Aside from much of the content sounding like the spiel of a Saab rep, I find a number of the assertions either incorrect, or made so far out of context that people who lack context will be mislead. The frequency and degree to which it seems to be happening is honestly making me wonder.
Take for instance the following comments:
AND
The two quoted comments do not match available information by providing a reduce P-8 Poseidon capability, and an inflated Global 6000/Swordfish capability.
Per
archived information from the RAAF, the P-8 Poseidon can transit 1,200 n miles (~2,200 km) and then loiter on station in excess of 4 hours at low altitude. Per the Saab datasheet on the Global 6000/Swordfish, that aircraft can transit 1,000 n miles (~1,800 km) and loiter at low altitude for 7.3 hours. While what the actual, exact performance data is not publicly available, shortening the stated P-8 transit distance by ~130 n miles/200 km as well as leaving the loiter time as just 4 hours, when the information states it is over 4 hours, is going to make the P-8 Poseidon performance look worse than it actually is from public data. By the same token, inflating the Global 6000/Swordfish low altitude loiter time from the publicly released 7.3 hours upwards to 8 hours is going to make the Global 6000/Swordfish performance look better than it's public data.
Other commentary which is questionable or out of context is this:
The above quote leaves out some of what the P-8 Poseidon can already do, and more that is in development or testing for deployment from the P-8 Poseidon.
The above comment is questionable from a number of aspects. The first thing I question is whether someone who is not involved in ASW ops and familiar with current and emerging USN ASW doctrine is really in a position to make accurate statements that the USN ASW doctrine is "retarded by the legacy operating doctrine" since as a rule, ASW and EW efforts and capabilities tend to be closely held secrets. Relating to that, the USN does have multi-static sonobuoys aboard the P-3 and P-8 and AFAIK there is no information available in the public domain regarding either their performance, or the performance of alternate multi-static sonobuoy systems which be used to extrapolate whether smaller/cheaper or larger/more expensive is "better". On a related note, the pneumatic launch tubes used to drop USN sonobuoys are also used to launch things like the
Coyote UAS, which can provide additional ISR capability controlled by P-8, while keeping the Poseidon out of 'harms way'. Had the USN gone with a smaller, gravity launch tube for sonobuoys suitable for the smaller sonobuoys mentioned above, then a Poseidon would not be able to launch and control a swarm of Coyote UAS, or similarly sized and capable UAV's. It is also possible that without the pneumatic launch, UAV's could not be deployed due to issues clearing the aircraft.
This has been mentioned previously, and just like before, I and others have a rather different take than that which seems to be getting suggested. For national security reasons the US (and other nations) are very interested in who has access to advanced avionics and sensors. What people would not realize from above quote is that the Seaspray 7500 AESA is not the only electronically scanned array that the US has either tried or succeeded in limiting the exportation of. Some of the Elta systems used in the IAI Phalcon AEW system come to mind when the US exerted pressure to stop Israel from exporting Phalcon AEW's to mainland China. As for "how good" the USCG found it, one should perhaps also keep in mind that aside from aboard USCG HC-130H Hercules aircraft which are tasked with aeronautical SAR and ice surveillance, other US maritime patrol/surveillance aircraft use other radars. What that suggests to me is that the radar system is certainly capable, otherwise it would have already been replaced. However, it also suggests that other radars are either of equal or better capability in various maritime surveillance applications, since the US military has introduced and kept them. Examples would be Raytheon's APY-10 as fitted to the P-8 Poseidon, or the Telephonics APS-143C fitted to USCG HC-144 Ocean Sentry's which first entered service in 2009, about four years after the Seaspray 7500 AESA was fitted to USCG HC-130H Hercules aircraft. Again, while I do believe the Seaspray 7500 AESA is a very capable radar system, there is nothing which IMO would imply the capability is greater or more appropriate for maritime surveillance than alternate radar systems and it seems that either people are reading too much into US attempts to limit exportation, or attempting to get others to read too much into such attempts.
With respect to aircraft pricing, it should be abundantly clear to most members that it is usually quite difficult to determine what the actual cost to purchase and aircraft, acquire the capability, and then sustain/support it is. By doing some significant digging, those interested can sometimes extrapolate a potential price range for an aircraft purchase, but those are just estimates and often very rough ones. One also has to be wary of relying too much upon a manufacturer's public cost projections, and comparing dissimilar costings. A classic false comparison, often made by those with an axe to grind, is using the estimated full rate production cost for one aircraft, and the prototype or LRIP cost of another.
From work which has already appeared earlier in this thread and elsewhere on DT, the purchase or 'flyaway' cost for a Global 6000/Swordfish is likely going to be close to that of a P-8 Poseidon which should mean that the purchase cost should not be a crucial factor. Either system is going to be expensive.
I was simply quoting from the Gripen presentation at the Singapore Airshow.
