Russia - General Discussion.

[ngatimozart]

Per the National Interest, Russia's new armaments Tsirkon and Poseidon could make their neutralization of opponent CSGs easier. Although I am not sure whether this is truly relevant today, as Russia now seems concentrated in their bordering regions in Europe and Asia. Still, these weapon systems seem to have been decades in development.

Why Russia Never Stops Tracking U.S. Aircraft Carrier Strike Groups

CSG’s are no longer the unstoppable maritime juggernaut that they once were— at least, not in Russia’s eyes.

nationalinterest.org

I have never believed that CSGs couldn't be beaten. In various exercises the RNZAF, RNZN, and RAN have sunk the CVNs at the centre of the CBG. The RNZAF lost all their A-4K Skyhawks doing it, and the RNZN their Leander class frigate but it was a good exchange. Believe that the RAN have done it with subs. As soon as the CVNs were sunk the yanks changed the rules so that they were unsunk.

 

[tequilashooter]

scramjets are still a better option than the chinese proposing ballistic missiles to target ships which we honed our air defenses in intercepting.

@tequilashooter Howabout some sources and reasons to back up your statement. You are making claims without providing supporting evidence and that is a requirement of the rules here.

Ngatimozart.

 

[Feanor]

The really sad thing is that I am pretty convinced that if Russia had moved in a democratic direction starting in the early nineties, and accepted that USSR was no more, and also accepted a "rules based" system (Strategic context: The rules-based international system - Atlantic Council ) Russia could have become part of NATO and perhaps even EU. That would have made Russia much richer and safer than today; in addition also Europe and the US would have been safer and richer with the addition of Russia to the international rules based system. Alas that did not happen. Instead Russia seems to try to weaken the rules based system, and also have ben proven to actively try to weaken democracies in Europe, as well as the US democracy.

I think Russia was fine with accepting a rules-based system but only if the rules are the same for everyone. If Russia isn't allowed to invade it's neighbors and replace their governments, then America shouldn't be allowed to do it in Iraq, and NATO shouldn't be allowed to bomb Yugoslavia without a UN resolution. Russia will only accept a rules based system if all the other major players do too. A system of "we all play by the rules but the remaining super-power is special" is unacceptable. If the name of the game is realpolitik and power-based politics, then Russia will have their sphere of influence, small as it may be.

Often times, I see the West trying to sell the carrot and stick approach but has it occurred to the West that maybe the Russians are not rabbits and carrots won’t work?

On the one hand, I think you're correct. Definitely not rabbits. On the other hand poking a bear with a stick isn't a great idea either. And while we're at it, what tangible foreign-policy carrot has Russia been offered? Lifting sanctions, by the way, isn't a carrot. It's hitting someone with a stick repeatedly and then claiming that stopping is a "carrot". Neither is trade and economic development, those things are mutually beneficial. Consider Russian relations with countries as complicated as Turkey, or Israel, or even China. A simple tit-for-tat strategy, and all of those countries can deal with Russia profitably. The issue is that something has to be offered. If the West has something tangible to offer Russia (something more then "we'll lift sanctions if you behave") they can probably get something for it.

 

[Feanor]

The two proposed agreements from Russia:
AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND MEMBER STATES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION - Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (mid.ru)
A few quotes:

Does this mean that Russia will stop all cyberattacks on all NATO countries? Great news! Will they also stop meddling with democratic processes in NATO countries? Will they instruct their ally Belarus to stop using immigrants in their hybrid warfare?

I suspect all of those things are on the table.

I would not mind, but only if Russia and her "allies" agree to do the same. Please leave Ukraine, Georgia, etc.

I think Russia would set for a formalized system of neutrality for the countries in question. That having been said, for Ukraine Russia will likely insist on the implementations of the Minsk 2.0 as it's written, which is basically impossible unless the US pushes Ukraine's elites pretty hard. And of course neutrality for Georgia wouldn't mean sacrificing the Ossetians or Abkhaz to a Georgian reconquista. Russia's position there would likely be "they are independent nations".

Europe is almost completely powerless vs Russia. It will be up to Russia and the US to reach an agreement. Europe should have rebuilt the military capabilities after 2008, and even more so after 2014. Instead Europe is sleep walking into a number of potential disasters, this is just one of them.

I think this is fundamentally incorrect. Europe is not only not powerless against Russia, it's quite a bit more powerful against Russia. It just has fewer reasons to clash with Russia. Russian interests clash with the US in Latin America (Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela), in India and the Middle East, and across the ex-Soviet periphery. Europe just has Eastern Europe, and they were pretty indecisive about further eastward expansion in 2008. Europe or rather the EU/European NATO, is demographically, economically, and militarily, in a position to stand alongside the USA and China as a super power. Russia is not.

 

[Feanor]

Dunno about that. We could always nuke it. Improbable, of course, but if Putin goes all existential . . . .

Remember between modern radars and modern missiles, the Russian airforce would have a hard time fighting even against the smaller NATO countries in the sky. The VVS is large, and relatively modern, but NATO is still pretty far ahead (especially when you factor in advantages in AEW). And that's without considering the arriving F-35s. And in terms of naval forces, the Baltic fleet is so weak it would likely be destroyed rapidly. The Northern Fleet could hypothetically break out and give a good fight in the Atlantic, but combined French, British, and Germany navies are both more modern and larger. And there's still Spain, Italy, and many of the smaller countries which can still contribute warships. Far from being reduced to the nuclear option, NATO would likely have a number of response options, assuming they could coordinate their actions. Europe's problem is political, not military.

 

[SolarWind]

I have never believed that CSGs couldn't be beaten. In various exercises the RNZAF, RNZN, and RAN have sunk the CVNs at the centre of the CBG. The RNZAF lost all their A-4K Skyhawks doing it, and the RNZN their Leander class frigate but it was a good exchange. Believe that the RAN have done it with subs. As soon as the CVNs were sunk the yanks changed the rules so that they were unsunk.

During the cold war, the VMF and USN had their mutual share of such "exercises", and both were careful enough not to start WW3. Nowadays, I don't think that Russia has an ideological need to be an opponent of the West. Surely, much about modern day Russia is naturally disliked in the West, but this is not the kind of culture clash that anyone would want to go to war over.

 

[STURM]

If the West has something tangible to offer Russia (something more then "we'll lift sanctions if you behave") they can probably get something for it.

Well put. Looking at the common narrative one gets the impression that it's only Russia which has to make concessions or compromises and that it's Russia and Russia only which is an obstacle.

 

[koxinga]

The issue is that something has to be offered. If the West has something tangible to offer Russia (something more then "we'll lift sanctions if you behave") they can probably get something for it.

But is such a thing even possible? Western, especially American narratives in recent years follows a "one does not reward bad behavior" approach in order not to look weak domestically. In those narratives, it is difficult to offer some genuine concessions that the other side sees as bona fide gestures of good faith.

 

[Goknub]

A big sticking point will be the concept of non-interference in internal affairs that Russia (and China) frequently demand. This clashes with the concept of human rights being international, even if some political leaders in the West agreed to this it would be ignored by large portion of the population. The idea that a country can do what it likes to its collection of human beings is never going to be acceptable.
Given that Putin is unlikely to change his spots I don't see how any agreement won't be ignored the moment it's signed. The proposal included that the West not identify Russia as an adversary, but as long as they remain authoritarian that's exactly what they are.

 

[STURM]

but as long as they remain authoritarian that's exactly what they are.

Russia is an adversary not because it's authoritarian but because it has major disagreements with the West and is in competition in various areas with the West. If it did not do anything which the West views as dangerous, destabilising or provocative; it would not be seen as an adversary; even if it was authoritarian.

 

[STURM]

even if some political leaders in the West agreed to this it would be ignored by large portion of the population. The idea that a country can do what it likes to its collection of human beings is never going to be acceptable.

But business would go on as usual; especially if those countries were oil/gas rich and spent billions on Western military gear. The West is very selective about democracy and human rights. Do the various countries whom the West has close ties with [to the extend of going to war if they're attacked by others] in the Middle East practice full human rights and democracy? How many of the countries in the Middle East are ruled by governments which were not elected into power in the first place?

Saddam and his Baathists didn't even know the definition of human rights or democracy but when he started a war with Iran he was supported by the West. When Gadaffi behaved and scrapped his WMD programme; for a period he was courted by the West until things really went overboard but not before then. Egypt is ruled by a government which took power in a coup but it's still the largest recipient of U.S. aid after Israel; thanks to Camp David. Thailand for a significant period was ruled by a government which overthrew by force an elected government; it remained a U.S. non NATO ally.

 

[Feanor]

But is such a thing even possible? Western, especially American narratives in recent years follows a "one does not reward bad behavior" approach in order not to look weak domestically. In those narratives, it is difficult to offer some genuine concessions that the other side sees as bona fide gestures of good faith.

I don't think the US should offer concessions. I suspect those won't help at this point. I think the US should offer clearly negotiated trades. Tit for tat, and no more. I also think the US should be very careful to stick to the agreements thusly made, because it could shut down possibilities for further negotiation and compromise. I think the US should walk into negotiations with Russia with a clear understanding of what Russia wants, and what they're prepared to offer, vs. what costs they're willing to incur in a confrontation with Russia if negotiations don't work out. In my opinion a purely pragmatic approach is best, with the understanding that offers need to be something tangible, and threats are basically useless. If the US is prepared to act, it should act.

 

[STURM]

In your opinion do the Russians have a clear undwrstanding of what the U.S. wants and how deep their concerns are? Also, was it a mistake on the part of NATO/U.S. to indicate that they're not willing to go to war over the Ukraine and that they should have left it ambigious? Knowing from the onset that the West is not willing to go to war makes it somewhat easier for the Russians does it not?

 

[John Fedup]

Probably shouldn’t have taken a military response off the table over Ukraine but the Russians are pretty confident that a Euro response is zero and the US isn’t much better. The West has wasted enough treasure and blood on essentially minimal interest conflicts. COVID expenses and the Chinese threat make the Ukraine a low priority. The biggest threat the US faces now is arguably internal.

 

[STURM]

and the US isn’t much better

The U.S. is focused more on China and also has to devote focus to Iran. Imagine a situation where troubles with Russia, China and Iran break out almost simultaneously - a possibility the world's only superpower has to cater for irrrespective of how slim the possibility. The North Korean situation is quiet, for now.

The West has wasted enough treasure and blood on essentially minimal interest conflicts.

Not too mention the blood paid on the part of the locals in the various conflicts. Unlike outsiders, the locals [the vast majority] didn't have the option of leaving when things went ratshit.

Western/U.S. intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo achieved the intended aims but not in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. In Libya it achieved the aim of toppling the "Colonel" but the present situation in Libya is highly telling.

 

[John Fedup]

Not too mention the blood paid on the part of the locals in the various conflicts. Unlike outsiders, the locals didn't have the option of leaving.

Western/U.S. intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo achieved the intended aims but not in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. In Libya it achieved the aim of toppling the "Colonel" but the present situation in Libya says it all.

WRT to Bosnia, the option of doing nothing wasn’t possible with WW2 style war crimes airing on TV every night right on the West’s doorstep.

 

[STURM]

Well the West did nothing over the genocide in Rwanda which of course is located in an area of far less strategic importance for the West.

Like the U.S. the Europeans lacked the will to follow through in Somalia which was a major mess but not a war per see. In Bosnia and Kosovo the Europeans lacked the political will. The U.S. taking the lead made the pivotal difference.

 

[SolarWind]

The reality of situation with Ukraine is that Russia can basically occupy it at will, without giving the West enough time to stop it. At the same time, making an announcement of military support for Ukraine or just quietly moving any significant amount of troops to Ukraine could instantly trigger Russia's super red line and, again, likely result in occupation, leaving the West with not enough time to stop it. So no conclusions about US ability or will in the European theater should be drawn from these announcements.

 

[koxinga]

I don't think the US should offer concessions. I suspect those won't help at this point. I think the US should offer clearly negotiated trades. Tit for tat, and no more. I also think the US should be very careful to stick to the agreements thusly made, because it could shut down possibilities for further negotiation and compromise. I think the US should walk into negotiations with Russia with a clear understanding of what Russia wants, and what they're prepared to offer, vs. what costs they're willing to incur in a confrontation with Russia if negotiations don't work out. In my opinion a purely pragmatic approach is best, with the understanding that offers need to be something tangible, and threats are basically useless. If the US is prepared to act, it should act.

But such a trade is not solely a US offer and will also depend on Ukraine and to some degree, NATO's cooperation. Putting aside the nature of the trade (i.e. security guarantees), NATO/Europe could still be persuaded to pursue a diplomatic path because the politicians are not keen to have war on their borders. But Ukraine? Would they go along with the US in a big power trade where they will potentially lose out? I have some doubts.

If anything, I see Ukraine as a wildcard in all of this. They are counting on foreign intervention (i.e. US/NATO) as the best option of recovering their lost territories and to deter Russia.

 

[Feanor]

But such a trade is not solely a US offer and will also depend on Ukraine and to some degree, NATO's cooperation. Putting aside the nature of the trade (i.e. security guarantees), NATO/Europe could still be persuaded to pursue a diplomatic path because the politicians are not keen to have war on their borders. But Ukraine? Would they go along with the US in a big power trade where they will potentially lose out? I have some doubts.

If anything, I see Ukraine as a wildcard in all of this. They are counting on foreign intervention (i.e. US/NATO) as the best option of recovering their lost territories and to deter Russia.

On the one hand Ukraine is totally dependent on the US (and allies, but not NATO as an organization) financially and military. The US could even tell Ukraine "follow the Minsk 2.0 Accords or we give Russia the green light to take Mariupol' and Kramatorsk-Slavyansk" (though I honestly don't think it would come to that, Ukraine's public is tired of the war, it's not hard to bring forward a peace-maker president and simply implement Minsk 2.0). On the other hand if the US is unwilling to pressure Ukraine to complete the Minsk Accords then it probably shouldn't promise those things.

Ukraine's right wing militias certainly pose a problem, but not an insurmountable one, especially if there is a certain amount of transparency with Russia about the source of the problems, and a good faith approach to resolving them. It could even be a good opportunity to shut down the armed wings of these militias as they're likely to be a problem eventually. At the end of the day, whether Ukraine joins the EU or not, it's not a good look to have public groups with government affiliations involved in stabbing gypsies.