Well, let's clarify a few things:
As long as acronyms have all the correct letters their meaning isn't lost- I don't worry about being 100% correct;
the PRC recently demostrated that ASATs can be done by BMs & laser interference instead of killer SATs;
Are you being serious? Their own satellite, on a predicted cycle, it's only intervention and control being manouvre of entry (not avoidance) and on a decaying orbit that is known? Thats not remotely comparable to killing the right satellite at the right orbit with free abandon.
Was it an interesting effort? Of course. Does it indicate latent capability? Yes - to some extent. Does it inidicate the ability to kill satellites that are in the outer orbit layers (and which are the critical ones for C5ISR). No
You do realise that up until now that there has been no need to include counter systems to lasers - but the solutions do exist and early generation solutions are already on some platforms. Do you seriously think that they won't be installed on future satellites as the older ones cycle down (they don't stay up there forever - hence the chinese training shot at their own asset)
in the 1st Gulf War, CSGs had to stay out of the Persian Gulf thanks to the mine threat, and had to use land based tankers to reach Kuwait & Iraq;
and thats a smart decision when one considers that the USN failed miserably to retain any useful saturated response to mines because it wasn't high on their own radar screen of things to have and do. 16 years later that has changed.
why in heavens name would you expect a carrier to stay around an area thats equivalent to a bathtub? The fleet was there to send a message. It wasn't there to fight a war. for example during the cold war, The Med was referred to as "An American lake" by the Soviets. The scale of firepower relative to the time was enormous.
Understand the basics. Carriers to do no go close to land to deliver the fight until SEAD/DEAD has been achieved. When and if they are in viewing range of the coast, or within the landbased response range its to send a message - its not to take up the fight.
during India-East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) war the US tried to
intimidate the Indian government, but avoided a possible clash with IN carrier- i.e. that CBG was mission killed by the mere presence of an opposing CBG;
This one is raised all the time as an example of Carrier vulnerability. What is does is hilight the influence of political decision over tactical - it does not demonstrate threat capability. Again, are you going to say to me that the Indian Ocean Fleet (although the junior fleet in the USN) was tactically intimidated by an oposing force that was 1/4 of its capability in firepower? Good grief, the opposing fleet was tagged by nukes for weeks. They could have at any time, if they decided that war was an option, sink those assets. On top of that, the US had 2.5-3 times the sensory reach and were able to extend the battlespace management by a similar amount. The Indian fleet had nowhere near any of that capability. The response and manouvre issues need to be looked at realistically - not in the context of some mythical force on force contest where one navy was "out butted" by the other. If it had been a decision to actually go to war the US carrier would have been a 2nd stringer. The US subs would have done the fighting - and no offence, the russian ASW systems and ASW systems the IN had at the time were woeful.
Don't confuse the political with the tactical.
All of the above shows that, as mighty as they are, CBGs/CSGs are not invincible or invulnarable. Even if the US knows about drone/supersonics threat that by itself isn't going to dimish it. No, in many scenarios carriers are useful and should not be scrapped right away, just like those army attack helicopters- but they have to be used prudently. IMO, sooner or later one of these behemots will be crippled- just like those battleships in the early XX century!
Nobody is saying that Carriers are invincible, but the arguments used to say how vulnerable they are clearly demonstrate to me a serious lack of forethought and almost zero appreciation of how complex and difficult it is to deal with them - especially when they're on a warfooting.
You reinforce my argument about comprehension when you raise the issue of the Apache attack helos. Why did they get destroyed so easily? - because they ignored their own doctrine on tactical deployment. If you don't use the assets properly you lose them.
As soon as people mumble about how supersonics (eg) will kill a carrier my eyes glaze over as it seems to me that there is a complete absence of comprehension about what defensive layers exist to deal with cruise missile threats.
There is often a complete absence of appreciation of what logistics are required to be in place as well as issues of placement, geography, defensive systems etc... when these discussions occur.
Sure, of course one day a Carrier will get hit and be lost (the americans assumed that they'd lose close to 25% in the first week of a shooting war with the Soviets) - but who in the world today has even remote tactical comparability to the Soviet Navy and Air Force? No one, nada, zip, zilch. And that immediately means that there are issues of presence, platforms, persistence, projection that fail to be achieved.
The article you quoted is a letter to the editor (ie, you or I could write the same letter and not be regarded as experts) - it is replete with errors - do you want me to respond to the errors of fact?
