dependence on this strategic waterway; as well as other narrow choke points which are vulnerable.
Getting past the Indian Ocean is only part of the story; it’s still a considerable distance to the Persian Gulf. The financing of ports in certain countries as well as the idea of the Kra. Canal are intended to offset things to some degree.

 

[ngatimozart]

The PLAN and its strategists, along with their academic cadres have been avid disciples of Mahon and I suppose he appeals to their default defence setting of Mao's active defence strategy. They have plenty of brown water institutional knowledge and experience along with some green water experience. However they have no real foundation in blue water operations and warfare unlike their neighbours and others who have an interest in the region. They have started working more with the Russian Navy but even then the Russian Navy is more of a continental navy rather than an oceanic navy, except for its boomers.

I would say that the PLAN is very strong on the theory and the text book side of things, but putting all the theory into practice is another story. You have to train your crews, squadrons, divisions, and fleets with realistic training evolutions, not something that is designed and choreographed to look good for Party big wigs. It has to be done repeatedly and each time the difficulty increased with more problems and unexpected situations thrown in so that mistakes are made and learned from. And it takes decades to get it to the point where everything is nominal and your navy may be considered experienced and capable enough short of war.

Whether or not the PLAN is a fully capable navy is somewhat doubtful. They are definitely building and fielding many new capabilities and platforms but the question is despite this expansion do they have the unit cohesion and C5 required for modern naval warfare? Are their personnel adequately trained, qualified, and experienced enough to face modern USN and Coalition task forces and win? It's one thing to have all the fancy gear, but another to know how to extract the best possible use from it. In this case one very important question - how much freedom of action does each unit commander have? How much initiative, if any, are they allowed to use? That can make a big difference.

Much to ponder and think about.

 

[STURM]

Fully agreed. By the same token however we simply cannot take for granted that the U.S’s superior training and experience; as well as edges in technology will make a victory over the Chinese a forgone conclusion. For a long period the standard narrative was that the Chinese are catching up and are good but not good enough. The question is whether that still holds true and whether the fact they’re not still good enough will ultimately prevent them from achieving what they aim to in the event of a conflict.

The Chinese are also very aware of their limitations and what they can and can’t realistically achieve. They have the advantage in that they’re operating in their backyard and will their best to maximise their strengths and mitigate their weaknesses. What they won’t do is to play to the strength of their opponents.

Unlike China the U.S. is a global power; it can sustain global ops; it has experience in actual high intensity combined warfare; it has men and officers with the training and experience the PLA lacks but for he type of conflict China envisages or hopes to fight: will all three factors be an actual liability?

Sure it’s carrier won’t last a day against the USN but the reasoning behind it wasn’t for it to go head in against the USN and I also won’t claim that the much hyped anti carrier ballistic missiles will sink USN carriers easily. Perhaps (or maybe it’s just me) we should not only devote time to China’s limitations but also it’s strengths; as well as the limitations of potential adversaries in the context of how a future conflict might be fought. One thing’s for
sure : war is full of surprises. It will also be the first direct conflict between two nuclear powers.

 

[Black Jack Shellac]

The strange Chinese reaction to the British carrier strike group -- Part 2


5. Agreed. I also cannot imagine Western forces having Chinese ROEs or behaving like Chinese idiots who use lasers to interfere with Australian helicopter operations in a routine RAN exercise. It's lonely at the top for the world's largest navy by tonnage. The Chinese are not ten feet tall, and I still see:

(a) the JMSDF, with their huge fleet of mine sweepers and large SSKs, as Asia's most capable navy; and​

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(b) the importance of the PLA(N) keeping the neutral or maritime protector gang from joining the potential adversaries. Keeping in mind that Singapore, Thailand and Germany, as countries, are hard-core, geo-political realists (with leaders who think that way). Geo-political realists tend to want choice by strategic action -- Germany's Leopard 2SG and Type 281SG sale to Singapore provides not only security but also preserves choice at multiple levels, for both parties, if the push to choose comes.​

6. Chinese Wolf warriors and the Global Times, are collectively, a self inflicted wound of the PRC. This is why the PLA(N), despite its huge size and global reach, has only few friends like the North Korean and Pakistani Navies; but plenty of:

(i) neutrals, like the Korean, the Singaporean, the Thai and German Navies (as maritime protectors);​

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(ii) potential adversaries, like the Royal Navy, the Indian Navy, the RAN, the RMN, and the TNI AL (who may potentially threaten to quarantine Chinese commercial shipping, if any hostilities are initiated by the PLA(N) against other partner navies); or​

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(iii) core enemies, like the JMSDF or the Taiwanese Navy.​

Just Curious of your opinion, where would you place the USN, potential adversary or core enemy?

 

[John Fedup]

IMHO the backyard advantage sort of negates the experience factor, especially if any confrontation is more or less in the Chinese sphere. American and Japanese submarine assets may be the PLAN’s biggest problem.

 

[OPSSG]

Just Curious of your opinion, where would you place the USN, potential adversary or core enemy?

1. Some where between potential adversary or core enemy, if you really force me but that need not be the case.

2. Taiwan is important because JMSDF will not allow it to fall — the Americans and Japanese are in lockstep. But is it necessary for the US Navy or desirable for the Americans to take the lead to bottle the PLA(N) (as the protector of SLOCs of the 2nd largest economy) in the 1st island chain?

3. The number of newborns in China in 2020 was 12 million, down from 14.65 million in 2019, and China's fertility rate of women of childbearing age was 1.3, a relatively low level, according to the census. I just don’t think that China is that stupid at a geo-strategic level — it’s like the US invasion of Iraq under Bush II — that level of stupid — as there is only a small window of China at peak power before demographics catches up. An invasion is a lose-lose-lose action, no matter how you game outcome from a Chinese perspective.

4. If China invaded Taiwan, the PLA’s self image and reputation as protector of Chinese people to pacify this ethnic Chinese island will be immense. This is not to say that the PLA, as the armed wing of the CCP, does not need the ability to threaten an invasion to influence Taiwanese domestic politics.

5. As troubling as the trend-lines of Chinese behavior are, it would be a mistake to infer that they represent a prelude to an unalterable catastrophe. China's top priority now and in the foreseeable future is to deter Taiwan independence rather than compel unification. Beijing remains confident in its capacity to achieve this near-term objective, even as it sets the groundwork for its long-term goal of unification. Indeed, based on polling on attitudes regarding defence, the people of Taiwan already are sober to the risks of pursuing independence.

6. Also will the PLA(N) suffer huge losses in the amphibious landing attempt? China’s reputation will be so badly hurt — if an attempt is made — South Korea will suddenly decide that China is a bigger threat than Japan. India and many others that share a border with China will see China as a threat that must be fought. Most of ASEAN will be forced to pick a side.

7. More likely, China will impose a naval quarantine to make the Taiwanese bend to their wishes — which is a more elegant solution — China’s goal is to hasten the rise of the multi-polar world (from the unipolar American moment, when Reagan was the President at the fall of the Soviet Union) — the CCP are like the pigs in Animal Farm — all states are equal — some are just more equal than others.

 

[STURM]

Also will the PLA(N) suffer huge losses in the amphibious landing attempt?

Unless they can significantly degrade Taiwan’s air and other defences I don’t see how heavy is casualties on the part of the Chinese avoidable. But they will probably be in no rush for a landing; preferring instead to rely on a blockade, air and missile attacks and a cyber/EW attack.

The Americans getting involved, as they surely will, will complicate things a lot for China.

 

[John Fedup]

Unless they can significantly degrade Taiwan’s air and other defences I don’t see how heavy is casualties on the part of the Chinese avoidable. But they will probably be in no rush for a landing; preferring instead to rely on a blockade, air and missile attacks and a cyber/EW attack.

The Americans getting involved, as they surely will, will complicate things a lot for China.

Blockades work the other way around against China, especially if they start them first.

 

[OPSSG]

Blockades work the other way around against China, especially if they start them first.

Agreed and the PLA(N) can’t win in a distant blockage by the US Navy.

 

[Black Jack Shellac]

Some where between potential adversary or core enemy, if you really force me but that need not be the case.

Taiwan is important because JMSDF will not allow it to fall. But is it necessary for the US Navy or desirable for the Americans to take the lead to bottle the PLA(N) (as the protector of SLOCs of the 2nd largest economy) in the 1st island chain?

If China invaded Taiwan, the PLA’s image and reputation of protector of Chinese people to pacify this ethnic Chinese island will be immense. I just don’t think that China is that stupid at a geo-strategic level — it’s like the US invasion of Iraq. It’s that level of stupid — as there is only a small window of China at peak power before demographics catches up. The number of newborns in China in 2020 was 12 million, down from 14.65 million in 2019, and China's fertility rate of women of childbearing age was 1.3, a relatively low level, according to the census.

More likely, China will impose a naval quarantine to make the Taiwanese bend to their wishes — which is a more elegant solution — China’s goal is to hasten the rise of the multi-polar world (from the unipolar American moment, when Reagan was the President at the fall of the Soviet Union) — the CCP are like the pigs in Animal farm — all states are equal — some are just more equal than others.

An invasion is a lose-lose-lose action, no matter how you game outcome from a Chinese perspective. Also will the PLA(N) suffer huge losses in the amphibious landing attempt? China’s reputation will be so badly hurt — if an attempt is made — South Korea will suddenly decide that China is a bigger threat than Japan. India and many others that share a border with China will see China as a threat that must be fought. Most of ASEAN will be forced to pick a side.

I would agree with you as somewhere in between, may also place RAN there as well.

I don't think the USA or the western democracies in general (other than those local to Taiwan) look at the first island chain that much. I think, for them, it is more about protecting a fellow democracy from a dictatorship.

For years China has been playing a passive game, and the western democracies slept. It allowed for an incoherent message to be presented to China, with every democracy acting in their own interest. But recent events and the ramping up of belligerence from the CCP seems to have woken the west up. There seems to be a more unified message being sent to the CCP from the west and I think Taiwan is the key. This is a good thing.

We allowed Tibet to fall, we allowed the subjugation of inner Mongolia, the subjugation of the Uyghurs, and the take over of Hong Kong. We sit back and watch China take slice after slice out of India. All of this because we were sleeping. I think those days are over.

Do I think the CCP will invade Taiwan? If the west continued to sleep, I have no doubt about it. But I believe the recent awakening has (at least temporarily) put those plans on hold. I think the CCP knows that the west would act in today's climate and the conflict would turn far to ugly, far to fast, even for them.

Could the CCP invade Taiwan? Only if the west does not come to their defence. It would not take very many submarines parked in the Taiwan straight to make an invasion attempt pretty short (I believe the submarines are the key, not the air defence). But only the west can supply those submarines right now.

My opinion, if the west allowed the CCP to invade Taiwan, it would be opening Pandora's Box. It would demonstrate that the west has no backbone and there would be no stopping the CCP after that. If, however, the west presents a unified message to the CCP that Taiwan is a step too far, then we can keep the genie in the bottle.

My opinion.

Edit:

After writing the above, I saw this article which pretty much sums up my thoughts:

Kelly McParland: Beijing is insulting the U.S. again. That's a good thing for the world | National Post

 

[STURM]

Blockades work the other way around against China, especially if they start them first.

To me not “blockades” per see but the vulnerability - stretching all the way from the Middle East to across the Indian Ocean right to China itself - of China’s oil and gas supplies to interdiction. China’s key vulnerability is its dependence on oil and gas imports which are largely transported via the sea.

Against Taiwan a blockade might be attempted short of an actual war but it would still draw the U.S. in.

 

[STURM]

We allowed Tibet to fall, we allowed the subjugation of inner Mongolia, the subjugation of the Uyghurs, and the take over of Hong Kong.

Times were different: it was the Cold War and focus was elsewhere. Tibet and Xinjiang (Turkestan) have populations which are not Han Chinese and were unjustly taken for strategic reasons by China. Hong Kong was different; it was a part of China and was taken by the Brits as after the Opium War. Britain has to eventually return it.

Amphibious ops and Taiwan. I fail to see any reason why China would rush into such a risky undertaking which can be disastrous for China when it has other ways of hurting Taiwan. Compared to the past China has more options to use against Taiwan.

Subs in the Taiwan Straits would only be very effective if air and sea supremacy was achieved. If it wasn’t China’s subs; plus land based ASW would be a major problem. Depending on the circumstances the Chinese could also resort to mining with large numbers; specific areas of the Straits.

 

[John Fedup]

Times were different: it was the Cold War and focus was elsewhere. Tibet and Xinjiang (Turkestan) have populations which are not Han Chinese and were unjustly taken for strategic reasons by China. Hong Kong was different; it was a part of China and was taken by the Brits as after the Opium War. Britain has to eventually return it.

Amphibious ops and Taiwan. I fail to see any reason why China would rush into such a risky undertaking which can be disastrous for China when it has other ways of hurting Taiwan. Compared to the past China has more options to use against Taiwan.

Subs in the Taiwan Straits would only be very effective if air and sea supremacy was achieved. If it wasn’t China’s subs; plus land based ASW would be a major problem. Depending on the circumstances the Chinese could also resort to mining with large numbers; specific areas of the Straits.

Again, like blockades, mining works both ways. China would to have huge faith in their ASW capability to write off the allied submarine threat to a Taiwan invasion. A couple of USN SSGNs make matters even worse.

 

[STURM]

Again, like blockades, mining works both ways.

Depends on the circumstances John. What I wrote was in the context of U.S. submarines being effective in the Straits “if” China attempted an amphibious operation - I doubt it will for the reason that it doesn’t have to; not until conditions are favourable and they may never be. If indeed the Chinese have no immediate intention of an amphibious operation and they wanted to prevent enemy subs operating effectively there; they could resort to mines. They not only have a very large stockpile but have also been known to have invested in a lot of R&D towards “smart” mines. Let’s also not overlook underwater sensors and unmanned stuff they may have.

The Chinese may also choose to deploy own subs there; not to mention strong surface and air ASW units. To prevent this the Americans would have to gain air and sea control over the surrounding area to ensure their subs are operating in favourable conditions. Sure; mines are a double edged sword but they may more useful for a specific side.[

China would to have huge faith in their ASW capability to write off the allied submarine threat to a Taiwan invasion.

It would be a question of using what they have in parallel with other assets. They wouldn’t necessarily have to destroy subs but merely prevent them from doing what they intend to do.

The Americans also would not deploy subs there if it felt that conditions were too unfavourable.

 

[John Fedup]

A high stakes game for all involved. Hopefully common sense prevails….history seems to indicate this is not the norm though.