I am not sure a catamaran is the answer if he is talking about over the beach rescue operations. Perhaps they would be better reinstating the LCH replacement program. The extra funding might be a little easier to obtain given recent events.
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates
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Takao
The Bunker Group
I think that's a great story bro, but lacking on a whole bunch of fronts.
Was HMAS Jervis Bay useful? Yes
Would a higher speed sea lift capability be useful? Yes
Is more sea lift needed? Yes
Except those three don't automatically answer each other. The author is, *sigh*, again, solutionising without any of the actual work in defining the problem.
Oh - and how were the people getting from the beach to the ferry? I get they are shallow draft - but there is still a wet gap to get kids, stores, animals and older people across....
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Actually the author got the tonnage wrong. The HMAS Jervis Bay did not displace 5000 tons. It was closer to 1200 tons. Makes me wonder how much research he did.
I think the Cat article and definitely my post were aimed at HADR and not “over the beach” operations.
If, during an assistance op, no wharf was available an EPF can use an embarked helo for transfers. The point being that a small-ish vessel can access small communities for immediate response. If heavy lifting is required the big boys can follow when needed.
The US Navy -- Fact File: Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF)
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Takao
The Bunker Group
I think I'm missing something here.
With a wharf - sold. A EPF can get there faster and lift out people quicker (although I'd like to see the maths at which lifts more over a given period/distance noting it takes about 4-5 EPF to lift what Choules can and 8 - 9 what Canberra can).
But if there is no wharf - you can get there quick and do what? Off Mallacoota they could have done very little without the ship-to-shore connectors. Noting that it would have taken 15 flights to load an EPF up with an MRH, that's close to not feasible - especially if there is an urgency factor or bad weather conditions.
I think an EPF can be justified on its merits. But part of that demands a secure SPOE that has appropriate facilities. Now, often that can be planned for or utilised. But selling them and using the recent fires as justification seems to be a little questionable.
I don’t think the Australian bushfire HADR is typical of what a Pacific support ship would be tasked to do although in other circumstances it may be useful and I certainly wouldn’t use the bushfire example as justification to acquire one.
They have proven to be extremely useful in West Africa and also in the HADR role after the St Maartens hurricane in the Caribbean.
The EPF has a 10 tonne crane which would enable it to embark and launch a LCVP in cases where no useful wharf was available.
FormerDirtDart
Well-Known Member
I posted this on another site yesterday. Seems relevant to the current discussion here
Basically traits of the Austal Omani HSSV applied to an extended US Navy EPF
I would add, they would need to remove the EPF's 'ferry seating' set up. And replace it with longer term berthing & C2 space
Basically traits of the Austal Omani HSSV applied to an extended US Navy EPF
I would add, they would need to remove the EPF's 'ferry seating' set up. And replace it with longer term berthing & C2 space
I have deleted 2 posts of yours because they were off topic and belligerent. Nothing to do with my personal views on the topic. If you continue to post off topic your posting rights here will cease. Final Warning!
They are still basically ferries, long term berthing isn't ideal for a HSV.
The improved aviation however is very useful for general enabling. You have a very high speed support platform to move/sustain air assets. Particularly useful on patrol, policing, ASW etc. Particularly in protected waters. A few of these operating around the Persian Gulf could be real game changers with regarding to supporting air or unmanned ops. But you have speed and capability that makes it fairly autonomous.
You have a really responsive platform that can really work in conjunction with air assets providing much more presence and ability to sustain, with out something like a LHD/LPD or carrier which has its own problems in something like the Gulf. At the same time, you have something that can quickly move resources around the region. Ideally not troops, at least not for long periods. But everything there is < 300km so in that kind of space, these types of craft are quite handy.
Operating in ocean conditions will see them get banged up quite badly and grumpy passengers.
I think there is a niche here, however..
As a connector to the larger ships and very short island hopping/port to port transfer.
Quick amphibious connector - L-CAT® Ship-to-Shore | CNIM
500nm range, 30kt max, ~100t payload max. Twice the range, 50-100% faster than the LCM1e. Not really a LCM replacement, but could be a handy augmentation.
The high speed transports are very useful for getting a lot of folk and 'some equipment' places in a hurry. The certainly work for the US Marines in the manner they operate them. But....
- They are based on the HSC code and in commerical use are restricted for 4 hours from a place of refeuge for a PAX vessel and 8 hours from a place of refuge for a cargo vessel. The RAN could ignore this but the limitation is there because of the operating limitations of the hull.
- In commericl use they are only used on fixed runs (for the reasons detailed in 1 above. Again the RAN could ignore this.
- They have significant operating limitions and are not design to rough it at speed. Tunnel slam adn prop immersion are probable issues and when operated to the limit of their envelope may be slower that a large mono hull.
- The burn prodigious amounts of fuel and this compromises long haul operations (i.e a round trip to Fiji and time on station). If they carry more fuel this compromises their cargo capacity.
- The are expnsive to run based on a fuel to cargo equation. A 20 knot large cargo vessel is going to deliver a lot more for a lot less cost and would not be thqat far behind the high speed transport (they would likely beat it if the weather was a bit lumpy)
- They have limited cargo capacity. The 127m trimaran ferry that under pins the LCS only has a cargo uplift capacity of around 500 tonnes. The T-EPF only has a cargo capacity of 600 short tons (which is 544 tonnes - see link below). This is not a lot and if the vessel is fitted with long range tanks it will come at the expense of cargo mass (these vessel will max out on weight way before the max out on volume)
- The T-EPF is designed around seated transport of troops which is entirely suitable for how the vessel is operated by the US. If additional 'proper' accomodation and medical facilities are required this again reduces cargo as the weight of cabins, galley, dining areas, supporting services and equipment, tanks (water and sewage) and stores for a prolonged voyage are going to weigh a lot more that a lot of folk sitting in a lightweight airline style seat.
- They are not cheap to buy and run over their life. They pretty fragile and the useful life will be short if operated hard. They are also not designed for combat (excluding LCS) in the T-EPF form.
Expeditionary Fast Transport (T-EPF)
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
IIRC, BC’s fast ferries were a derivative. Total cluster but most of that as due to the BC provincial government and a questionable builder. Still, the disposable of these ferries makes one question how viable they were. Apparently they weren’t even considered viable for HADR for the BC coast. Socialist government, $400+ million screw up...no big deal, the NDP supporters had jobs for a couple of years.
I’m not sure why they would be a cluster? The operator or builder perhaps?
The Alaska Marine Highway fleet operates this one and her sisterVessel Profile: FVF Chenega | Alaska Marine Highway System successfully in similar conditions.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
I agree, in that I do not really see these fitting either RAN capabilities and CONOPS, or being appropriate for a Pacific support ship, at least not based on what little has been released so far.
There are two additional areas which IMO was not really covered above that would cause issue in terms of suitability for the Pacific support ship. The first has to do with acquisition cost, with the production costs for Spearhead-class EPF's on the actively running Austal facility in Mobile, Alabama being ~USD$180 mil. or ~AUD$265 mil. at current exchange rates. I bring this number up because of two statements made about the Pacific ship, with the first being that the vessel will be "new" which I take to mean a newly-built vessel as opposed to purchasing a 2nd hand vessel that is already in service. The second statement is that the funding for the purchase is supposed to come from within the existing budget and will cause a deferment in some training, as opposed to additional or supplemental funding. With the purchase of the MV Skandi Bergen which became the ADV Ocean Shield, for AUD$130 mil. I cannot really see the defence budget being able to accommodate a purchase of AUD$250+ mil. without a significant negative impact, something beyond 'just' deferring some training.
The second area I see an issue with trying to use an EPF as the base for a Pacific support ship has to do with the potential areas where Australia would want or need to send a humanitarian vessel to, and the distances it would need to transit to get there. With a range of ~1,200 n miles @35 kts, there are quite a few places in the S. Pacific that would be out of reach without either a port call or RAS to refuel.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Lots of stupidity wrt the fast ferry failure. Builder and government were part of the problem and the MTU/water jet propulsion package was unreliable. Wake restrictions reduced a key feature...speed.
Defence leaders have refuted claims made in the press recently that the SEA1000 schedule and cost will fail to meet targets. The programme is continually being assessed and they say that delays in meeting the first targets will be made up over later stages.
They also deny looking to other submarine solutions.
Australian defense leaders defend submarine buy with France’s Naval Group
They also deny looking to other submarine solutions.
Australian defense leaders defend submarine buy with France’s Naval Group
Doesn't address the elephant in the room, however, which is the additional $145 Billion required to support these boats through end of life.
With the continuous build perhaps Australia could sell Canada the first batch of Attacks as they come due for their fist Full Cycle Docking at 8 to 10 years, and build new hulls for the RAn in a slightly increased build tempo.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
The RCN’s Victoria class will need replacement before the first batch would become available I would think, especially when the time for refit is added in. What is your estimate as to when this batch would start to become available?
Generally agree but two points.
1. Six subs has always been less than required, even when the sub capability was seen as primarily a clockwork mouse for ASW training for the Skimmers and ASW aircraft. To meet the training need of the ADF (back when they took ASW seriously) it was determined we needed a minimum of 8 hulls, while the UK Submarine flotilla size of 10 was seen as the ideal. I look at Tiger as an example of fleet size affecting capability, had we only acquired 12 to 15 to equip a single Sqn plus training, deep maintenance and attrition overheads I suspect the capability would have been stretched to the point of failure and the fleet would not be doing the things it does today. Had we gone in and ordered 30 or so Tigers up front the capability would likely be operating much more comfortably today with no question what so ever of early replacement.
2. These days the subs are seen as our most survivable strike, ASW, ISR and special forces support capability. They are probably the most hot war (China) survivable capability we have and any aggressor is going to be sh_tting bricks until they have accounted for each and every allied submarine when embarking on any adventure. Subs require disproportionate resources to counter because the enemy doesn't know where they are and they can actually remain hidden while gathering intelligence, deploying special forces, UUVs, mines etc. The can sneak in somewhere, do what they need to do, and sneak out while the enemy is sardine bashing literal schools of fish, doing an immense amount of damage to the enemy without firing a shot. When its worth it they can sink a high value target ie a carrier or large amphib and quite possibly slink away after. Assuming they get a land attack capability they can assist in delaminating an enemy air defence system (South China Sea anyone), clearing the way for other strike assets.
And it was apparently only partially double hulled, and its machinery was not as effectively isolated from the hull as the Collins.
There are things the Swedes did better than the Germans, Brits or Dutch back in the 80s that helped make the Collins the boats they are today. Long time ago yes but subs are usually evolutionary, not revolutionary and pretty much every current design is evolved from something much older, the Japanese boats can be traced back to the USN Barbel design (as can the Dutch Walrus I believe) while the German designs trace back to the tiny Type 206. Been a long time but the DNA is still there, the Collins was just evolved for a newer, more advanced design.
The Barracuda is a new design with less DNA from earlier designs holding it back and Australia's experience with the Oberons and then the Collins made it apparent that some of the offered designs were in some key ways less advance and less capable than what we already had, only the Short Fin offered a real advance over an evolved Collins.
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