South China Sea thoughts?

[Volkodav]

I'm wondering what will happen over the next 50 years with China's impending demographic implosion? They will go through the next couple of decades with large numbers of angry young men, not enough women and an aging over all population. They may very well take the SCS as a Chinese lake but in 50 years the dynamic, powerhouses will likely be Indonesia and Vietnam.

 

[Sandhi Yudha]

Appropriate reaction to the stationing of the Type 022 missile vessel in the South China Sea — Part 1

1. ASEAN does not care and will not stand with President Duterte when China crushes him, over a EEZ fisheries dispute in the South China Sea — given that he is the leader of a Chinese client state. In 2020, Duterte stated that China was in “possession” of the South China Sea and underscored his position that it was futile to act against it. This is all the signal China needs to confirm his real lack of resolve. Nearly five years of downplaying Chinese moves and kowtowing to Chinese positions in the contested maritime region in a manner harmful to ASEAN unity have resulted in a fait accompli by turning Whitsun Reef into an anchorage. "Most importantly, the Philippines must abandon its individualist, defeatist, and clientelist mind-set, and mercenary attitude toward geopolitics, hoping China will reciprocate with great favours and unrestricted benevolence,” as Jay Batongbacal said.

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(a) Under Indonesia’s (as ASEAN’s largest country) and Brunei’s (as Chairman) leadership, I am not optimistic of an unified ASEAN response to China’s move to convert the South China Sea into a Chinese lake. 2020 is an important year for Indonesia-China relations. The ties between Jakarta and Beijing have increased and expanded, not only in political and economic fields, where China is now Indonesia’s most crucial trading partner and investor, but also in defence and cultural realms.​

(b) Following Prabowo Subianto’s inauguration as defence minister in 2019, China was the first major power he visited for talks with Chinese counterpart General Wei Fenghe and deputy chairman of China’s Central Military Commission General Xu Qiliang. Plans had been mooted for a US $200 million purchase of naval patrol ships from China, and although the idea was reportedly abandoned.​

(c) Replacing its previous soft protest against China’s actions in the South China Sea, Indonesia has recently taken more aggressive steps. In May 2020, Indonesia, through a strongly worded diplomatic note to the United Nations, also rejected Beijing’s claim that its maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea are guaranteed under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The problems in the relationship might not soon disappear. But Indonesia-China cooperation looks set to continue to increase.​

2. I offer my condolences to the Philippines for:

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(i) deciding not to invest in a real air force, by choosing not to order F-16V before the end of Duterte’s term of office in June 2022 and failing to maintain their C-130 fleet;​

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(ii) deciding not to invest more in procuring capable frigates (like the HDF-3800 frigates from HHI, the Mogami-class frigate from MHI or the Admiral Ronarc’h class FDI frigate from the Naval Group), instead they bought two poorly armed Jose Rizal class corvettes from South Korea; and​

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(iii) deciding to down grade ties with the US by threatening to cancel the VFA; in Feb 2021, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte went so far as to say that the US must pay if it wants to keep a two-decade-old troop deployment agreement with his country that is central to US strategy in Asia.​

3. If the Pinoys were serious about growing their air and naval capabilities, they would place a follow-on order of 6 more Jose Rizal class corvettes from HHI and an initial order of 36 F-16Vs.

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4. Anything less than 6 to 8 corvettes for presence and 2 MRF fighter squadrons is just mere puff. If they at least did the minimum of ordering MICA NG missiles for the Jose Rizal class corvettes to gain a basic air warfare capability, I would recognise their modernisation efforts but since that is not done, their efforts thus far is seen by me as lame and ineffective.

100% agree. I’ve not much to add.

These are the consequences of
1. Taking defence not seriously for decades.
2. Being china's little doggy in the years under Duterte's leadership.

And about ASEANS' response: expect nothing, ASEAN is weak and devided.

 

[ngatimozart]

*

I'm wondering what will happen over the next 50 years with China's impending demographic implosion? They will go through the next couple of decades with large numbers of angry young men, not enough women and an aging over all population. They may very well take the SCS as a Chinese lake but in 50 years the dynamic, powerhouses will likely be Indonesia and Vietnam.

That is going to be very much the problem. The CCP are already following some Hitlerian National Socialist policies and they could adopt another one. This was the policy of encouraging every Aryan fraulein and frau to have multiple children to good Aryan men for the future of the Reich. They were given support from the Reich and if the mothers happened to be single at the time it wasn't a great problem.

Xi Jinping’s conception of socialism | The Strategist

Is Xi Jinping more Hitlerian or Stalinist in his view of Chinese socialism? The answer to that question is important because it bears on the policy choices China’s adversaries will need to make. George Kennan, ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

 

[Ananda]

For time being:

Menkes: Pemerintah tambah pesanan vaksin Sinovac antisipasi embargo

Menteri Kesehatan Budi Gunadi Sadikin menyampaikan bahwa pemerintah berencana menambah jumlah pemesanan sebanyak 90 juta - 100 juta Vaksin ...

m.antaranews.com

With Eurozone, India and US halt shipment of Vaccine so far, Indonesia don't have choice but adding the order from China. Most of Chinese vaccine don't come as finish products, but more as raw materials that being finish in Indonesia by Indo Pharma. Sinovac already choose Indo Pharma and Brazilian pharmaceutical company as part of their Vaccine ecosystem manufacturing, just like Astra Zeneca use India for that.

The additional order number of 90-100 Mio dose basically to replace vaccine that come from Euro and India suppliers. Indonesian indigenous vaccine will not be ready until later half of this year or early next year. Thus to reach at least 50% vaccination drive, reliance to Chinese vaccine like Sinovac or Sinopharm is the only choices.

So up until now, China Vaccine diplomacy work. By Targeting Indonesia and Brazil as the early recipient of their vaccine in large numbers and also using both countries as part of their Vaccine distribution ecosystem, China basically manage to gain diplomatic influence coup toward South East Asia and South America largest nation (both in economy and population). Both of them also have diplomatic influence in their own region.

Off course Indonesia knows well the risk of China. In Defense and Investment diplomatic Indonesia so far shown balancing act with giving more projects to Japan, ROK and US both in Investment and Defense assets. However that will be the most Indonesia can do for now. The Indonesian chamber of commerce already give prediction that China will replace US as the largest Indonesian export market.

I think US knows well the effect on Vaccines Diplomacy, but unlike China and with much larger domestic infection, they just can't send their vaccine as China did. They (US) already assure Indonesia by second half this year they will begin sending Pfizer and Moderna. However it will not be as large as Chinese supply. Both Sinovac and Sinopharm already talk in media that by end of this year they can reach 2 billion doses capacity each with more than half can be exported. Most will be send to low and middle income countries in Africa, Asia, Middle East and South America.

At least for foreseeable future, this vaccine diplomacy together with Investment drive after COVID will potentially give huge diplomatic gain for China in that area.
It's up to Western power on how to counter that.

 

[Volkodav]

Apparently the reason Australia went for the Astra Zenaca was our ability to manufacture it locally where as the RNA type vaccines cannot. The question I have is, how long would it have taken to set up new facilities and why we haven't gone down that track now we have seen how deviating such viruses can be.

 

[oldsig127]

Apparently the reason Australia went for the Astra Zenaca was our ability to manufacture it locally where as the RNA type vaccines cannot. The question I have is, how long would it have taken to set up new facilities and why we haven't gone down that track now we have seen how deviating such viruses can be.

It's my understanding that CSL audited their capacity to produce mRNA vaccines about August last year and building capacity to develop and produce RNA type vaccines would take about 12 months. Whether they're moving ahead, I can't verify but vaguely recall being mentioned since then

Source: an interview on ABC Insiders

oldsig

 

[OPSSG]

Appropriate reaction to the stationing of the Type 022 missile vessel in the South China Sea — Part 2

100% agree. I’ve not much to add.

These are the consequences of
1. Taking defence not seriously for decades.
2. Being china's little doggy in the years under Duterte's leadership.

And about ASEANS' response: expect nothing, ASEAN is weak and devided.

5. China can pursue vertical or horizontal escalation. Vertical escalation refers to how China can increase levels of violence, whereas horizontal escalation identifies how China’s navy and PAFMM can broaden a conflict beyond its original parameters of a EEZ dispute. This remains an important issue for ASEAN given the inability of our navies to field forces that can incrementally increase levels of violence, to match the PLA(N) within zones of contention or sustainably project force beyond a specific area of hostilities.

6. My greatest worry on horizontal escalation is when conventional PLA(N) forces confront an ASEAN Navy (it is shooting at), suggests that the incentives surrounding mutual restraint may prove minimal; unlike the case of the border dispute with India (where mutual restraint was shown). And this form of escalation is what creates a larger ungoverned space, where local rebel groups can operate to terrorise seafarers.

7. What great power competition means and how it is pursued has important implications for ASEAN navies’ future force designs. The great power paradigm shift has led some to suggest that the members of ADMM fully invest in preparing for great power competition, rather than manage the issue of ungoverned spaces — which can allow ISIS inspired groups to thrive. But I think that is unsustainable — ADMM navies working along side the US Navy and the JMSDF need a mix of high-low capabilities and not just focus on high end naval warfare.

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(a) Realistically, I expect that ASEAN navies are not going to be able to afford destroyers, but investment in frigates and corvettes must be part of the future force mix. Ideally, 8 corvettes and 4 frigates is what is needed for constant presence to deter an enemy and meet the challenge of vertical escalation, within a single zone of contention.​

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(b) In 7 years, the PLA(N) built 83 of the 400-ton Type 022s, each armed with 8 anti-ship missiles, at an estimated cost of US$40 million per ship. And production continues at a high rate in several shipyards. Given these numbers, the 83 Chinese Type 022 can operate forward in swarms to fire up to 664 anti-ship missiles — even if we assume that a single limited engagement results in less than 10% of the anti-ship missiles fired, an ASEAN country’s naval task group needs to have the minimum capability of intercepting 60 anti-ship missiles. To deter the PLA(N) from vertical escalation, any ASEAN Navy needs to force generate a naval task group of corvettes and frigates on a 365 basis to deter vertical escalation in the use of force. From a force generation perspective (to support a CONOPS), having 8 corvettes means up to 3 can deploy at each time, and 4 frigates, means 1 to 2 frigates can deploy on short notice, to generate a capable naval task group that deters the use of force.​

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(c) Each ASEAN navy needs to the war game for itself a variety of scenarios (of limited conflict in the South China Sea), to see what mix of systems and platforms currently sought gives the best bang for the money, while ensuring that it can maintain a 365 naval presence. The reality is that capable naval task groups need time to train and not just deploy for naval presence; which is why the very capable Singapore Navy (by ASEAN standards) gives ST Marine build orders in the following numbers:​

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- 4 (Sentinel class, 4 Invincible class and 4 Endurance class vessels),​

- 6 (6 Formidable class and 6 Victory class vessels), or​

- 8 (Independence class vessels).​

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(d) Supported by MPAs and MALE UAVs, each class of vessel for the Singapore Navy performs a specific task within a naval task group that can operate concentrated or dispersed depending on the threat matrix.​

 

[Volkodav]

I have a solution, provide the retiring RAN Armidale Class patrol boats to China for their coast guard along with the rights to manufacture more of them. By the time they realise how useless they are the situation will have stabilised due to the complete absence of the Chinese PBs from the area.

 

[Ananda]

...expect that ASEAN navies are not going to be able to afford destroyers, but investment in frigates and corvettes must be part of the future force mix. Ideally, 8 corvettes and 4 frigates is what is needed for constant presence to deter an enemy and meet the challenge of vertical escalation, within a single zone of contention.

What I'm afraid with Naval capacity build up in ASEAN (outside Singapore) is the build up based more to paradigm "what my neighbors have" and not to "what my Navy really need". This can ruin the consistency on building program.

Malaysian Navy (RMN) with their plan for consolidating vessels types for example, in my opinion already working in right way. Will have to see the consistency on implementation. Because that's what I do see the problem on any Defense planning, the "Political disturbance" due to changes on "whim" from changing administration.

Indonesia clearly the good example on that. From Gus Dur administration, there's plan for changing TNI-AL from Brown Water Navy toward competence Green Water Navy. This is already two decade, and I'm still see the implementation changing each time new administration come.

I'm not going ranting too much on the problem of Indonesian Defense planning and implementation. I already done too much on that in Indonesian threads. However what happen in Indonesian defense planning is also not isolated case if we referring toward most of ASEAN.

I don't know how the future of ASEAN Defense development, but I do worry most of them will caught unprepared toward great power competition. Philippines is one of the worst example so far, but honestly many of the rest is not faring much better. There's urgency from most of ASEAN military planners, but to turn it into consistent long term military implementation ?? Well that's the big question so far.

 

[STURM]

What I'm afraid with Naval capacity build up in ASEAN (outside Singapore) is the build up based more to paradigm "what my neighbors have" and not to "what my Navy really need". This can ruin the consistency on building program.

In the case of the RMN; with a few exceptions; i would argue that this is not the case.

Granted; a number of purchases are driven by threat perceptions and the need not to be left too far behind by its neighbours but the bulk of planned procurement are part of a policy to progressively improve the service’s ability to meet current peacetime operational challenges; as well as those planners feel are most likely to be faced in the future; doesn’t include the possibility of a full blown state on state high intensity conflict in which the full resources of both states have to be utilised/employed .

Malaysian Navy (RMN) with their plan for consolidating vessels types for example, in my opinion already working in right way.

The RMN has long identified the problems it faces and has solutions. The problem lies with the government. How successful the RMN eventually is depends on the level of support and commitment it receives from its political matters.

On top of economic issues caused by Covid and the traditional reluctance of past governments to spend beyond what it feels is the absolute minimum needed to spend on defence; an added problem is the present internal political situation; things are very fluid at the moment.

 

[OPSSG]

Appropriate reaction to the stationing of the Type 022 missile vessel in the South China Sea — Part 3

8. The recent Whitsun Reef incident is demonstration of China’s willingness to take risks by horizontal escalation. China’s military leadership will be evaluating the performance of its most recent maritime militia foray and the responses it has elicited from the US and others within ASEAN, especially the pitiful response of the Philippines.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1380677821731893255

9. China is making greater advances is civil-military fusion to gain superior maritime domain awareness; with Sansha 1 and Sansha 2 supply ships being upgraded to conduct surveillance in their South China Sea supply runs — which will give the PLA(N) better domain awareness against the Vietnamese navy — with the Pinoys not able to effectively react.

 

[STURM]

By 2030, Vietnam’s 6 Kilo class submarines will be the hunted by Chinese ASW groups. That’s a scary thought. That is why, 8 years ago, Singapore decided to invest in a new class of regionally superior submarines — to ensure our active armed neutrality to any conflict.

My opinion is that in the went of an all out war; Vietnam will probably not deploy its subs in the Spratlys area per se but along the periphery or closer to its shores.

Granted; subs will always have a key advantage over surface assets but irrespective of how advanced they are; should never be placed in a disadvantageous position which is what will happen if they deploy in the Spratlys.

In addition to PLAN surface ASW groups; there will also be airborne ASW assets and subs in the area - in numbers - on the lookout for enemy subs. On top of that I’ll be very surprised if the Chinese haven’t placed any underwater sensors in the area as well. Mines (“smart” or other wise) are also a possibility.

If the USN and other countries are involved and deploy subs in the area; the undersea domain could also get congested and the danger of a “friendly” incident could arise.

to gain superior maritime domain awareness; with Sansha 1 and Sansha 2 supply ships being upgraded to conduct surveillance in their South China Sea supply runs.

I remember a discussion I had with a naval officer many years ago over drinks in a bar in Manila. He said we also should start getting worried when Chinese survey ships start making a presence in the area; because that would indicate a number of things.

Well; it eventually happened.

Up until the early 2000’s RMN people who deployed in the area spoke of regularly encountering Vietnamese and Filipino ships and aircraft; actually encountering Chinese ones was a rarity and even then it was mostly trawlers. How times have changed.

 

[Volkodav]

I imagine mines would be a nightmare in the SCS. I wonder if it would be possible to strangle the man made islands with a mining campaign?

 

[ngatimozart]

I imagine mines would be a nightmare in the SCS. I wonder if it would be possible to strangle the man made islands with a mining campaign?

Should be if you had enough mines and were able to deploy them.

 

[STURM]

I have no idea about the Philippines and Brunei (which doesn’t physically occupy any reefs) but mines are stockpiled by all the other claimants. Unsurprisingly it’s the Chinese with the largest stockpile and the one reportedly investing in a lot of R&D.

The nightmare would be bottom laid mines in ceramic casings which makes them hard to detect and rocket assisted mines programmed to be activated upon detecting a specific acoustic signature.

I would imagine that in time of war mines would be employed by the smaller/weaker claimants as a form of sea denial at specific areas around the reefs they claim and occupy. The Chinese on the other hand woujd employ mines - in conjunction with other assets - as a means of denying outside powers the ability to intervene in the area. Performing MCM would be tricky in areas covered by Chinese missiles.

 

[Volkodav]

If China wants the SCS as a personal lake, let them have it but deny them any actual use of it. Surrounding nations could conceivably cut off access to it all together.

 

[ngatimozart]

If China wants the SCS as a personal lake, let them have it but deny them any actual use of it. Surrounding nations could conceivably cut off access to it all together.

But then it kind of buggers it up for Vietnam though and possibly South Korea. It would also mean shipping going the longer way to Japan and South Korea from the Middle East and Europe. I will have to have a good look at the appropriate maps / charts.

 

[swerve]

Not just from the Middle East & Europe. Consider Thailand. Quite a lot of its trade would have to go further. There are lots of factories in Thailand tied in to supply chains in Japan & S. Korea. I've done jobs for Japanese firms with factories in Thailand, & they all seem to be closely tied in with their home factories.

And what about Singapore & Malaysia?

 

[STURM]

And what about Singapore & Malaysia?

Quite of bit of Malaysian oil & gas is exported to South Korea and Japan; as well as manufactured goods and other items to North America via the South China Sea.

To date; China has steadily gotten away with everything. Other countries have complained and the U.S. has responded in various ways but the fact remains that China has gotten its way.

The question is what action - apart from a strike on Taiwan - would China have to undertake for the U.S. to actually willing to be engaged in an all out war? Despite its warnings and its credibility being at stake would the U.S. actually risk an all out war if say a Philippines (a treaty ally) naval ship was sunk or if international sea lanes were momentarily disrupted due to a naval clash between Vietnam and China?

How much support would the U.S. actually get from it’s NATO allies who are more focussed on Russia and would China’s nuclear arsenal be a limiting factor in the U.S’s response?

What would happen if trouble broke out in the South China Sea whilst the U.S. was engaged in a crisis with Russia or Iran? Would North Korea at China’s behest; undertake certain actions to tie down the U.S, Japan and South Korea whilst the U.S. was engaged in the South China Sea?

 

[Ananda]

It would also mean shipping going the longer way to Japan and South Korea from the Middle East and Europe. I will have to have a good look at the appropriate maps / charts.

If SCS being blocked by China, the trade route between East Asian & other nations toward SEA and Indies ocean still can use trade route through Philipines waters through Makassar Straits and then other Indonesian Straits (eg. Sunda Strait or Lombok Strait) toward Indian Ocean. It is actually routes that are being used right now, although the traffic is not as big as SCS.

In theory, the Natuna islands can be used as SCS choke point. China knows that, which why Indonesia stregthen Military base in Natuna and conducting regular miltary exercise there. However, as OPSSG already put in his posts, ASEAN either don't have strong enough military capabilities to choke China's trade flows from SCS, or ASEAN it self is not unified enough toward China on SCS.

That's what China counting on. Fracturing ASEAN means China can use coastal routes near some friendlier ASEAN states to gain access towards SCS.

That's why China still try to make deal with Thailand for Kra Istmus canal. Even in Thailand some analysts there questions the economic viability of the project. It's only cut 1200km journey compare using Malacca Straits, thus only save two days at most. Compare with Suez and Panama that can save up to two weeks journey. Thus business wise it raise question who wants to pay Canal Tool fee for only saving two days journey.

However, it can provide China own water ways if they can get the deal from Thailand. Imagine scenario that Indonesia-Singapore-Malaysia close China shipping from using Malacca Strait (due to their protest of China closing SCS as China own pool). If China already got the deal to open Kra Canal, then they can use Cambodia (China’s long time ASEAN allies) waters by-passing Natuna and direct to Thai's waters through Kra Canal. In short they can by pass potential 'less friendlier' ASEAN waters while still maintain direct routes to Indies Ocean from SCS.

China knows well ASEAN is not unified toward China action in SCS, and they know how to exploit that. Thus if Western power especialy US letting China control all SCS, and hope ASEAN unified to oppose that, I don't think it will happen. US as now at most can only hope at best to get 3 to 4 ASEAN members that have enough positioning to oppose China if they close SCS. This also only happen if US and allies shown active support on that.