Janes isn't the authority it once was, and apart from that, how would they know that 48 VLS was mandated?? None of us here has seen any public announcement of those finer details for the RFT, they are just not in the public domain.
No doubt the RFT specified a minimum, but again we don't know what that is, was it 16? or 32? or 48? or even 148??
Firstly, if you go back to the 'parent' designs for the three contenders, the F-105/AWD came with 48 Strike Length Mk41 VLS, and Navantia did publicly state their 'offering' was 48 in the F-5000, the parent Italian FREMM had 16 and space for an additional 16 (eg total 32), the UK T26 has 24 Strike Length Mk41 VLS.
If you have a look at various models/renderings/images of the three designs for SEA5000, they show that F-5000 is 48, and the other two, 32 cells.
Here's a number of links with those models, etc:
sea 5000 pacific 2017 - Google Search
And this on DTR:
Defence Technology Review : DTR OCT 2017, Page 1
And this too:
BAE Systems Wins Australia’s SEA 5000 Tender with Type 26 - Hunter-class Frigate
It would 'appear' at this stage the Hunter class FFGs will have 32, but of course that could change, who knows??
I think it's also worth going back a few pages (page 2017, Samoa's post), where he said:
As someone who has been directly involved in the SEA5000 CEP for the past three years ......
I know a lot of posters are fixated on specific weapons loadout or ‘insert my niche subject’ but that selected design meets all requirements set out in the CEP by CASG. For example, one of the misnomers, is the VLS cell count, the answer should be well known following any kind of investigative research on-line which should allow you to deduce the answer. While a keyboard warrior considers more is better, you need to appreciate the big picture of providing more (or less) to the overall package of capabilities sought by the CoA that are stipulated in the requirement set. If more, then where is the funding allocation to come from to justify the procurement of additional FMS equipment (the VLS launchers are not an inconsequential cost impact to the overall programme bottom line), noting the DoD must to put forward costs and budgetary submission through first and second pass endorsements to government to allow this to be realizable, and the budget had already been set. Ultimately what is the purpose of ‘more’ if insufficient birds are not planned for inventory. How does this compromise on other capabilities that are specified in the requirement set, which have been built around a set of conops and a doctrine of use? One of the most significant technical aspects of the GCS-A is the platforms inherent margins, which frankly have been engineered into the platform in ways that have not been widely employed before. They are nothing ground-breaking but are clever. So, should the CoA decide after building FOC, or anywhere during the drumbeat that it would like to double the cell load-out it can, and know that it’s going to have to a high level of confidence that this can be done without unacceptable loss of other capabilities, and furthermore and significantly so that this can be done within the drumbeat cycle and not halt the ‘continuous’ build cycle.
(S
The part that stands out to me is:
So, should the CoA decide after building FOC, or anywhere during the drumbeat that it would like to double the cell load-out it can, and know that it’s going to have to a high level of confidence that this can be done without unacceptable loss of other capabilities, and furthermore and significantly so that this can be done within the drumbeat cycle and not halt the ‘continuous’ build cycle.
As to the number of VLS, who knows? Again, it 'appears' to be 32 at this stage, but that could increase if required in the future.
Cheers,
