I'll give you one example - there are a myriad more
SB Block 1A is a conventional conversion of the SB nuke
The drivetrain doesn't exist
No western country has used a DE drivetrain on a pumpjet - it has yet to be designed, tested and then developed - and that needs to be done before it goes into the last 3 sections
Look at the pumpjet on a nuke - its able to develop basically instant thrust - ie sprint and surge on demand - the best DE available can't do that - IOW there is an immediate change in performance and handling dynamics
then compare the drivetrain real estate issues on a nuke and compare it to a conventional
the nuke doesn't have to deal with any issues of changes of fuel state impacting upon handling
the nuke doesn't have the same real estate issues as there are no bunkerage issues and no battery issues commensurate with the drivetrain
ie all of that real estate advantage that is available to a boat with a small nuke changes dramatically with DE drivetrains
the handling issues are immediate
the acoustic management issues increase exponentially with DE compared to nukes
and then there are the energy management issues.
you just can't add 30% more KW based on a 30% increase in size.
I'm not dumb enough to talk about the classified issues - I'm only talking about the engineering realities
there's a difference between discussing capability issues and making claims about inherent performance
some of the discussion about pump jets is just tosh.
we avoid hypotheticals as much as possible on this forum for a reason - accordingly when people discuss things they tend not to make empirical claims - especially when this is actually a greenfields build
the only thing that will retain a probability of minimal change will be the outer shell - everything else changes.
I don’t mean to be flippant, but essentially all you have stated here is significant technological challenges remain for the Shortfin Barracuda to meets the public claims made by DCNS. In any case, I’m not sure how the above issues indicate that DCNS’s statements about the Shorfin Barracuda are inherently unachievable or technically unfeasible. Obviously, there’s much work to be done, but that stands for practically every element of the design. Are we to refrain from making claims whatsoever about the boats likely displacement given public statements by DCNS? Could be 6,000 tons? Could be 2,000?
In any case, not only does that not really challenge anything I have said in this thread – as I made NO hard claims about capability – but its entirely to be expected from a program this immature. The fact that you think taking a clear statement from DCNS about the platform’s intended performance equates to a ‘hypothetical’ is hardly consistent with the conversation not only in this thread – much of which is dedicated to carriers, F-35Bs, possible missile counts on SEA-5000 contenders and future force structure – but much of what I have read here. Take the extensive discussion in several airforce threads about likely capabilities of systems such as AN/APG-81, EODAS and EOTS in relation to the F-35. I fail to see how these discussions, which rely on
exactly the same kinds of limited, open source, information, are somehow acceptable, but the above comments are not. If you go back far enough you see the program at the exact same phase of the development cycle.
It seems hard to explain this without special pleading, or are the rules applied selectively here?
I blame idiotic journos for some of the nonsense that we see, but its sites like this where we try and talk about defence issues with a dose of reality.
if you look at those with blue tags (eg) - they invariably qualify with caution - there's a reason why they do that. prev experience and a bit of circumspection.
I'd suggest reading through a number of posts in the RAN thread to get an indication of tone and intent - we've discussed subs in here over the last 10 years.
there's a wealth of knowledge from people who have actual sub design, industry and defence experience.
and I've worked on french built subs on tech transfer issues.....
I have no doubt of your experience in the industry, and I’m not questioning your expertise -but just FYI not only the members with blue tags are active in the strategic space. But that ‘wealth of technical knowledge’ has, IMHO, limited the discussion here to engineering and project management issues, where that wealth of experience lies. Reading back there really isn’t much discussion on geostrategic aspects of this deal such as entrapment, long term industry development and the second and third order strategic effects of said development.
There are other aspects to SEA1000 than simply building the submarines, which have seldom been discussed. Yet even without addressing these issues, there seems to have been a consensus on option J.
But it seems as though the only valid discourse on this topic in this thread is the technical reputations of the rival partners.
CB90 said:
A contractor can claim whatever they want. Without a clarification of unspoken caveats, it's hard to know how much a statement really "means."
They can claim it matches the SSN variant's sustained transit speed.
Note they don't define the duration of "sustained." Or "comparable."
Until the heavy engineering work is done and the design is close to finalized, it's hard for even DCNS to know what's going to be the result..
Again, you probably need to appreciate the difference between an inference of likely capability from public statements made by a contractor and a hard truth claim. If we apply the rule that no statement from any contractor can be given any weight, then the majority of the capability discussions in this thread, and others, is worthless. Obviously, there is a real chance DCNS will not be able to meet this public ‘commitment’ – for lack of a better term – but clearly this statement indicates this is a capability objective for DCNS.
Todjaeger said:
I am not speaking on GF's behalf, but a number of posters, usually newer posters, have offered commentary in this RAN thread recently that is quite enthusiastic about DCNS having been selected for the SEA 1000 programme. However, a number of comments have been made which, even if there is publically available information out there confirming, does not mean that is actually what is/will be taking place.
I guess I’ll just have to take the condescension with a grain of salt.
Take the 14 kts sustained transit speed as an example. The sustained transit speed the future RAN subs will operate at would be dictated by RAN CONOPS, not the sub design. In fact, the CONOPS requirement is what will drive the required sustainable transit speed (as well as what is considered a sustainable transit speed). Not being a marine/submarine engineer, I am making an assumption here, but I would assume that if a particular design can sustain a 14 kts transit speed (which would require nn amount of power) then the same design should be able to sustain a transit speed of 10 kts or 8 kts, which would require less power. This reduction in power consumption could easily be preferable for the RAN, since it could permit a lower indiscretion rate, permit more time on station, and/or maintaining a larger charge on the batteries for action.
You are essentially confusing doctrine with capability – the latter does not always follow the former. Take the F-35 as an example, AFAIK the original program requirements for AIR-6000 did not include VLO, EODAS and the AIM-9X BII combination, but you dont think the RAAF is now building doctrine around these capabilities? That VLO has no bearing on how the RAAF will employ the F-35 because it wasn't originally part of the AIR-6000 program requirements or RAAF fighter CONOPS in the mid 2000s?
Any coherent concept of operations is about how people can reliably leverage the technology at their disposal to achieve tactical, operational and thus strategic outcomes.
IF the Shortfin Barracuda offers capabilities the Type 216 does not the RAN will alter its doctrine accordingly. We are not in the luxurious position – if any nation is – of bending technological tools to our doctrinal objectives. Everything is constrained by the technological environment it inhabits.
Blitzkrieg and Deep Battle did not drive the technological development of armor – they were doctrinal responses to technological development. Thus, claiming a platforms capabilities are irrelevant to how the user will employ it on doctrinal grounds mistakes what doctrine is and what it does.