Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Volkodav]

I worked on the Commercial support Program at Amberly in the 80’s when Australia started going it alone with F111 and trying to secure the corporate knowledge of existing staff before they got posted out of 501 Wing. The F111 WSLM in the USAF was going to disappear along with the engineering support and they were also buying as many spares as possible for the F111.

The govt passed legislation allowing staff, officers and NCO’s to transfer to the Public Service immediately, “en masse”. They left the RAAF on Friday and started work as a civilian at their same desk/bench on Monday.

Some of the very best, and sadly the very worst I have worked with have been ex ADF. There is unfortunately a large, incompetent, lazy, self entitled number of employed for life ex ADF public servants.

They had reached their level of incompetence in uniform and the ADF was well rid of them, unfortunately the fact they used to wear a uniform gives them an advantage of other APS for promotion and opportunity.

 

[Volkodav]

I'm getting very frustrated with the narrative being pushed by some in media, political and strategic commentary areas, including a few who should know better, in regards to the surface fleet.

First is the lie that the GPFs / Mogamis are required because of delays and short falls in capability of the Hunters.

Then there is the lingering misinformation that Fremm or F-100 evolved/ F-110 would have been a better choice than Type 26 because the type 26 in under armed????

Now we have the new fairy tail that Australia is being ripped off because Norway is paying less for their Type 26s, which just happen to be minimum change, coming of a hot line.

 

[Bluey 006]

They appear to be quite a bit more capable than the Arafura’s with a full strength helicopter deck.

Japan starts production of a new fleet of OPV - Naval News

JMU eyes export opportunities with its OPV design - Naval News

At the time the OPVs were selected, the choice was the Fassmer OPV 80, which had capabilities equal to or better than the Japanese OPV or the Arafura class. However, the government chose the Arafura.

The geopolitical situation was a little less volatile back then, but the warning signs were already evident.

Many, both here on DT and more broadly (including myself), were advocating for the maximum capability possible, hence the Fassmer. I think it came as a bit of a shock to some when the government opted for the Arafura, especially given the missteps with the gun selection and other aspects.

Hindsight is a beautiful thing. So, what lessons should be learned from this in defence procurement circles?

Also, worth pondering : If we had gone with the Fassmer OPV, complete with a hangar, missile capability, and all the bells and whistles, would the GPF even have been considered?

All that said, the Arafura's are significantly more capable than the Armidale class they were intended to replace.

 

[Reptilia]

At the time the OPVs were selected, the choice was the Fassmer OPV 80, which had capabilities equal to or better than the Japanese OPV or the Arafura class. However, the government chose the Arafura.

The geopolitical situation was a little less volatile back then, but the warning signs were already evident.

Many, both here on DT and more broadly (including myself), were advocating for the maximum capability possible, hence the Fassmer. I think it came as a bit of a shock to some when the government opted for the Arafura, especially given the missteps with the gun selection and other aspects.

Hindsight is a beautiful thing. So, what lessons should be learned from this in defence procurement circles?

Also, worth pondering : If we had gone with the Fassmer OPV, complete with a hangar, missile capability, and all the bells and whistles, would the GPF even have been considered?

All that said, the Arafura's are significantly more capable than the Armidale class they were intended to replace.

Fassmers OPV80(see below) was definitely a better choice than Luerssens OPV80 but it’s still not as capable as japans new OPV.
The OPV90 was also available at the time and since then they have introduced new OPV80 options, OPV2020 and the new OPV90 Mk II(see below)

Fassmer OPV90 Mk II Revealed At IMDEX Asia 2025

German Shipbuilder Fassmer Defence this week presented a new patrol vessel dubbed the OPV90 Mk II at IMDEX Asia 2025 in Singapore.

www.navalnews.com

 

[iambuzzard]

I'm getting very frustrated with the narrative being pushed by some in media, political and strategic commentary areas, including a few who should know better, in regards to the surface fleet.

First is the lie that the GPFs / Mogamis are required because of delays and short falls in capability of the Hunters.

Then there is the lingering misinformation that Fremm or F-100 evolved/ F-110 would have been a better choice than Type 26 because the type 26 in under armed????

Now we have the new fairy tail that Australia is being ripped off because Norway is paying less for their Type 26s, which just happen to be minimum change, coming of a hot line.

When you consider the massively increased capabilities of the Hunter class the critics are on the wrong horse. It may have only 32 VLS cells but it's the electronics, ASW and quiet hull that put it light years ahead of it's contemparies. We turned it into a virtual destroyer. That's why the extra cost. Also, we had to build up the manufacturing facilities for it. It wasn't a hot line.
There's a lot of crap out there and politics aside, we are finally heading in the right direction.

 

[OldTex]

When you consider the massively increased capabilities of the Hunter class the critics are on the wrong horse. It may have only 32 VLS cells but it's the electronics, ASW and quiet hull that put it light years ahead of it's contemparies. We turned it into a virtual destroyer. That's why the extra cost. Also, we had to build up the manufacturing facilities for it. It wasn't a hot line.
There's a lot of crap out there and politics aside, we are finally heading in the right direction.

The critics of the Hunter-class in the media, think-tanks and politics are pushing that narrative partly because their "choice" wasn't selected. So in that regards it is childish sour grapes. The other part of the driving force for the criticisms is the need for a tag that the general public (ie voters) can grasp (without the need to do some or any thinking) and that tag is price. Just using a headline number, without any explanation of what it means and what it includes and doesn't include, makes it the ideal tag. The narrative then compares that number with how many "hospitals" or "schools" that could be provided with that money. Again no explanation of the inclusions and exclusions for the funding alternative. So the narrative becomes comparing cars with houses.
As pointed out it is the changes to the baseline design which will drive up the unit price (as well as the effort to go from a non-existent production facility to a properly and efficiently running one). A contemporary example of that is the US Navy Constellation-class disaster and to a lesser degree the USN LCS debacle.
In the end it is the media trying to sell advertising space and think-tanks trying to get exposure and perhaps some credibillity and politicians just trying to get reelected that is the basis for the criticism.
Defence is damned if they do and damned if they don't (for a lot of different reasons).

 

[Wombat000]

The Hunter (Tranche 1) is 32 VLS, for the ASW variant.
I’m an advocate for more VLS, but I appreciate the practical need for continuing the momentum on the initial build spec in the first instance. With the proliferation of regional submarines and strategic factors it’s an essential capability.

Who knows perhaps the mission bay will become a capability multiplier for its role and utility?
There was merit in its inclusion in the design for reasons.

I think the beauty of the Hunter is in its adaptability for subsequent iterations, the capability to operate Aegis, size and the suggested AAW design is encouraging in this, and certainly the bolstered VLS numbers will be welcomed. The fact that it has a quiet ASW heritage can only enhance it.

 

[John Fedup]

The critics of the Hunter-class in the media, think-tanks and politics are pushing that narrative partly because their "choice" wasn't selected. So in that regards it is childish sour grapes. The other part of the driving force for the criticisms is the need for a tag that the general public (ie voters) can grasp (without the need to do some or any thinking) and that tag is price. Just using a headline number, without any explanation of what it means and what it includes and doesn't include, makes it the ideal tag. The narrative then compares that number with how many "hospitals" or "schools" that could be provided with that money. Again no explanation of the inclusions and exclusions for the funding alternative. So the narrative becomes comparing cars with houses.
As pointed out it is the changes to the baseline design which will drive up the unit price (as well as the effort to go from a non-existent production facility to a properly and efficiently running one). A contemporary example of that is the US Navy Constellation-class disaster and to a lesser degree the USN LCS debacle.
In the end it is the media trying to sell advertising space and think-tanks trying to get exposure and perhaps some credibillity and politicians just trying to get reelected that is the basis for the criticism.
Defence is damned if they do and damned if they don't (for a lot of different reasons).

Canada has the same media BS about our River class costing way more than the UK/Norway T26s. Both Hunter and River have modifications, different weapons, radars, and CMS leading to higher costs Like Australia, Canada had to invest in Irving Shipyards for domestic production. When all three versions are in operation, it will be interesting to see how each compares wrt stuff other than the prime mission, ASW.

 

[SammyC]

I'm getting very frustrated with the narrative being pushed by some in media, political and strategic commentary areas, including a few who should know better, in regards to the surface fleet.

First is the lie that the GPFs / Mogamis are required because of delays and short falls in capability of the Hunters.

Then there is the lingering misinformation that Fremm or F-100 evolved/ F-110 would have been a better choice than Type 26 because the type 26 in under armed????

Now we have the new fairy tail that Australia is being ripped off because Norway is paying less for their Type 26s, which just happen to be minimum change, coming of a hot line.

I think a good deal of the population does not understand the strategic value of an indigenous supply chain.

The financial industry has evolved to prioritise lowest cost over resilience for decades, premised on the (incorrect) view that globally integrated supply chains eliminate the potential for conflict (it's a derivative of the mutually assured destruction philosophy). The growth in most economies over the last fifty years has been due to this principle.

Only in the last few years has industry commenced evaluating its supply chain for the impact of disruption due to geopolitical breakdown. Most businesses will need in the order of at least 10 years to unwind, when in reality they probably have five years or less. This is becoming aparent in boardrooms across Australia.

COVID started this adjustment, and climate change has accelerated it (floods and fires). Both demonstrate what happens when products become scarce and people act in their own self interest. China and Russia showed how supply chains can be used as weapons and blackmail. Trump is pouring petrol on the whole thing.

I know that for the first time in the last year or so, my company has added overseas supply systems as a critical strategic risk (basically the risk of a foreign government shutting down a supply chain within their jurisdiction that we rely on, be that punitively or for their own self needs). We are actually evaluating sourcing closer to home, and also looking at making products that others may soon want to procure locally, even when this is not the lowest cost solution.

I think in the few years to come, the decision to invest in in-country military production, of which shipyards are part of, will be looked at as one of the best calls we made in the early 2020's. Even though they have been very expensive. I suspect those same critics now, will be the people actually lauding these decisions later on. And I bet they will say they were always supportive.

In the meantime we will need to put up with people being armchair critics.

 

[SammyC]

At the time the OPVs were selected, the choice was the Fassmer OPV 80, which had capabilities equal to or better than the Japanese OPV or the Arafura class. However, the government chose the Arafura.

The geopolitical situation was a little less volatile back then, but the warning signs were already evident.

Many, both here on DT and more broadly (including myself), were advocating for the maximum capability possible, hence the Fassmer. I think it came as a bit of a shock to some when the government opted for the Arafura, especially given the missteps with the gun selection and other aspects.

Hindsight is a beautiful thing. So, what lessons should be learned from this in defence procurement circles?

Also, worth pondering : If we had gone with the Fassmer OPV, complete with a hangar, missile capability, and all the bells and whistles, would the GPF even have been considered?

All that said, the Arafura's are significantly more capable than the Armidale class they were intended to replace.

Interesting sliding doors moment.

I have always thought had a few things gone differently, the Arafuras could have been seen in a different light and could have been in the water earlier.

In hindsight, my view is that it probably would not have altered the situation at the time of the surface combatant review. Neither the Arafura or the Fassmer would have met the need articulated need for a combat capable vessel that could be put in harms way.

The Hunter program, was never going to be able to deliver the required expanded fleet size, driving the requirement for a second build program.

The disappointing aspect is that the surface combatant review should have been done several years earlier. Some of the rush we now have could have been avoided.