Royal Canadian Navy Discussions and updates

[matt00773]

This is the first news article I have come across regarding to status of the CSC tender, not very encouraging. The article claims bidders all failed on certain unspecified specifications and will have one opportunity to address the issues. Failure to do so means disqualification. This could be due to unrealistic Canadian specifications. Unrealistic Canadian specifications is what destroyed the Canadian designed JSS project and continues today with design changes requested for the Berlin design the government selected for our AORs.

It is not impossible that none of the bidders will be 100% complaint resulting in either a degrading of the specifications likely resulting in litigation, delay, and worse, a new tender. Thus the fluster cuck procurement continues to rule the day.

The article also confirms only three bids were received. Assuming technical issues are resolved, an winner won't be decided upon until later this year and financial details still need to be agreed to. I guess Nov-Dec if things are resolved. Realistically, wait for the announcement of a new tender, junior has spent all our money. Team FREMM will be back in the game, perhaps others as well, and the 15 ships will become 10 or less. Then again, maybe bidders will say "screw this".

New Canadian warship project off to rocky start as bidders fail to meet some requirements

To be honest, I'm not surprised that there were failures all round in the first pass. The important thing, which is not stated, is which of the bids had the more serious breaches of compliance - and therefore more difficult to resolve.

There's a long way to go then if they're only up to the "cure" phase. The long winded procurement process for CSC is stated below:

The first stage is a completeness check where bids will be reviewed to ensure that they are complete and nothing has been missed.

The first pass of true evaluation comes in Stage 2.

In this Stage bids will be evaluated with respect to the Technical (how well the proposals meet Canada’s technical requirements) and Value Proposition (the quality of the bidder’s commitments to bring benefits to Canada and to incorporate Canadian content into the CSC design) elements of their bids.

During this evaluation bidders will need to demonstrate compliance with the identified Mandatory Compliance criteria and conformance with the other required criteria. Bids will be scored in accordance with the Evaluation Plan.

Again in the interests of maximizing the competition we will give any bidder that has not demonstrated compliance or conformance an opportunity to fix their proposal, a process we refer to as the Cure Process. This Cure process will be conducted in the following manner:

• As evaluation teams complete each section of evaluation, feedback will be provided to each of the bidders regarding their bid. This feedback will explain what areas of the bid were found to be non-compliant or non-conformant and why. Bidders will be able to ask questions regarding the feedback they receive
• Once all the sections of Technical and Value Proposition evaluation are completed and the final feedback has been provided to bidders the Final Submission Deadline will be established and communicated to bidders This date will be at least 4 weeks after the final feedback. During this period Canada and Irving Shipbuilding will respond to any questions asked regarding the bid feedback provided
• On the Final Submission Deadline bidders will need to resubmit the affected portions of their bids and will need submit their financial proposals

The evaluation teams will then do the required re-evaluations based on the updated bids

There will only be one pass through the Cure Process. Any bidder that is still deemed non-compliant with any of the identified Mandatory Compliance criteria after the Cure Period will be eliminated from the competition.

If at least one bidder is compliant and has demonstrated conformance with all the other required criteria then those bidders’ scores will be considered final and the evaluation process will continue with Stage 2 score weighting using these scores. In this scenario any non-conforming bid will be set aside.

However, if after the Cure Process none of the compliant bidders have demonstrated full conformance with all the required criteria then non-conformance adjustments will be made to each of the compliant bids’ corresponding technical risk scores and the evaluation process will continue with Stage 2 score weighting using these adjusted scores.

The resultant Stage 2 scores of compliant bids will be weighted 75% Technical /25% Value Proposition (the highest Value Proposition weighting to date) and the top 2 bids (plus any that are very close) will move on to the next stage of evaluation.

The other bids will be set aside.

Those bids that have passed through will be scored for the remaining evaluation elements of Design Maturity, Software Capability and Financial. Each bid’s raw scores for Technical and Value Proposition from the earlier stage will be retained and reweighted.

All the Stage 3 scores will be weighted and added together to get the bidder’s Total score. The final weightings will be Technical 42%, Value Proposition 15%, Design Maturity 19%, Software 1%, and Financial 23%.

Speaking notes for National Shipbuilding Strategy technical briefing on Canadian Surface Combatant request for proposal – National Shipbuilding Strategy – Sea – Defence Procurement – Buying and Selling – PSPC

Edit: added quote section

 

[John Fedup]

The degree of compliance breach is of course the key but we have no idea or whether one company was worse than the others or if they were all in serious breach. All speculation at this point but I feel the failed JSS project serves as a possible template for another procurement CF. As you mention, only at the start of the cure phase so any decision is likely going to be very close to 2019 or even later.

The only positive on any delay into early 2019 will be the political consequences for junior. He ridiculed the Conservatives on the fighter replacement program during the last election , a program that is now floundering and if the CSC program ends up in the same situation, it adds to his increasing list of screw-ups. Unfortunately the electorate here is not the brightest.

 

[ASSAIL]

This is the first news article I have come across regarding to status of the CSC tender, not very encouraging. The article claims bidders all failed on certain unspecified specifications and will have one opportunity to address the issues. Failure to do so means disqualification. This could be due to unrealistic Canadian specifications. Unrealistic Canadian specifications is what destroyed the Canadian designed JSS project and continues today with design changes requested for the Berlin design the government selected for our AORs.

It is not impossible that none of the bidders will be 100% complaint resulting in either a degrading of the specifications likely resulting in litigation, delay, and worse, a new tender. Thus the fluster cuck procurement continues to rule the day.

The article also confirms only three bids were received. Assuming technical issues are resolved, an winner won't be decided upon until later this year and financial details still need to be agreed to. I guess Nov-Dec if things are resolved. Realistically, wait for the announcement of a new tender, junior has spent all our money. Team FREMM will be back in the game, perhaps others as well, and the 15 ships will become 10 or less. Then again, maybe bidders will say "screw this".

New Canadian warship project off to rocky start as bidders fail to meet some requirements

Given the tortured procurement processes of the past it would seem that Fincantieri/Naval Group have given the Canadian govt a golden gift by offering to supply and build for $30b. What sane government would turn down a chance to save up to $30b and still get what is required? What do Irving, BAE and Navantia offer to the government that FREMM doesnt and justifies doubling the cost?
The whole process is a bit like an episode of "Yes Minister" on steroids linked to a Greek Tragedy.

 

[ASSAIL]

To be honest, I'm not surprised that there were failures all round in the first pass. The important thing, which is not stated, is which of the bids had the more serious breaches of compliance - and therefore more difficult to resolve.

There's a long way to go then if they're only up to the "cure" phase. The long winded procurement process for CSC is stated below:



Speaking notes for National Shipbuilding Strategy technical briefing on Canadian Surface Combatant request for proposal – National Shipbuilding Strategy – Sea – Defence Procurement – Buying and Selling – PSPC

Edit: added quote section

To be honest, I'm not surprised that there were failures all round in the first pass. The important thing, which is not stated, is which of the bids had the more serious breaches of compliance - and therefore more difficult to resolve.

There's a long way to go then if they're only up to the "cure" phase. The long winded procurement process for CSC is stated below:



Speaking notes for National Shipbuilding Strategy technical briefing on Canadian Surface Combatant request for proposal – National Shipbuilding Strategy – Sea – Defence Procurement – Buying and Selling – PSPC

Edit: added quote section

i think those speaking notes explain everything! What I fail to understand is how a private shipbuilder, Irving, who will profit from the process, gets a seat at the table in deciding the winning bid!
Is it the RCN, Irving or PSPC who determine Technical 42%, Value Proposition 15%? Design Maturity19%, Financial23% and the killer Software a whole 1% ?

 

[MrConservative]

A recent critique of the National Shipbuilding Strategy

http://byers.typepad.com/files/byers-shipbuilding-report-embargoed.pdf

I have a couple of questions that were not entirely answered in the article by Prof Michael Byers.

How many people are directly employed in shipyards that are part of the NSS?
What is the total amount to be spent by the Govt of Canada on the NSS across all projects?
How much does each job cost to create and sustain per worker?

 

[John Fedup]

The numbers keep on changing as does what is actually included. The AOPS is 3.5 billion but this number includes around 250 for "Canadian modifications and design changes, unbelievable considering they are basically the same ship as Norway built for a ton less. The last number I heard on the two Berlins was 2.3 billion which the Germans built in Germany, again for much less. Same inflated costs differ

i think those speaking notes explain everything! What I fail to understand is how a private shipbuilder, Irving, who will profit from the process, gets a seat at the table in deciding the winning bid!
Is it the RCN, Irving or PSPC who determine Technical 42%, Value Proposition 15%? Design Maturity19%, Financial23% and the killer Software a whole 1% ?

Good question, I think the RCN and PSPC should be the major decision makers with minor or no involvement by Irving. I have read that the CMS can represent around 30% and as it has significant software content, a 1% section criterion importance is beyond stupid. As the process is influenced by pollies nothing surprises me.

 

[matt00773]

The numbers keep on changing as does what is actually included. The AOPS is 3.5 billion but this number includes around 250 for "Canadian modifications and design changes, unbelievable considering they are basically the same ship as Norway built for a ton less. The last number I heard on the two Berlins was 2.3 billion which the Germans built in Germany, again for much less. Same inflated costs differ


Good question, I think the RCN and PSPC should be the major decision makers with minor or no involvement by Irving. I have read that the CMS can represent around 30% and as it has significant software content, a 1% section criterion importance is beyond stupid. As the process is influenced by pollies nothing surprises me.

I'm wondering about that 1% software evaluation and wonder if this actually refers to the software to design the ships and for lifecycle management rather than the CMS - and other on-board software. If it does indeed include the CMS, then I agree there is something wrong.

 

[John Fedup]

Getting information from any Canadian government be it provincial or federal, regardless of the party in power, is like having teeth pulled. WTF knows what 1% really means?

 

[John Fedup]

A recent critique of the National Shipbuilding Strategy

http://byers.typepad.com/files/byers-shipbuilding-report-embargoed.pdf

I have a couple of questions that were not entirely answered in the article by Prof Michael Byers.

How many people are directly employed in shipyards that are part of the NSS?
What is the total amount to be spent by the Govt of Canada on the NSS across all projects?
How much does each job cost to create and sustain per worker?

I saw one article, Sep 2017, that 850 people at Irving were working on the AOPS project. I assume that number will be higher for the CSC. Not sure about SeaSpan but they should employ as many as Irving. As for the total amount, 60 billion for the CSC, 3.5 billion for 5 AOPS and 2 billion plus for the 2 Berlin AORs. Not sure about the budget for the CG vessels and the heavy icebreaker but probably more than 2 billion. These numbers are about as stable as radioisotopes.

 

[John Fedup]

This story reports the USCG's progress on a new icebreaker. The article provided me with some great comic half way down when I read the Canadian icebreaker John Diefenbaker will be delivered later this year.

"On the Fincantieri team is the firm that designed the Canadian Coast Guard Ship John G. Diefenbaker, which is slated for delivery this year, he said."


Coast Guard Icebreaker Competition Under Way

 

[John Fedup]

Perhaps my greatest confusion with the NSPS is the AOPS project. AOPSs are derived from Norway’s Svalbard ship commissioned in 2001 at $80 million US, granted a number from Wikipedia, the only source I could find and certainly not the most reliable. Let’s assume a cost of 100 million in 2001 which is roughly 150 Million in 2001 CDN dollars. Can any blue tag member explain if $700 million per ship is a fair price after 16 years of inflation?

Electronic kit will have way more capability and cost after 16 years than other components but does that explain a 4x factor increase in price? Assuming only 5 ships, this still leaves 500 million.

 

[ASSAIL]

I'm wondering about that 1% software evaluation and wonder if this actually refers to the software to design the ships and for lifecycle management rather than the CMS - and other on-board software. If it does indeed include the CMS, then I agree there is something wrong.

I agree, I think it refers to such items as the platform management systems and everything else other than theCMS. it may also include some design software. Even so, it's a tiny amount when software plays such an important and increasing role in ship production and management.

 

[John Fedup]

I agree, I think it refers to such items as the platform management systems and everything else other than theCMS. it may also include some design software. Even so, it's a tiny amount when software plays such an important and increasing role in ship production and management.

We can only hope that is the case. As per my and others earlier posts, details on CSC specifications are unknown so it is all a mystery at this point.

 

[John Fedup]

Here is a Conservative MP's take on the current status of the NSPS. Costs on some of the other vessels are mentioned, no idea if they are correct. I agree with his corrective action except for bringing Davie in. No naval business for the province of separation. Finally, notice there is no mention on who created this cluster in the first place, his own Conservative Party.

CLEMENT: Liberals must change course on sinking approach to shipbuilding

 

[John Fedup]

Maybe the USN has just given junior a means to delay the CSC project. If the USN can extend the heavily utilized Burkes service out to 45 years then surely junior will be promoting the Halifax class can sail on for 60 years.

Navy Will Extend All DDGs to a 45-Year Service Life; 'No Destroyer Left Behind' Officials Say - USNI News

 

[J_Can]

Maybe the USN has just given junior a means to delay the CSC project. If the USN can extend the heavily utilized Burkes service out to 45 years then surely junior will be promoting the Halifax class can sail on for 60 years.

Navy Will Extend All DDGs to a 45-Year Service Life; 'No Destroyer Left Behind' Officials Say - USNI News

I certainly hope not. One thing I have been curious about though was why the Halifax class built in such relatively quick time-span slightly less than ten years for 12 ships? Everyone must have realized that after the Halifax class finished building out the design staff, the work force, and dockyard abilities would go as well? I do not know much about the classes prior to the Halifax and the shape they were in however. Yet it just seems like they made a production line that was burning hot and then silence. It appears they do not want to do that with the current plans, but perhaps we should follow how the Japanese do things. Were they build of class of ships maybe 2 to 4 large, then improve up them/ modified them to a different role (ASW to AAW), and eventually move on to a clean sheet design. That way they're always building something constantly never in large numbers but constantly. This would cost more but those costs go to domestic spending in the short to medium term, something any politician would generally support. I guess there is something very large to be said for having single class of ships for maintenance and training purposes, but if the 75-90 percent of the classes are the same would that not be good enough?

Something could be said for politicians were they just after 4 ships they would not build the follow on class, but I firmly believe us doing this large block build for 15 surface combatants is setting us up for an ever worse situation 20 to 30 years down the road were we face another block buy. In general I think by in large military procurement for most things should be slow but steady small block buys of equipment as long as a large degree of commonality exists between the platforms. I feel like the other path most western nations (including Canada) are taking however is hollowing out and shrinking of total combat power to maintain some sort of sufficiency in modern equipment. Really the only country that I can think of that does not do this would be Finland but they face very particular threats, are even still very bullish about their defence budget. Ideally larger military budgets would fix all of this but I do not see that happening either. Instead these smaller but continuous block buys I would argue could be spun off as domestic spending, keep "middle-class" jobs, spur on R&D, and keep a military that is sufficiently equipped for Canada's defence needs. We do not have to building everything from first screw to a finish product, even just repair and overhaul to the depot level would create so much work and institutional knowledge across the board. This knowledge could then eventually transfer over to new build items or niche specialists, which to some extent Canada already does; yet there is no firm public strategy for this.

Sorry for the massive block of text it just something I have been thinking about.

 

[John Fedup]

The Halifax class had 3 ships built by Davie in Quebec and the rest were built in Saint John NB. Also, Canadian ship building back in the late eighties was still viable and had not been allowed to wither way to almost nothing as happened once the Halifax build ended. This likely was the reason for the faster build. Also, the Cold War was active when the Halifax was conceived so there was more urgency. As for keeping our ship building capability viable, more ships need to be planned for in order to keep two yards going. Fewer ships down the road would make supporting two yards difficult and only having one yard wouldn't do much for competitiveness.

 

[ASSAIL]

The Halifax class had 3 ships built by Davie in Quebec and the rest were built in Saint John NB. Also, Canadian ship building back in the late eighties was still viable and had not been allowed to wither way to almost nothing as happened once the Halifax build ended. This likely was the reason for the faster build. Also, the Cold War was active when the Halifax was conceived so there was more urgency. As for keeping our ship building capability viable, more ships need to be planned for in order to keep two yards going. Fewer ships down the road would make supporting two yards difficult and only having one yard wouldn't do much for competitiveness.

But isn't this what the national shipbuilding policy is all about? Maintaining two yards, building frigates, supply ship, coast guard cutters, ice breaker et al and this programme has enough work to continually build.
The problem seems to be not the potential for continuous shipbuilding but the lack of timely decisions by governments and the lack of funds. The blueprint is in place.

 

[John Fedup]

Yes, that was the intent of the NSPS. The timing is certainly an issue that isn't working. As it stands now, Irving will finish off the AOPS build of 5 ships before the CSC build is started. Thus, unless a sixth AOPS is ordered, Irving will have to lay off workers unless a way can be found to advance the CSC. I doubt this will happen. The situation with SeaSpan seems to be their slow pace finishing off CG research and patrol vessels but the AOR design modifications don't seem to be finalized so that's on the government, not SeaSpan. The AORs are the RCN's priority. The heavy icebreaker design is ready now which is why I advocate building it now and double the order to keep SeaSpan happy while the AORS are built offshore. The savings will go a long way to paying for a second icebreaker IMO.

 

[Joe Black]

Perhaps RCN could find RAN's ANZAC class useful after RAN retire them when Sea5000 frigates come online and join the RAN's ranks.