Royal New Zealand Air Force

[ngatimozart]

Guys, regardless of the "political motives" one way or another of each side, would it be fair to say that the context as to whether NZ should or shouldn't have an ACF was a product "of its time" eg the end of the Cold War (the Soviet threat in the Pacific/SE Asia had vanished overnight), the end of joint training and military cooperation with the US (the demise of ANZUS in a NZ context) and like the 1960's hippies always wanted (lets include Clark, even Mapp and Bradford I guess ) "peace" had broken out!

Yep agree

Shouldn't the question today though is what, if anything, has changed? One thing for a start we now have a new emerging Superpower in "our" region, one that we and the rest of the Western world is at peace with, trades with and is co-dependant on. But how will that relationship change over the next eg 20 years and would it be prudent to make precautions?

China is pursuing its right to be a Great Power. It once was and will be again and nobody has a real problem with that. What is causing the tensions is Chinas methodology in asserting its place in the world and right to be a Great Power. For example, the recent Air Defence Identification Zone would not have raised hackles if it had followed international norms. However, it did not because China is trying to assert Chinese domestic law on international airspace. Another form of attempted Chinese dominance is when the Provincial Government of Hainan enacted a law that came into effect (1 January 2014) that prevents all foreign fishing vessels from fishing in the South China Sea including the Spratly Islands. This area extends into the Philippines EEZ and the closest point to the Chinese coast is 600 nautical miles. China is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on Law Of the Sea (UNCLOS). Hence, this begs the question of what are Chinas real intentions? Actions speak louder than words and on July 8, 2013, the Hong Kong pro-PRC Chinese-language newspaper, Wenweipo published a story entitled "Six Wars China Is Sure to Fight In the Next 50 Years"

1. The 1st War: Unification of Taiwan (Year 2020 to 2025)
2. The 2nd War: “Reconquest” of Spratly Islands (Year 2025 to 2030)
3. The 3rd War: “Reconquest” of Southern Tibet (Year 2035 to 2040) - part of India
4. The 4th War: “Reconquest” of Diaoyu Island [Senkaku] and Ryukyu [Okinawa] Islands
   (Year 2040 to 2045)
5. The 5th War: Unification of Outer Mongolia (Year 2045 to 2050)
6. The 6th War: Taking back of lands lost to Russia (Year 2055 to 2060)

Whilst this cannot be taken as "gospel”, such an article wouldn't be published without sanction from within the higher echelons of the Chinese government. Many articles have appeared in the mainland Chinese media written by Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) officers, mostly Colonels that have called for the use of force to regain "lost territories". They play on the 100 years of shame that is embedded in current Chinese society. It is the 100 years from the 1840s to 1949 when China was plagued with foreign invasions and having to kow tow and pay tribute to foreigners, especially the west and Japan.

These Colonels and other officers of the PLA making these statements in public and in the media would not be doing so, without the sanction of higher authority and that would in this case be the Politburo and Xi Jinping in particular.25 Xi has taken steps ensuring that the PLA answers to him and he has it fully under his control.

China is developing a "String of Pearls" across the Asian seascape from China to Pakistan with nexus (pearl) at strategic ports along the string. This is a geopolitical strategy with the Chinese government and Chinese companies funding and building port and infrastructure upgrades. This strategy runs in conjunction with the Silk Road strategy which is eventual the overload route from China through to Europe with the Chinese government and companies again funding and building infrastructure projects The string of pearls not only is an economic phenomena but also a military and security one with China believed to be also negotiating berthing and logistical support agreements for surface and subsurface vessels of the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in some countries such as Pakistan and Myanmar, plus surveillance facilities at some locations in the Indian Ocean. China has developed a sea control strategy based upon fixed lines drawn through two island chains encroaching upon other nations territory from the Kuril Islands to the Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean including United States islands and military bases in the Pacific. It is important to note that the island chains encompass the main shipping routes between the Indian Ocean into the Pacific Ocean via the Straits of Malacca, Sunda Straits and the Lombok Straits with the vast majority going through the South China Sea to nations such as Singapore, China, Thailand, Taiwan, Brunei, South Korea and Japan. Furthermore there is shipping lanes to nations such as Australian and New Zealand. This would be an issue to these nations if China was to develop a security hegemony over the area.

The current South China Seas disputes with Chinese assertiveness and "island" construction there is increasing tensions within the region. Since Xi has been appointed General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China has been more aggressive in asserting its perceived claims to territories, within the Chinese nine dashed line map that China legally has no claim to undercurrent international law. The CCP in 2012 determined that the South China Sea was a core national asset. The 2015 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook, cited by Gady, states that is increasing tensions in Asia by its efforts in reshaping the "regional military - security dynamic" China has been coercive in its approach to its claims in the South China Sea. Whilst it hasn't overtly used open military force this time it is using the paramilitary Chinese Coastguard to enforce its claims whether or not they have any legal status under the UNCLOS. This is a direct challenge to the rules based world order that has existed since the end of the Second World War.

China is using the dispute in the South China Sea to obtain as much maritime territory as it can in order to enforce a new status quo arrangement that will see it remain in control of the territory that it has coerced from neighbouring states without a return to the status quo ante. This redefinition of the status quo is not going to cease until China either achieves hegemony or is shown that it cannot continue down this path without some form of consequences. China is reclaiming land and building artificial islands in order to bolster its claims and artificial islands are excluded from territorial claims in UNCLOS. Furthermore it has not honoured the agreement it signed with the Association of South East Asian Nations in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, regarding conduct about disputes in the South China Sea.

How is our relationship with the US now? We now have joint exercises in NZ with them as well as over in Australia and on the US continent itself. (There are obviously some sticking points in terms of US naval visits to NZ itself but in time ....). Finally what happened to the "benign" strategic environment that NZ was meant to be in? Looks like "peace" has flown out the door!

After a couple of decades in the wilderness it seems pretty clear that the NZDF is rebuilding itself and to be inter-operable with a range of friends and allies again, meaning investment has (as is) rightfully being put into these areas and capabilities. It takes time (and a lot of money) to build these up.

I guess NZ isn't "there yet" for an ACF restoration (who knows that could be an issue post-2020, if at all) but I guess it would be prudent to make little steps in that direction. Perhaps the T-6 acquisition is one of them?

Volk, the other day (and others in the past) have raised the more likely (funding wise) scenario of putting RNZAF personnel through the ADF training system and perhaps ultimately NZ building up a flight (what 3 or so aircraft) of comparable aircraft in the interim. Somehow then Volks sensible suggestion veered of to discussions on pretty much a full ACF restoration, which won't happen like that cost and priority wise!

It will be interesting to see if the forthcoming Whitepaper makes a hint of any of this (I guess, publically, it will be unlikely), or whether that is something for the Whitepapers in 2020 etc. I guess all we can do is, whenever we run into politicians at events, is to raise these issues so that they are aware of public interest, which may be small (and small things can develop into bigger things over time), but that's better than none or saying nothing at all!

Finally is an ACF the answer, or for a maritime nation like NZ, is the longer-range P-8 (etc) brimming with long-range stand off missiles and supporting surveillance/satellite capabilities the answer? Plus better Navy (and ship-borne offensive) capabilities etc?

If we don't have the ACF then we definitely should have P8s or P1s with long range stand off weapons that that keep the launch platform well outside any warships SAM umbrella. Concerning the Navy, definitely should have shipborne long range stand off weapons capability permanently fitted to the ship, not just the ships helo and a third frigate.

Putting aside Army close air support of course, which the Army appears to be suggesting that because they will deploy with other like minded coalitions the appropriate ACF assets will already be provided (although perhaps NZ then could invest in more rotary support assets to deploy with Army)?

I would suggest say 12 AW109 Helicopters, fully marinised, armoured, fitted with FLIR, Electro Optical Targeting System, add-on 25mm gun pod, 70mm Hydra rocket pods compatible with the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) as Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters because they give the army a capability that they have needed for many years. Whilst fast jets can provide Close Air Support (CAS) the ARH provides more than just guns and rockets. It also is the eyes of the ground commander and can provide air support very quickly if needed. The AW109 suggested is not an anti tank helicopter designed to combat heavy tanks. It is armed so that it combat light forces, vehicles and light armoured vehicles. Augusta Westland advertise the aircraft with 2 x 12.7mm (.50 cal) gun pods however whilst they are good a single 25mm auto cannon would be of similar weight, provide greater fire power and range, and keep the aircraft out of heavy machine gun range.

Perhaps we need to adjust our mindsets?

I came across this today regarding the Kawasaki P1 and IF the costs cited in the article are correct then it would be a better deal for NZ to acquire the P1. US$150 million vs US$250 million for the P8 certainly makes for a reasonably strong argument especially if the platforms have similar capabilities. On the face of it if the money in the budget could only buy four P8s then the same money could acquire six P1s with possibly some change. This is an RUSI article on it authored by JMSDF officer. I believe that it is worth having a serious look at.

Now something else that I spotted the LockMart are looking at as a future air transport. It is a concept but they are investing money in it so they think it's worth going further with. The thing I like about it is that according to them it's scalable so you can have a C5 sized one or a B757 sized one. This is way in the future and definitely not in our timeline.

 

[Ranger25]

Yep agree

China is pursuing its right to be a Great Power. It once was and will be again and nobody has a real problem with that. What is causing the tensions is Chinas methodology in asserting its place in the world and right to be a Great Power. For example, the recent Air Defence Identification Zone would not have raised hackles if it had followed international norms. However, it did not because China is trying to assert Chinese domestic law on international airspace. Another form of attempted Chinese dominance is when the Provincial Government of Hainan enacted a law that came into effect (1 January 2014) that prevents all foreign fishing vessels from fishing in the South China Sea including the Spratly Islands. This area extends into the Philippines EEZ and the closest point to the Chinese coast is 600 nautical miles. China is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on Law Of the Sea (UNCLOS). Hence, this begs the question of what are Chinas real intentions? Actions speak louder than words and on July 8, 2013, the Hong Kong pro-PRC Chinese-language newspaper, Wenweipo published a story entitled "Six Wars China Is Sure to Fight In the Next 50 Years"

1. The 1st War: Unification of Taiwan (Year 2020 to 2025)
2. The 2nd War: “Reconquest” of Spratly Islands (Year 2025 to 2030)
3. The 3rd War: “Reconquest” of Southern Tibet (Year 2035 to 2040) - part of India
4. The 4th War: “Reconquest” of Diaoyu Island [Senkaku] and Ryukyu [Okinawa] Islands
   (Year 2040 to 2045)
5. The 5th War: Unification of Outer Mongolia (Year 2045 to 2050)
6. The 6th War: Taking back of lands lost to Russia (Year 2055 to 2060)

Whilst this cannot be taken as "gospel”, such an article wouldn't be published without sanction from within the higher echelons of the Chinese government. Many articles have appeared in the mainland Chinese media written by Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) officers, mostly Colonels that have called for the use of force to regain "lost territories". They play on the 100 years of shame that is embedded in current Chinese society. It is the 100 years from the 1840s to 1949 when China was plagued with foreign invasions and having to kow tow and pay tribute to foreigners, especially the west and Japan.

These Colonels and other officers of the PLA making these statements in public and in the media would not be doing so, without the sanction of higher authority and that would in this case be the Politburo and Xi Jinping in particular.25 Xi has taken steps ensuring that the PLA answers to him and he has it fully under his control.

China is developing a "String of Pearls" across the Asian seascape from China to Pakistan with nexus (pearl) at strategic ports along the string. This is a geopolitical strategy with the Chinese government and Chinese companies funding and building port and infrastructure upgrades. This strategy runs in conjunction with the Silk Road strategy which is eventual the overload route from China through to Europe with the Chinese government and companies again funding and building infrastructure projects The string of pearls not only is an economic phenomena but also a military and security one with China believed to be also negotiating berthing and logistical support agreements for surface and subsurface vessels of the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in some countries such as Pakistan and Myanmar, plus surveillance facilities at some locations in the Indian Ocean. China has developed a sea control strategy based upon fixed lines drawn through two island chains encroaching upon other nations territory from the Kuril Islands to the Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean including United States islands and military bases in the Pacific. It is important to note that the island chains encompass the main shipping routes between the Indian Ocean into the Pacific Ocean via the Straits of Malacca, Sunda Straits and the Lombok Straits with the vast majority going through the South China Sea to nations such as Singapore, China, Thailand, Taiwan, Brunei, South Korea and Japan. Furthermore there is shipping lanes to nations such as Australian and New Zealand. This would be an issue to these nations if China was to develop a security hegemony over the area.

The current South China Seas disputes with Chinese assertiveness and "island" construction there is increasing tensions within the region. Since Xi has been appointed General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China has been more aggressive in asserting its perceived claims to territories, within the Chinese nine dashed line map that China legally has no claim to undercurrent international law. The CCP in 2012 determined that the South China Sea was a core national asset. The 2015 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook, cited by Gady, states that is increasing tensions in Asia by its efforts in reshaping the "regional military - security dynamic" China has been coercive in its approach to its claims in the South China Sea. Whilst it hasn't overtly used open military force this time it is using the paramilitary Chinese Coastguard to enforce its claims whether or not they have any legal status under the UNCLOS. This is a direct challenge to the rules based world order that has existed since the end of the Second World War.

China is using the dispute in the South China Sea to obtain as much maritime territory as it can in order to enforce a new status quo arrangement that will see it remain in control of the territory that it has coerced from neighbouring states without a return to the status quo ante. This redefinition of the status quo is not going to cease until China either achieves hegemony or is shown that it cannot continue down this path without some form of consequences. China is reclaiming land and building artificial islands in order to bolster its claims and artificial islands are excluded from territorial claims in UNCLOS. Furthermore it has not honoured the agreement it signed with the Association of South East Asian Nations in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, regarding conduct about disputes in the South China Sea.

If we don't have the ACF then we definitely should have P8s or P1s with long range stand off weapons that that keep the launch platform well outside any warships SAM umbrella. Concerning the Navy, definitely should have shipborne long range stand off weapons capability permanently fitted to the ship, not just the ships helo and a third frigate.

I would suggest say 12 AW109 Helicopters, fully marinised, armoured, fitted with FLIR, Electro Optical Targeting System, add-on 25mm gun pod, 70mm Hydra rocket pods compatible with the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) as Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters because they give the army a capability that they have needed for many years. Whilst fast jets can provide Close Air Support (CAS) the ARH provides more than just guns and rockets. It also is the eyes of the ground commander and can provide air support very quickly if needed. The AW109 suggested is not an anti tank helicopter designed to combat heavy tanks. It is armed so that it combat light forces, vehicles and light armoured vehicles. Augusta Westland advertise the aircraft with 2 x 12.7mm (.50 cal) gun pods however whilst they are good a single 25mm auto cannon would be of similar weight, provide greater fire power and range, and keep the aircraft out of heavy machine gun range.

I came across this today regarding the Kawasaki P1 and IF the costs cited in the article are correct then it would be a better deal for NZ to acquire the P1. US$150 million vs US$250 million for the P8 certainly makes for a reasonably strong argument especially if the platforms have similar capabilities. On the face of it if the money in the budget could only buy four P8s then the same money could acquire six P1s with possibly some change. This is an RUSI article on it authored by JMSDF officer. I believe that it is worth having a serious look at.

Now something else that I spotted the LockMart are looking at as a future air transport. It is a concept but they are investing money in it so they think it's worth going further with. The thing I like about it is that according to them it's scalable so you can have a C5 sized one or a B757 sized one. This is way in the future and definitely not in our timeline.

Thank you for the great article, very interesting. Recent PLA moves in Djibouti directly reflect this course of action IMO.

Do you see further Allied cooperation within ANZUS as a way to deter PLAN aggression in the Region?

 

[recce.k1]

China is pursuing its right to be a Great Power......
...............

1. The 1st War: Unification of Taiwan (Year 2020 to 2025)
2. The 2nd War: “Reconquest” of Spratly Islands (Year 2025 to 2030)
3. The 3rd War: “Reconquest” of Southern Tibet (Year 2035 to 2040) - part of India
4. The 4th War: “Reconquest” of Diaoyu Island [Senkaku] and Ryukyu [Okinawa] Islands
   (Year 2040 to 2045)
5. The 5th War: Unification of Outer Mongolia (Year 2045 to 2050)
6. The 6th War: Taking back of lands lost to Russia (Year 2055 to 2060)

...............

Cheers for your detailed response Ngati! Just taking the "1st War" as a discussion starting point, in your opinion how likely would that be (and in that timeframe?) considering counter military (US/Asean) posturing, and the economic and trading ramifications for mainland China, especially with the current downturn jitters?

I suppose the answer could also depend on how willing is the West and Taiwan's neighbours' resolve to stare down such a move? Does the West and some Asean nations (including NZ) wish to become embroiled in a conflict or diplomatically make concessions and appeasements (and thus emboldening China and setting the tone for the future wars you've listed?

The current South China Seas disputes with Chinese assertiveness and "island" construction there is increasing tensions within the region.....

China is using the dispute in the South China Sea to obtain as much maritime territory as it can in order to enforce a new status quo arrangement that will see it remain in control of the territory that it has coerced from neighbouring states without a return to the status quo ante. .......

I noticed the following article was "doing the rounds" because of its poor heading but to the article itself it mentions "The expansion of its claim on the South China Sea may be intended to create a deep-water sanctuary – known in military parlance as a “bastion” – where its submarine fleet could avoid detection. "
China may be trying to hide its submarines in the South China Sea | McClatchy DC

Which also puts some of those territory dispute issues in perspective i.e. the submarine threat.

So from a NZ perspective, again, like the Cold War period, with the proliferation of submarine building for a variety of Asian nations, it seems prudent that maritime (sea and air) capabilities including ASW be given greater prominence.

Perhaps that could be in the form of bringing forward the P-8 (or similar) and other supporting acquisitions to 2020 (if not earlier) rather than from the mid-2020's, and build up operational skillsets on the new platform.

Rather than (alas, sigh) thoughts to perhaps restoring an ACF as such? Just thinking about the amount of (scarce) funds to restore an ACF plus additional support capabilities such as air-air refuelling to make an ACF effective, perhaps those "funds" could be better directed to RNZAF (P-8 or similar + supporting systems), RNZN (Frigates and future OPV's with underwater surveillance and detection systems) and Army (fattening out the existing 1 Brigade combat and combat support structures, and perhaps the acquisition of additional marinised rotary transport and as you mention effectively reconnaissance helos with the likes of FLIR and supporting armaments for the Army when based on land or as part of the NZDF JATF)?

 

[swerve]

"Reconquests" of places which have never in recorded history seen a Chinese soldier or official, or which have seen them only on occasional diplomatic missions to what the Chinese imperial archives categorised as 'unconquered barbarian countries' (e.g. Ryukyu, to which visits averaged less than one every twenty years).

 

[kiwi in exile]

Good article NM. Questionable Chinese nationalistic newspaper propoganda aside you have raise a whole raft of valid considerations for future NZ defence and foreign relations policy.

Our biggest vulnerability to China (current and future) is in the cyber domain - both to govt and commercially. However this seldom gets a mention in Def Talk. Cyber stuff is all top secret and way over my head anyway.

Re ACF: I'm for equipping our P3 (P8s- fingers crossed) replacements with standoff missiles. In my mind the missile capability is more important that the launch platform capability. We are allready going to get new MPAs. An ACF would be a whole other set of costs to acquire and maintain. Additionally I imaging the MPAs would be on the scene allready to vector the ACF strike aircraft, and have more range/persistance. Fast jets over the pacific would require more A2A refuling and close basing.

I would also advocate for stronger engagement with NZs own 'string of pearls' in the S Pacific.

Re the 12 armed, marinised AW109s: I'm in favour of arming some AW109s and/or sprites with rockets/APKWS/hellfires/JAGM/brimstones. However 12 seems like too much. Have seen pics of 109s with 20mm gun pods and (Belgium) has had 109s wih TOW missiles fitted. In my mind something like a predadtor (or ideally a ship launched UAV) would be a better CAS platform as it can do persistent ISR as well, is perhaps more stealthy (audio visually) and has potentially standoff range weapons/sensors. NZ need to move foward on UAVs as ISR for deployed ops.

 

[ngatimozart]

Good article NM. Questionable Chinese nationalistic newspaper propoganda aside you have raise a whole raft of valid considerations for future NZ defence and foreign relations policy.

Maybe propaganda but it was published in China probably as an opinion piece and as such would have had to have official sanction. The reason I included it is that it does illustrate some of the the nationalist thinking that is current in China and should not just be discounted as propaganda.

Our biggest vulnerability to China (current and future) is in the cyber domain - both to govt and commercially. However this seldom gets a mention in Def Talk. Cyber stuff is all top secret and way over my head anyway.

This is a large vulnerability but whether or not it is our biggest is open for discussion. I actually think our greatest vulnerability is our SLOC because of our Island nation geo status.

Re ACF: I'm for equipping our P3 (P8s- fingers crossed) replacements with standoff missiles. In my mind the missile capability is more important that the launch platform capability. We are allready going to get new MPAs. An ACF would be a whole other set of costs to acquire and maintain. Additionally I imaging the MPAs would be on the scene allready to vector the ACF strike aircraft, and have more range/persistance. Fast jets over the pacific would require more A2A refuling and close basing.

I would also advocate for stronger engagement with NZs own 'string of pearls' in the S Pacific.

Re the 12 armed, marinised AW109s: I'm in favour of arming some AW109s and/or sprites with rockets/APKWS/hellfires/JAGM/brimstones. However 12 seems like too much. Have seen pics of 109s with 20mm gun pods and (Belgium) has had 109s wih TOW missiles fitted. In my mind something like a predadtor (or ideally a ship launched UAV) would be a better CAS platform as it can do persistent ISR as well, is perhaps more stealthy (audio visually) and has potentially standoff range weapons/sensors. NZ need to move foward on UAVs as ISR for deployed ops.

The actual reason for the 12 is that I see them as a reconstituted NZ Army Aviation Corps. Whilst RNZAF aircrew could do the hunt and kill side of the capability quite well, the other side the recon has to be Army because Army see the battlefield differently to Air Force. Hence no lost in translation issues which have the potential to be quite damaging. When suggesting the armed etc., AW109s I kept it simple staying away from Brimstone and Hellfire. The APKWS capability gives a 70mm rocket accuracy similar to a Hellfire for a third of the cost. They aren't for taking on MBTs and Soviet tank armies. If NZ plans to unilaterally invade China we will buy Apache gunships and get our Skyhawks back At the moment I have my doubts about armed UAVs doing CAS in a contested environment and NZ has little UAV experience. However shipborne UAVs will eventually happen in RNZN service.

 

[ngatimozart]

Thank you for the great article, very interesting. Recent PLA moves in Djibouti directly reflect this course of action IMO.

Do you see further Allied cooperation within ANZUS as a way to deter PLAN aggression in the Region?

ANZUS in reality is only the US and Australian now although I understand that the Treaty hasn't fully been abrogated so NZ does still have obligations within it. The platforms that would see military cooperation are the FPDA if China threatens Malaysia and / or Singapore and the ASEAN ADMM Plus Group, with the latter being an informal group in comparison to the former. At present the only way NZ would have to act by treaty is as mentioned the FPDA, ANZUS where the US or Australia was attacked and the Canberra Agreement where Australia was attacked. Both NZ and Australia are members of the ASEAN ADMM Plus Group, however there is no real security and military consensus within ASEAN or the ASEAN Plus Group, which is unfortunate because that is the best platform in which to build a strong security and military relationship and grouping. There is no real political will to do so at the moment with regard to the PRC expansion. The Philippines is the only country within ASEAN that is willing to take the PRC on by committing to actions beyond just words. In their case they have taken the PRC to the ICJ over their breaches of SOLAS which they, the PRC, have signed up to and ratified.

 

[Ranger25]

ANZUS in reality is only the US and Australian now although I understand that the Treaty hasn't fully been abrogated so NZ does still have obligations within it. The platforms that would see military cooperation are the FPDA if China threatens Malaysia and / or Singapore and the ASEAN ADMM Plus Group, with the latter being an informal group in comparison to the former. At present the only way NZ would have to act by treaty is as mentioned the FPDA, ANZUS where the US or Australia was attacked and the Canberra Agreement where Australia was attacked. Both NZ and Australia are members of the ASEAN ADMM Plus Group, however there is no real security and military consensus within ASEAN or the ASEAN Plus Group, which is unfortunate because that is the best platform in which to build a strong security and military relationship and grouping. There is no real political will to do so at the moment with regard to the PRC expansion. The Philippines is the only country within ASEAN that is willing to take the PRC on by committing to actions beyond just words. In their case they have taken the PRC to the ICJ over their breaches of SOLAS which they, the PRC, have signed up to and ratified.

Thank You. I'm a bit surprised, given the PLAN moves in the region, that the FPDA hasn't made any further resolutions or comments. IMO free nations linking more tighty together (military excesses, integration etc) will be the best way to deter aggression and ideally prevent any kinetic engagement

 

[t68]

Thank You. I'm a bit surprised, given the PLAN moves in the region, that the FPDA hasn't made any further resolutions or comments. IMO free nations linking more tighty together (military excesses, integration etc) will be the best way to deter aggression and ideally prevent any kinetic engagement

One must also remember that FPDA is not a formal alliance and is only to consult it does not mean any of the nations FPDA must legally provide military support.

Under the terms of its founding communiqué (16 April 1971), Australia, New
Zealand, the United Kingdom, Malaysia and Singapore pledged:

"in relation to the external defence of Malaysia and Singapore, that in the
event of any form of armed attack externally organised or supported, or the
threat of such attack against Malaysia or Singapore, their Governments
would immediately consult together for the purpose of deciding what
measures should be taken or separately in relation to such an attack or
threat"

FPDA continues to evolve from its humble beginnings in the 70's and really took off with a robust consultative structure and multilateral military component from the 90's onwards

 

[ASSAIL]

Not so, it was very active during the 70s with what remained of the RN Far East Fleet, ANZAC frigates in FE Strategic Reserve, RAAF Butterworth, a RN Commando Unit and Army units from all countries rotating through Singapore and Malaysia.

What is true is that the old powers are less prominent today but they have been replaced in kind by the emergence of strong and professional forces from Singapore and Malaysia

 

[t68]

What is true is that the old powers are less prominent today but they have been replaced in kind by the emergence of strong and professional forces from Singapore and Malaysia

Agree it was not my intension to disparage the forces committed to the early stages under FPDA,it could also be seen as trip wire for forward defence for the mainland Australia/New Zealand, something akin to the expeditionary nature of the current ADF.

From what I gather in the early days of the agreement UK, Australian and New Zealand forces were needed until such a time Malaysia and Singapore could defended themselves due to the defence capacity of Malaysia and Singapore at that time.

from what information I have come across was that there was two distinct levels of management, the Joint Consultative Council and the Air Defence Council.

The JCC was made up of Ministers of Defence from their respect nations along with the High Commissioners from Aus,NZ and the UK and the JCC only held meeting four times up until 1981, it was not until the 1990's that regular high level meeting took place between members of the FPDA.And It wasn't up till 1994 that the two tiered system of the JCC and ADC was replaced with a single Consultative Council

 

[Ranger25]

Not so, it was very active during the 70s with what remained of the RN Far East Fleet, ANZAC frigates in FE Strategic Reserve, RAAF Butterworth, a RN Commando Unit and Army units from all countries rotating through Singapore and Malaysia.

What is true is that the old powers are less prominent today but they have been replaced in kind by the emergence of strong and professional forces from Singapore and Malaysia

Agreed and that's not necessarily negative IMO. Regional powers with growing and robust economies will need to bolster their efforts to counter a more aggressive PLA. I did find the "12 Wars" article highly nationalistic but an interesting theme

 

[kiwi in exile]

Maybe propaganda but it was published in China probably as an opinion piece and as such would have had to have official sanction. The reason I included it is that it does illustrate some of the the nationalist thinking that is current in China and should not just be discounted as propaganda.

This is a large vulnerability but whether or not it is our biggest is open for discussion. I actually think our greatest vulnerability is our SLOC because of our Island nation geo status.

The actual reason for the 12 is that I see them as a reconstituted NZ Army Aviation Corps. Whilst RNZAF aircrew could do the hunt and kill side of the capability quite well, the other side the recon has to be Army because Army see the battlefield differently to Air Force. Hence no lost in translation issues which have the potential to be quite damaging. When suggesting the armed etc., AW109s I kept it simple staying away from Brimstone and Hellfire. The APKWS capability gives a 70mm rocket accuracy similar to a Hellfire for a third of the cost. They aren't for taking on MBTs and Soviet tank armies. If NZ plans to unilaterally invade China we will buy Apache gunships and get our Skyhawks back At the moment I have my doubts about armed UAVs doing CAS in a contested environment and NZ has little UAV experience. However shipborne UAVs will eventually happen in RNZN service.

I had written an earlier response but accidentally deleted it before posting. There were a couple of points I wanted to make.

Cyber attacks: these can be over before we even know that an attack has taken place. It may not be clear what has happened and who is responsible. Conventional military aggression- we/our our allies would likely see it coming and it would be clear what had taken place. I would imagine any first move would be in the cyber realm. FYI this as well
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DF-21#/media/File:PLA_ballistic_missiles_range.jpg


APKWS are a good start, but they may not be heavy enough or have the range for all jobs. I doubt NZ forces are likely to face any soviet tank armies, buy Brimstone has been the weapon of choice in A'stan, Lybia,Iraq for taking out technicals, protected firing positions etc. definitely effective, maybe not cost effective.

Lack of experience with UAVs is hardly an excuse not to move forward. The latest Def Tech Review discusses an ASPI article about the lack of UAVs on Australias LHD as a "glaring gap in capability." I have long felt the same applies to our JATF. I'm not talking of having a Triton overhead. More a ship/land deployed tactical ISR capability. Sure these may be vulnerable in a contested environment, but how contested are we talking. If it was truely contested, we would be there (at least until the yanks and Australia had done their bit). And a UAV wouldn't be any more vulnerable than a AW109 (with people on board).

Cheers.

 

[ngatimozart]

A couple of items.
A RNZAF P3K2 Orion and support personnel have been deployed to South Korea and Japan for "readiness training activities". The Korean deployment is an ASW exercise with the South Korean and US Navies in the Yellow Sea. After that the aircraft will train with No 1 Sqn JMSDF Fleet Air Force at Kanoya. NZDF - NZDF Airborne Surveillance Force to Train in Northeast Asia

Ten retired RNZAF UH1H Iroquois helicopters, plus spares, have been sold to Dakota Aviation Services of the US for between NZ$3 million and NZ$5 million. This sale is subject to NZ and US governments approval. The remaining three Iroquois have been retained for display purposes: the Army Museum has NZ3802; the Air Force Museum has NZ3801, which is already on display, and NZ3808 will remain at Ohakea. A partial airframe has been loaned to the Nelson Marlborough Institute of Technology as a training aid. NZ3808 is either the RNZAF Historic Flight (based at Ohakea) aircraft or the spares aircraft for it.
NZDF - Defence Force Sells Iroquois Helicopters

 

[RegR]

A couple of items.
A RNZAF P3K2 Orion and support personnel have been deployed to South Korea and Japan for "readiness training activities". The Korean deployment is an ASW exercise with the South Korean and US Navies in the Yellow Sea. After that the aircraft will train with No 1 Sqn JMSDF Fleet Air Force at Kanoya. NZDF - NZDF Airborne Surveillance Force to Train in Northeast Asia

Ten retired RNZAF UH1H Iroquois helicopters, plus spares, have been sold to Dakota Aviation Services of the US for between NZ$3 million and NZ$5 million. This sale is subject to NZ and US governments approval. The remaining three Iroquois have been retained for display purposes: the Army Museum has NZ3802; the Air Force Museum has NZ3801, which is already on display, and NZ3808 will remain at Ohakea. A partial airframe has been loaned to the Nelson Marlborough Institute of Technology as a training aid. NZ3808 is either the RNZAF Historic Flight (based at Ohakea) aircraft or the spares aircraft for it.
NZDF - Defence Force Sells Iroquois Helicopters

Seems like a good deal for a fleet of helicopters regardless of age considering them being so well looked after. Hopefully historic flight can keep one airborne here, such an icon as well as still one of the coolest helos around.

 

[ASSAIL]

Seems like a good deal for a fleet of helicopters regardless of age considering them being so well looked after. Hopefully historic flight can keep one airborne here, such an icon as well as still one of the coolest helos around.

They may not be the coolest helo but that distinctive 2 x blade rotor "thwop thwop" will remain in the hearts and heads of all those of us who served in VN and will remain there until the end.

 

[40 deg south]

Milestone for RAF's A400M transport acquisition program - UPI.com

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/raf-a400m-stretches-legs-on-us-detachment-417161/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pztso0Mi0ts

A few updates on the entry of the A400M into RAF service, which looks to be progressing smoothly.

Interesting that they have gone to the trouble of doing loading trials with a US Stryker this early in the piece - I assume the Stryker has very similar exterior dimensions to NZ LAVs?

 

[40 deg south]

RNZAF twitter feed shows one of the 757s down on the ice again.

I remember speculation they wouldn't go back to Antarctica after the dicey landing a couple of years back - looks as if an acceptable risk management programme has been put in place.

https://twitter.com/nzairforce

 

[Ranger25]

Milestone for RAF's A400M transport acquisition program - UPI.com

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/raf-a400m-stretches-legs-on-us-detachment-417161/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pztso0Mi0ts

A few updates on the entry of the A400M into RAF service, which looks to be progressing smoothly.

Interesting that they have gone to the trouble of doing loading trials with a US Stryker this early in the piece - I assume the Stryker has very similar exterior dimensions to NZ LAVs?

The NZ LAV and the Stykers are based on the same platform. All built by GD Canada I believe.

 

[John Fedup]

The NZ LAV and the Stykers are based on the same platform. All built by GD Canada I believe.

Yep, by GD's plant in London, Ontario for he NZ Lavs, not sure if some Strykers are built their as well. They are currently building for Saudi Arabia (10 billion dollar order).