Pepe
Thanks for the P-3K2 ASW information. I trust that I am not 'slagging off kiwi's' by providing more on another sad period of RNZAF history. Also, I was previously being a bit glib with my english. Apologies.
This was early 2001 and thus, for context, the same period as the ACF disbanding and Timor & Twin Towers attack under PM Clark. There are a number of other google hits, but for reference after the initial war of words between NZDF and the PM (which while great fun, as a government service is only ever going to end in tears) this Beehive press release has a multitude of interesting points from that time; my
bold highlights;
Misleading information on submarines':
"Officials reviewing our maritime patrol needs concluded that New Zealand
does not need to maintain arrangements that include an anti-submarine capability at this time. By maintaining an Orion fleet, however, we retain the ability to invest in such a capability in future if we need it.
"This government will invest in capabilities which are a
priority and not in those which are not," Helen Clark said.
Now I am the first to admit that ASW is complicated and that I know about as much as what I have read from Tom Clancy and being bored by a multitude of very capable and passionate light blue and dark blue fish-heads; however, the following strikes me as being pertinent in a discussion on current NZ maritime capability:
1. The then PM seems to have spent an awful lot of time looking at defence capabilities in this period, which is the opposite of today where by it is ignored; note, with her character and background, this was not necessarily a good thing
2. For a maritime nation, even during this self declared period of being in a 'benign strategic environment' NZ seemed to be wreaking whatever limited air-sea operational capability that it had and prioritising other areas of defence (lets go and buy little tanks (IE. LAVIII) instead)
3. Just because today we have near end of life ASW torpedoes, Mk 82's, 1 or 2 ASW capable acft/helo's , and 1 or 2 ASW capable frigates, does not make a modern operational capability that will meaningfully contribute to our Allies
4. Like any complex system of systems, ASW involves a lot of very hard training and corporate knowledge as well as hardware; it's very nice that 5 Sqn is getting P-8A's for a whole host of reasons (including the survival of NZ in FVEY and the existence of the RNZAF) but their numbers are very few and weapons are fewer; on the good side, modern IT (including simulation and virtual networked events) will help 'simplify' the task, but the fact remains that ASW is a perishable skill that requires mucho effort and funding and cannot just be turned off and then on again, when needed
5. IMHO a way to address this 'capability holiday' (sorry, I'm using another nations terminology here for not bothering with operationally balanced maritime defence forces and instead relying on other nations to undertake our responsibilities instead EG. bludger) in NZ ASW is to accelerate the programs that are already/presumably in train within DCP et al:
a. Mk 54
b. Replacement 6 Sqn wokka-wokkas with a modern ASW capability (apparently the European plastic 90 type helo is el pants)
c. new and more ASW frigates
d. more P-8As
Noting my previous comments about NZ recently placing any defence decisions on hold for the next 18 months, despite the current strategic situation and the woeful state of NZDF/RNZAF hard power capability, and I am weeping in my weetabix/weet-bix daily.
Related is this article '... enables the Raytheon MK 54 torpedo carried aboard the Navy Boeing P-8A Poseidon jet to glide through the air from as high as 30,000 feet.' which implies that this capability is still being developed State side.
We can hope that this weapon will be procured by NZ as it becomes available.
HAAWC enables the Raytheon MK 54 torpedo carried aboard the Navy Boeing P-8A Poseidon jet to glide through the air from as high as 30,000 feet.
www.militaryaerospace.com