I was reading about the distributed lethality concept which seems to effectively network the entire surface fleet.
'Distributed Lethality' Is The Surface Navy's Strategy For The Trump Era
Unless I am misunderstanding the concept of distributed lethality ... which is possible ... it means that the OPVs will already be effective combat vessels even if they aren't fitted with much more than what they already carry. They could operate as part of a networked group sharing information with other more powerful units. If that is the case you could probably get away with fitting them with a basic CIWS and they might simply serve as part of the kill chain allowing the navies new destroyers and frigates to fire their weapons remotely at extreme range.
Australia seems to have already taken a step in this direction with the mandating the all future naval vessels including the OPVs and new AORs be fitted with the SAAB Australia developed combat management system.
My take on Distributed Lethality is that it is similar to such developments for aircraft/the air force. What that essentially means is that the shooting platform and the sensing/detecting platform do not have to be one and the same.
With that in mind, I still do not see much of a role for either the SEA 1180 OPV's or the RAN's future AOR in distributed lethality, unless those vessels are going to be kitted out much better than expected or IMO even advisable. The armaments, at least as currently indicated, are not (IMO at least) at a minimum capable of basic self-defence, but instead are only sufficient vs. incoming hostile smallcraft. The OPV's and/or AOR would be vulnerable to hostile warships, aircraft, submarines, and AShM or torpedoes launched from any of the previously listed types of platforms. This would be exacerbated if the OPV's and/or AOR would be acting as a picket vessel.
In addition, while the vessels are to be fitted with the common 9LV CMS in use aboard the FFH's and LHD's, without comprehensive (and expensive) sensor fitouts like air & surface search radars, hull & towed sonar arrays, ESM, etc. the vessels would be unsuitable for the sensor role, in addition to already being unsuitable for the shooter role. Absent more capabilities than the SEA 1180 OPV design is currently understood to have, or major upgrades to the current design, I suspect the vessels would be little more than targets in a future shooting war.
I think these are all good suggestions and in the interests of the original question and delving into fantasy money land I would offer that any expansion of the RAN should concentrate on Warfare helos as you mention above and increasing the submarine fleet by a further 50% above the planned 12. Subs are the most effective force multiplier in our arsenal producing a strategic and tactical response way in excess of their actual numbers.
However, as Maritime and anti submarine warfare acquisitions already consume 25% of the entire planned investment in our defence force any non emergency increase is in the realm of fantasy.
The ACPBs and Capes are a complete aberration with a planned 15 year life and I doubt if they will ever be repeated, although Alex probably knows what the build rules are for the Lurssen replacement, I don't.
My interest in seeing more naval helicopters like the MH-60R 'Romeo' brought into service is their ability to participate and expand upon the capabilities of whatever group or task force they are assigned to. Having four or more 'Romeos' in a task force should permit one to stay aloft in most conditions, and provide an extended and expanded sensor footprint beyond what the vessels themselves could do. This is of course operating under the assumption that such a hypothetical RAN task force was operating outside of the range at which the RAAF could sustain land-based surveillance aircraft operations. On a related note, I would also like to see more such enabling systems like a closer to 1:1 replacement ratio for the AP-3C to P-8A, more E-7's, more AAR, etc.
Where things start to get questionable is how and where a RAN task force could have sufficient helicopters embarked to provide both an ASW when needed, and air/surface surveillance coverage. One of the LHD's definitely has sufficient helicopter spots, but utilizing them would degrade the LHD's ability to land, move and support embarked troops in their primary role.
As a side note, in the event of hostilities, having orbiting naval helicopters near some of Australia's major ports could help detect and deter (or destroy) unfriendly visitors and any 'tourists' they might attempt to deliver.