Royal New Zealand Air Force

[RegR]

You might want to research what the process is for commercial aviation pilots go through to become commercial pilots, and then what/how they get cleared for flying different commercial aircraft. It might seem like a commercial airline pilot with 20+ years of experience and 10k+ hours flight time should be able to just exit the cockpit of a B747 and enter an A380 cockpit and just fly it 'as normal' but the aircraft handling characteristics are different, the displays are different, how different tasks are accomplished is different, etc.

Using a somewhat simpler analogy, would it be reasonable to expect a regular person who drives a regular 2,000 kg automobile, commuting to work during the week, to suddenly start be able to safely and properly drive a 13,000 kg heavy duty truck as their commute vehicle. Honestly just the difference in acceleration and stopping distance would be enormous, never mind if the braking system was different (like air brakes), the truck had more gears than a normal 4, 5, or 6-speed transmission, or if the truck had or was expected to have a trailer of some sort.

The differences in changing between different aircraft models, even of the same class (fighter, multi-engine transport, etc) or different versions of the same design, is normally significantly more involved than the ground vehicle example I used above. The is why aircraft pilots have different tickets or endorsements, and aircraft ratings. They show what a pilot is known to be qualified to do.

For an idea how complicated that can be, take a look at cockpit photos from inside commercial airliners. Pilots need to be able to look at all the lights, dials, indicators and other things and be able to determine basically instantly what is 'normal' and more importantly during an emergency, what is 'not normal'. Then they need to know what to do to recover from a 'not normal'. All of this takes time, and more importantly, practice. While the experiences of other aircraft users can be helpful in learning what some of the quirts and capabilities are (like does the aircraft become nose heavy in a power loss situation, or does the aircraft veer in a particular direction in the event of an engine loss for a multi-engine aircraft). Even with these facts known on paper, pilots need the opportunity to experience and build muscle-memory on how to react to such situations.

I don't think anyone is doubting the need to convert to type but merely the time it takes, 2 years does seem alittle excessive, as they are not re-learning to fly from scratch and it is still just an airplane albeit it another model and sliggtly larger, the basic fundamentals are exactly the same and not a whole new concept.

To use your anlogy it would not take me a month to convert from a ford to a holden, station wagon to a van or an articulated truck to a truck and trailer. I would be hoping I could learn (at least basically) to fly from nothing after 2 years otherwise there must something wrong in the process somewhere as that is just a ridiculously long time.

That would be yet another reason not to go with such a small fleet as at that rate even converting to type would take on a large amount of hours that we would struggle with in a 2 ship fleet. We can do it with B757 as they are not the mainstay of our air transport fleet and we have 5 C130 to supplement.

 

[RegR]

After reading this debate over the last few weeks, the questions I keep asking myself are: how many $'s can NZ afford to spend on a C-17A capability, how many airframes will be required and importantly, how many airframes will be available?

As I understand it, of the 10 'white tails' that Boeing is building, the UAE has two, Canada has one and the RAAF has two (which will expand the fleet to eight), that leaves five airframes, if the RAAF does announce in the forthcoming DWP that the fleet will be expanded to ten (there appears to be FMS approval for four airframes in total), then that leaves a grand total of three unallocated airframes (yes of course the RAAF has not committed to airframes 9 and 10, but I would suspect that Boeing, which the RAAF is a good customer, would probably have a 'reserved' sticker on a couple of airframes till a final decision is made).

To me the minimum number of airframes in a 'possible' NZ C-17A fleet would have to be three, I think that two (as has been thrown around here) would be too small.

To give you an example of what I mean, if we go back a few years (just prior to the RAAF receiving airframe number five), the first of the 'original' four airframes was due to return to the US for it's heavy maintenance period, which as I understand from the reporting at the time was 6mths, if the 5th airframe (and subsequently 6th) had not been ordered and delivered, the RAAF would have been in situation where for a period of two years the fleet would have been effectively reduced to three airframes (as one airframe returns from its 6mth heavy maintenance period, the next would follow and so on till all are done).

To put that in NZ terms, if the NZG does approve and acquire two airframes, then somewhere down the track both of those airframes will have to return to the US for their respective heavy maintenance periods of 6mths each, in effect the fleet would be reduced to 'one' airframe for a period of 12 months, I would assume that during the service life of the aircraft this is something that will happen 3 or 4 times.

Would the USAF or the RAAF be able to provide a 'loaner' for that period of time, who knows? Maybe, maybe not, but if every X number of years (or X number of flight hours) the fleet is effectively reduced to one airframe for a whole year, is that a capability that is worth having in the first place?

Far be it for me to say or suggest what the NZG should or shouldn't do, but to me two airframes is scratching the bottom of the barrel, three should be the bare minimum (four would be better!).

Anyway, just my opinion!

Cheers,

Oh I agree with you and this is exactly why I am not a fan of a 2 AC C17 purchase, not enough fat where we actually need it, physical numbers on the ground (or in the air in this case) to avoid critical failure at some point, and it will happen, especially when there are other options that can do the job we require just as well but provide us with more workable numbers. Now 3 would be better (but still cutting it thin) and should be the bare minimum but will our finances short and long term support this?

We need to weigh up (literally) exactly how much a purchase like this will cost NZ vs what it will afford us and then compare it to what we regularly do and need from it.

I don't buy this notion that we can get away with any possible downtime by borrowing from our allies as we have had availability issues with our 5 hercs and we did'nt just go 'borrow' one off our neighbours, commonality does'nt quite stretch that far in terms of assets like these. We can use space now and again if able on each others aircraft if and when available (and usually mutually beneficial) but wholesale borrowing of aircraft (ships, armour etc) of this nature is alittle more complex and involved then some make it out to be.

 

[t68]

I don't buy this notion that we can get away with any possible downtime by borrowing from our allies as we have had availability issues with our 5 hercs and we did'nt just go 'borrow' one off our neighbours, commonality does'nt quite stretch that far in terms of assets like these. We can use space now and again if able on each others aircraft if and when available (and usually mutually beneficial) but wholesale borrowing of aircraft (ships, armour etc) of this nature is alittle more complex and involved then some make it out to be.

Agree, before RAAF had C17 we could not count on the USAF for aircraft even with their large numbers

 

[Zero Alpha]

C-17 Aircrew Training Instruction, USAF

The link above has a fairly detailed explanation of aircrew training requirements.

It also looks like L3 Systems are performing training under contract, and are boasting 1,500 pilots and loadmasters trained per annum. It appears that it's a 73 day training programme, including classroom time.

 

[Todjaeger]

I don't think anyone is doubting the need to convert to type but merely the time it takes, 2 years does seem alittle excessive, as they are not re-learning to fly from scratch and it is still just an airplane albeit it another model and sliggtly larger, the basic fundamentals are exactly the same and not a whole new concept.

Having done some checking, it usually takes a commercial airline pilot several weeks of training to transition from one aircraft to another. As I understand it though, reaching IOC for a new (to the service) aircraft involves quite a bit more than 'just' having pilots transition. Part of it involves getting IP's sufficiently skilled in flying the aircraft, so that they can then go and train and transition other pilots into the aircraft. Likewise, ground crews need to be trained to service, maintain, and repair the aircraft, excepting for some of the periodic deep maintenance work. This need for ground crews for the aircraft also means that the service needs to have it's own ground crew trainers sufficiently skilled so that they can train the ground crews who will normally be serving the aircraft. Then there is the potential need to make changes to an air force's physical plant/base infrastructure to provide hangar and maintenance work areas, have the appropriate tools, etc.

All this is just to reach IOC, never mind FOC when the service should have largely settled on doctrine and know how they will be using the new aircraft.

We need to weigh up (literally) exactly how much a purchase like this will cost NZ vs what it will afford us and then compare it to what we regularly do and need from it.

Respectfully, I disagree.

Of course NZ needs to consider what Gov't normally needs from the NZDF and RNZAF in terms of airlift. However, not also considering a range of vignettes where the airlift needs are different than 'regular' operations, the likelihood of some of the vignettes, and the severity of the need (or if the need is unmet), will just result in mission failure at some point. Inevitably, unexpected and unusual will happen, and if the RNZAF's airlift capacity is based around just "normal, day-to-day operations" then almost certainly there will be insufficient surge capacity or availability in some circumstances.

As part of the decision-making process, there should be some analysis of cost vs. risk, and areas/vignettes of greater risk should be met even if they cost more. Whether or not that will happen given how the NZDF budget and acquisitions have been handled is another matter.

For that matter, this is really part of what the air transport study should be looking at. Given that we do not know just what the potential and projected airlift needs are, I am not willing to consider two C-17's an insufficient number in service for the RNZAF yet. I do anticipate that there can be prolonged (12+ months) where there might only be a single C-17 available or already on a deployment due to deep maintenance needs.

However, if the likely airlift need during a 12 month period is projected to be a need for no more than a single strategic/C-17 airlifter, then a pair of C-17's might work as part of the RNZAF's airlift replacement solution. Especially if there are potential/projected airlift requirements that either need the weight or volume of a C-17, with an A400M being insufficient.

Not at this point saying the C-17 is the 'correct' strategic airlifter for the RNZAF, or that the A400M is the wrong one. We just do not know enough about who/what is driving the requirements.

 

[Todjaeger]

C-17 Aircrew Training Instruction, USAF

The link above has a fairly detailed explanation of aircrew training requirements.

It also looks like L3 Systems are performing training under contract, and are boasting 1,500 pilots and loadmasters trained per annum. It appears that it's a 73 day training programme, including classroom time.

Interesting link, though my reading of it suggests it is just providing trained C-17 flight crews, vs. a flight crew training cadre. The difference between the two AFAIK can be significant.

 

[Zero Alpha]

Having done some checking, it usually takes a commercial airline pilot several weeks of training to transition from one aircraft to another. As I understand it though, reaching IOC for a new (to the service) aircraft involves quite a bit more than 'just' having pilots transition. Part of it involves getting IP's sufficiently skilled in flying the aircraft, so that they can then go and train and transition other pilots into the aircraft. Likewise, ground crews need to be trained to service, maintain, and repair the aircraft, excepting for some of the periodic deep maintenance work. This need for ground crews for the aircraft also means that the service needs to have it's own ground crew trainers sufficiently skilled so that they can train the ground crews who will normally be serving the aircraft. Then there is the potential need to make changes to an air force's physical plant/base infrastructure to provide hangar and maintenance work areas, have the appropriate tools, etc.

Why bother training your own instructors? For such a small fleet, is there any real point in establishing a bespoke training system?

 

[aussienscale]

Why bother training your own instructors? For such a small fleet, is there any real point in establishing a bespoke training system?

Agree, for a fraction of the cost the RNZAF would tie into the RAAF

 

[RobWilliams]

On the other hand A400 is in its infancy and has not reached FOC in any country using them, the UK is not expecting FOC for their A400 till 2022 but the French are using them on operations in Mali but not to their full capabilty,

So is the UK. Right now A400M's are capable of strategic airlift with IOC to be declared alter in the year. The French are really heavily using them right now & the UK has used it to deploy supplies to Cyprus in support of Operation Shader.

Course, the UK has the C-17/C-130 fleet to lean on so isn't as driven in getting the A400M up to speed, the French on the other hand . . .

 

[Nick underscore]

Agree, for a fraction of the cost the RNZAF would tie into the RAAF

But, this leads a broader view that Mr C touched on for the MPA discussion and I believe relates to the consideration of the C-17 and to a further extent, aspects within the RNZN thread..

When it comes to future 'Purple' asset purchase for both sea & air strategic lift capabilties (along with future MPA/ BAMS requirements), both the Aust & NZ Govt should be thinking of joint purchases. Future 'pooling' assets, maintenance + training, makes sense on so many levels.

Everything else can move on seperate cost vs. capabilty decisions by their own respective Govt's, but these three military capabilties (strategic sea & air + MPA/BAMS) should be homogenous throughout both defence forces.

Obviously, RNZN wouldn't need an LHD to add to the pool, but a next-level down addition, would make sense (LSD type)

Just my opinion

 

[RegR]

Having done some checking, it usually takes a commercial airline pilot several weeks of training to transition from one aircraft to another. As I understand it though, reaching IOC for a new (to the service) aircraft involves quite a bit more than 'just' having pilots transition. Part of it involves getting IP's sufficiently skilled in flying the aircraft, so that they can then go and train and transition other pilots into the aircraft. Likewise, ground crews need to be trained to service, maintain, and repair the aircraft, excepting for some of the periodic deep maintenance work. This need for ground crews for the aircraft also means that the service needs to have it's own ground crew trainers sufficiently skilled so that they can train the ground crews who wiltl normally be serving the aircraft. Then there is the potential need to make changes to an air force's physical plant/base infrastructure to provide hangar and maintenance work areas, have the appropriate tools, etc.

All this is just to reach IOC, never mind FOC when the service should have largely settled on doctrine and know how they will be using the new aircraft.



Respectfully, I disagree.

Of course NZ needs to consider what Gov't normally needs from the NZDF and RNZAF in terms of airlift. However, not also considering a range of vignettes where the airlift needs are different than 'regular' operations, the likelihood of some of the vignettes, and the severity of the need (or if the need is unmet), will just result in mission failure at some point. Inevitably, unexpected and unusual will happen, and if the RNZAF's airlift capacity is based around just "normal, day-to-day operations" then almost certainly there will be insufficient surge capacity or availability in some circumstances.

As part of the decision-making process, there should be some analysis of cost vs. risk, and areas/vignettes of greater risk should be met even if they cost more. Whether or not that will happen given how the NZDF budget and acquisitions have been handled is another matter.

For that matter, this is really part of what the air transport study should be looking at. Given that we do not know just what the potential and projected airlift needs are, I am not willing to consider two C-17's an insufficient number in service for the RNZAF yet. I do anticipate that there can be prolonged (12+ months) where there might only be a single C-17 available or already on a deployment due to deep maintenance needs.

However, if the likely airlift need during a 12 month period is projected to be a need for no more than a single strategic/C-17 airlifter, then a pair of C-17's might work as part of the RNZAF's airlift replacement solution. Especially if there are potential/projected airlift requirements that either need the weight or volume of a C-17, with an A400M being insufficient.

Not at this point saying the C-17 is the 'correct' strategic airlifter for the RNZAF, or that the A400M is the wrong one. We just do not know enough about who/what is driving the requirements.

The bulk of our training, deep mantainence and even support will tie in directly with Australia, no point creating our own tails for such a small fleet when we have an established and working system just across the tasmen and the activities we will conduct in house will be generic run of the mill stuff. Easier to buy options in this case then pay for our own.

This has been going on for years and we already know where we are deficient and what needs improving. Our largest outsize cargoes are now known, NZLAV, NH90, MHOV etc in terms of lift requirement and sadly C130 cannot now support ( this would have been understood once we first commited to NZLAV way back when) and if we keep wondering what we could potentially move then we won't get anywhere and could well end up 'needing' C5 Galaxies for that once in a decade requirement. We cannot cover every scenario in the book with any capability in the NZDF but we find our niche and happy median and make it work.

We will never have enough surge capacity and it's all about prioritizing but we also do not require to surge all that often so we do not want wasted capacity for the majority of the time therefore it's all about balance. Capability unfortunately costs more the bigger you go in terms of aqquisition, operation and support therefore better to cover off what you would do first and what could do last, any thing after that is always a bonus anyway.

 

[Volkodav]

It takes time to introduce new capabilities into service, irrespective of how long they have been in service elsewhere.

There are logistics and training systems to be brought online and certified, it doesn't matter that the USAF, RAF, or Botswanan Airforce have done it previously (although it will make it quicker and easier to do) you still need to set these things up within your existing structures. You need to introduce the special tools, spares, jigs, fixtures, manuals, record systems, ordering systems. All of this needs to be set up, proven and certified which takes time, possibly years but if it is not done correctly (or may be at all) it will come back and bite you causing all sorts of support issues and costing you far more time and money down the track.

It is simplistic to think that any new capability can be introduced to service by having a third party train the operators alone, there is so much more to it and if you skimp or take short cuts you will end up with much greater costs and delays down the track. Many projects have suffered from this, the platform is acquired, minimal personnel are trained, it enters service, the polies get their photo opportunities, then it sits on the apron or at the wharf barely able to be used as the support systems are insufficient, no spares, no infrastructure, no weapons etc.

 

[ASSAIL]

It takes time to introduce new capabilities into service, irrespective of how long they have been in service elsewhere.

There are logistics and training systems to be brought online and certified, it doesn't matter that the USAF, RAF, or Botswanan Airforce have done it previously (although it will make it quicker and easier to do) you still need to set these things up within your existing structures. You need to introduce the special tools, spares, jigs, fixtures, manuals, record systems, ordering systems. All of this needs to be set up, proven and certified which takes time, possibly years but if it is not done correctly (or may be at all) it will come back and bite you causing all sorts of support issues and costing you far more time and money down the track.

It is simplistic to think that any new capability can be introduced to service by having a third party train the operators alone, there is so much more to it and if you skimp or take short cuts you will end up with much greater costs and delays down the track. Many projects have suffered from this, the platform is acquired, minimal personnel are trained, it enters service, the polies get their photo opportunities, then it sits on the apron or at the wharf barely able to be used as the support systems are insufficient, no spares, no infrastructure, no weapons etc.

Agree; look no further than the myriad instances worldwide where capable platforms and weapons systems have either been donated or left before a change of regime or by a Cold War donor.
Indonesia in the 60's - Whiskey class submarines, Sverdlov cruisers etc ad nauseum, Iran post the revolution with a whole armoury of US weapons and platforms, innumerable African nations.
Then see what happens to those systems because of a complete lack of support structure.
Time and training of both operators and sustainers are critical elements in ensuring long and functioning service of any system so take as long as is needed to reach IOC and reap the benefit for decades

 

[Zero Alpha]

It takes time to introduce new capabilities into service, irrespective of how long they have been in service elsewhere.

I don't think anyone is saying that it doesn't take time. What I'm saying is that the time required should be different when the type is in service elsewhere and the design proven.

I'm not suggesting that safety be compromised, but one of the benefits of a large mature fleet is that a risk-based approach to introducing a new type should be possible, based on an extensive base of real-world experience of other users.

If I were to take a commercial approach, I'd be saying that the cost of borrowing the $1.2 billion or so is around $3M a month in interest alone. While the aircraft isn't in service, that money is totally wasted. It also means I can afford to invest that sunk cost at a rate of around $3M for every month I can shave off the in-service date.

What are my options? I could move to a vendor-managed inventory model for supply for the first X years of operation. I could pay the vendor to perform all maintenance tasks while I train my own pers. I could offer better-than-commercial contracts to experienced instructor pilots and crew chiefs. I could ask my allies to provide personnel to help me introduce the capability. Etc, etc.

Defence gets a periodic thrashing from the audit office for major equipment purchases precisely because they often don't follow conventional commercial practice. Some times there are valid reasons for that, but equally often it's because there isn't the depth of experience in large-scale capital acquisition. There isn't enough work for experienced project and programme managers to move from one large endeavour on to the next and take those lessons with them. That tends to mean that projects are introduced on a much more conservative basis than they would in other fields.

 

[RegR]

It takes time to introduce new capabilities into service, irrespective of how long they have been in service elsewhere.

There are logistics and training systems to be brought online and certified, it doesn't matter that the USAF, RAF, or Botswanan Airforce have done it previously (although it will make it quicker and easier to do) you still need to set these things up within your existing structures. You need to introduce the special tools, spares, jigs, fixtures, manuals, record systems, ordering systems. All of this needs to be set up, proven and certified which takes time, possibly years but if it is not done correctly (or may be at all) it will come back and bite you causing all sorts of support issues and costing you far more time and money down the track.

It is simplistic to think that any new capability can be introduced to service by having a third party train the operators alone, there is so much more to it and if you skimp or take short cuts you will end up with much greater costs and delays down the track. Many projects have suffered from this, the platform is acquired, minimal personnel are trained, it enters service, the polies get their photo opportunities, then it sits on the apron or at the wharf barely able to be used as the support systems are insufficient, no spares, no infrastructure, no weapons etc.

Again not denying we cannot just jump in and drive but 2 years, years, 2, 2 years. We have transport aircraft, have had them since day dot, nothing new just a differenet make and model and we are not re-learning the wheel. C17 is not a developmental aircraft and has been around for years, what could we possibly learn that has not already been hashed to death already by current operators?

On a smaller scale comments were being made how quickly and efficiently we got T6 up and running and that was transitioning from a analogue CT4 to a glass cockpit T6 yet it will take us years to go from a glass cockpit C130 transport to a glass cockpit C17 transport? Understandably a bigger beast in terms of operation, support and logistics but relatively 2 years seems like a stretch for something we essentially already have in place. Either get a simpler aircraft, pre-plan logistics prior to arrival, embed select pers now (would'nt hurt even if we don't end up aqquiring as no doubt will still be experience) or maybe C17 is just too complex for our requirements which will cause problems in itself for such a small fleet.

 

[Volkodav]

Some elements of the new capability would come on line quite quickly but when you are talking a transformational capability such as the C-17 it is quite easy to imagine it taking a couple of years to achieve FOC. For example the RAAFs C-130Js took several years to fully certify even though they had been flying Hercs for decades.

 

[Zero Alpha]

Some elements of the new capability would come on line quite quickly but when you are talking a transformational capability such as the C-17 it is quite easy to imagine it taking a couple of years to achieve FOC.

We're probably in danger of vigorously agreeing with each other and not noticing what we are saying, but you are right.

"Full" capability for C-17 would include special ops work, formation paradrop, formation cargo drop, etc. For a 757 replacement though, we'd achieve equivalent capability from a new type at the point non-tactical strategic move was signed-off (parking up the Antartica flights for a second). "Full" capability from the perspective of the US is something we don't train for now with any of our air lifters.

For example the RAAFs C-130Js took several years to fully certify even though they had been flying Hercs for decades.

I thought when the RAAF got their first J-models the type wasn't signed off by Lockheed for tactical ops?

 

[RegR]

Some elements of the new capability would come on line quite quickly but when you are talking a transformational capability such as the C-17 it is quite easy to imagine it taking a couple of years to achieve FOC. For example the RAAFs C-130Js took several years to fully certify even though they had been flying Hercs for decades.

But the Js were a new model then, complete with its own set of minor issues to be ironed out and signed off on , and one of the major factors people keep bringing up is the fact C17 is a proven and in use platform.

If that's not such a selling point anymore then no reason why we could not add those years onto A400 for the 2020 retirement party instead.

 

[t68]

But the Js were a new model then, complete with its own set of minor issues to be ironed out and signed off on , and one of the major factors people keep bringing up is the fact C17 is a proven and in use platform.

If that's not such a selling point anymore then no reason why we could not add those years onto A400 for the 2020 retirement party instead.

Well the C17 can be in Kiwi colours relatively quick. Wonder when the first A400 could be delivered if they were ordered in the next couple of months. That may work in the C17 favour maybe

But would really like to nail down the air mobility budget

 

[Zero Alpha]

But would really like to nail down the air mobility budget

Most of the documents released publicly have redacted capital budgets because of commercial sensitivity.

I've managed to get hold of some of the DMRR documents that were released to media, but not put up in the MoD site. It's hard to pin down, but the option for the 'Tier 1' track included a figure of $957M for replacement of the Boeing 757s (just the Boeings, not Hercs). Another part of the same document suggests this figure was linked with a Boeing replacement with a budgeted planning figure for replacement with A400. $957M would be consistent with 3 A400s replacing 2 Boeings. Another part of the working paper said that 50% of capex related to just 3 projects - Frigate replacement in 2027/28 (29%), C-130 replacement in 20/21 (14%) an P-3 replacement in 2023/24 (11%).

Stirring the tea leaves that would give a budget of around $1.5 billion for both Boeing and Herc replacements.