Royal New Zealand Air Force

[Todjaeger]

G’day wombat, I’d be more interested in the ‘Who’ and ‘what’. Who is the target, and whatis the underlying strategic environment that drives the requirement?

I would also throw in the 'where' and 'when' questions as well, since those answers alone could exclude a number of types of aircraft.

Also if memory serves, while the P-8A Poseidon has been ordered, no ordnance was ordered. I would be much more comfortable with having ordnance for the Poseidon before any talk of raising a CAS/strike/maritime strike capability. After all, if the MPA capability is not armed, what reason would anyone have to think that armaments would be acquired for a new attack/strike capability?

 

[Wombat000]

G’day wombat, I’d be more interested in the ‘Who’ and ‘what’. Who is the target, and whatis the underlying strategic environment that drives the requirement?

Hi South.
im not fully aware of what you are asking?

my comments are observations re comments referring to RNZAF strike capability.
however I think RNZAF strike will currently initially likely reoccur as a CAS level to support deployed ground assets, deployed as AH-1Z type with other RNZAF tactical helicopters.
it’s roles are obviously everything from tactile expression to recon and overwatch or simply de-escalation by its implied force presence. minimising NZ casualties and improving their efficiency. I suggest that These requirements currently exist, but fielded by allies or an artillery battery.
the requirements to be NZ capable are there, the platform isnt, but it’s an evolutionary advancement.

IMHO I cannot see a dedicated fixed wing or substantial modified strike solution into the far Long term.
strike projection potential will likely be
-primarily in the organic support of the NZ ground units
-secondary in support of coalition units.
-thirdly if available wider theatre objectives.

being a smaller airframe system, they’re able to be moved by RNZAF & RNZN means, have more deployment flexibility than a fixed wing runway, and can be theoretically operated from a ship in the pacific littorals. .

hope that makes sense.... :4)

 

[OldTex]

Also if memory serves, while the P-8A Poseidon has been ordered, no ordnance was ordered. I would be much more comfortable with having ordnance for the Poseidon before any talk of raising a CAS/strike/maritime strike capability. After all, if the MPA capability is not armed, what reason would anyone have to think that armaments would be acquired for a new attack/strike capability?

If P-8A Poseidons have been ordered without any requisite ordnance the question for the NZ Government should be 'why?'. A high end MPA/ASW asset without ordnance is a nonsense. If it is not going to be armed then why not purchase ATR-72 or CN-295s equipped for maritime search?
Perhaps the answer may be that the extant weapons on the P-3Ks are able to be transferred to the P-8A, which would eliminate the need to introduce a new weapon(s) into the logistic and sustainment chain.

 

[OldTex]

G’day wombat, I’d be more interested in the ‘Who’ and ‘what’. Who is the target, and whatis the underlying strategic environment that drives the requirement?

In my opinion the 'who' is the proverbial elephant in the room. 'What is the underlying strategic environment that drives the requirement' could be answered by a combination of restriction or interdiction of maritime trade and infringement of NZ EEZ, with resource theft.

 

[t68]

I would also throw in the 'where' and 'when' questions as well, since those answers alone could exclude a number of types of aircraft.

Whilst I agree that the when and where are important considerations, I just wonder why the strategic outlook is so different between AU/NZ, it’s like we live on two different planets instead of a small strip of ocean between the two

For AU I imagine DOA was more about protecting natural resources than anything else really, NZ also has an abundance of natural resources

 

[south]

Hi South.
im not fully aware of what you are asking?

my comments are observations re comments referring to RNZAF strike capability.
however I think RNZAF strike will currently initially likely reoccur as a CAS level to support deployed ground assets, deployed as AH-1Z type with other RNZAF tactical helicopters.
it’s roles are obviously everything from tactile expression to recon and overwatch or simply de-escalation by its implied force presence. minimising NZ casualties and improving their efficiency. I suggest that These requirements currently exist, but fielded by allies or an artillery battery.
the requirements to be NZ capable are there, the platform isnt, but it’s an evolutionary advancement.

IMHO I cannot see a dedicated fixed wing or substantial modified strike solution into the far Long term.
strike projection potential will likely be
-primarily in the organic support of the NZ ground units
-secondary in support of coalition units.
-thirdly if available wider theatre objectives.

being a smaller airframe system, they’re able to be moved by RNZAF & RNZN means, have more deployment flexibility than a fixed wing runway, and can be theoretically operated from a ship in the pacific littorals. .

hope that makes sense.... :4)

what is the threat (both for your own survivability, but what you need to kill) and what is the strategic environment will determine the tools you need to crack the nut.

example CAS in Afghanistan against a insurgent force, will drive a different requirement to CAS in the Baltic’s against a near peer threat, which will be different again to CAS in the South Pacific.

Todjaeger, I agree, apologies but I was lumping that stuff into the ‘strategic environment’.

 

[t68]

Thinking of this issue of RNZAF strike capability and it’s somewhat link to restoring fast air:
South does raise a pertinent point, but I feel that the question of “when” is evolved from “why”.
I think the RNZAF needs to think ‘outside of the square‘ with this.

i suggest that the solution Is a helicopter, not a fixed wing, and that helicopter is the AH-1Z.

A viper is an excellent modern solution to plausible NZDF tactical strike.
Strike in the current NZ context is linked to directly supporting the ground, not the wider ranging theatre.
Not only is Viper (in the theoretical capability sense) an organic CAS capability to deployed NZ ground efforts (& I think this is key) but would be a valuable contribution to any coalition efforts (which makes it politically significant).
It brings overwatch and support fires to the package. = there is a reason for it.

The “When” is the NZG has a history of deploying artillery support to coalition efforts, and more recently deploying helicopters.
It’s not theoretical, it fits within historical and current NZDF practice.
= there is a reason for it.

The Viper most neatly fits as a USEFUL load package in a C130J.
Not only is there a tactical and politically significant deployable role for a Viper, of which there’s a precedence, but it can be strategically moved, by RNZAFs own assets.
It is marinised and easily moved, and deployed directly, by sea by present RNZN capability.
It fits within the wider US supply food chain.

I feel the NZG will not entertain an idea without convincing capability merit.
The Viper fits NZ like a glove, whilst it’s not fixed wing, & it’s not a fast jet, it DOES provide currently realistically plausible tactical scope options consistent with NZDF CONOPS and ready usefulness.

what do you reckon?

- edit : typo of aircraft type subsequently corrected. -

Agree the Viper will be most likely needed if and when the NZDF as a whole move to an amphibious expeditionary force via the ATF, but untill such a time NZ already have the building blocks to generate to battlefield armed overwatch and CAS with the T-6c Texans, 6 additional AT-6B Wolverine would ease the burden of additional mixed types in the fleet

 

[Rob c]

G’day wombat, I’d be more interested in the ‘Who’ and ‘what’. Who is the target, and whatis the underlying strategic environment that drives the requirement?

The question being asked here does not have a answer as we are blind to the future. Trying to say that we can predict what the strategic situation we need to cover for and ignore all else is a policy that will lead to you getting it wrong most of the time. History shows us that no country has ever foreseen a threat to its sovereignty in time to rearm to meet that threat and if your armed forces are not at least reasonably capable at the time of seeing the threat you will loose. To answer the who or what question you have to be able to foretell the future a significant time into the future and as as all of us would fail to be able to tell what the lotto numbers are for next saturday it is a fruitless argument. We must except that we are blind to the future and that the reason that we don't see threats to our freedom or sovereignty is due to this blindness and that we need to cover the basic bases of knowing what is entering our area of concern and being able to deal with it.

To what end?

What operation recently would a KA-50 be useful in to the NZG? I’m not even sure it can carry a targeting pod from my quick google...

The primary role of any armed force is to defend that countries sovereignty and protect its citizens and recent operations are irrelevant to this task. Obviously in times of peace you make the best use you can of your military assets for other purposes, but you should never lose sight of the primary role which has happened in NZ . The main role of an ACF in NZ would be to provide a significant amount of deterrence against any future aggression in our area which due to our large moat does not require a gold plated solution, but does need a modest solution. Recent operations the government has carried out are not relevant to our overall security.

 

[Todjaeger]

what is the threat (both for your own survivability, but what you need to kill) and what is the strategic environment will determine the tools you need to crack the nut.

example CAS in Afghanistan against a insurgent force, will drive a different requirement to CAS in the Baltic’s against a near peer threat, which will be different again to CAS in the South Pacific.

Todjaeger, I agree, apologies but I was lumping that stuff into the ‘strategic environment’.

No worries. I brought that up more because some had been suggesting specific platforms as a viable 'solution' when even the basic type of platform which would be most appropriate can very depending on the scenario. To me at least, that is sort of a cart trying to pull a horse type approach.

In terms of potential adoption by the NZDF, I would think the most likely/viable routes would be to acquire some type or types of multi-role ordnance suitable for deployment from the P-8A Poseidon. This could be ordnance like JDAM, JSOW, and SDB plus LWT's, all potentially kitted out with glide wings to permit both launch at altitude but also further extend range. Some sort of AShM or LACM with an anti-shipping capability would also be called for IMO. My personal preferences in this regards would be for JSM or NSM, since these missiles could also be adopted for use from RNZN vessels, as well as potentially carried by naval helicopters. Speaking of naval helicopters, IIRC the current SH-2G(I) naval helicopters were kitted to launch the short-ranged Penguin AShM. If possible I would replace that with the NSM and/or JSM, and investigate the possibility for the carriage of Hellfire missiles as well. This could permit a limited CAS capability as well as increased littoral warfare capability against smallcraft.

Before anyone starts taking these ideas and really trying to run with them, people need to recognize that while these ideas are potentially viable, they are not going to be free or even necessarily easily to implement. When that gets coupled with the NZG's reluctance to fund warfighting capabilities, even just to sustain them, I do not think going to far down this rabbit hole is going to be productive.

 

[south]

The question being asked here does not have a answer as we are blind to the future. Trying to say that we can predict what the strategic situation we need to cover for and ignore all else is a policy that will lead to you getting it wrong most of the time. History shows us that no country has ever foreseen a threat to its sovereignty in time to rearm to meet that threat and if your armed forces are not at least reasonably capable at the time of seeing the threat you will loose.

This is what white papers do - they attempt to set out the circumstances and strategic environment to describe the defence posture. Indeed you go on and do this in your second paragraph (deterrence, future aggression, large moat = desired modest capability)..

I just checked the NZ defence white paper 2018. It is, unsurprisingly, quite modest. Talks a lot about coalition operations, and I couldn't find "Full Spectrum", and peer was mentioned once, but not in the context of peer/near peer.

The primary role of any armed force is to defend that countries sovereignty and protect its citizens and recent operations are irrelevant to this task. Obviously in times of peace you make the best use you can of your military assets for other purposes, but you should never lose sight of the primary role which has happened in NZ . The main role of an ACF in NZ would be to provide a significant amount of deterrence against any future aggression in our area which due to our large moat does not require a gold plated solution, but does need a modest solution. Recent operations the government has carried out are not relevant to our overall security.

I don't see a sovereign threat to NZ that requires a ACF. But I'm happy to explore, the challenges that I see to a NZ ACF being relevant are:
1. Budget (and by result capability)
2. Range
3. Mass

For mine - if you want to talk proper ACF, you need to talk $$$$. Because if you aren't on the leading edge of capability, training, doctrine etc, you die. All that will happen is you spend a significant amount of money on something that is not able to engage on a peer/near peer fight.

So, I'm not convinced that if people are talking modest capability, and a modest threat, that something akin to a Reaper-B (or even ER) wouldn't be a better option. It will provide superior range, endurance, ISR capes including maritime, is cheaper per flight hour to run, doesn't require LIFT, contributes to 5 eyes on a daily basis etc. The only capability that it won't bring is a maritime strike (beyond GBU-12), but does a FA-50 with a maverick do much against anything bigger or better armed than a patrol boat? Or, for that role against a modest threat just use the P-8s as Todjaeger has described.

 

[Wombat000]

The question often discussed is the notion of returning an ACF or fast air to the RNZAF.
I think, as previously mentioned, the first motivator to do that is probably the strike role.

But what would motivate the NZG to reinstate something that it currently doesn’t have?
What need is there?

In responding to that, I think the argument of Maritime Strike, with heavy dedicated Anti-Ship Missiles is easily accounted for by the use of a P8. Regardless of whether it’s current ordered form includes it or not, the NZG will side with the inevitable suggestion that these platforms can be uploaded with the required weaponry and a new dedicated platform is not required.
So, is the pathway to RNZAF strike thru the maritime realm, no. It’s currently an overreach and a distraction.

The NZG can actually do nothing.
It can simply continue to act under allied umbrellas, Australia does that at times too.
Its not actually committed to field any type of capability. It’s an island, it has its defence arrangements but nothing dictates it’s holdings. It does what it does only because it feels it’s needed and relevant.
Because there is no capability connect with its inevitable fighting partner, it’s the random Left Arm of the same ANZAC boxer.

But what would be relevant to prompt the NZG to reinstate strike element to the RNZAF?

I suggest that the motivator is its own demonstrated history. The NZG has a history of deploying artillery to kinetic fights.
It does that because it’s a tactical effect multiplier, and it adds to the safety of their deployed ground forces and those of their close mates. A battery is typically small, easily deployable.

So, in this context, a strike capability is air launched artillery. An evolution of a predefined and pre-used capability.
But its effect is envisioned primarily as a CAS task. CAS of the NZ units on the ground, and their close mates.
Whilst not having the endurance and persistence as a traditional artillery battery, it is an evolution of it and a dramatic effect magnifier, it’s organic enhanced safety to NZ deployed assets. CAS capability is also more politically significant at the negotiating table.

NZ is postured as a helicopter operator. It has a recent history of being prepared to deploy those helicopters.
Its a logical simple step to add a chopper onto a pad rather than a fixed wing and a runway.
A fixed wing is a concept govt does not have, but we have helicopters!
A AH-1Z is an evolution of what we operated happily for decades, not a whole different expensive system.

The Viper is a small footprint, lightweight marinised contemporary aerial artillery platform. It can be moved by NZ itself.
It will have substantial effect multiplying effects,
Its most like what the RNZAF currently operates and has done for decades.

The path to reinstating ACF/strike for the RNZAF is not a new fixed wing plane, but a manageable tactical platform.
And I suggest it’s a helicopter.

 

[Rob c]

I don't see a sovereign threat to NZ that requires a ACF. But I'm happy to explore, the challenges that I see to a NZ ACF being relevant are:

As I pointed out before, No one ever does see a threat until it is miles too late. What we need to remember is that the whole world situation is deteriorating due to climate change, unrestrained population growth and now world depression caused by covid 19, so what the future holds is anybody's guess. There was a recent US army report (sorry lost the link when computer it was on died but it was on this site) that predicted a breakdown of world order was likely in 20 years.
An AFC provides coverage that covers most of the possible major threats that can happen to NZ more than any other capability and more importantly also provides a very significant deterrent ability more than any other capability short of nukes. This deterrence is the main function we want as if you can deter you have save a lot of lives and our young men and women don't have to suffer because we failed to give our sovereignty and freedom the attention it deserves. The reason you don't see a threat is that like the rest of us you are blind to the future and like a significant number of people, assume that because you cannot see something that there is nothing there, however history paints a different picture.

 

[Rob c]

In responding to that, I think the argument of Maritime Strike, with heavy dedicated Anti-Ship Missiles is easily accounted for by the use of a P8.

I think that to endanger a high value and limited number aircraft such as the P 8 in a combat situation would be foolhardy. This was also the thinking of the RNZAF back in the Skyhawk/P3 days and was the thinking which lead to the Kahu upgrade and their very effective anti ship abilities. An air intercept mode would also be handy, which would not be the forte of the P 8.


The primary way a direct threat would come to NZ would either be by air or sea and a helicopter would struggle to achieve much in this regard.
Simply put an AFC would be a significant deterrent against anyone not owning a couple of large aircraft carriers and even then with the right weapons would be a cause for significant concerns.

 

[Wombat000]

I think that to endanger a high value and limited number aircraft such as the P 8 in a combat situation would be foolhardy.

I am no expert but I tend to agree with you. I guess a tactical attack profile against a defended target would be challenging.
But at this stage that’s not the point, because there will be an argument that a P8 can prosecute a target. So holding the fielding of a capability for the holy grail of Maritime is counterproductive.

I feel this is not a question of a ‘defending a direct threat v NZ’, but instead any argument/chance of initiating a RNZAF strike capability will be in response to the tactical arena, in direct organic CAS support of deployed ground forces, as has been demonstrated by prev deployed arty.
.....and I guess imaginative scope for ship borne operations in the Pacific littorals as NZ exerts it’s influence.

 

[south]

As I pointed out before, No one ever does see a threat until it is miles too late. What we need to remember is that the whole world situation is deteriorating due to climate change, unrestrained population growth and now world depression caused by covid 19, so what the future holds is anybody's guess. There was a recent US army report (sorry lost the link when computer it was on died but it was on this site) that predicted a breakdown of world order was likely in 20 years.
An AFC provides coverage that covers most of the possible major threats that can happen to NZ more than any other capability and more importantly also provides a very significant deterrent ability more than any other capability short of nukes. This deterrence is the main function we want as if you can deter you have save a lot of lives and our young men and women don't have to suffer because we failed to give our sovereignty and freedom the attention it deserves. The reason you don't see a threat is that like the rest of us you are blind to the future and like a significant number of people, assume that because you cannot see something that there is nothing there, however history paints a different picture.

Gday Rob. I see the threat, plenty of threats. If you want peace prepare for war etc etc... I’d also love to have NZ having a decent ACF, provided it was resources appropriately.

Please elaborate though - by sovereignty and deterrence are you talking NZ mainland?

 

[south]

I am no expert but I tend to agree with you. I guess a tactical attack profile against a defended target would be challenging.

Challenging maybe. Read up on Patriot/CSA9/SA-21/Aegis and let me know if you want to go into their envelope?

 

[Wombat000]

Challenging maybe. Read up on Patriot/CSA9/SA-21/Aegis and let me know if you want to go into their envelope?

I agree, but let’s not let practicalities stand in the way of govt money.

We are talking about standing up a capability that currently does not exist.
what are u suggesting, a flight of B1s or a squadron of Exocet armed Super Etendards?
Neither will happen and govt will simply maintain just what it has.

Other than helo mounted Penguin, the RNZN itself is a gunboat navy so let’s not suddenly get tied up with minimum standards of anti-shipping capability.
When competing with purse-holding ideologies, the brochure says “a P8 can sink a ship just like, if not better than anything else we have”.

 

[Gibbo]

I think that to endanger a high value and limited number aircraft such as the P 8 in a combat situation would be foolhardy. This was also the thinking of the RNZAF back in the Skyhawk/P3 days and was the thinking which lead to the Kahu upgrade and their very effective anti ship abilities. An air intercept mode would also be handy, which would not be the forte of the P 8.

The path to reinstating ACF/strike for the RNZAF is not a new fixed wing plane, but a manageable tactical platform.
And I suggest it’s a helicopter.
The primary way a direct threat would come to NZ would either be by air or sea and a helicopter would struggle to achieve much in this regard.
Simply put an AFC would be a significant deterrent against anyone not owning a couple of large aircraft carriers and even then with the right weapons would be a cause for significant concerns.

I think one point that does work in favour of your argument for a chopper as a key strike platform for RNZAF, in this day & age, is that it is a snugger fit with the now well accepted primary focus for the NZDF largely based around an Amphib role in the NZ & South Pacific area... a role which has mostly developed largely since the A4 fleet was dumped (grrrr, that still rankles!). That capability is still very in it's infancy in NZ though - only once we have 2 'proper' Amphib vessels (as foreshadowed in the DCP) should we really consider such a capability. However this ultimately probably largely depends on the NZ Army defining the requirement...hmm!

Would it not be fair to say that while the Kahu A4 had good anti-shipping capability, they would never have been any good in that role whilst they were limited to the Maverick as the primary anti-shipping weapon.... it would've been a suicide mission unless you imagine Argentinian A4's in the inlets around the Falklands where they could use rising ground close to the target vessels for cover... that was last-gasp desperate efforts by the Argies, not a good focus on which to base a defence strategy.

IMHO we won't see fast jets again unless something really big gives pollies & joe public the absolute shits... by which time it's way too late anyway. I think such frights will see an initial focus on boosting existing capability (eg: longer-range weapons for the P8, more transports & choppers) depending on lessons learnt from such a crisis (assuming we aren't all talking Swahili after same!)

 

[ngatimozart]

People talking about NZ fast air doing CAS as though that was its main tasking - it isn't, not inthe new environment we will be looking at. You seem to forget that we are an Island nation stuck in the middle of the wet blue wobbly stuff. Unless the army can swim or fly it can't do bugger all in defending our SLOC - Sea Lanes Of Communication. It's not about stopping an enemy storming the beaches here, or about our EEZ, but about our SLOC, which extend across both the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

We don't need to be invaded by an enemy to be forced to bend to their will. They can do that by the means of a naval and air blockade. Just look at the disruption to our lives and economy that the COVID-19 crisis has caused. So have a good look at a map of the southern hemisphere and see how much we are dependent upon those sea and air lanes.

We have ordered 4 P-8A which from memory can carry 4 AShM each. Each aircraft is about NZ$400 million each and that's just the flyaway cost. For the equivalent amount of money we can acquire 3 F-16V Vipers flyaway and have some change. We would be absolutely stupid to send a P-8 into contested airspace, whereas a fast jet has a greater survival probability and is far cheaper to replace, both in crew and in financial cost.

With regard to weapons, it is NZ govt practice for their funding to come out of the operational expenditure budget, not the capital expenditure budget that acquisitions like aircraft, ships etc., come out of. They are regarded as consumables.

The NZG has looked at attack helos before, but they don't meet all of the policy requirements of the govt.

@Wombat000 times they are a changing whether we like it or not. Post COVID-19 the world will be a different place and more dangerous than it was pre COVID-19. The economic depression we are entering will be on par to the great depression of the 1930s. The US has declined in moral authority, really annoyed its allies and friends, and shown it self to be very self centred and mercurial. The PRC has proved that it is highly untrustworthy, extremely selfish, bent on dominating its neighbours and the wider environs, and its word is worth nothing. Nations are becoming more nationalistic at the moment and there are some parallels to the lead up to the 2nd world war. Whether our MFAT bureaucrats and pollies pull their heads out of the sand and recognise that is debatable, but the signs are there for them to see.

 

[Todjaeger]

People talking about NZ fast air doing CAS as though that was its main tasking - it isn't, not inthe new environment we will be looking at. You seem to forget that we are an Island nation stuck in the middle of the wet blue wobbly stuff. Unless the army can swim or fly it can't do bugger all in defending our SLOC - Sea Lanes Of Communication. It's not about stopping an enemy storming the beaches here, or about our EEZ, but about our SLOC, which extend across both the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

We don't need to be invaded by an enemy to be forced to bend to their will. They can do that by the means of a naval and air blockade. Just look at the disruption to our lives and economy that the COVID-19 crisis has caused. So have a good look at a map of the southern hemisphere and see how much we are dependent upon those sea and air lanes.

We have ordered 4 P-8A which from memory can carry 4 AShM each. Each aircraft is about NZ$400 million each and that's just the flyaway cost. For the equivalent amount of money we can acquire 3 F-16V Vipers flyaway and have some change. We would be absolutely stupid to send a P-8 into contested airspace, whereas a fast jet has a greater survival probability and is far cheaper to replace, both in crew and in financial cost.

With regard to weapons, it is NZ govt practice for their funding to come out of the operational expenditure budget, not the capital expenditure budget that acquisitions like aircraft, ships etc., come out of. They are regarded as consumables.

The NZG has looked at attack helos before, but they don't meet all of the policy requirements of the govt.

@Wombat000 times they are a changing whether we like it or not. Post COVID-19 the world will be a different place and more dangerous than it was pre COVID-19. The economic depression we are entering will be on par to the great depression of the 1930s. The US has declined in moral authority, really annoyed its allies and friends, and shown it self to be very self centred and mercurial. The PRC has proved that it is highly untrustworthy, extremely selfish, bent on dominating its neighbours and the wider environs, and its word is worth nothing. Nations are becoming more nationalistic at the moment and there are some parallels to the lead up to the 2nd world war. Whether our MFAT bureaucrats and pollies pull their heads out of the sand and recognise that is debatable, but the signs are there for them to see.

Two things. While I agree that sending a P-8 into contested airspace, unless there really was no other option available, would be foolish, the potential capabilities (assuming it was suitably kitted and armed... yes I know what is can mean to assume) might not put a P-8 into a contested space.

I am particularly thinking of if hostile vessels threatening NZ's SLOC. The sensors on a P-8 could potentially detect hostile naval vessels from 200 n miles away, which should be well outside the engagement range of a vessel's air defences. If the P-8 was armed with standoff AShM, of which there are several possibilities, that could permit engagement of threats to the SLOC.

As for the pollies and bureaucrats needing to pull their heads out of the sand, I tend to disagree on that too. I suspect (strongly, given the smell) that they need to pull their heads out of a part of their own anatomy and not sand...