That's when Pakistan come to play. This is where China will support Pakistan whatever they can. US influence on Pakistan day by day, bit by bit being replaced by China.
India can't attack China Sea and Land routes (road and belt routes) in Arabian sea and Central Asia without have to pacified Pakistan first.
Beyond the fact that Pakistan’s rail system can be disrupted by India, the Indian Air Force and Navy faced off with Pakistan during:
(a) Operation Safed Sagar by the Indian Air Force; and
(b) Operation Talwar by the Indian Navy
both in May and July 1999.
Operation Talwar was a demonstration of Indian Naval capability that involved the largest ever deployment of Indian combatant ships. The Pakistan Navy was forced avoid the Indian Navy and it was later revealed that the blockade of Karachi and interruption of oil supply, caused an operational pause by Pakistan that aided Operation Vijay by the Indian Army. It has been chronicled that Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif indicated after the conflict that — the Indian Navy blockaded Karachi — Pakistan had fuel supplies only for six days of conventional combat due to the blockade.
Yes some freight can be diverted through other modal links but using the rail example in the paper if, for example, the PRC was to start importing 200,000 tonnes of oil per shipment by rail. Well that's one very tempting target, for example, the Indian Air Force to interdict and it doesn't even have to go looking for it because you can't hide train tracks. Build a pipeline - that can be attacked by air or ground forces
Forgive my off topic reply on this thread — with a different take on shipping that I hope adds to the discussion.
1. In Asia, trade is strategy. Nothing unites North East Asian (NE Asian) interests like a threat to their shipping — which is why, both Korea and Japan have deployed naval ships to the Persian Gulf.
2. Just because India has a border dispute with China it does not mean that the Indian Navy is free to escalate in any manner it likes. China is not at war with Japan, Korea, Taiwan or Singapore; and in a capitalistic society, businesses will seek profit, even if that profit is from moving China’s cargo in the Indian Ocean to get round an Indian blockade. Just as the South China Sea is not a Chinese lake, the Indian Ocean is not an Indian lake.
3. Three points to note: One, attempts by Indian strategists to talk about disrupting Chinese (aka NE Asian) trade routes in the Indian Ocean is not credible. Two, as a non-aligned state (free of alliance responsibilities), Indian attempts to get more than lip service sympathy from ASEAN members with regards to its border issues, with China or Pakistan, is doomed to failure. Three, China’s 3,700 plus merchant ships carry cargo from not just China but for NE Asia, and vice versa for the Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese merchant ships in these interlinked economies. Any Indian Navy attempt to disrupt commercial shipping will make it a pariah state.
(a) A simple way for China to avoid Indian Navy attempts to do so, would be to reflag 15% to 30% of Chinese flagged merchant ships to another flag (eg. Singapore, Panama, Marshall Islands, and Hong Kong to name 4 of the top 5 flag states). About 8,600 ships fly the Panamanian flag. By comparison China has just over 3,700 registered vessels. From decision to the massive reflagging (for 550 to 1,100 ships), this administrative task can be done in about 3 to 4 weeks. In the event of an Indian blockade, the PLA(N), wil just escort some of their own remaining merchant ships, with higher value cargos in convoys — in 2019, China had a 335-ship naval fleet, according to a US Congressional Research Service report — the PLA(N) is also well rehearsed in forming counter piracy escort groups for the last 12 years. The PLA(N) has the capability to conduct convoy escorts for its own merchant ships on the scale of Operation Earnest Will, conducted by the Americans, in 1987.
(b) If the Indian Navy plays its cards wrongly, and their dispute with the PLA(N) affects innocent merchant traffic, the RAN, JMSDF, ROKN, ROCN and RSN could end up running escorts to convoy NE Asian and Oceania cargo routes transiting through the Indian Ocean — esp container liner trade that is currently controlled by:
(i) Mitsui OSK Lines, NYK and Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha;
(ii) Hyundai Merchant Marine, CK Line, Dongjin Shipping, Don Woo Shipping, Dong Young Shipping, Hansung Line, Heueng-A Shipping, KMTC, Namsung Shipping, Pan Continental Shipping, Pan Ocean, Sinokor Shipping, SM Line and Tai Young Shipping;
(iii) Evergreen Line and Yang Ming Marine Transport; or
(iv) Pacific International Line.
(c) Japanese, Korean, Indonesian and Singaporean owned or flagged cargo ships would just enjoy high cargo usage — from a multi-modal transport cost point of view, cargo moved by sea is much cheaper than rail.
(d) For the energy trade, to evade an Indian Navy blockage, Chinese SOEs could also buy a portion of its supply from other trading hubs (eg. Singapore) or from sources that do not need to sail through the Indian Ocean. The LNG and oil will be owned by MNCs importing it into a port outside the reach of the Indian Navy — the Chinese would buy it there — thereafter, their merchant ships pick it up from the trading hub — by-passing an useless Indian Ocean blockage.
4. Just because India has a border dispute with China it does not mean that the Indian Navy is free to escalate in any manner it likes. China is not at war with Australia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan or ASEAN members (like Indonesia and Singapore) and the businesses of these countries will seek profit, even if that profit is from moving container cargoes, bulk cargoes, oil and LNG cargoes that are ultimately destined for China, at a later stage, and transiting through the Indian Ocean. The reverse is also true, just because China has a border dispute with India, it does not mean that the PLA(N) is free to escalate in any manner it likes.
5. Like the Koreans and Japanese, Chinese anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have directly supported PLA(N) modernization goals and provided invaluable experience operating in distant waters. Lessons learned have spawned PLA(N) innovations in doctrine, operations, and international coordination. Many of the insights gleaned during deployments are applicable to security objectives closer to home; some officers enjoy promotion to important positions after returning. Anti-piracy operations have been a springboard for China to expand considerably its maritime security operations, from evacuating its citizens from Libya and Yemen to escorting Syrian chemical weapons to their destruction and participating in the search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370. So great are the benefits to China’s global maritime presence and enhanced image at home and abroad that when Gulf of Aden anti-piracy operations finally wind down, Beijing will have to develop new means to address its burgeoning overseas interests.
6. As I said earlier, trade in strategy. IMHO, SLOCs are part of the global commons that capable navies exist to protect.
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