John Fedup
The Bunker Group
As long as junior is around, no CDS will requote that completely sensible line. As for all those battling these horrendous fires, awesome service! BE SAFE!!
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates
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The Military has some capability to help out in civil emergencies. But it shouldn't take away focus from their core function (at all) and it should be at the cost of civilian services that look after those responsibilities. In many cases there is positive overlap. The current scale of the bush fires is an unprecedented emergency as Australia has never had fires of this size before.
Spartans doing airlift of fire fighter personnel. The Navy evacuating people. RAAF Richmond is getting a heavy workout with fire fighting planes and coordinating the helicopters. Army in helping in communications and supply drops to emergency centers. In each of these cases, they are basically doing what they would normally do, but doing it to assist local civilians. IMO the ADF is doing heaps to support the emergency services at the moment, however that message isn't clearly getting out. It should also be minimal in length.
It doesn't mean getting the Army or Navy to man fire hoses, or act as a police force. That does take away from their role.
Anyway. Too late now.
Its currently 47+ degrees c at Richmond right now. These are record temperatures, with record low rainfall, gusty winds. It is truly apocalyptic conditions. Doing anything in direct sunlight is likely to give you heat exhaustion very quickly. The fires are now too large to fight effectively, fire fronts are hundreds of km long.
3000 reservists are being called up. However, many reservists are also volunteer fire fighters, and have already been fighting the fires "unpaid" for 2+ months. I know of a cop who is also a reservist and a volunteer fire fighter. They want him to do all three jobs at the same time.
PM announces deployment of Navy's largest amphibious ship to fire-affected areas
Chinooks coming down from Townville
HMAS Adelaide has been activated too. To evacuate people from Victoria.
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
Reservists who are also volunteer Fire Fighters or whose Homes are under threat will not be part of the 3000 that was made clear in the Press Conference today.
Takao
The Bunker Group
The mods may want to cut this across to the Army discussion, but...
A Brigade is the unit of action. You want us to do anything more than a week against any type of actual threat? It's almost certain you need a Brigade. It gives you firepower, manoeuvrability, mass, flexibility, comms and resilience. It also - and most importantly - gives you C2 beyond 5000 m. At a pinch, the Bde Commander can act as a JTF Commander (yes, doctrinally they can, but there is a significant amount of pressure on the HQ then that is...sub-optimal). The Land Force acts as combined arms formation - and that demands a Brigade.
If we are a bit player within a coalition (a'la Afghanistan or Iraq) you can get away without it - but it significantly restricts your options and you end up being a one trick pony that doesn't really accomplish anything. Remember that our effort in Timor-Leste in 1999 was a Brigade (minus tanks and the guns) - and if there had been the slightest suggestion the Indonesian's weren't going to let us go in then you can bet the tanks and guns would have been there.
All of that demands an ARG to seize the way. It demands more than an ARG. And yes, it'll need escorts. But if you are about to commit a Brigade (with all its attachments), what else do you think the DDGs, FFGs and SSGs are going to be doing? That mission will be the main effort of the theatre - and there will be everything supporting that. Including Triton, P-8s, F-35s, FA-18s and EA-18s. Just like the amphib fleet has been in every operation. Even in 1982 the carriers shifted to protecting the ARG as it came into the theatre. Even in 1945 we took naval forces off their normal missions to devote to the escort of the invasion forces within Operation Oboe - and the IJN no longer existed as a naval force!
As for the claim there will never be an opposed landing again - it's been said before. I have senior RN and USN admirals highlighting that landings were no longer feasible in 1900s and 1910s thanks to radio/howitzers/vehicles; 1922 and 1928 thanks to Gallipoli; 1938 thanks to the airpower shown in the Spanish Civil War; 1948 thanks to Normandy, North Africa and the Pacific; and 1954 thanks to nukes and Inchon. With all of those naysayers in mind, we still did opposed and unopposed landings after we assessed they were impossible. The reality is we have never wanted to do opposed landings ("soft underbelly of Europe" anyone?). Look at the planning for Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Leyte Gulf and Japan - the Americans tried to land where the Japanese weren't! Look at the effort taken to draw the Germans away from Sicily or Normandy. Opposed landings have never been preferred or wanted. Sometimes the terrain and the mission dictate otherwise though. Sometimes you do have to do an opposed landing. Any enemy worth their salt will know likely avenues of advance, likely landing zones and their key areas to defend. But that's always been the case.
It's why we don't do landings at the drop of the hat; why we take weeks or months to plan them and it's a fully integrated plan that involves 10 - 100 times the number of people than simply the landing force. The ADF landing of 2025 will not just be elements of 1 and 16 Brigade + the LHDs, LSD and escorts. There will be subs on maritime approaches, SF playing silly buggers, a full list of options from the RAAF that seek to kill everything red that flies, floats or drives within 50 km of the force. This builds on all the preliminary strikes on red C2 nodes, log nodes, critical assets. The EM spectrum won't be usable - because we'll have killed it. All within an IO campaign that will have been going for months - if not years. All of this in turn will be operating within an integrated plan that will be applying effects across time and space and a solid, responsive logistics system that can get the land force the replacements and stores at D-10 that they will need.
Note that the RAN has proven their bit of the ARG. So has 16 Brigade. They've put the three amphibs to see, with an escort and operated an Aviation TG off them. And they've done it twice now. So the last bit is the Land Force. It's up to us to demonstrate that we can put the Brigade ashore - and support it.
With all this in mind, it's one of our jobs. And if the mission that the Government gives us needs an opposed landing - by God we better have thought about it and trained for it. Because we cannot turn around to the public and say "ahhh, gee, we didn't think we'd need to do this".
A Brigade is the unit of action. You want us to do anything more than a week against any type of actual threat? It's almost certain you need a Brigade. It gives you firepower, manoeuvrability, mass, flexibility, comms and resilience. It also - and most importantly - gives you C2 beyond 5000 m. At a pinch, the Bde Commander can act as a JTF Commander (yes, doctrinally they can, but there is a significant amount of pressure on the HQ then that is...sub-optimal). The Land Force acts as combined arms formation - and that demands a Brigade.
If we are a bit player within a coalition (a'la Afghanistan or Iraq) you can get away without it - but it significantly restricts your options and you end up being a one trick pony that doesn't really accomplish anything. Remember that our effort in Timor-Leste in 1999 was a Brigade (minus tanks and the guns) - and if there had been the slightest suggestion the Indonesian's weren't going to let us go in then you can bet the tanks and guns would have been there.
All of that demands an ARG to seize the way. It demands more than an ARG. And yes, it'll need escorts. But if you are about to commit a Brigade (with all its attachments), what else do you think the DDGs, FFGs and SSGs are going to be doing? That mission will be the main effort of the theatre - and there will be everything supporting that. Including Triton, P-8s, F-35s, FA-18s and EA-18s. Just like the amphib fleet has been in every operation. Even in 1982 the carriers shifted to protecting the ARG as it came into the theatre. Even in 1945 we took naval forces off their normal missions to devote to the escort of the invasion forces within Operation Oboe - and the IJN no longer existed as a naval force!
As for the claim there will never be an opposed landing again - it's been said before. I have senior RN and USN admirals highlighting that landings were no longer feasible in 1900s and 1910s thanks to radio/howitzers/vehicles; 1922 and 1928 thanks to Gallipoli; 1938 thanks to the airpower shown in the Spanish Civil War; 1948 thanks to Normandy, North Africa and the Pacific; and 1954 thanks to nukes and Inchon. With all of those naysayers in mind, we still did opposed and unopposed landings after we assessed they were impossible. The reality is we have never wanted to do opposed landings ("soft underbelly of Europe" anyone?). Look at the planning for Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Leyte Gulf and Japan - the Americans tried to land where the Japanese weren't! Look at the effort taken to draw the Germans away from Sicily or Normandy. Opposed landings have never been preferred or wanted. Sometimes the terrain and the mission dictate otherwise though. Sometimes you do have to do an opposed landing. Any enemy worth their salt will know likely avenues of advance, likely landing zones and their key areas to defend. But that's always been the case.
It's why we don't do landings at the drop of the hat; why we take weeks or months to plan them and it's a fully integrated plan that involves 10 - 100 times the number of people than simply the landing force. The ADF landing of 2025 will not just be elements of 1 and 16 Brigade + the LHDs, LSD and escorts. There will be subs on maritime approaches, SF playing silly buggers, a full list of options from the RAAF that seek to kill everything red that flies, floats or drives within 50 km of the force. This builds on all the preliminary strikes on red C2 nodes, log nodes, critical assets. The EM spectrum won't be usable - because we'll have killed it. All within an IO campaign that will have been going for months - if not years. All of this in turn will be operating within an integrated plan that will be applying effects across time and space and a solid, responsive logistics system that can get the land force the replacements and stores at D-10 that they will need.
Note that the RAN has proven their bit of the ARG. So has 16 Brigade. They've put the three amphibs to see, with an escort and operated an Aviation TG off them. And they've done it twice now. So the last bit is the Land Force. It's up to us to demonstrate that we can put the Brigade ashore - and support it.
With all this in mind, it's one of our jobs. And if the mission that the Government gives us needs an opposed landing - by God we better have thought about it and trained for it. Because we cannot turn around to the public and say "ahhh, gee, we didn't think we'd need to do this".
Over the Christmas period there are a couple of vessels kept at high readiness while the remainder have a reduced activity period and their ship’s companies get some leave. As has been proven on many occasions that Operational Response Vessel can be sailed very quickly; Choules would seem to have been the ORV this year. Getting non ORV ships sailed will always take longer as you have to recall their people from all over the place. Complaining that Adelaide or Canberra were not immediately available is ignoring reality.
And ignoring the fact Choules was acquired to provide an extra large hull to ensure one would always be available for disaster relief following the no show of Bill, Ben or Tobroken following a cyclone. Three modern capable, well maintained ships is a much better state of affairs than a decade ago.
My experience on the FCPB was the captain was a two and a half (sometimes a two ringer) and there were no Commanders at sea. To be far we did not operate in formations except in exercises and most of what we did was patrol ward off illegal fishermen. We did a long overseas deployment to escort a PCPB to Micronesia (coming back via Guam and Vanuatu) but again only with a two and a half in charge.
Certainly commendable that Choules was available and an LHD was able to follow up in due course.
It does highlight that numbers of a capability certainly helps with availability.
So consigning the "Era" of Bill,Ben and Tobroken to history and acknowledging they're Amphibious contribution was an improvement on what we had in the 70's + 80's.
Where do we go from here.
Does the Amphibious / Supply fleet stay at 5, or is this inadequate for our needs in the decades ahead?
Suggest lack of numbers may prove a problem , and some reflection on this may need a fix, sooner rather than later.
Regards S
The ANI has published three more highly commended essays from the CN's recent essay competition: Melos Down Under by Roger Strachan, Undersea disruption: retaining a potent covert capability by Patrick McMillan & Thomas Paterson, & Implications for the Royal Australian Navy of the Second World War in Australia’s Region by Robert Moyse.
Of the three, Moyse's essay is definitely worth a read followed closely by Strachan's essay.
Of the three, Moyse's essay is definitely worth a read followed closely by Strachan's essay.
Novascotiaboy
Active Member
Melos Down Under is IMHO better applied to New Zealand. Australia has invested in its armed forces and continues to do so. Its well known amongst those here that the NZDF is woefully under resourced. A three, preferably four, frigate navy is needed sooner rather than later. In order to get the quantity the UK T31 is the type of ship that should be considered. Commercial standards of build with adequate sensors and an ability to up gun if required. An open ocean escort able to show presence and offer a credible contribution to an allied force. I think T26 is too costly for NZ in terms of limiting the number acquired given the overall cost.
Undersea Disruption has implications for the NZDF as well. Although unlikely there is value in a submarine force to provide NZ with protection but the cost would be astronomical as NZ has no background. In comparison to a three frigate T26 acquisition how much would a three Attack class acquisition cost?
The third article was a good read but the implications to NZ are limited as distance from the threat is an important consideration. But again the report highlights the SLOC that require protection and this is best done from the sea.
In all three reports the need for a strong navy is emphasised many times.
People like Ngati should be listened to by those in elected positions. His repeated concerns for the Sea Blindness of NZ is ever more important as each day goes by.
But I digress.
Undersea Disruption has implications for the NZDF as well. Although unlikely there is value in a submarine force to provide NZ with protection but the cost would be astronomical as NZ has no background. In comparison to a three frigate T26 acquisition how much would a three Attack class acquisition cost?
The third article was a good read but the implications to NZ are limited as distance from the threat is an important consideration. But again the report highlights the SLOC that require protection and this is best done from the sea.
In all three reports the need for a strong navy is emphasised many times.
People like Ngati should be listened to by those in elected positions. His repeated concerns for the Sea Blindness of NZ is ever more important as each day goes by.
But I digress.
NZ is in orbit around AU. No one is getting anywhere near NZ without taking on Australia first. Unlike Melos Australia has a significant Navy. We also don't intend to fight them off our coastline, Australia has always been about pushing the fight well away from our shores, of at least the mainland. However, both Australia and NZ need to work out how much of a priority is our Navy and how far we want to push it away from our coastlines. Key issues of cost for countries like NZ/AU are crewing, crewing isn't hugely different between the two ships. I think many would love to see NZ return to three or four frigate navy, that would be a significant capability. Australia's fleet span two enormous oceans the pacific and the Indian, so NZ operating 3-4 capable ships in the Pacific adds tremendous coverage and availability improvements.
The problem with NZ operating subs is the distance. Its 2000km to Australia. However, I am sure Australia would gladly facilitate a NZ force, but again, its not really a core function of NZ's navy. Any kiwi's interested in becoming submariners would be gobbled up by the RAN anyway. However, undersea drones might be something for NZ to look at in the future.
I disagree that Melos Down Under doesn't apply to Australia, because it very much does and I would suggest that it is read in conjunction with Implications for the Royal Australian Navy of the Second World War in Australia’s Region – The Australian Naval Institute because the two are interrelated. Regarding the NZ issues that's for discussion on the RNZN page and not here.
Does Australia need an ice strengthened OPV? Something like the Norwegian NoCGV Svalbard perhaps? Or is the ABFC Ocean Shield ur go to ship?
Is something grey with a gun required?
I know there are a lot nice to haves but being able to effectively patrol all our zones of interest/responsibilities is important. It would also avoid sending (risking damage to) a Frigate.
Is something grey with a gun required?
I know there are a lot nice to haves but being able to effectively patrol all our zones of interest/responsibilities is important. It would also avoid sending (risking damage to) a Frigate.
Takao
The Bunker Group
Ocean Shield and its replacement are the go to's. It's unlikely that any threat or anything worth a FFG can physically operate down there across winter, so the priority for an ice-hardened hull on a grey ship is quite low.
About 10 or so years or even longer back, the RNZN sailed a ANZAC frigate into the great southern ocean where icebergs roam and after that experience said never again. It suffered damaged to the foc'sle and other parts from the tad heavy seas that inhabit such regions. Ever since the Protector class OPVs have ventured south and even they are pushing it on occasion, however they are only minimumly ice strengthened to Class 1C. That's why the NZG is acquiring a purpose built Southern Ocean PV - eventually.
It is my belief that Australia will eventually have to sortie purpose built armed gray painted hulls down to the Ice as nations like China decided to ignore the Antarctic Treaty and deploy armed forces on and around the continent as they look to begin extracting the mineral resources from there and utilising the strategic advantages of it.
Takao
The Bunker Group
I agree about the likely increase in security issues around Antarctica, but when discussing this with some very senior RAN and ADF personnel, the comment was "it's not that we can't operate there in winter, it's that no-one can". Hence my assessment that, while a priority to develop a capability (as you rightly point out, we may have to go there in the medium-long term), it's quite low compared to the other priorities within the ADO.
It is a low priority but i would prefer the Government started to think about it now than the usual panic buy of an unsuitable ship when things go pear shaped. And it's not like an extra OPV or two would go astray. Better to get the right ship(s), experience and SOP's worked out before we need them. It would also signal our intention to protect the AAT.
To your senior RAN and ADF officers i would advise, never say never. We're not talking ice breakers or anything like that. It's operating there when others want to.
To your senior RAN and ADF officers i would advise, never say never. We're not talking ice breakers or anything like that. It's operating there when others want to.
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DouglasLees
Member
On a light-heated note, as it's midweek, I think I'd like to apply for a job supplying gas to this transport company. I have perfect qualifications, decades of experience and can provide excellent references.
The Ocean Shield and Ocean Protector are both at the bottom edge of the Ice Class range and are not intended in or through heavy ice, however, they are entirely satisfactory for southern ocean patrols.
For the most part a 50 cal is more than enough for illegal fishermen and other policing activities.
It is not just the hull structure that is important it is how the vessel is operated. Adelaide operated deep into the southern ocean to rescue Tony Bullimore. The issue there was taking time to ‘normalise’ the hull to the temperature. Racing into very cold waters without doing this can result in brittle cracking.
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