Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[Volkodav]

RADM Davyd Thomas RAN retd., Commander Australian Fleet 2005-2007 and Deputy Chief of Navy 2008-2011, a Novacastrian, has been a member of the Austal Board since 2012 and is currently Vice President, Defence for that company. A fine officer.

No not him, this was a customs bloke who rose through the ranks.

I know of and actually know many outstanding individuals who have moved from the ADF to private enterprise who have done great work in every capacity they have worked.

This particular case I am thinking of just came to mind because we had been discussing conflicts of interest when the news in the appointment came out and we joked that Austal would probably start to get more orders again. Low and behold, a week later and there's discussion of the RAN getting three more unsatisfactory Cape Class.

 

[alexsa]

Eventhough Border Force have eight of these already and the RAN are operating two .... I cannot see the point. The Border force training system is entirely different as these vessels operate with civilian qualfications. Even the operation of the vessels is subject to civilian certification and a mandatory safety management system. The current manning issues are such that I would peg for additional OPVs for the Navy (the crewing is not much different and the envisaged life is longer) and leave the Cape Class with BPC.

Having now read the article ..... always a good idea, it appears to be in lieu of any life extension to the ACPB. I am not sure the 1m draft difference is really going to offer that much as the article suggests. The tidal range in the North are generally very large and even in the FCPB we tended not to rely on an underkeel clearance of 1m or less. Mind you ... in saying that we run bulk carriers through Torres Strait with muchless than 1m but subject to active DUKC systems.

 

[Takao]

Keeps coming up and going nowhere.
WWII we had the seaward defence vessels that became the Bathurst Class Corvettes ( mine sweepers) but post war there was the Light Destroyer (DDL) program that grew into a full FFG before cancellation, the OPC of the mid 90s, that was cancelled in favour of the eventual ACPB program, then the 2009 White Paper OCV that evolved into the current OPV program.
The concept keeps coming up and keeps getting canned. Enough merit to be considered, even planned, but not seen as critical enough to ensure funding.

I think there is an issue in two areas here - acceptance and reality.

For the first one is a symptom across the West that I think has parallels with the 1920s and 30s when fleet budgets became strained. In this case though, DDGs/FFGs are the CA/CL. The balance between CA/CL, trade protection and fleet use (especially for the RN) was not sustainable and they had to curtail production. Meanwhile, the critical parts of the fleet - the DDs were only scrapped together eventually by the RN and USN; other navies simply could not produce enough for their needs.

With that analogy in mind - what are the current DDs? Ships that are small, reasonably cheap to operate and (as harsh as it sounds) disposable? Jack of all trades that can escort convoys or capital ships, operate (in a limited way) independently in flotillas and can be built rapidly? It isn't OPVs, nor is it LCSs. The Russians may have the answer in the Steregushchiy class, but the West doesn't and it doesn't seem to be interested in finding it.

The second one is reality. The USN is selling the idea of distributed lethality - but I've never had anyone able to explain how that works in reality. To have a bunch of small, optionally-crewed running around sounds awesome, right up until the shooting starts. How do these things survive? The USN demonstrated what distributed lethality looks like against a peer threat in a modern A2AD environment in 1945 off Okinawa - and the destroyers bled. Once these you-beaut uncrewed platforms start dying because they are too far beyond the AA bubble then the core fleet becomes exposed and we are back to now. Like much of what has come out of the US recently, what we have is a great theory that has not been considered in any real experimentation or fleet exercise against a likely threat. Now, this isn't specific to the US, but it is common. To build and pay for entire fleets (*cough* LCS *cough*) without any real idea in how they will operate is so stupid.

For the RAN, there has been no work in this area, no consideration of something smaller than a DDG/FFG and larger than a OPV. Even asking what happens when we take losses is a frustrating experience as so few in white actually consider it - despite our rich maritime history. What we have is, in my view, a need not yet fully identified, a need not fully scoped and no way of fulfilling said need. Unlike the USN with the LCS, we have to do it in that order - that's how we get a Joint Force by design.

Stepping into a fantasy world - I honestly think there is room for a modern Battle (or even J/K/L-class) destroyer. 1500 - 2000 tonnes, 20 - 35 knots, 5000 - 6000 nm range, 1 - 2 4 - 5" gun, 1 - 2 CWIS, 24 - 32 VLS and some torpedo tubes. A helo pad, but no hanger. ECM and a cheap, surface radar like the TRS-4D or (even better) something like the LAND 19-7b CFAR radar. Built in blocks a'la a Liberty ship that can spread the build across WA, SA and TAS with final assembly in WA or SA. Something like that would be cheap, able to be built rapidly and fulfil the role of the old DD. It'd be able to operate as a pretty mean 4-ship flotilla while integrating with a SAG consisting of a Hobart and two Hunters. Nice little add to an amphib task force too, while a number (say - 10 - 12) would enable a reasonably permanent presence in the region.

 

[Volkodav]

I think there is an issue in two areas here - acceptance and reality.

For the first one is a symptom across the West that I think has parallels with the 1920s and 30s when fleet budgets became strained. In this case though, DDGs/FFGs are the CA/CL. The balance between CA/CL, trade protection and fleet use (especially for the RN) was not sustainable and they had to curtail production. Meanwhile, the critical parts of the fleet - the DDs were only scrapped together eventually by the RN and USN; other navies simply could not produce enough for their needs.

With that analogy in mind - what are the current DDs? Ships that are small, reasonably cheap to operate and (as harsh as it sounds) disposable? Jack of all trades that can escort convoys or capital ships, operate (in a limited way) independently in flotillas and can be built rapidly? It isn't OPVs, nor is it LCSs. The Russians may have the answer in the Steregushchiy class, but the West doesn't and it doesn't seem to be interested in finding it.

The second one is reality. The USN is selling the idea of distributed lethality - but I've never had anyone able to explain how that works in reality. To have a bunch of small, optionally-crewed running around sounds awesome, right up until the shooting starts. How do these things survive? The USN demonstrated what distributed lethality looks like against a peer threat in a modern A2AD environment in 1945 off Okinawa - and the destroyers bled. Once these you-beaut uncrewed platforms start dying because they are too far beyond the AA bubble then the core fleet becomes exposed and we are back to now. Like much of what has come out of the US recently, what we have is a great theory that has not been considered in any real experimentation or fleet exercise against a likely threat. Now, this isn't specific to the US, but it is common. To build and pay for entire fleets (*cough* LCS *cough*) without any real idea in how they will operate is so stupid.

For the RAN, there has been no work in this area, no consideration of something smaller than a DDG/FFG and larger than a OPV. Even asking what happens when we take losses is a frustrating experience as so few in white actually consider it - despite our rich maritime history. What we have is, in my view, a need not yet fully identified, a need not fully scoped and no way of fulfilling said need. Unlike the USN with the LCS, we have to do it in that order - that's how we get a Joint Force by design.

Stepping into a fantasy world - I honestly think there is room for a modern Battle (or even J/K/L-class) destroyer. 1500 - 2000 tonnes, 20 - 35 knots, 5000 - 6000 nm range, 1 - 2 4 - 5" gun, 1 - 2 CWIS, 24 - 32 VLS and some torpedo tubes. A helo pad, but no hanger. ECM and a cheap, surface radar like the TRS-4D or (even better) something like the LAND 19-7b CFAR radar. Built in blocks a'la a Liberty ship that can spread the build across WA, SA and TAS with final assembly in WA or SA. Something like that would be cheap, able to be built rapidly and fulfil the role of the old DD. It'd be able to operate as a pretty mean 4-ship flotilla while integrating with a SAG consisting of a Hobart and two Hunters. Nice little add to an amphib task force too, while a number (say - 10 - 12) would enable a reasonably permanent presence in the region.

Ironically the cruiser through the age of sail and into the industrial age was made up of frigates, corvettes and sloops, fast warships with a single gun deck, capable of independent operations, such as scouting, liaison, communications, and trade protection. Modern frigates fit the more traditional description very well.

I've been pushing the Barrow for almost twenty years that the OPC / corvette was a missed opportunity. It had a baseline capability not much short of the original ANZAC config, had the potential to be upgraded in a similar manner to the ANZAC, was larger, longer ranged, more seaworthy, more durable and more survivable than a Fremantle or Armidale. In addition, had the build gone ahead there would not have been the shipbuilding blackhole that caused so many issues early in the Hobart program, and, because of their greater capability and durability, we would not be replacing them yet.

Quite simply they would have cost more to acquire than Armidales but wouldn't have had the maintenance and durability issues, would not have required the Fremantle's to be life extended, would not have needed to be replaced early and would not have needed to be supplemented in service by major fleet units. Much more capability for not as much more as you would expect, with the added bonus of keeping shipbuilding ticking over saving money on following projects.

 

[Stampede]

Ironically the cruiser through the age of sail and into the industrial age was made up of frigates, corvettes and sloops, fast warships with a single gun deck, capable of independent operations, such as scouting, liaison, communications, and trade protection. Modern frigates fit the more traditional description very well.

I've been pushing the Barrow for almost twenty years that the OPC / corvette was a missed opportunity. It had a baseline capability not much short of the original ANZAC config, had the potential to be upgraded in a similar manner to the ANZAC, was larger, longer ranged, more seaworthy, more durable and more survivable than a Fremantle or Armidale. In addition, had the build gone ahead there would not have been the shipbuilding blackhole that caused so many issues early in the Hobart program, and, because of their greater capability and durability, we would not be replacing them yet.

Quite simply they would have cost more to acquire than Armidales but wouldn't have had the maintenance and durability issues, would not have required the Fremantle's to be life extended, would not have needed to be replaced early and would not have needed to be supplemented in service by major fleet units. Much more capability for not as much more as you would expect, with the added bonus of keeping shipbuilding ticking over saving money on following projects.

I wonder if the Arafura Class can be subdivided into two batch's of different sizes

Currently 12 Vessels are to be built, with potentially another three for Survey and Mine warfare.While the later are not locked in to the Lurssen OPV 80 design, but the commonality of class certainly has appeal.
The concept is for 15 vessels broken into a 6 to 9 mix, with 9 for the original design and six in a larger vessel with more robust military capacity.

Staying with the same supplier, Lurssen offer a range of larger OPV's with the 90m version having greater weapons and aviation capacity.
Alternatively one could step up to their Multi role light frigate design which would be my preference.
The nine Arafura Class could share the constabulary / survey /mine counter measure role with the larger vessels doing the SAME, but with the benefit of extra warfare capacity to contribute to that ambiguous middle ground in military contingency's.

This approach is not adding to fleet numbers, just giving some extra flexibility to our means of response across all scenarios.

There will obviously be additional cost for the extra weapons systems, helicopters and crew to round out the six larger ships, but I feel this is a prudent expenditure for what is delivered.
Suggest a true flight deck and Romeo sized hangar is a must with six additional Romeo helicopters purchased.
Given the Romeo is over kill for the constabulary role some HATS sized helicopters would be appropriate both for this class as well as a option across the fleet.

I'm sure Lurrssen would not want to give some contractual grief to this larger order.

A win for all

Thoughts

Regards S

 

[Takao]

I wonder if the Arafura Class can be subdivided into two batch's of different sizes

Currently 12 Vessels are to be built, with potentially another three for Survey and Mine warfare.While the later are not locked in to the Lurssen OPV 80 design, but the commonality of class certainly has appeal.
The concept is for 15 vessels broken into a 6 to 9 mix, with 9 for the original design and six in a larger vessel with more robust military capacity.

8 minehunters, not 3. With 80% commonality to the Arafura's.

 

[hauritz]

Defence Connect
Some speculation that the LOTE for the Collins may use the engines and other technology from the Attack class. Sensible really. The Collins class look like they may serve into the late thirties and perhaps even into the forties. Also, this is an excuse to work on a virtual "son of Collins" design just in case the Attack Class fails to deliver.

 

[Stampede]

Defence Connect
Some speculation that the LOTE for the Collins may use the engines and other technology from the Attack class. Sensible really. The Collins class look like they may serve into the late thirties and perhaps even into the forties. Also, this is an excuse to work on a virtual "son of Collins" design just in case the Attack Class fails to deliver.

So does SEA 1000 need a Super Hornet equivalent fall back?

Regards S

 

[StingrayOZ]

Keeps coming up and going nowhere.

WWII we had the seaward defence vessels that became the Bathurst Class Corvettes ( mine sweepers) but post war there was the Light Destroyer (DDL) program that grew into a full FFG before cancellation, the OPC of the mid 90s, that was cancelled in favour of the eventual ACPB program, then the 2009 White Paper OCV that evolved into the current OPV program.

The concept keeps coming up and keeps getting canned. Enough merit to be considered, even planned, but not seen as critical enough to ensure funding.

But we do have a small ship production line going on over at WA. Facilities at SA in near war time could widen. East coast has latent capability which could easily be ramped/adapted. Technology has changed as well. As we are now acting like a regional power, it might also be worth having something on the books our friendlies can realistically operate.

Lurrsen has the OPV 90 (which is much like a up-sized hull the Afura is based off) and the K130 (Searam x2, minelaying, 76mm, RBS, 26kt).

Key requirements:
< 12 month per build (at least able to be done)
<2,5000t
< 60 crew
40mm-76mm main gun
At least 1 gun based CIWS.
Multiple RWS 20mm with really excellent overlapping coverage.
Capability to be upgraded with missiles (Harpoons/NSM/ESSM/CAMM).
Able to fit capable radar and sensors

But I would personally go with a gun fit out. Corvette probably isn't the right term. Gun Patrol Ship?. Designed for heavier missions than a OPV, in a non-wartime stand off against a state actor. But clearly not a frigate or destroyer (or even a Corvette). No offensive missile capability. Might be the type of ships smaller nations would acquire if things start to get hairy. Could be armed with missiles (particularly defensive), but missiles would basically be under authority and supported by a larger partner nation (AU, US, JP, UK etc) with an embarked team(s). The whole ship could be war leased or similar temporary arrangement made. Designed to non-navy, non-peer combat action, but something beyond pirates and illegal fishing.

They could provide close support for amphibious operations, resupply, heavy policing/sanction activities, etc.

Designed also to operate out of bases/countries that don't have capabilities to maintain and operate missiles, high end gear etc.
PNG (perhaps dual patrolling with the same class Australian Ship out of Manus). While small maintenance is done in home port, Manus would become the key support base for all ships, with people being trained their from all nations on say a 12 month rotation basis).
Fiji/Tonga/Samoa joint operation under an Australian or NZ commander.
Philippines (they could fully operate such a ship)
East Timor (again, perhaps a dual patrol situation).
UAE (?) -
Africa (?)
Countries like ET have been asking Australia for something more capable than what they have been getting. They have a decent argument for something more significant. This provides a pathway, other than going to China etc.

This kind of project would sit above the Guardian-class patrol boat - Wikipedia. Unified training and operation.

Even if such a program doesn't go ahead it might be useful to have discussions around it. Find out what is and isn't possible. Wider regional cooperation.

Just because something isn't built doesn't always mean its a complete waste of time. Perhaps having a corvette design ready to go or in embryonic stages is something worthwhile for Australia to have in its back pocket.

Some speculation that the LOTE for the Collins may use the engines and other technology from the Attack class. Sensible really. The Collins class look like they may serve into the late thirties and perhaps even into the forties. Also, this is an excuse to work on a virtual "son of Collins" design just in case the Attack Class fails to deliver.

All of Collins will basically need a life extension. So all the engineering work needs to be done anyway.

If Attack as a program collapses (very big if, but nothing is impossible), then welding up new Collins hulls will be the least of our issues.

From a program design point of view. It may have been a better possibility to build 3 new Collins hulls (starting steel laying immediately following the AWD's bridging the valley of death) while awaiting the Attack class. We really wouldn't have any more subs available, as following this we would start pulling the existing subs out for major refit and life extension. Then skip updating the oldest 3 Collins as we should have new attack subs coming on line after that. It would be a hard project to sell, buy new subs and upgrade the old ones.

But that kind of project would need to have been put in place 5+ years ago.. We will be stuck doing Collins refits while also trying to get attack up and running. Remembering even a normal mid life refit costs 70-80% the cost of a new build for subs on a drive in drive out fleet wide upgrade on a sub in service with multiple navies.

I wouldn't be surprised if a comprehensive life extension + refit for Collins is ~100%+ the cost of new build Collins. Not only that, new builds would probably be quicker, and less risky, and take risk and time out of the Attack build. Many were very annoyed son of collins didn't get green lit as an interim plan.

So does SEA 1000 need a Super Hornet equivalent fall back?

Collins is the fall back. There really isn't any OTS thing we can just buy. Subs aren't like planes, or like surface ships or essential like anything other than reusable spacecraft. Crewing anything different would also be a nightmare. Again, not like planes and ships. This is why navies tend to try to operate single types (even big ones like USN, UK, France etc).

And as we have seen with the space shuttle, reusable manned craft, does not really mean cheaper. Even then the space shuttle didn't need to be angle grinded in half to get access to its engines.

 

[ngatimozart]

Keeps coming up and going nowhere.

WWII we had the seaward defence vessels that became the Bathurst Class Corvettes ( mine sweepers) but post war there was the Light Destroyer (DDL) program that grew into a full FFG before cancellation, the OPC of the mid 90s, that was cancelled in favour of the eventual ACPB program, then the 2009 White Paper OCV that evolved into the current OPV program.

The concept keeps coming up and keeps getting canned. Enough merit to be considered, even planned, but not seen as critical enough to ensure funding.

But we do have a small ship production line going on over at WA. Facilities at SA in near war time could widen. East coast has latent capability which could easily be ramped/adapted. Technology has changed as well. As we are now acting like a regional power, it might also be worth having something on the books our friendlies can realistically operate.

Lurrsen has the OPV 90 (which is much like a up-sized hull the Afura is based off) and the K130 (Searam x2, minelaying, 76mm, RBS, 26kt).

Key requirements:
< 12 month per build (at least able to be done)
<2,5000t
< 60 crew
40mm-76mm main gun
At least 1 gun based CIWS.
Multiple RWS 20mm with really excellent overlapping coverage.
Capability to be upgraded with missiles (Harpoons/NSM/ESSM/CAMM).
Able to fit capable radar and sensors

But I would personally go with a gun fit out. Corvette probably isn't the right term. Gun Patrol Ship?. Designed for heavier missions than a OPV, in a non-wartime stand off against a state actor. But clearly not a frigate or destroyer (or even a Corvette). No offensive missile capability. Might be the type of ships smaller nations would acquire if things start to get hairy. Could be armed with missiles (particularly defensive), but missiles would basically be under authority and supported by a larger partner nation (AU, US, JP, UK etc) with an embarked team(s). The whole ship could be war leased or similar temporary arrangement made. Designed to non-navy, non-peer combat action, but something beyond pirates and illegal fishing.

They could provide close support for amphibious operations, resupply, heavy policing/sanction activities, etc.

Designed also to operate out of bases/countries that don't have capabilities to maintain and operate missiles, high end gear etc.
PNG (perhaps dual patrolling with the same class Australian Ship out of Manus). While small maintenance is done in home port, Manus would become the key support base for all ships, with people being trained their from all nations on say a 12 month rotation basis).
Fiji/Tonga/Samoa joint operation under an Australian or NZ commander.
Philippines (they could fully operate such a ship)
East Timor (again, perhaps a dual patrol situation).
UAE (?) -
Africa (?)
Countries like ET have been asking Australia for something more capable than what they have been getting. They have a decent argument for something more significant. This provides a pathway, other than going to China etc.

This kind of project would sit above the Guardian-class patrol boat - Wikipedia. Unified training and operation.

Even if such a program doesn't go ahead it might be useful to have discussions around it. Find out what is and isn't possible. Wider regional cooperation.

Just because something isn't built doesn't always mean its a complete waste of time. Perhaps having a corvette design ready to go or in embryonic stages is something worthwhile for Australia to have in its back pocket.

First of all as Volk points out, there is no funding for such a capability at the moment, nor any indication of any, and that is the most important consideration. If you were to continue down this road what other capability(ies) are you going to reduce or retire / cancel to pay for it?

I think there is an issue in two areas here - acceptance and reality.

For the first one is a symptom across the West that I think has parallels with the 1920s and 30s when fleet budgets became strained. In this case though, DDGs/FFGs are the CA/CL. The balance between CA/CL, trade protection and fleet use (especially for the RN) was not sustainable and they had to curtail production. Meanwhile, the critical parts of the fleet - the DDs were only scrapped together eventually by the RN and USN; other navies simply could not produce enough for their needs.

I agree. Since the Cold War has ended in 1991, the pollies in the West have taken a so called Peace Dividend and I don't believe in any such entity as a Peace Dividend. Peace is just rest periods between conflicts, and we should always be prepared for the next one, because unfortunately there will always be a next one.

With that analogy in mind - what are the current DDs? Ships that are small, reasonably cheap to operate and (as harsh as it sounds) disposable? Jack of all trades that can escort convoys or capital ships, operate (in a limited way) independently in flotillas and can be built rapidly? It isn't OPVs, nor is it LCSs. The Russians may have the answer in the Steregushchiy class, but the West doesn't and it doesn't seem to be interested in finding it.

The second one is reality. The USN is selling the idea of distributed lethality - but I've never had anyone able to explain how that works in reality. To have a bunch of small, optionally-crewed running around sounds awesome, right up until the shooting starts. How do these things survive? The USN demonstrated what distributed lethality looks like against a peer threat in a modern A2AD environment in 1945 off Okinawa - and the destroyers bled. Once these you-beaut uncrewed platforms start dying because they are too far beyond the AA bubble then the core fleet becomes exposed and we are back to now. Like much of what has come out of the US recently, what we have is a great theory that has not been considered in any real experimentation or fleet exercise against a likely threat. Now, this isn't specific to the US, but it is common. To build and pay for entire fleets (*cough* LCS *cough*) without any real idea in how they will operate is so stupid.

The concept of distributed lethality is that every ship in the fleet has both offensive and defensive weapons, i.e., besides your DDGs &FFGs., your LHDs, LPDs, LSD, AORs, OPVs etc., all carry SSM, SAM etc., CMS, and appropriate sensors. USVs with such weapons etc., are an added extra. It means that an enemy has to target every ship in a fleet / TF simultaneously in order to neutralise all the shooters, therefore making an enemies job harder.

Off Okinawa the USN was faced by airborne Kamakazies and every ship had mounted 5 in guns and a plethora of 40 mm Bofors and 20 mm Oerlikon. If you look at video from the battle, you can see this on sides of the carriers, mounted on the platforms below the flight deck edges, solid lines of 40 mm Bofors and 20 mm Oerlikon from stem to stern. The carriers had 2 twin 5 in gun turrets fo'rd of the island. Think they had the same aft of the island as well. The destroyers bled because they were on a radar picket line duty well out from the fleet so were alone when attacked. Any ship on it's lonesome when attacked by multiple aircraft, will find it difficult to survive. That was shown many times during WW2 and in the Falklands. So I think you are using that example out of context.

For the RAN, there has been no work in this area, no consideration of something smaller than a DDG/FFG and larger than a OPV. Even asking what happens when we take losses is a frustrating experience as so few in white actually consider it - despite our rich maritime history. What we have is, in my view, a need not yet fully identified, a need not fully scoped and no way of fulfilling said need. Unlike the USN with the LCS, we have to do it in that order - that's how we get a Joint Force by design.

Stepping into a fantasy world - I honestly think there is room for a modern Battle (or even J/K/L-class) destroyer. 1500 - 2000 tonnes, 20 - 35 knots, 5000 - 6000 nm range, 1 - 2 4 - 5" gun, 1 - 2 CWIS, 24 - 32 VLS and some torpedo tubes. A helo pad, but no hanger. ECM and a cheap, surface radar like the TRS-4D or (even better) something like the LAND 19-7b CFAR radar. Built in blocks a'la a Liberty ship that can spread the build across WA, SA and TAS with final assembly in WA or SA. Something like that would be cheap, able to be built rapidly and fulfil the role of the old DD. It'd be able to operate as a pretty mean 4-ship flotilla while integrating with a SAG consisting of a Hobart and two Hunters. Nice little add to an amphib task force too, while a number (say - 10 - 12) would enable a reasonably permanent presence in the region.

Your fantasy ship would need to be somewhat larger for the armament that you propose. Also it would reaquire a hangar even if you don't intend embarking a helo on it. Steel is cheap and air is free. Hangar can be used as a mission bay for an UAV etc. Only one 5" gun at most, but a 76 mm probably be better.

 

[hauritz]

Collins is the fall back. There really isn't any OTS thing we can just buy. Subs aren't like planes, or like surface ships or essential like anything other than reusable spacecraft. Crewing anything different would also be a nightmare. Again, not like planes and ships. This is why navies tend to try to operate single types (even big ones like USN, UK, France etc).

And as we have seen with the space shuttle, reusable manned craft, does not really mean cheaper. Even then the space shuttle didn't need to be angle grinded in half to get access to its engines.

The only OTS solution I can think of would be if Australia were to consider shorter range submarines. By the 2030s Australia may well find itself in a position where they are countering Chinese submarines and surface ships in our own waters. Maybe then range won't be as big an issue. Perhaps a mix of shorter-range and longer-range boats might be an acceptable compromise. We could have around three overseas builds now instead of a LOTE program for the Collins and hopefully, they will hold the line until the Attacks start entering service from the mid 30s.

 

[seaspear]

Is it possible that unmanned submersibles may be deployed from the Hunter class for patrols ,I have read the U.K have recently purchased several from America of a size to be deployed from the type 26

 

[Stampede]

But we do have a small ship production line going on over at WA. Facilities at SA in near war time could widen. East coast has latent capability which could easily be ramped/adapted. Technology has changed as well. As we are now acting like a regional power, it might also be worth having something on the books our friendlies can realistically operate.

Lurrsen has the OPV 90 (which is much like a up-sized hull the Afura is based off) and the K130 (Searam x2, minelaying, 76mm, RBS, 26kt).

Key requirements:
< 12 month per build (at least able to be done)
<2,5000t
< 60 crew
40mm-76mm main gun
At least 1 gun based CIWS.
Multiple RWS 20mm with really excellent overlapping coverage.
Capability to be upgraded with missiles (Harpoons/NSM/ESSM/CAMM).
Able to fit capable radar and sensors

But I would personally go with a gun fit out. Corvette probably isn't the right term. Gun Patrol Ship?. Designed for heavier missions than a OPV, in a non-wartime stand off against a state actor. But clearly not a frigate or destroyer (or even a Corvette). No offensive missile capability. Might be the type of ships smaller nations would acquire if things start to get hairy. Could be armed with missiles (particularly defensive), but missiles would basically be under authority and supported by a larger partner nation (AU, US, JP, UK etc) with an embarked team(s). The whole ship could be war leased or similar temporary arrangement made. Designed to non-navy, non-peer combat action, but something beyond pirates and illegal fishing.

They could provide close support for amphibious operations, resupply, heavy policing/sanction activities, etc.

Designed also to operate out of bases/countries that don't have capabilities to maintain and operate missiles, high end gear etc.
PNG (perhaps dual patrolling with the same class Australian Ship out of Manus). While small maintenance is done in home port, Manus would become the key support base for all ships, with people being trained their from all nations on say a 12 month rotation basis).
Fiji/Tonga/Samoa joint operation under an Australian or NZ commander.
Philippines (they could fully operate such a ship)
East Timor (again, perhaps a dual patrol situation).
UAE (?) -
Africa (?)
Countries like ET have been asking Australia for something more capable than what they have been getting. They have a decent argument for something more significant. This provides a pathway, other than going to China etc.

This kind of project would sit above the Guardian-class patrol boat - Wikipedia. Unified training and operation.

Even if such a program doesn't go ahead it might be useful to have discussions around it. Find out what is and isn't possible. Wider regional cooperation.

Just because something isn't built doesn't always mean its a complete waste of time. Perhaps having a corvette design ready to go or in embryonic stages is something worthwhile for Australia to have in its back pocket.


All of Collins will basically need a life extension. So all the engineering work needs to be done anyway.

If Attack as a program collapses (very big if, but nothing is impossible), then welding up new Collins hulls will be the least of our issues.

From a program design point of view. It may have been a better possibility to build 3 new Collins hulls (starting steel laying immediately following the AWD's bridging the valley of death) while awaiting the Attack class. We really wouldn't have any more subs available, as following this we would start pulling the existing subs out for major refit and life extension. Then skip updating the oldest 3 Collins as we should have new attack subs coming on line after that. It would be a hard project to sell, buy new subs and upgrade the old ones.

But that kind of project would need to have been put in place 5+ years ago.. We will be stuck doing Collins refits while also trying to get attack up and running. Remembering even a normal mid life refit costs 70-80% the cost of a new build for subs on a drive in drive out fleet wide upgrade on a sub in service with multiple navies.

I wouldn't be surprised if a comprehensive life extension + refit for Collins is ~100%+ the cost of new build Collins. Not only that, new builds would probably be quicker, and less risky, and take risk and time out of the Attack build. Many were very annoyed son of collins didn't get green lit as an interim plan.


Collins is the fall back. There really isn't any OTS thing we can just buy. Subs aren't like planes, or like surface ships or essential like anything other than reusable spacecraft. Crewing anything different would also be a nightmare. Again, not like planes and ships. This is why navies tend to try to operate single types (even big ones like USN, UK, France etc).

And as we have seen with the space shuttle, reusable manned craft, does not really mean cheaper. Even then the space shuttle didn't need to be angle grinded in half to get access to its engines.

Hi Stingray
Your correct, their is no off the shelf sub looking for a buyer that's suitable to the RAN.

Now I am all for the Attack class being a success and hopefully on time and within budget.

But it does look to me that such a complex project my fall short with the above
.
The JSF was as they say too big to fail.
The Attack class, or more appropriately a RAN Submarine capability, does fall into the same category. but there is a difference..
One, this class of vessel is been built for only two nations, with each having different weapon and propulsions systems.(Our submarine will be unique )
Two no equivalent "Super hornet" submarine substitute.

Now I'd hope away from the public forum there are some options for SEA 1000 going astray.

Well at least I hope so.

If not the fear maybe if some good news does not come out regards to this project very soon,it may become a political football.
If alternatives other than rebuild / refit Collins are sort, some smart and timely decisions will need to be made very soon.
A 2022 Federal election may be within that time frame which is a concern.

Submarine point scoring form both sides of the house has being done before.

While I do hope SEA 1000 goes to plan, much commentary in ASPI and APDR add fire to the questions in the public domain regarding our submarine future.

Fingers crossed

Regards S

 

[hauritz]

Is it possible that unmanned submersibles may be deployed from the Hunter class for patrols ,I have read the U.K have recently purchased several from America of a size to be deployed from the type 26

Australia may well be more involved in the area of unmanned submersibles than many believe.
https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/us-and-australian-progress-in-autonomous-warfare-at-sea
Australia set to build its first research submarine
I think we are at a nexus point now. We want both unmanned and manned systems but we may not have enough money for both ... at least not without making compromises.

 

[Takao]

First of all as Volk points out, there is no funding for such a capability at the moment, nor any indication of any, and that is the most important consideration. If you were to continue down this road what other capability(ies) are you going to reduce or retire / cancel to pay for it?

Ahhhh - my favorite saopbox! Repeated for truth!

The concept of distributed lethality is that every ship in the fleet has both offensive and defensive weapons, i.e., besides your DDGs &FFGs., your LHDs, LPDs, LSD, AORs, OPVs etc., all carry SSM, SAM etc., CMS, and appropriate sensors. USVs with such weapons etc., are an added extra. It means that an enemy has to target every ship in a fleet / TF simultaneously in order to neutralise all the shooters, therefore making an enemies job harder.

Off Okinawa the USN was faced by airborne Kamakazies and every ship had mounted 5 in guns and a plethora of 40 mm Bofors and 20 mm Oerlikon. If you look at video from the battle, you can see this on sides of the carriers, mounted on the platforms below the flight deck edges, solid lines of 40 mm Bofors and 20 mm Oerlikon from stem to stern. The carriers had 2 twin 5 in gun turrets fo'rd of the island. Think they had the same aft of the island as well. The destroyers bled because they were on a radar picket line duty well out from the fleet so were alone when attacked. Any ship on it's lonesome when attacked by multiple aircraft, will find it difficult to survive. That was shown many times during WW2 and in the Falklands. So I think you are using that example out of context.

I don't think so - your point about the radar pickets is my point.

That description of distributed lethality is part of the concept. Placing weapons across all vessels is great in theory, but in my view in practise it is a bugbear of mine but I've lost online and at work My specific issue with this is the scope creep within each ship's mission; and like the (ultimatly wrong) fighter mafia and the F-15E, every pound of missiles and offensive weapons on the non-pointy grey ships is one less pound of support; which is their primary job. This increases with the sensors - if an LHD needs VLS for SM-6 and CFAR what is it giving up? It needs some self defence (and I'm convinced Goalkeeper is the minimum needed, the Phalanx is out of date) but it's true defence lies in the networked umbrella of air defence. The air defence doctrine changes from 1938 - 1945 within the RN and USN highlight that (after the VT rolled out), depth and C2 was more important than more weapons.

And do we honestly think an enemy won't try and sink every vessel?

The other part of the USN doctrine utilses uncrewed ships operating well away from the fleet to provide depth. This is where my critisism of the concept really stems from - those combatants are wasted. Any vessel operating by itself against a modern threat will find itself like a DD at Okinawa - uncovered and dead. An uncrewed vessel has even less options as the is absolutly no battle damge repair.

Your fantasy ship would need to be somewhat larger for the armament that you propose. Also it would reaquire a hangar even if you don't intend embarking a helo on it. Steel is cheap and air is free. Hangar can be used as a mission bay for an UAV etc. Only one 5" gun at most, but a 76 mm probably be better.

Not really - not accepting some comprimises and a shift in doctrine. There is a similar thought exercise using a Fletcher (Navy Matters: Knee Jerks and Paradigms) that I think has real possibilities. There is real truth in his views that there is a knee-jerk rejection of challenging 'known' concepts; and the Russian's appear to be demonstrating with their new corvette that such weapon loads are feasible. It wouldn't look like a modern 1945 DD, but putting those weapons on a 2000 t vessel is feasible on paper. Note that there are significant effencies in the engine room and electronics; modern systems are smaller and weigh less. In addition, the 4 - 5" guns offer options to sink ships beyond an expensive missile, provide naval gun fire support and point-defence that a 3" can't - plus offeres across RAN / USN / RN flexibility and commonality of parts and ammo.

Stuff like a hanger, sure - but the oft thrown out comment that steel is cheap and air free is wrong. Having played with the costies at work on real and hypothetical surface combatants the construction bill gets very big for ships the bigger they get. Electronics and the like only are 15- 20% of the cost of construction. I have always assumed it was the other way, that the hull + superstructure was 10 - 15% of the cost making a 7000 t ship a worse option than a 9000 t because it isn't the steel. That's not true though. And that fallicy became obvious across three costing methods.

As most here know, it's really hard to breakdown acqusition costings (especially for foreign nations), but looking at the LCS costings suggests that building a hull is very expensive. A 2000 t combatant hull will not cost 1/4 of the 9000 t Hunter, it will cost less. Before adding the sub-systems and weapons you will probably get 4 - 5 2000 t hulls for the cost of one Hunter. Furthermore, when we start taking losses, a 2000 t combatant is quicker to build than a Hunter or Hobart - so we can make up the losses faster. That includes just getting the raw material in the first place. That's before you get into infrastructure - there are more places in Australia that acn assemble a 2000 t ship than there are that can do a 9000 t ship. And a modular construction increases these options and speeds.

As for air, every additional cubic metre demands more HVAC and filtration, adding to the ships electrical load and increasing the demand on the engines and hence making them bigger. A 2000 t combatant would not need as much electrical load for it's livability, freeing up ergatrons for sensors, weapons or making the engine room smaller. This becomes even more obvious when looking at CBRN capabilities - there is less air that needs to be considered.

Now, traditionally combatants get bigger. Hence why a frigate is now 8800 t versus 1400 t from 70 years ago. Even in a class there is growth - the addiing of AA weapons and the lengthening of the American DD's and Type 12 show this. But starting at 1500 - 2000 t forces some naval perceptions and sacred cows to be reconsidered - and yet I believe a really useful, and survivable, ship can be developed that is cheap, flexible and has growth potential.

 

[Takao]

Australia may well be more involved in the area of unmanned submersibles than many believe.
No hands on deck: US and Australian progress in autonomous warfare at sea — United States Studies Centre
Australia set to build its first research submarine
I think we are at a nexus point now. We want both unmanned and manned systems but we may not have enough money for both ... at least not without making compromises.

But the best thing about a "Joint Force by Design" is that those compromises do not have to be within SEA 1000. You can take funding from other projects if, which they do, uncrewed options provide significant benefits. An example I've used before is P-8's - perhaps spending P-8 money on buying uncrewed large submarines (large for uncrewed, not Attack sized) is better as it gives more survellience and allows the more targeted use of the P-8 fleet.

 

[seaspear]

This article provides some historical context on size and the reason for evolution
Judging the Good from the Bad

 

[Volkodav]

The SAAR 6, evolved from the K130 is an interesting design in the corvette space. It has a comprehensive air defence system including an significant anti missile capability, as well as a hangar and facilities suitable for a Seahawk, it shows what can be achieved on a limited displacement.

I have also read a USNI piece on corvettes, suggesting that a small, fast combatant, with modified F-35 like sensors and its sensor fusion, combined with canaster launched weapons could be both highly affordable and viable, while more combat effective than a more conventional FAC or corvette.

Then there is the Iver Huitfeldt based Type 31e, clearly not a corvette but an affordable general purpose frigate, well and truly capable of being upgraded quite significantly.

There are many options between an OPV and a high end, cruiser sized, frigate, I can see some of these options being a good fit with the ADF. The question remains whether they would be a supplement or a replacement for and existing or planned capability, would they come with an opportunity cost for other capabilities?

Are there capabilities that are worth discarding or reducing to fund corvettes?

 

[ngatimozart]

Ahhhh - my favorite saopbox! Repeated for truth

Exactly because we are dealing in realities and until more funding is provided where are you going to get the money from to introduce a new capability into the fleet?

I don't think so - your point about the radar pickets is my point.

No it doesn't because you are taking an example totally out of context and trying to use it to support your argument. The concept of distributed lethality was even thought of in WW2 because the CONOPS were totally different. The DD radar picket line was to provide advance warning or Japanese air attacks and nothing else. The USN DDs carried the typical armament and radar & sonar fitout available at that particular time of the war, plus the ever trusty Mk 1 eyeball.

That description of distributed lethality is part of the concept. Placing weapons across all vessels is great in theory, but in my view in practise it is a bugbear of mine but I've lost online and at work My specific issue with this is the scope creep within each ship's mission; and like the (ultimatly wrong) fighter mafia and the F-15E, every pound of missiles and offensive weapons on the non-pointy grey ships is one less pound of support; which is their primary job. This increases with the sensors - if an LHD needs VLS for SM-6 and CFAR what is it giving up? It needs some self defence (and I'm convinced Goalkeeper is the minimum needed, the Phalanx is out of date) but it's true defence lies in the networked umbrella of air defence. The air defence doctrine changes from 1938 - 1945 within the RN and USN highlight that (after the VT rolled out), depth and C2 was more important than more weapons.

A LHD having VLS with ESSM, SM2/6 plus 8 SSM, plus sensors is not going to give up a lot, if anything. At 27,000 tonnes displacement there will be room and stability tonnage to play with. It's not like an ANZAC FFG where every tonne is an issue. C2 / C3 is no problem because you use the same CMS, comms, data transfer etc., as the FFG. During WW2, the landing ships, merchies etc., had AAA in the form of 4", 3" guns, Bofors guns, Oerlikon cannon, machine guns etc., depending upon the country.

And do we honestly think an enemy won't try and sink every vessel?

Of course they will as we would theirs, but their basic strategy is take out the escorts first and then deal to the phat ships. However if every ship, including the phat ships, are capable of taking out your aircraft and warships etc., you have to target the lot at the same time. Means more resources have to be committed at once rather than in say a two wave strike and it also means that you have a higher probability of increased losses and mission failure.

The other part of the USN doctrine utilses uncrewed ships operating well away from the fleet to provide depth. This is where my critisism of the concept really stems from - those combatants are wasted. Any vessel operating by itself against a modern threat will find itself like a DD at Okinawa - uncovered and dead. An uncrewed vessel has even less options as the is absolutly no battle damge repair.

Not really - not accepting some comprimises and a shift in doctrine. There is a similar thought exercise using a Fletcher (Navy Matters: Knee Jerks and Paradigms) that I think has real possibilities. There is real truth in his views that there is a knee-jerk rejection of challenging 'known' concepts; and the Russian's appear to be demonstrating with their new corvette that such weapon loads are feasible. It wouldn't look like a modern 1945 DD, but putting those weapons on a 2000 t vessel is feasible on paper. Note that there are significant effencies in the engine room and electronics; modern systems are smaller and weigh less. In addition, the 4 - 5" guns offer options to sink ships beyond an expensive missile, provide naval gun fire support and point-defence that a 3" can't - plus offeres across RAN / USN / RN flexibility and commonality of parts and ammo.

Stuff like a hanger, sure - but the oft thrown out comment that steel is cheap and air free is wrong. Having played with the costies at work on real and hypothetical surface combatants the construction bill gets very big for ships the bigger they get. Electronics and the like only are 15- 20% of the cost of construction. I have always assumed it was the other way, that the hull + superstructure was 10 - 15% of the cost making a 7000 t ship a worse option than a 9000 t because it isn't the steel. That's not true though. And that fallicy became obvious across three costing methods.

As most here know, it's really hard to breakdown acqusition costings (especially for foreign nations), but looking at the LCS costings suggests that building a hull is very expensive. A 2000 t combatant hull will not cost 1/4 of the 9000 t Hunter, it will cost less. Before adding the sub-systems and weapons you will probably get 4 - 5 2000 t hulls for the cost of one Hunter. Furthermore, when we start taking losses, a 2000 t combatant is quicker to build than a Hunter or Hobart - so we can make up the losses faster. That includes just getting the raw material in the first place. That's before you get into infrastructure - there are more places in Australia that acn assemble a 2000 t ship than there are that can do a 9000 t ship. And a modular construction increases these options and speeds.

As for air, every additional cubic metre demands more HVAC and filtration, adding to the ships electrical load and increasing the demand on the engines and hence making them bigger. A 2000 t combatant would not need as much electrical load for it's livability, freeing up ergatrons for sensors, weapons or making the engine room smaller. This becomes even more obvious when looking at CBRN capabilities - there is less air that needs to be considered.

Now, traditionally combatants get bigger. Hence why a frigate is now 8800 t versus 1400 t from 70 years ago. Even in a class there is growth - the addiing of AA weapons and the lengthening of the American DD's and Type 12 show this. But starting at 1500 - 2000 t forces some naval perceptions and sacred cows to be reconsidered - and yet I believe a really useful, and survivable, ship can be developed that is cheap, flexible and has growth potential.

It's not about sacred cows as you put it, but about practicalities and safety. All very well having 32 VLS in said ship along with fancy electronics but no bloody good if said ship rolls on wet grass and turns turtle in a 4 m sea. 3,000 - 3, 500 tonne displacement probably would be better especially if you want room for upgrades but she'd be a tight fit and I'd forget about the 5" guns.

Hull and build costs very much depend upon where you build them. The LCS is expensive because its built in the US with professional, labour, and compliance costs being quite high there.

However the real problem with all this, is that there has been no true peer on peer full on naval combat at sea since WW2, so none of these theories and systems have been truly tested in such combat,so we don't know what works and what doesn't. Until then we could be sucking on the wrong prawn.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Our Australian cousins could better answer this but the Collins program was an attempt to address this as other SSKs at the time were deemed limited wrt range.

Its not just range. You can built a ship/sub with a 15,000 mile range. But if it only has a 30 day endurance you won't be going anywhere.

For subs this is a particular issue as they are not really able to be resupplied. Carrying extra diesel with a sub is very easy, some subs have more diesel compartments than they can possibly use and are just permanently filled with seawater. That doesn't really increase operational endurance.

For Australia's needs, you need a diesel will very fast transit speeds. Every day you waste in transit you loose two on station. You also need a sub that can maintain a ~80+ day endurance. HMAS Attack will be unmatched for its transit speeds as a diesel sub. There has never been a diesel sub with more installed diesel power.

Thats really the core of it. On top of that it needs to be a very good submarine, be able to support SSN level mech services (hot tropical waters), low noise, SSN sonar/combat etc.

Exactly because we are dealing in realities and until more funding is provided where are you going to get the money from to introduce a new capability into the fleet?

The original intention was for 20 OCV replacing the existing small ship fleet of 24+. While I certainly understand that there won't be any significant change in the main surface fleet, a ship with a crew <50 is something the RAN could do. Particularly if it has high levels of commonality with the existing OPV fleet, of 12. I believe funding could be found for acquisition, the main issues would be crewing and upgrades. Again.. Plus as I said, I don't think the capability will be properly funded until a decrease in the regional stability. Do I think the commonwealth could consider a design study for a few million. Yes, definitely.

But designing and building the first ship is often the most difficult task taking the most amount of time. It might be worthwhile to do this, particularly if we can offer regional friendlies this kind of capability and assist in manning it and use it as a joint project to build relations.

At this stage I think its a valid thing to have a discussion about. WW2 Australia build ~60 corvettes and operated 56 of them. The program started in 1938, played an important role in the war, and the ships played significant roles after the war.