Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[t68]

I would have thought that a more doable option would be to increase the offensive and defensive capabilities of a given platform rather than more vessels. CRAM and Tommahawk are just two example of what could be done.
A stronger long range offensive anti-ship capacity in the air would a cheaper way this same goals could be achieved.

Having seen 9 major ships of the fleet at Garden Island, on a rare visit to Sydney this week, I was impressed. Would like to see their crews given the best in equipment.

Agree, but unfortunately that's also defined by the limited funding for capability, we saw that with the AWD build program Gibbs &Cox was the preferred vessel not only in more capability per vessel but more future growth, with the trade off being the less capability per ship but with a hoped option of a forth hull, 3 Baby Burkes would have given us the same VLS capability as 4 current Hobarts. Its only speculation now if it would have been cheaper or not

 

[hauritz]

In Australia's case it could be manpower costs that would stop it from significantly expanding the size of its navy so I agree that we might end up having to squeeze every bit of capability we can out of the hulls we will have.

The final design for Australia's new frigates haven't been determined yet and the government has already started to add on extra capabilities such as AEGIS and Ballistic Missile defences. Land attack missiles may soon follow.

Australia may yet regret not going for a larger hull design such as the Baby Burke.

 

[alexsa]

In Australia's case it could be manpower costs that would stop it from significantly expanding the size of its navy so I agree that we might end up having to squeeze every bit of capability we can out of the hulls we will have.

The final design for Australia's new frigates haven't been determined yet and the government has already started to add on extra capabilities such as AEGIS and Ballistic Missile defences. Land attack missiles may soon follow.

Australia may yet regret not going for a larger hull design such as the Baby Burke.

I understand the man power issue is be exacerbated but a large number of ineffectives (due to medical, physical or mental health issues). I admin this is third hand from someone who has just left the RAN and was involved in manpower. I don’t have any reason to believe he would embellish this. If you look at the number of uniform members in the navy offer the last 30 years and the crew sizes relative to the ships we should be able to man up all current vessels effectively.

If this situation is true then we have a significant HR issue that is directly impacting effectiveness.

PS: it can be a bit hard to get definite figures on the aDF numbers. The ADF took a bit hit in the mid 80s from around 72K personal (ful time) but stabilised at about 58K by about 1996.

The Challenge of Military Service: Defence Personnel Conditions in a Changing Social Context – Parliament of Australia

Current manning for the ADF is just over 58K

 

[StingrayOZ]

I wonder how the RAN will function when the UK and Canada come on line with new ships and it will become harder to steal/poach/attract sailors from the RN and the Canadian Navy. But this affects the RAN no matter what its size as does ineffectiveness issues.

IMO its not an impossible dream to go to 14 surface combatants it may even be desirable in terms of hull management for upgrades, and fleet life. I think if you wanted more than that you would be looking at corvettes or something with a lot less man power and trading in larger hulls for more smaller hulls.

I don't think a baby burke was ever a realistic hull for the entire surface combatants like the F-105 hull might be. Crewing size (220) and over all cost would have ruled it out.

 

[Takao]

I understand the man power issue is be exacerbated but a large number of ineffectives (due to medical, physical or mental health issues). I admin this is third hand from someone who has just left the RAN and was involved in manpower. I don’t have any reason to believe he would embellish this. If you look at the number of uniform members in the navy offer the last 30 years and the crew sizes relative to the ships we should be able to man up all current vessels effectively.

If this situation is true then we have a significant HR issue that is directly impacting effectiveness.

PS: it can be a bit hard to get definite figures on the aDF numbers. The ADF took a bit hit in the mid 80s from around 72K personal (ful time) but stabilised at about 58K by about 1996.

The Challenge of Military Service: Defence Personnel Conditions in a Changing Social Context – Parliament of Australia

Current manning for the ADF is just over 58K

I think you are on to something here alexsa, there are HR issues that need to be addressed first. A couple of RAN officers and I tried to chase this topic in 2016 and couldn't get a definite answer. But, broadly speaking, the RAN of the early 1960s had similar numbers of ships and personnel that they do today. Despite that, our FAA has been cut and our ships require less crew (look at the engineering department of the two HMAS Brisbane's!). So where is the 'gap' in personnel?

The best we could come up with was a combination of Joint requirements (especially at the operational level) and the greater corporate governance requirements. Not sure what is more important, Fleet or Canberra. Nonetheless, I'd be concerned that the current RAN does not have the depth to fight a major war, especially if taking losses (but then again, that's an ADF issue).

 

[John Fedup]

I wonder how the RAN will function when the UK and Canada come on line with new ships and it will become harder to steal/poach/attract sailors from the RN and the Canadian Navy. But this affects the RAN no matter what its size as does ineffectiveness issues.

IMO its not an impossible dream to go to 14 surface combatants it may even be desirable in terms of hull management for upgrades, and fleet life. I think if you wanted more than that you would be looking at corvettes or something with a lot less man power and trading in larger hulls for more smaller hulls.

I don't think a baby burke was ever a realistic hull for the entire surface combatants like the F-105 hull might be. Crewing size (220) and over all cost would have ruled it out.

Given Canada's performance in military procurement, the sailor movement will continue from RCN to RAN as the RCN fleet diminishes. The RN has new ships coming on line but limited funds to crew them so unless the UK government starts funding the RN properly their sailors may drift to warmer waters too.

 

[hairyman]

Given the various calls for increases to our defence force and defence spending, from Jim Molan and others, how many surface combatant ships should the RAN have? It is obvious that twelve will not be sufficient. I would personally like to see three further AWD's built, but bigger and more powerful. And there might be a case for a number of smaller frigates than those planned for as Future Frigates, take a leaf out of Japans book, who are building 3000 ton frigates as well as their larger ones. If we went along that path, I would re-visit Meko, their 200 AN looks like it would be a good fit for the RAN. Slightly smaller than the Anzac class.

 

[hairyman]

Another thought, would it not be practical for the RAN to purchase a number of Lynx Wildcat helicopters for use from our smaller vessels? The Wildcat can be used in all the roles that the M60R can do, and it is only half the size?

 

[ASSAIL]

Another thought, would it not be practical for the RAN to purchase a number of Lynx Wildcat helicopters for use from our smaller vessels? The Wildcat can be used in all the roles that the M60R can do, and it is only half the size?

It may be half the size but what will it be there for?
System integration, weapon commonality and data links are all complex issues which need to be considered.
The helo is not there as just a helo, it's there as an extension of the Fleet/ship capability and must integrate seamlessly across all the platforms.
So no, it wouldn't be practical, it would be possible with a huge effort in time and money and we'd end up with twice the expense and half the capability.

 

[hairyman]

ASSAIL, what do you say regarding my previous post in relation to the size of the Australian surface combatant fleet? Do you think 12 ships is enough? Or how many would you like to see in our future fleet?
I value your opinion.

 

[Todjaeger]

Another thought, would it not be practical for the RAN to purchase a number of Lynx Wildcat helicopters for use from our smaller vessels? The Wildcat can be used in all the roles that the M60R can do, and it is only half the size?

If memory serves, the in-service helicopter with a size issue is the NH90, which is a bit too large to fit aboard in the hangar of the ANZAC-class FFH's. The S-70B-2 Seahawks and presumably the MH-60R 'Romeo' which is based off the Seahawk did not/does not have that issue.

With the SEA 1180 OPV design at present lacking a hangar, I do not see any particular need or advantage to getting another, smaller sized helicopter. This is before any considerations would come into play about supporting yet another helicopter type, or the need to achieve integration with the comms and weapon systems etc.

 

[ASSAIL]

ASSAIL, what do you say regarding my previous post in relation to the size of the Australian surface combatant fleet? Do you think 12 ships is enough? Or how many would you like to see in our future fleet?
I value your opinion.

In answering this question I'm constrained by the 2016 DWP and IIP. The most important guidance in these documents comes in the IIP Forward and is worth reading every time a suggestion on force structure is made.
The IIP was developed through a comprehensive force structure review which assessed defence capability needs to meet the challenges of our regions operating environment through the 2030s.
It ensured an alignment between national defence strategy, capability and resources and the result was a BALANCED, AFFORDABLE AND CAPABLE force.
The Australian government decides both Strategic Fefence Interests and Strategic Defence Objectives.
These Objectives are threefold; to defer,, deny and defeat attacks on Australia and our northern approaches, to effectively contribute to operations in maritime SEAsia and support the governments of PNG, Timor L'Este and the Pacific Islands and lastly to contribute military capabilities to coalition operations supporting our strategic objectives. We should refer to these Objectives often.

All the above is a long winded way of saying that I believe our force structure is currently adequate (including the surface Fleet) within the constraints of balance and affordability. The question you should ask is " if the surface force is increased, what capability and from which service will a sacrifice be made to pay for and man it"?

 

[Todjaeger]

All the above is a long winded way of saying that I believe our force structure is currently adequate (including the surface Fleet) within the constraints of balance and affordability. The question you should ask is " if the surface force is increased, what capability and from which service will a sacrifice be made to pay for and man it"?

I have a suggestion on the above. Increase the number of naval helicopters and ensure that sufficient are in inventory to be operational whilst embarked on all major vessels. Also work/re-work to ensure that SEA 1180 vessels can have and support an embarked naval helicopter. As for where the sacrifice should be made in service... How does from PM&C and the MP's sound?

There are a number of ways that could be realized to expand the capabilities of the RAN. As Assail mentioned though there are issues of balance and affordability. I would like there to be more VLS cells available for a larger and wider range of missile loads than currently possible for the RAN. However, one problem with more VLS cells (apart from the cells themselves have acquisition and maintenance costs) is that getting enough munitions to fill those cells can be an expensive proposition.

What might be possible is to require all future RAN (as opposed to vessels in general gov't service) be built to naval as opposed to other build standards. I do not know about the SEA 1180 vessels, but the ACPB and I strongly suspect the Cape-class patrol boats in RAN service were built to HSC standards. I also believe that the ADV Ocean Protector was built to a civilian/commercial shipping standard, as opposed to a naval standard. By taking such a step, it could potentially aid from letting a ship with a 'glass jaw' into the fleet. Even for non-combat ships like the AOR, having improved damage control features should make RAN vessels more survivable in the event of an incident.

 

[Massive]

I always think RAN is a little on the lean side...

I read this article with some frustration as I felt it didn't provide a compelling "Why" there was this need. Then it headed off into fixed wing fairyland.

What's realistic? Probably not something too different to what is planned now?

My take on possible expansion options:

More submarines past 12
Light frigate class of 8 ships taking patrol duties form some of the OPVs
An additional oiler
LSH class (perhaps 4)
Expanded helicopter availability (say 16 requiring X additional airframes) - note that a fully equipped escort squadron of 1 AWD, 3 Frigate, 1 Oiler could deploy 8 helicopters

Thoughts?

Massive

 

[hauritz]

I have a suggestion on the above. Increase the number of naval helicopters and ensure that sufficient are in inventory to be operational whilst embarked on all major vessels. Also work/re-work to ensure that SEA 1180 vessels can have and support an embarked naval helicopter. As for where the sacrifice should be made in service... How does from PM&C and the MP's sound?

There are a number of ways that could be realized to expand the capabilities of the RAN. As Assail mentioned though there are issues of balance and affordability. I would like there to be more VLS cells available for a larger and wider range of missile loads than currently possible for the RAN. However, one problem with more VLS cells (apart from the cells themselves have acquisition and maintenance costs) is that getting enough munitions to fill those cells can be an expensive proposition.

What might be possible is to require all future RAN (as opposed to vessels in general gov't service) be built to naval as opposed to other build standards. I do not know about the SEA 1180 vessels, but the ACPB and I strongly suspect the Cape-class patrol boats in RAN service were built to HSC standards. I also believe that the ADV Ocean Protector was built to a civilian/commercial shipping standard, as opposed to a naval standard. By taking such a step, it could potentially aid from letting a ship with a 'glass jaw' into the fleet. Even for non-combat ships like the AOR, having improved damage control features should make RAN vessels more survivable in the event of an incident.

I was reading about the distributed lethality concept which seems to effectively network the entire surface fleet.

'Distributed Lethality' Is The Surface Navy's Strategy For The Trump Era

Unless I am misunderstanding the concept of distributed lethality ... which is possible ... it means that the OPVs will already be effective combat vessels even if they aren't fitted with much more than what they already carry. They could operate as part of a networked group sharing information with other more powerful units. If that is the case you could probably get away with fitting them with a basic CIWS and they might simply serve as part of the kill chain allowing the navies new destroyers and frigates to fire their weapons remotely at extreme range.

Australia seems to have already taken a step in this direction with the mandating the all future naval vessels including the OPVs and new AORs be fitted with the SAAB Australia developed combat management system.

 

[hairyman]

What ASSAIL has not taken into account is the call from Jim Molan (Now a member of the government) and others, for an increase in defence spending to above 2% GDP. This is where the funding for new equipment should be coming from.

The fall of the US as a world power is given as the reason for a larger Australian Defence Force.

 

[ASSAIL]

I have a suggestion on the above. Increase the number of naval helicopters and ensure that sufficient are in inventory to be operational whilst embarked on all major vessels. Also work/re-work to ensure that SEA 1180 vessels can have and support an embarked naval helicopter. As for where the sacrifice should be made in service... How does from PM&C and the MP's sound?

There are a number of ways that could be realized to expand the capabilities of the RAN. As Assail mentioned though there are issues of balance and affordability. I would like there to be more VLS cells available for a larger and wider range of missile loads than currently possible for the RAN. However, one problem with more VLS cells (apart from the cells themselves have acquisition and maintenance costs) is that getting enough munitions to fill those cells can be an expensive proposition.

What might be possible is to require all future RAN (as opposed to vessels in general gov't service) be built to naval as opposed to other build standards. I do not know about the SEA 1180 vessels, but the ACPB and I strongly suspect the Cape-class patrol boats in RAN service were built to HSC standards. I also believe that the ADV Ocean Protector was built to a civilian/commercial shipping standard, as opposed to a naval standard. By taking such a step, it could potentially aid from letting a ship with a 'glass jaw' into the fleet. Even for non-combat ships like the AOR, having improved damage control features should make RAN vessels more survivable in the event of an incident.

I think these are all good suggestions and in the interests of the original question and delving into fantasy money land I would offer that any expansion of the RAN should concentrate on Warfare helos as you mention above and increasing the submarine fleet by a further 50% above the planned 12. Subs are the most effective force multiplier in our arsenal producing a strategic and tactical response way in excess of their actual numbers.
However, as Maritime and anti submarine warfare acquisitions already consume 25% of the entire planned investment in our defence force any non emergency increase is in the realm of fantasy.
The ACPBs and Capes are a complete aberration with a planned 15 year life and I doubt if they will ever be repeated, although Alex probably knows what the build rules are for the Lurssen replacement, I don't.

 

[ASSAIL]

What ASSAIL has not taken into account is the call from Jim Molan (Now a member of the government) and others, for an increase in defence spending to above 2% GDP. This is where the funding for new equipment should be coming from.

Jim Milan is not in Cabinet and is free to express any view. It's not policy.

 

[hairyman]

What ASSAIL has not taken into account is the call from Jim Molan (Now a member of the government) and others, for an increase in defence spending to above 2% GDP. This is where the funding for new equipment should be coming from.

Jim Milan is not in Cabinet and is free to express any view. It's not policy.

I am sorry. I was unaware that we could not throw up for discussion anything that was not government policy on this thread..
Molan is only one of many who are calling for an increase in defence spending based on the changing circumstances that are existing today. And most are saying our fleet is too small for our large coastline.

 

[ADMk2]

In answering this question I'm constrained by the 2016 DWP and IIP. The most important guidance in these documents comes in the IIP Forward and is worth reading every time a suggestion on force structure is made.
The IIP was developed through a comprehensive force structure review which assessed defence capability needs to meet the challenges of our regions operating environment through the 2030s.
It ensured an alignment between national defence strategy, capability and resources and the result was a BALANCED, AFFORDABLE AND CAPABLE force.
The Australian government decides both Strategic Fefence Interests and Strategic Defence Objectives.
These Objectives are threefold; to defer,, deny and defeat attacks on Australia and our northern approaches, to effectively contribute to operations in maritime SEAsia and support the governments of PNG, Timor L'Este and the Pacific Islands and lastly to contribute military capabilities to coalition operations supporting our strategic objectives. We should refer to these Objectives often.

All the above is a long winded way of saying that I believe our force structure is currently adequate (including the surface Fleet) within the constraints of balance and affordability. The question you should ask is " if the surface force is increased, what capability and from which service will a sacrifice be made to pay for and man it"?

No offence intended but the force we have is the one that Government is prepared to fund. There is no particular strategic imperative for the size of our current defence forces. We talk about generational change and other buzzwords but the reality is we effectively replace platforms more or less one for one and then write force structure documents in vague terms justifying this structure

The ‘manning constraints’ so often used as an excuse as to why we could not significantly expand the RAN or ADF more broadly is a function of the Government authorised strength of our forces, not the actual numbers of people we could recruit and train if these artificial caps were lifted.

The fact that we have effectively maintained the same sized surface combatant force for the last 45 years of more when our population has more than doubled is indicative of this.