You are right that Putin considered to join NATO. He was told that Russia had to go through the same application procedure as other countries (e.g. Poland, Bulgaria, etc.). Perhaps Putin expected NATO to break their own rules and admit Russia anyway, but when he realized that Russia had to meet the NATO requirements, he realized it was not going to happen. Not because NATO refused to let Russia start the process to become a member, but because they refused to break/change their own rules.Except it was hardly a first step for Putin. When Putin came to power he was trying to build bridges with the west on some sort of terms of acceptance and equality. He had G.W. look into his eyes, and he even talked about Russia potentially joining NATO. He wanted a single economic space from Lissabon to Vladivostok, a joint BMD which included Russia, against rogue state threats, and wanted to have the west respect a Russian sphere of influence in eastern Europe the same way that France got one in Africa. You can trace the slow disillusionment with the West over the years through public statements and policy decisions. As late as 2011 Russia let through the Security Council resolution to dismember Libya ("no fly zone") and joined in sanctions againts Iran. Yet the considerations Russia got in exchage were modest, and meanwhile the US continued to push political influence and military cooperation programs closer and closer to Russia while simultaneously excluding Russia from the BMD program.
There is a pattern here of Russia wanting to be integrated into a joint security architecture with the west, and of this falling through. I agree that some of Russia's desires were the problem, but they weren't the only problem. I see a tendency in this conversation to project backwards and equivocate Russia and Putin today with Russia and Putin in say 2004. This is fundamentally false. Russia and Putin have both changed a lot in the past two decades. And this change was at least partialy in response to their relations with the west.
What I find very interesting, is that there was one option available to Russia: to start reforms to meet NATO requirements... for some reason this option seems to never be mentioned when this topic is discussed in Russia...
I fully support NATOs position: NATO must keep their requirements for admission. This was also the reason why Ukraine could not become NATO member already, they did not meet the requirements.
NATO did offer collaboration instead of a full NATO membership, and Russia seemed to accept this, at least for some time.
Edit: This article articulates very well what I think about what has happened, and Putins role in it:
Putin’s Folly: A Case Study of an Inept Strategist - War on the RocksA decade ago, Putin had a very good hand to play. NATO was sagging under the weight of the war in Afghanistan and an unwise intervention in Libya. U.S. leaders grumbled about European free-riding, and European leaders questioned Washington’s commitment to the common defense. Any efforts to buck these trends and rally the old alliance were constrained by European reticence to spend more on defense and a toxic dependence on Russian oil and gas. Meanwhile, the Russian economy had recovered from the 2008 recession and was healthy enough to support a long-term military modernization program. Russia was getting stronger as its traditional adversaries were coming apart.
The stage was set for Putin. He blew it.
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