Royal New Zealand Navy Discussions and Updates

[Stuart M]

NZ need to join up with the RAN and purchase 4 of the Damen crosser over xo vessels to supply an all round multi mission small frigate with low personnel requirements. They can be built in Australia for a total of 12 vessels and be low cost but provide everything the rnzn needs amphibious and all

NZ has its own requirements that are determined by government on advise provided by the NZDF, and doesn't "need" to do anything with Australia.
Australia, like NZ, has its own needs and this, for frigates, is being met by the ANZAC class which will be superseded by the locally built Hunter class.

 

[Redlands18]

NZ need to join up with the RAN and purchase 4 of the Damen crosser over xo vessels to supply an all round multi mission small frigate with low personnel requirements. They can be built in Australia for a total of 12 vessels and be low cost but provide everything the rnzn needs amphibious and all

There is nothing cheap for a foreign Government to have ships built in Australia. Shipbuilding in Australia is very expensive, this is offset by the amount of the money spent that goes into the Australian Economy through job creations etc and Income and Company Taxes that comes back to the Government, the NZG would get none of this and it would work out cheaper to have the ships built in South Korea or Eastern Europe.

 

[recce.k1]

NZ need to join up with the RAN and purchase 4 of the Damen crosser over xo vessels to supply an all round multi mission small frigate with low personnel requirements. They can be built in Australia for a total of 12 vessels and be low cost but provide everything the rnzn needs amphibious and all

I'll bite, what are the expected costs for these vessel variants? Asking as I haven't seen them mentioned on the RAN thread?

If the RNZN were to ever be properly funded (as in defence spending at 2.5-3% of gdp which so far no NZ politician is advocating those levels), I could possible see some utility in a couple of them for work around the Pacific (freeing up the main combatants) but not as 1st tier replacements for the current ANZAC's - their direct replacements should be specialised combatants i.e. optimised for ASW (with AA/ASuW capabilities) as their primary role.

Mixing amphibious capabilities compromises the utility of a main combatant which in NZ's case will likely be deployed forward with an allied task force (or be required to escort high value assets).

The Damen XO vessels wouldn't be suitable (what search/fire control radar capabilities do they have), but perhaps there could be a place for them as second/third tier multirole vessels for regional functions. But in that case wouldn't T31/Arrowhead 140 and LPD's be a more flexible combination?

 

[spoz]

As with Australia, equipment selection follows identification of a capability need. To the best of my knowledge neither country has a currently identified capability need which would be satisfied by these ships. Even if NZ did, it is much more likely they would build at a yard with significantly lower labour costs than those is Australia. If they were to choose a Damen product then that might be in Vietnam for example.

 

[Stuart M]

As with Australia, equipment selection follows identification of a capability need. To the best of my knowledge neither country has a currently identified capability need which would be satisfied by these ships. Even if NZ did, it is much more likely they would build at a yard with significantly lower labour costs than those is Australia. If they were to choose a Damen product then that might be in Vietnam for example.

Or a souped up A140 built in Korean yards? Not sure NZ will ever build in Vietnam, but the Koreans have done good work for NZ to date.

 

[swerve]

...
The Damen XO vessels wouldn't be suitable (what search/fire control radar capabilities do they have), ...

The pictures show fixed arrays, presumably Thales Nederland radars as standard, in an I-Mast 100. Whether they'd be suitable for any particular role depends on the exact fit, & since they've not been built, I think that there'd be a choice available to any customers, just as with the Arrowhead 140.

Note that the 'C' models are primarily combatants. 'A' is armed but with an amphibious emphasis, & the smaller 123 & 115 models are 'security' rather than warfare-optimised.
Crossovers - Damen
You can download PDFs which give much more detail.

Saying they wouldn't be suitable looks to me as if you haven't really looked at them. The problem I see isn't suitability for what the RNZN would want or need, but the fact that there's no hardware or, AFAIK, detailed design, so the RNZN would be taking a risk.

 

[recce.k1]

The pictures show fixed arrays, presumably Thales Nederland radars as standard, in an I-Mast 100. Whether they'd be suitable for any particular role depends on the exact fit, & since they've not been built, I think that there'd be a choice available to any customers, just as with the Arrowhead 140.

Note that the 'C' models are primarily combatants. 'A' is armed but with an amphibious emphasis, & the smaller 123 & 115 models are 'security' rather than warfare-optimised.
Crossovers - Damen
You can download PDFs which give much more detail.

Saying they wouldn't be suitable looks to me as if you haven't really looked at them. The problem I see isn't suitability for what the RNZN would want or need, but the fact that there's no hardware or, AFAIK, detailed design, so the RNZN would be taking a risk.

Sure the Damen XO's are a very clever concept. But have noticed some curiosities (or oddities) eg their main combatant designs (XO139FC & XO131C) feature the smaller I-Mast 100 (not the larger I-Mast 400 or I-Mast 500, which would allow for provisioning of more or larger sensors). Even their armament is relatively "light" for their size. One VLS, is that 8 cell? Or 16 cell? But surely at least 24 cells should be the minimum? Interesting that even the Dutch Holland Class OPV's feature the larger I-Mast 400 and that's just an OPV not a combatant.

Yes I still say they wouldn't be suitable for the RNZN (I thought I explained why in my original post). The RNZN would want a combatant optimised for ASW but with AAW/ASuW capabilities slightly greater than what the XO139/131 provides (and current ANZAC's), after all there has been some interest on the record with the BAE Type 26 (or a variant of). The multirole features would likely be a negative.

Putting capabilities aside the issue with the XO139/131 are, as you stated the RNZN taking a risk on a concept vessel that hasn't been built nor anyone ordering it. Being a multirole vessel it has the ability to carry landing craft and vehicles but what use would that be when the vessel is joining an allied taskforce undertaking sea control or area denial or escorting duties or hunting submarines ... all thousands of miles away in SE Asia? Presumably they wouldn't be carried for these roles.

The second problem of being a multirole vessel is, our glorious Treasury and politicians would then say to the RNZN, sorry no T26/Hunter/CSC or Constellation Class or Type 31/Arrowhead 140 or SE Asian built specialist combatant, use these "cheaper" multirole jack-of-all-trades and master-of-none instead. It could be like Projector Projector's fallacy of a supposed Multirole Patrol Vessel (HMNZS Canterbury), which turned out to be hopeless for patrolling, being replicated at MFU Combatant level?

But as mentioned earlier, I could see some use as 2nd/3rd tier vessels eg the smaller XO's (eg 131 L/123SF/115S (assuming the RNZN was well funded enough to operate main/specialised combatants in their primary roles as the high priority, funding wise, with extra funding for this new capability? Might be wishful thinking and unrealistic)? Well, unless perhaps as an OPV replacement (putting the Vard options aside for a moment), as that would give any OPV replacement much greater utility, capabilities and flexibilities, particularly the military "profiles" that Damen mention. But on the negative side, presumably RNZN would have to be careful not to have have such vessels "threaten" future LPD projects that are in the pipeline (remember our glorious Treasury and politicians and their "great money saving ideas").

There is a 3rd option for the XO, but it is a very, very unlikely option. That would be for the NZDF to be funded so well in the future (that every other NZDF need is addressed first) and a small "Marines" battalion unit is formed with their own specialist vessels ....

Okaay, we have a saying here, it goes "Yeah/Nah"!

If I were Damen I would actually be pitching these (larger/capable) XO vessels to the militaries in, for example, South East Asia. Why? For those nations closer to the "front line", would it make sense to have amphibious forces that can "hide" out at sea (or in a bay etc), that if their homeland landforce bases are attacked then they could be brought back safely? Or land "up the coast" somewhere to defend territory? Just a thought.

 

[ngatimozart]

There is a 3rd option for the XO, but it is a very, very unlikely option. That would be for the NZDF to be funded so well in the future (that every other NZDF need is addressed first) and a small "Marines" battalion unit is formed with their own specialist vessels ....

Why not make the NZ Army a complete "Marines" type formation? That would fit in with the JATF concept and NZ's maritime position. The NZ Army is to wedded to its colonial Pommy origins of being a continental army.

 

[Stuart M]

Why not make the NZ Army a complete "Marines" type formation? That would fit in with the JATF concept and NZ's maritime position. The NZ Army is to wedded to its colonial Pommy origins of being a continental army.

I'm not sure the Brits ever had a contental army per se, indeed I think it was Fisher who called it a projectile to be fired by the Navy, but a dedicated band of amateurs with a dash of professionalism that occasionally gets out of hand.
Having said that there is no reason to think that the NZ army could not be equipped and trained as a 'Marine' type force, its not like they would abandon their traditions and ethos as an army.

 

[swerve]

If I were Damen I would actually be pitching these (larger/capable) XO vessels to the militaries in, for example, South East Asia. Why? For those nations closer to the "front line", would it make sense to have amphibious forces that can "hide" out at sea (or in a bay etc), that if their homeland landforce bases are attacked then they could be brought back safely? Or land "up the coast" somewhere to defend territory? Just a thought.

They seem to prefer budget LPDs, though. Indonesia adopted a Korean design (which IIRC was tweaked to fit what Indonesia wanted) & is doing good business building it for the Indonesian & Philippines navies. Myanmar's bought one direct from Korea, & I think Malaysia has shown an interest, as well as looking at LPDs & LHDs from other builders. Thailand bought a small LPD from Singapore (which builds its own) some years ago & is buying a new one (reported to be carrying out sea trials for the yard two weeks ago) from China.

I don't see much room there for alternative amphibious ships in SE Asia.

 

[chis73]

Thought I would leave this till after Christmas, but I found an interesting OIA release via the NZDF website. It regards the decision made in December to lay-up the OPVs, and 1 IPV, due to the manning crisis (link here). It shows the options considered and why they have pulled the Naval Patrol Force off the line. Basically, it is to man the amphibious/auxiliary fleet over the upcoming Pacific cyclone season. However, now that the Orion fleet is also being retired early (was May 2023, now end of Jan), that doesn't leave much out there covering the EEZ (Manawanui and 1 IPV perhaps, or the one working frigate). It will be open season on fishing I guess, come February.

Also, if anyone is looking for some summer reading, the latest edition of the Professional Journal (Vol. 3) is out (link here). Some interesting articles again: a 3-parter from Geoffrey Till to open and one from the head of Babcocks at Devonport on ship maintenance in particular. There is also an article on Army's amphibious capabilities by the Chief of Army. All the articles/essays are again well worth a read, even the book reviews are good.

Maybe they could cover force structure in the next issue. That needs some serious thought. If the budget doesn't increase massively, something will have to give soon. I've been reading Pugh's excellent Cost of Seapower (from 1986). At the point we are at, you either need to step down a level, or up the budget. Seeing as we only have two (marginal) combatants now, a step down would basically be goodbye Navy, hello Coastguard.

 

[Todjaeger]

Thought I would leave this till after Christmas, but I found an interesting OIA release via the NZDF website. It regards the decision made in December to lay-up the OPVs, and 1 IPV, due to the manning crisis (link here). It shows the options considered and why they have pulled the Naval Patrol Force off the line. Basically, it is to man the amphibious/auxiliary fleet over the upcoming Pacific cyclone season. However, now that the Orion fleet is also being retired early (was May 2023, now end of Jan), that doesn't leave much out there covering the EEZ (Manawanui and 1 IPV perhaps, or the one working frigate). It will be open season on fishing I guess, come February.

Also, if anyone is looking for some summer reading, the latest edition of the Professional Journal (Vol. 3) is out (link here). Some interesting articles again: a 3-parter from Geoffrey Till to open and one from the head of Babcocks at Devonport on ship maintenance in particular. There is also an article on Army's amphibious capabilities by the Chief of Army. All the articles/essays are again well worth a read, even the book reviews are good.

Maybe they could cover force structure in the next issue. That needs some serious thought. If the budget doesn't increase massively, something will have to give soon. I've been reading Pugh's excellent Cost of Seapower (from 1986). At the point we are at, you either need to step down a level, or up the budget. Seeing as we only have two (marginal) combatants now, a step down would basically be goodbye Navy, hello Coastguard.

IIRC there had been some talk a number of years ago, about one of the aspirations for the future of the RNZN to be more like the Irish Republic's Naval Service, which in terms of capabilities functions more as a Coast Guard than an actual navy. This seemed to be the direct certain NZ leaders wanted to head NZ in terms of defence generally. The reality that Ireland's diplomatic position as a more or less non-aligned nation and also literal position in the world is very different from the situations that NZ is in did not appear to occur to the advocates.

 

[Stuart M]

IIRC there had been some talk a number of years ago, about one of the aspirations for the future of the RNZN to be more like the Irish Republic's Naval Service, which in terms of capabilities functions more as a Coast Guard than an actual navy. This seemed to be the direct certain NZ leaders wanted to head NZ in terms of defence generally. The reality that Ireland's diplomatic position as a more or less non-aligned nation and also literal position in the world is very different from the situations that NZ is in did not appear to occur to the advocates.

Those who advocate for such a position for the RNZN are unfortunately in a strong position to influence, or are part of, the NZ government.
Functionally speaking I think they have moved on from big bang cancellations like the disbandment of the ACF, to a gradual policy of wastage and crying poor/other more pressing priorities, but the goal is the same.

 

[Stampede]

Thought I would leave this till after Christmas, but I found an interesting OIA release via the NZDF website. It regards the decision made in December to lay-up the OPVs, and 1 IPV, due to the manning crisis (link here). It shows the options considered and why they have pulled the Naval Patrol Force off the line. Basically, it is to man the amphibious/auxiliary fleet over the upcoming Pacific cyclone season. However, now that the Orion fleet is also being retired early (was May 2023, now end of Jan), that doesn't leave much out there covering the EEZ (Manawanui and 1 IPV perhaps, or the one working frigate). It will be open season on fishing I guess, come February.

Also, if anyone is looking for some summer reading, the latest edition of the Professional Journal (Vol. 3) is out (link here). Some interesting articles again: a 3-parter from Geoffrey Till to open and one from the head of Babcocks at Devonport on ship maintenance in particular. There is also an article on Army's amphibious capabilities by the Chief of Army. All the articles/essays are again well worth a read, even the book reviews are good.

Maybe they could cover force structure in the next issue. That needs some serious thought. If the budget doesn't increase massively, something will have to give soon. I've been reading Pugh's excellent Cost of Seapower (from 1986). At the point we are at, you either need to step down a level, or up the budget. Seeing as we only have two (marginal) combatants now, a step down would basically be goodbye Navy, hello Coastguard.

Yes NZ is really at that juncture of determining what it should expect from its navy both today and going forward.
We can all have our fantasy fleets of what should replace what with what and how many of each vessel should be acquired.
But realistically at this point, NZ politics needs to have a practical conversation and plan that is agreeable to all for the decades ahead.
For many, this may be an ugly conversation with an equally ugly outcome.

To be blunt, without proper funding you will not get a navy that is of any military relevance and service

So either build an appropriate sized Coast Guard or fund a Navy with some bite that can also do the constabulary stuff as required.

What ever you do, get it right.



Cheers S

 

[CJohn]

RNZN's Rear Adm. David Proctor talks to DefenceNews about current Naval personnel attrition rates and measures to counter this moving forward.

How the New Zealand Navy plans to fix its sailor and ship shortfalls

“We have lost significant flexibility,” said Rear Adm. David Proctor, “and we have lost the ability to undertake a number of concurrent activities.”

www.defensenews.com

 

[ngatimozart]

RNZN's Rear Adm. David Proctor talks to DefenceNews about current Naval personnel attrition rates and measures to counter this moving forward.

How the New Zealand Navy plans to fix its sailor and ship shortfalls

“We have lost significant flexibility,” said Rear Adm. David Proctor, “and we have lost the ability to undertake a number of concurrent activities.”

www.defensenews.com

The Navy currently has funding for 2,230 people, but Proctor said the service’s ideal end strength is about 2,340. As of Nov. 30, it had 2,117 in service, he said.​

So the RNZN is underfunded by 110 people and at 30/11/22 was 113 people short of what it's funded for and 223 people short of what it actually requires. That's a whole frigate and an IPV crew short. Not good at all.

The service has “often struggled” to hit recruitment targets, Proctor noted, with the group coming in next year representing half of the service’s goal. Part of the problem is the highly competitive labor market.​

​

“If the current attrition rate of 16.5% can be arrested, it is expected [that we] will have sufficient sailors to operate the rest of the fleet,” a Navy spokesperson told Defense News. “However, there remains a level of uncertainty until this attrition rate is reversed. This requires a number of initiatives to take effect, including addressing the widening gap between our sailor remuneration and what the highly competitive job market is offering.”​

So the attrition rate is 16.5% and they can't arrest it at the moment. People are voting with their feet and the quarantine deployment has done significant harm to the RNZN and NZDF as a whole. Our political masters should be very proud of themselves; they've found another way to destroy the RNZN and NZDF.

 

[Xthenaki]

On signing up to one of our defence services and swearing on oath to obey and serve our Monarch and country you are left with few options`if you are dissatisfied with your employment especially changes made that would not have been envisaged - deployment to MIQ facilities. If you refuse to comply (face a Court Martial) OR resign. In my opinion the GOD used this loophole (if taken in this context) for a QUICK FIX without recourse. Sadly they did not look further down the track at the consequences. (Old saying - A penny wise A pound foolish - how true). At the end of their MIQ assignment a special bonus paid in recognition of their valued contribution over and above what would normally expected WOULD NOT HAVE GONE AMISS. Its an awkward one considering efforts made by other essential services but in this case the job done was outside their normal work. How to fix the problem - employment packages (Wages and accomodation allowances) need to be better than what competitors are offering. I also feel that an apology for a badly handled MIQ deployment should be given by the Minister of Defence.

 

[Aerojoe]

Where is Canterbury at present? Seems odd that during one of this country’s most significant natural disasters in recent times (Christchurch aside) the Navy’s primary disaster/cyclone relief asset is absent and a frigate is instead tasked to Napier. Don’t get me wrong, it’s fantastic to see Manawanui in action but Canterbury seems conspicuous by her absence.

 

[ngatimozart]

Where is Canterbury at present? Seems odd that during one of this country’s most significant natural disasters in recent times (Christchurch aside) the Navy’s primary disaster/cyclone relief asset is absent and a frigate is instead tasked to Napier. Don’t get me wrong, it’s fantastic to see Manawanui in action but Canterbury seems conspicuous by her absence.

It's down in the Sub Antarctic Islands. It was past its point of return when the cyclone hit Gisborne and Hawkes Bay.

 

[RegR]

Where is Canterbury at present? Seems odd that during one of this country’s most significant natural disasters in recent times (Christchurch aside) the Navy’s primary disaster/cyclone relief asset is absent and a frigate is instead tasked to Napier. Don’t get me wrong, it’s fantastic to see Manawanui in action but Canterbury seems conspicuous by her absence.

Apparently Its on its way back and will bring supplies up from the south so straight into it. Sometimes a delay in response is not a bad thing as now that the dust (in this case water) has settled authorities will have a better picture of actually what is required long term and on reflection.