Russia - General Discussion.

[PhysicsMan]

I have explained why I believe several of the ex-Warsaw Pact nations joined NATO, some a decade after becoming 'independent' of Moscow. Naturally, I have a potentially different perspective from others which colours my thinking.

Are we going to get an alternate explanation for why countries like Poland joined NATO?

While I agree with your reasoning about the driving factors for the Eastern Europeans to join NATO, I think a bigger question is not why they wanted to join but why they were allowed (and encouraged) by NATO to do so. One can argue that accommodating the fears of the former Warsaw Pact states while antagonizing Russia by doing so, to put it mildly, showed lack of foresight. The sole purpose/target of the organization's existence was given every reason to be weary and fearful of the organization. A possible alternative could have been to actually mean what they proclaimed by "partnership for peace" and try to forge that peaceful partnership with Russia - where the mood toward the West at the time was far different from what it is today, unfortunately. People were very hopeful that the cold war was left behind and were looking forward to a much friendlier relationship with the West. That evaporated in the 90s, thanks to the NATO enlargement, to a significant extent.

 

[John Fedup]

IMHO, in Poland's case, NATO was morally obligated to accommodate entry given how this country was abandoned to Stalin by the Western Allied Powers after WW2 and the ongoing promotion of the Solidarity movement in the 1980s.

 

[Larry N Stout]

@Larry N Stout Interesting hypothesis. Something that maybe Leon Trotsky or Stalin may have written had they been alive; or did comrade Putin author it? Anyway how about some reliable authoritative sources for your claims. Since we are a professional run defence forum we do have rules about such things and it would behove you to read said rules since you have already unwittingly breached two cardinal rules that really get the Moderators twitchy. We do not accept TASS, RT, or Fox News as reliable sources, because of their political biases.

I have nothing to do with TASS, RT, or Fox, or any other organization. You and Darth Vader can take your forum and shove it.

Mod Edit: Member permanently Banned. Not really surprising given the poster's tone.
-Preceptor

 

[Todjaeger]

While I agree with your reasoning about the driving factors for the Eastern Europeans to join NATO, I think a bigger question is not why they wanted to join but why they were allowed (and encouraged) by NATO to do so. One can argue that accommodating the fears of the former Warsaw Pact states while antagonizing Russia by doing so, to put it mildly, showed lack of foresight. The sole purpose/target of the organization's existence was given every reason to be weary and fearful of the organization. A possible alternative could have been to actually mean what they proclaimed by "partnership for peace" and try to forge that peaceful partnership with Russia - where the mood toward the West at the time was far different from what it is today, unfortunately. People were very hopeful that the cold war was left behind and were looking forward to a much friendlier relationship with the West. That evaporated in the 90s, thanks to the NATO enlargement, to a significant extent.

From my understanding of history, I have a rather different take. As a practical matter, it seems that a number of the expansionist policies of Tsarist Russia were continued under the Soviet Union. Among the policies which either continued or in some instances was dramatically increased in effect was the encouragement given to ethnic Russian re-settlement/colonization in Soviet Socialist Republics other than Russia. The current Russian city of Kalingrad being an example, where the site had been the capital of German East Prussia and called Konisberg with a native German population, and following WWII the native inhabitants had either fled or were deported en masse with Russian re-settling the area after the Soviet Union claimed additional territory from Germany and Poland.

The Soviets had also gone about re-claiming territory which had been held, some albeit loosely, by Tsarist Russia but lost during the Russian Civil War as various ethnic minorities re-asserted their independence. This was accomplished with a mix of annexation and occupation like was done in the Baltic States and portions of areas claimed by Finland and lost to Russia during the Winter War.

With all the above having been said or mentioned, I would consider it highly unlikely that nations in the early 1990's, which had formerly been under Soviet (Russian) rule or influence, would not automatically assume that a future resurgent Russia would not desire and likely seek to reassert control over areas that had once been under Tsarist and/or Soviet dominion. Given some of what has gone on with Georgia, Moldova and the Ukraine as well as the conflicts with Chechens in the 1990's, it would seem that there were some within the halls of power in Russia who were going to seek to 'restore' what had been lost regardless of what NATO did.

All the above should certainly illustrate why various former Soviet or Warsaw Pact nations would be interested in an opportunity to join NATO, but it does not really answer why NATO would allow former adversaries to join. At this point I do feel the need to point out that, apart from the former East Germany/GDR becoming part of NATO in 1990 following the reunification of Germany, the next nations to join NATO, namely Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic did not join NATO until 1999, at the end of the 1990's. Two reasons come to mind. The first being that the free and independent countries might feel a moral obligation to aid other independent nations in maintaining their sovereignty, particularly given the history of the region. The second involves a degree of self-interest, or at least the potential for it. This involves establishing a framework which would make it more difficult for a future Russia re-assert power/control over former holdings and client-states, and thereby attempt to avoid or minimize the scope of future conflicts. Looking back at history, consider how WWII might have been different, or perhaps never even occurred if then-Czechoslovakia had been stronger and/or had a sufficiently strong mutual defence pact which could have prevented the annexation of the Sudetenland.

While Russia has been able to annex the Crimean and de facto occupy portions of the Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, it has not been able to do something like that with the Baltic states, who are NATO members. As for whether or not that makes sense, it does raise the question of whether it is better to cater to one nation which is a major power, or a number of smaller nations who are concerned about the major power.

 

[PhysicsMan]

From my understanding of history, I have a rather different take. As a practical matter, it seems that a number of the expansionist policies of Tsarist Russia were continued under the Soviet Union. Among the policies which either continued or in some instances was dramatically increased in effect was the encouragement given to ethnic Russian re-settlement/colonization in Soviet Socialist Republics other than Russia. The current Russian city of Kalingrad being an example, where the site had been the capital of German East Prussia and called Konisberg with a native German population, and following WWII the native inhabitants had either fled or were deported en masse with Russian re-settling the area after the Soviet Union claimed additional territory from Germany and Poland.

The Soviets had also gone about re-claiming territory which had been held, some albeit loosely, by Tsarist Russia but lost during the Russian Civil War as various ethnic minorities re-asserted their independence. This was accomplished with a mix of annexation and occupation like was done in the Baltic States and portions of areas claimed by Finland and lost to Russia during the Winter War.

With all the above having been said or mentioned, I would consider it highly unlikely that nations in the early 1990's, which had formerly been under Soviet (Russian) rule or influence, would not automatically assume that a future resurgent Russia would not desire and likely seek to reassert control over areas that had once been under Tsarist and/or Soviet dominion. Given some of what has gone on with Georgia, Moldova and the Ukraine as well as the conflicts with Chechens in the 1990's, it would seem that there were some within the halls of power in Russia who were going to seek to 'restore' what had been lost regardless of what NATO did.

All the above should certainly illustrate why various former Soviet or Warsaw Pact nations would be interested in an opportunity to join NATO, but it does not really answer why NATO would allow former adversaries to join. At this point I do feel the need to point out that, apart from the former East Germany/GDR becoming part of NATO in 1990 following the reunification of Germany, the next nations to join NATO, namely Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic did not join NATO until 1999, at the end of the 1990's. Two reasons come to mind. The first being that the free and independent countries might feel a moral obligation to aid other independent nations in maintaining their sovereignty, particularly given the history of the region. The second involves a degree of self-interest, or at least the potential for it. This involves establishing a framework which would make it more difficult for a future Russia re-assert power/control over former holdings and client-states, and thereby attempt to avoid or minimize the scope of future conflicts. Looking back at history, consider how WWII might have been different, or perhaps never even occurred if then-Czechoslovakia had been stronger and/or had a sufficiently strong mutual defence pact which could have prevented the annexation of the Sudetenland.

While Russia has been able to annex the Crimean and de facto occupy portions of the Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, it has not been able to do something like that with the Baltic states, who are NATO members. As for whether or not that makes sense, it does raise the question of whether it is better to cater to one nation which is a major power, or a number of smaller nations who are concerned about the major power.

Yes, historically your point is valid. There is certainly a strong historic precedent for the bordering nations to be very wary. My view though is more based on the overall security of Europe (and beyond) of the current day. Is it safer now due to the discussed policies or would it have been safer with a very different approach? Were NATO and US not pursuing the consistent policy of strategic domination over Russia, would Russia be as assertive and resurgent militarily and politically today? Wouldn't it be better for the Eastern European security as well if Russia had a constructive relationship with the West? It seems obvious to me that a part of what is driving Putin's foreign policy is making it clear to the West and US that having an adversarial Russia is much worse for their health than having a friendly and respected Russia. Only the most hawkish few in the elites and military-industrial complex want this antagonistic relationship. Most, including Putin seem to be willing to have much better relations with the West.

 

[cdxbow]

NATO’s growing membership, demonization of Putin drive anti-Western policies

At the beginning of his presidency, Vladimir Putin tried to pursue a flexible and moderate policy. In the early years, his foreign policy course was as pro-Western as possible under the circumstances. But his pro-Western policy pursued during 2000-2003 was unappreciated by the United States, which regarded Moscow’s policy as evidence that it was well on its way to becoming a U.S. satellite. Washington drew the conclusion that Russia would always have to accept, unconditionally, any and every decision made by the West.

Contrary to the popular but simplistic Western narrative, the collapse of Russia’s pro-Western foreign policy course in the 1990s had nothing to do with “Russian grievances against the West.” The real reason involved a fairly rational assessment of the pros and cons of various foreign policy alternatives by the Russian political elite and the public in general.

To summarize, NATO enlargement was instrumental to the collapse of Russia’s pro-Western foreign policy course in the 1990s. And the year 2003 saw another wave of NATO enlargement: The alliance admitted the three Baltic states. It also launched efforts to secure Ukraine’s and Georgia’s accession at some point in the future. To that end, the West energetically supported the “color revolutions” in the two countries in 2003 and 2004. By doing so, it turned Ukraine into a nuclear time bomb in Russian-Western relations.

Meanwhile, President Putin continues to pursue a moderate, centrist and evasive foreign policy in an effort to preserve what little common ground still remains between Russia and the West. Despite saber-rattling by Russian hawks, he decided against a full-scale invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. The Western mainstream, however, paints Putin as the devil incarnate and the leader of the world’s autocrats, hellbent on “undermining global democracy”.

That demonization of Putin ignores fundamental problems in Russian-Western relations and pretends that all would be well between Russia and the West were it not for Putin’s personal role. It also feeds into the mass, Western delusion that these problems can be resolved or ameliorated once Putin is out of the way. It is, after all, crystal clear that the main goal of the successive waves of Western sanctions against Russia is the deposal of Putin and a regime change in Moscow.

The truth is that the NATO enlargement has made any potential pro-Western foreign policy agenda in Russia impossible for decades to come. Any attempt by a Russian government, whatever its orientation, to make significant concessions to the West would quickly and inevitably run up against the question of Ukraine’s admission to NATO and the inevitability of U.S. troops and missiles being deployed a mere 500 kilometers from Moscow.

Meanwhile in Ukraine, no settlement is possible without Ukraine itself becoming a reliably neutral state, but the United States would never allow that. Further, any attempts at normalizing the broader Russian-U.S. relationship would also fall foul of the Ukraine problem and of Washington’s resolve to indefinitely maintain sanctions against Moscow as an instrument of pressure on a broad range of issues. Many among the Russian elite are already resigned to the idea that “the United States will never lift the sanctions, no matter what we do.” Washington’s rhetoric and actions only serve to reinforce that conviction.

As a result, the scenario of Russia reverting to its former position of a U.S. satellite is almost completely unrealistic for the foreseeable future, regardless of who succeeds Putin at the Russian helm. The foreign policy and domestic costs of the “satellization” course would quickly become unbearable for any Russian government. As a result, even the most “democratic” regime would sooner or later follow the same trajectory as the Yeltsin and Putin administrations did: from attempts at “friendship” and “partnership” with America to an inevitable new confrontation and the same kind of rhetoric we are hearing now.

A normalization between Russia and the West (which essentially means with the United States) would only become possible if the United States concedes to Russia a place in the U.S.-led global order that would satisfy key Russian security interests, probably in return for Russia relinquishing any claims to “a sphere of influence.”

Right now, the political elites in both countries lack such a vision of Russia’s place in the world order. Besides, the U.S. elite sees no need for granting such a place to Russia among its own satellites. It still entertains the delusion that once Putin is deposed and Russia “capitulates,” the Russian problem will be resolved automatically. That is the very same delusion that existed in the U.S. establishment in the early 1990s.

As a result, there is no realistic model of a Russian integration into the Western community in the foreseeable future, and the ongoing crisis between Russia and the West will continue unabated for a very long time.

Ruslan Pukhov is the director of the Moscow-based think tank Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies.

NATO is the obstacle to improving Russian-Western relations

No. Traditionally authoritarian Russia has traditionally been intensely suspicious of the west and is simply reverting to form, encouraged by ultra-nationalistic policies used to cover up it's shortfalls by the it's 'elites'. It also shares with China the desire to change from a US lead world to a 'multipolar' world order. The rise of China has helped in this regard as it is now conceivable the US could be toppled as top dog. Not only could the US be toppled, but it's also possible the US could disintegrate given the extreme polarisation in it's politics and community. I will remind people, no one predicted the way the demise of the Soviet Union happened.

Regarding the demonization of Putin, I think it has become justified for many reasons, especially his penchant for chemicals with adverse effects on biological systems or testing the effects of acceleration of gravity on those same systems.

 

[Todjaeger]

Yes, historically your point is valid. There is certainly a strong historic precedent for the bordering nations to be very wary. My view though is more based on the overall security of Europe (and beyond) of the current day. Is it safer now due to the discussed policies or would it have been safer with a very different approach? Were NATO and US not pursuing the consistent policy of strategic domination over Russia, would Russia be as assertive and resurgent militarily and politically today? Wouldn't it be better for the Eastern European security as well if Russia had a constructive relationship with the West? It seems obvious to me that a part of what is driving Putin's foreign policy is making it clear to the West and US that having an adversarial Russia is much worse for their health than having a friendly and respected Russia. Only the most hawkish few in the elites and military-industrial complex want this antagonistic relationship. Most, including Putin seem to be willing to have much better relations with the West.

One thing which is absolutely questionable in my mind is whether a strong Russia would want a constructive relationship with Eastern Europe, or would a strong Russia actually seek a dominant relationship with a subservient Eastern Europe.

Another thing, which might actually be telling, would be to look at the first post in this thread and consider, really consider, the implications of what was stated in the first couple of paragraphs. For me, if that is how Russia, the general Russian populace and leadership view things, then I have to consider the very real possibility that their viewpoint was or is shaped by how they would do things if the could, or perhaps how they did things in the past.

For instance, NATO is a multi-national defence pact and without a doubt the US and US armed forces are the single most capable national armed forces within NATO. However, that does not (despite whatever Russia and/or another country might state of believe) give the US the ability to order another NATO member-state to carry out some military function, or even require another member-state to provide the US with the use or support of a national defence asset or unit. Member-states are able to, outside of Article 5, decide for themselves whether or not to participate in a joint NATO operation, and the degree of involvement and assets.

This means that despite what Russians and others might believe about NATO, it is not simply an extension of the US armed forces because the US lacks that degree of control. IMO this fact should be obvious, given how France withdrew from the integrated military command in 1966, and how in recent years some elements within the US have complained and/or agitated for European NATO member-states to contribute more to the alliance's operations and capabilities, as well as increase their respective nations' defence budgets...

I suspect that the Russian leadership believes the US/NATO relationship is more like the old Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact relationship, where the different satellite/puppet gov'ts might have notionally been independent, but Moscow could indeed order the other countries around.

 

[Feanor]

I suspect that the Russian leadership believes the US/NATO relationship is more like the old Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact relationship, where the different satellite/puppet gov'ts might have notionally been independent, but Moscow could indeed order the other countries around.

I would be surprised if this wasn't the case. This is overwhelmingly the opinion that I've seen expressed by Russian sources across the board. Many Russians and no doubt many in Russian government firmly believe that the US exercises an undue amount of influence over other NATO members, especially the smaller and weaker ones. In my opinion Russian perception of NATO as a threat is in large part based on this perception. To be fair, there is a high degree of integration even at the intelligence services level between some of NATO and the US, which can give that impression, especially if you have little to no trust in American good faith in foreign policy issues.

 

[Todjaeger]

I would be surprised if this wasn't the case. This is overwhelmingly the opinion that I've seen expressed by Russian sources across the board. Many Russians and no doubt many in Russian government firmly believe that the US exercises an undue amount of influence over other NATO members, especially the smaller and weaker ones. In my opinion Russian perception of NATO as a threat is in large part based on this perception. To be fair, there is a high degree of integration even at the intelligence services level between some of NATO and the US, which can give that impression, especially if you have little to no trust in American good faith in foreign policy issues.

The issue I have with this, is that US relationships with allies tends to be quite different from the relationships the Soviet Union had with client and/or puppet states. Picking out another example, look at and consider the defence relationship between the US and NZ, particularly during and since the incident with the Charles F. Adams-class DDG USS Buchanan, and then consider how the Soviet Union or now Russia would have responded to the NZ requirements for port entry. IMO a Soviet or Russian gov't would not have respected the rights of an "allied nation" if East Germany, Poland, or another client state adopted a Nuclear Free stance like NZ has.

 

[Feanor]

The issue I have with this, is that US relationships with allies tends to be quite different from the relationships the Soviet Union had with client and/or puppet states.

I want to make sure I'm clear about this. I'm not arguing that the US in fact has this kind of relationship (it may or may not, but this is a completely separate conversation). However I'm of the opinion that Russia holds this perspective at a high level.

 

[Todjaeger]

I want to make sure I'm clear about this. I'm not arguing that the US in fact has this kind of relationship (it may or may not, but this is a completely separate conversation). However I'm of the opinion that Russia holds this perspective at a high level.

No, I do understand that. What I was attempting to point out is that if Russia and the Russian leadership view something like NATO as being other than what it is, then attempting to make Russia feel at ease becomes difficult if not outright impossible.

 

[Ranger25]

No, I do understand that. What I was attempting to point out is that if Russia and the Russian leadership view something like NATO as being other than what it is, then attempting to make Russia feel at ease becomes difficult if not outright impossible.

I would concur, I think the current Russian Leadership likes to portray NATO as an offensive Alliance for domestic consumption.

 

[Feanor]

No, I do understand that. What I was attempting to point out is that if Russia and the Russian leadership view something like NATO as being other than what it is, then attempting to make Russia feel at ease becomes difficult if not outright impossible.

I think the easiest way to make Russia feel at ease would have been to make an effort to integrate Russia into NATO and into the Euro-Atlantic political and economic space. Putin made general gestures to that extent early in his first presidency, and I think the best thing would have been for NATO to move in that direction. Unwillingness to trust Russia on cooperation on the BMD issue certainly didn't help either.

I strongly suspect that if the US and the EU were to put their full political weight behind forcing Ukrainian compliance with the Minsk 2 accords that would go along way towards reducing tensions with Russia and would likely end the conflict in Ukraine. However, this would merely be a geopolitical sacrifice with no tangible gain, unless there was a clear understanding what kind of relationship the US and NATO want with Russia, and the relationship would have to be one Russia is willing to accept.

On a side note, I personally think that the US does have a clear understanding of what kind of relationship they want to have with Russia and I see no reason to think that they don't have it now.

EDIT: To clarify, I'm far from convinced that an attempt to bring Russia into NATO or closer to NATO and the EU would have been successful. It might well have failed miserably, and quite possibly due to Russian behavior. But it would have been a viable attempt at building a new kind of relationship with Russia.

 

[ngatimozart]

Looks like Vladimir Vladimirovich has formulated a way for him to rule as President of All the Russias for the following 16 years after his current term expires in 2024 Will Putin Be Russia’s President For Life?. Valentina Tereshkova, the first woman to fly in space, and a member of the ruling United Russia party put forward a motion in the State Duma, that Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin's time served as President be reset to zero at the end of his current term. For some strange reason the motion was passed by the State Duma and now has to be approved by the Russia’s Constitutional Court, which should rubber stamp their approval of the decision.

 

[Feanor]

Looks like Vladimir Vladimirovich has formulated a way for him to rule as President of All the Russias for the following 16 years after his current term expires in 2024 Will Putin Be Russia’s President For Life?. Valentina Tereshkova, the first woman to fly in space, and a member of the ruling United Russia party put forward a motion in the State Duma, that Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin's time served as President be reset to zero at the end of his current term. For some strange reason the motion was passed by the State Duma and now has to be approved by the Russia’s Constitutional Court, which should rubber stamp their approval of the decision.

It's part of an alarming trend, involving the continuing personalization of power. I don't want to go too deep down the political rabbit hole, but I suspect this does not bode well for Russia, or for Russian relations with the west. If I'm right, Putin and his supporters have badly miscalculated, and are taking Russia down a path where the transition away from Putin (which will have to happen sooner or later, since he's going to die eventually) will be more difficult. And if I'm wrong, then the current political and economic order in Russia is so fragile that they really do need Putin to avoid a crisis, in which case the situation is even worse.

 

[Feanor]

An interesting paper from RAND on the Russian military, worth a read on my opinion.

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR4200/RR4235/RAND_RR4235.pdf

 

[Boagrius]

An interesting paper from RAND on the Russian military, worth a read on my opinion.

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR4200/RR4235/RAND_RR4235.pdf

Had a quick skim and it was certainly interesting. Will have a proper read when I have more time.

Feanor, in your view, what is the intended goal(s) of Russia's recent/ongoing modernisation & buildup of its conventional military forces? There are an abundance of articles writing about the possibility of a clash between Russia and NATO in Europe, but I would have thought Russia's nuclear arsenal alone ought to deter the thought of NATO aggression on Russian soil.

Some cite the Baltics as a potential flashpoint, but is there even an inclination on the Russian side to pick a fight there? Curious to get some insight on the Russian POV.

 

[Feanor]

Had a quick skim and it was certainly interesting. Will have a proper read when I have more time.

Feanor, in your view, what is the intended goal of Russia's recent/ongoing modernisation & buildup of its conventional military forces? There are an abundance of articles writing about the possibility of a clash between Russia and NATO in Europe, but I would have thought Russia's nuclear arsenal alone ought to deter the thought of NATO aggression on Russian soil.

Some cite the Baltics as a potential flashpoint, but is there even an inclination on the Russian side to pick a fight there? Curious to get some insight on the Russian POV.

I think that the Russian military is not undergoing any exceptional modernization or buildup at this point. The defense budget has been shrinking for a few years, and current Russian military development isn't anything out of the ordinary. To paint in broad strokes, after the collapse of the 90's defense budgets began to grow with the growth of the economy, and government spending power. However by the late 2000's the political leadership had some serious questions about money being poured into the military with little to show for it. A civilian defense minister was appointed primarily to look into how the money was being spent. The 2008 war was in many ways the final drop. Despite the surface level success, it revealed shocking problems, and among the highest readiness Military District. The result was that a green light was given to a much discussed reform of the armed forces. Then, in the course of the reforms, GPV-2020 was rolled out and the military was on the one hand given a very large amount of money, with the express purpose of overcoming the routinely cited collapse of the military in the 90s, on the other hand the military was told unequivocally that this was all they would get. It's why so many spending programs were adjusted in 2010/11. The current economic situation is highly problematic, with a collapse in oil prices and a global economic crisis due to the current pandemic. The future is murky, but before the recent blows, I would have said that the military is entering a fairly stable plateau. We shouldn't expect drastic defense increases, unless something else changes, nor drastic cuts.

So to respond more precisely to the issues you have raised;

1) I don't think there is a high chance of NATO aggression against Russia. It strikes me as highly unlikely.
2) I don't think there is a high chance of US aggression directly against Russia either, though there is always the potential for clashes via proxy or in third countries by one or the other side.
3) Russia continues to rely on its strategic nuclear arsenal as its primary means of deterrence vis-a-vis NATO and the US. To that end they will continue to develop next generation nuclear weapons and delivery systems. They take the threat of BMD not only (and not so much) in its current state but also in its potential future development. Thus programs like Avangard, Burevestnik, and Poseidon, will continue.
4) I don't think there is a high chance of conflict near or in the Baltic states. They are far too stable, they are NATO members, and Russia does not appear to be building up its military presence in that area. Russia has drastically re-militarized Kaliningrad region in the past few years, but prior to that the protection for a large VMF base there was laughable. I think that if the situation in the EU becomes highly unstable, and the Baltic states take an economic hit strong enough to cause internal unrest, this could change, but I don't see any signs that Russia is actively looking for it.

 

[Boagrius]

Thanks for the overview. It strikes me that despite the geopolitical rivalry there is actually very little incentive for either side to engage in direct conflict. Circumstances can change of course (don't we all know it now) but the situation wrt Russia and the West at large seems fairly stable for the time being.

 

[SolarWind]

Getting Serious About Russia

The future of U.S.-Russia relations is largely America’s choice. If the United States cannot settle for anything short of unquestioned hegemony, Russia will indubitably prove a serious impediment, prepared to challenge it.

nationalinterest.org

I think this article from the National Interest says it well. A flexible but firm policy toward Russia may be in everyone's interest.