Royal New Zealand Air Force
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John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Assuming Australia exercises the option for two more, that leaves five. At this point, other than current users, NZ is the only other potential customer I can think of.
Some say the RAAF options are a pantomime horse agreement on NZ's behalf. An insurance policy for NZ if the C-17 clock runs down too quickly. I think that is a little cynical though. There is a rfi for at least 2.
Nick underscore
Member
Four requested for possible sale via FMS + supporting kit - Australia C-17 Globemaster III Aircraft | The Official Home of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
"..The Government of Australia has requested a possible sale of up to 4 C-17A Globemaster III aircraft.."
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Nothing wrong with helping out your friends.
Sorry about the confusion, by ISR I was talking about the palletised "Combi" 2 station version that Portgual are operating (to be used for SO ISR & "littoral fisheries/customs support") rather than a ASTOR or Wedgetail like ISR Capability.
Thus my break down is
2X C-17 at $400M each
8 x C295 "transporters" at $35M each
8 x C295 "Combi" at $50M each
8 x C295 MPA at $60M each
The great thing about this solution is that it fits within the budget, is already certified for each role the NZDF would utlise, are in production and have an established logistics and training support structure in place.
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C27J operated by the USAF were being flown in Afghanistan in small numbers. Australian soldiers were flying on them from time to time.
From Wikipedia
The United States received its first C-27J on 25 September 2008. In September 2008, the C-27J schoolhouse, operated by L-3 Link, officially began classes at the Georgia Army National Guard Flight Facility, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. By April 2009, the U.S. Army had accepted deliveries of two aircraft and had 11 more on order. A decision in May 2009 that the U.S. Army/Army National Guard relinquish all of its aircraft to the U.S. Air Force, primarily the Air National Guard, with a reduction of the total buy to 38 aircraft, led the DoD to give total control of the US's C-27Js to the USAF in December.
Although the initial plan was for the C-27J to be operated by the Air National Guard for direct support of the United States Army, that changed to both Army National Guard and Air National Guard flight crews to support the fielding of the aircraft. The U.S. Air National Guard had received four C-27Js by July 2010 and began using them for testing and training. Purchase of 38 Spartans was anticipated with initial operational capability expected in October 2010. The U.S. Air Force had planned the C-27J's first combat deployment for summer 2011.
In August 2011, two C-27J aircraft flown by Air National Guard aircrews, augmented with Army National Guard personnel, began operations at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan. In the eleven months from August 2011 to June 2012, the C-27Js of the 179th Airlift Wing, followed by the 175th Wing executed more than 3200 missions transporting over 25,000 passengers, and 1400 tons of cargo. By exercising tactical control of the C-27Js, the U.S. Army was able to employ helicopters in a much more efficient fashion, splitting missions between the two platforms to make the best use of the strengths of each.
While the U.S. Army had indicated that their fleet of 54 aircraft posed a moderate risk to mission fulfillment in 2005; the USAF has moved to cancel the program entirely in early 2012.
My understanding is that Certification activities carried out by the USAF on the C27J were extremely limited and that a number of military roles and were never verified. For this reason the RAAF is having to pick up the certification tasks
Probably all connected with the USAF's cunning plan, all along, to kill off the US procurement of the C-27J. First, make the US army plan joint with the USAF. Then, take it over & make it a USAF programme. Then, close it down. All the way through, take every chance to cut it back, minimise spending & effort, so it wouldn't cost the USAF too much.
Cynical? Moi?
No, realistic.
Cynical? Moi?
No, realistic.
40 deg south
Well-Known Member
This is certainly taking 'ruthless commonality' seriously!
Where are you getting your budget figures for this from, Reaver? (Not disputing them, just curious).
While I like the C295, the weakness of this structure for surveillance is that the C295 has less range/endurance that either the P-3C or P-8. This may be partially offset by increased numbers, but for some tasks (e.g. MH370 search) there is no substitute for range.
40 deg south
Well-Known Member
I don't disagree, but for me the the key words are 'at present'. I was looking at a recent human-interest piece from a Long Beach newspaper and the following para leapt out at me
First Boeing team finishes its work on the last C-17
There are a few managers in Spain right now who would sympathise!
Boeing built 279 C-17s over at Long Beach over 25 years, and it took a long time to iron out the kinks in the production system.
My assumption is that Airbus will manage to get their own house in order and sort out the current A400 manufacturing issues. This seems highly probable, based on their track record in the civil sector. They currently have 174 orders from eight countries, which is a stronger starting point than the C-17 began from. Production of existing orders will take over a decade, so it is feasible to image the production line still running for 15-20 years.
A strength of Airbus engineering has been the willingness to make upgrades/improvements to their existing products, rather then face the risk of a clean sheet design. The A320NEO, which mated new-generation engines with a slightly-tweaked existing airframe, is the classic example. In the military sector, they have done this with the C235. First it was stretched into the C295, then it was offered with winglets and a software package to boost engine performance. Compare the sales figures against the C27J and you will see that the market has voted with it's wallet.
Given this willingness to make improvements, I think it is highly likely that the A400 will keep getting better the longer the production line runs. And some of those upgrades will be available as retro-fits on earlier airframes.
The C-17 has real advantages in being well-proven and of commonality with allies (particularly Australia). On the other hand, A400 is cheaper and almost certainly has lower costs per flight hour, which could potentially mean more aircraft could be purchased.And it will be in service with a group of countries we often cooperate with on security matters, even if some are geographically distant. (Although France and Malaysia aren't particularly remote from our area of operations).
All this is a long-winded way of saying that I think the A400 is still a viable option for NZ. All the signs are pointing towards the DefMin favouring the C-17, but I hope officials get the chance to do a realistic assessment of the costs and benefits of each option.
Finally (before the rocks start being thrown!), I'd like to observe that this thread is a model of civilised discussion between people who have different views but a common interest in NZ's defence. Give yourselves a pat on the back, gentlement!
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John Fedup
The Bunker Group
@ 40 deg S....all your points are valid regarding Airbus. With the C-17 production run ending, the A400M is basically the only option for countries needing a strategic lift capability. One negative is the financial condition for several of the Euro countries. As for the C-295/C-27, the C-27's poor sales is a bit surprising. It is faster, carries a larger load further and shares some components with the C-130J. I guess the price negates these features.
I still think the C-17 is a better option for NZ.
I still think the C-17 is a better option for NZ.
I think that the poor C27J sales are primarily due to the USAF playing politics and axing the platform. If they hadn't axed it you might have seen it having a goodly number of sales. However because the original program was a US Army one it was like a red flag to a bull to the USAF. It is also interesting to watch the developments around the A10 Warthog with accusations that the USAF is trying very hard to avoid CAS.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Not to get off topic, but those accusations were getting before Korea and IIRC have been off and on since then. I have come across some interesting comparisons between USMC organic air support and USAF air support from just before Korea. The impression I got was that the Air Force wanted to focus on strategic bombing like over Japan and Europe during WWII and did not give a hoot what the troops on the ground wanted or needed.
In a similar vein, the USAF killed off the USN/USMC NATS, and have caused a number of problems when, the Army in particular, has sought solutions for their service's respective aviation needs which were not being met by the air force.
I would agree with this assessment of the C295MPAs capabilities. It has short legs and would be more of a brown and green water MPA. It s most definitely not a blue water MPA because it just doesn't have the range to go out say 1000nm and then loitre for a minimum of four hours before returning to its home base. That's the minimum that an teir 1 MPA / MMA in NZ service has to do. Anything less is a waste of money and resources. Whilst I prefer a two tier approach to airborne maritime patrol and surveillance, their is disagreement regarding whether the second their should be Tier 2 or Tier 3. My argument is that the second tier should be Tier 2 because that gives us the weapons option if needed. NZ public and pollies are very sea blind which is really ludicrous for an island nation dependant upon maritime transportation for 99.4% of its trade by volume (74% by value)
One thing Reaver, Wikipedia is not really regarded as an authorative source here. For aviation sources try the aircraft manufacturers website or Air Force Technology, Flight Global etc.
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The overriding factor I think is our obligations in the South Pacific; that 4 P8 won't be able to cover. Looking at Naval Technology there a number of the MPA that fit Tier 2 in terms of loiter time and range (ATR 72, CN235, CN295 - Range is 1800nm). Realistically however both the Maritime Patrol Review and 2010 Defence White Paper were looking at short range aircraft. The only way I see Tier 2 getting a look in is through a combination of dumping the UAV MPA that was referred to in the White Paper (I think) and combining the role with tactical transport.
The C-295 has an 11 hour endurance - going out to 1000 nautical miles at cruise speed (260 knots) will take 3 hours 50 mins, with the return it would have a roughly give it a roughly 3 and a half hour loiter at that distance - that's pretty damn close in the scheme of things, bearing in mind we are not using exact figures, to your nominal 4 hour requirement.
It could do a 4 hour loiter at 900 nautical miles which is again pretty close.
Cruise Speed and Endurance figures are taken from the Pacific Wings article on the visit of the C-295 a couple of months ago. (Assuming my maths is right - I have so little idea about knots/miles so used an online calculator)
If we have say 4 armed P8s then why do we need another 2-3 armed C-295s as well at added expense, logistics and planning? Especially since we have never even used our current P3s weapon systems operationally therefore is there a viable need to have the entire maritime patrol fleet armed or just what we would actually use if the time and place came ie P8 (type), or are you suggesting an entire fleet of C-295 in lieu of P3/P8? (I personally feel would be a step back not forward).
The mooted 'short range' maritime patrol aircraft was to fill a gap locally and for the day to day less demanding tasks and free up the big gear for the longer legged/more complex missions (although they still can, as is currently, do the local stuff) so arming the smaller type IMO seems pointless unless of course that type infact becomes our primary MP platform and a P3/P8 type is not even in the equation then of course arm away. Fisheries/SAR is different to sub hunting and anti-ship as a P8 is to C-295, similar in basic operation but completely different in actual application.
Funding will be tight as is, especially if they still want to add a UAV/BAMs type capability into the mix therefore arming everything is an expense that will need to come from somewhere else within the capability range such as actual numbers or sensors fitted for no real gain or use for us as standard. Recent history has shown the exact need of arming in our context and bar WWIII sadly is not enough to justify arming for armings sake when we have other options to cover. The tiers should be separate and their outputs clearly defined be it combat or peacetime in nature and use one or the other accordingly.
A very good analysis RegR.
Just to reinforce to others what you said the thing to remember is building capacity over time. Essentially by taking 3 capability steps over the next 15 years or remainder for the DWP period.
The first stage is the introduction of the light twin based maritime surveillance aircraft (ala B-350ER) that does the short to medium range EEZ role for fisheries, customs et al later this decade (that platform ideally also conducting the DVIP/MEPT/AWO/SAR) - will allow the primary P-3K2 role to concentrate on ISR at the strategic partnership level. It is far more fiscally and operationally cogent to have those capabilities contained within that relatively basic platform than attempting a tactical tarnsport / palletised MPA platform.
The second stage sees the replacement of the P-3K2 with ideally the P-8A in a later block configuration (frankly there is no alternative) - with the final third stage being the UAS platform ideally Triton that broadens both the fixed wing platforms as a force multiplier. Remember the forthcoming investment in WGS is all part of this context.
Cheers MrC
Agreed MrC, I think if we go anything less than P8 (only real viable contender IMO) we will ultimately diminish our built up hard work and skillset in this area and will also flow into the other options such as UAS with either a seriously dummed down version or loss altogether.
Whilst expensive it is an area we excel in and use routinely therefore we need to do it right from the start to get the most from the capability effectively.