Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[StevoJH]

Refuelling required every 7-10 years.
With RAN use, it could be just 7, that’s 3-4 refuelling cycles.
Would it still be worth it?

That would depend on cost of refuelling, whether it could be done *in Australia* (politically as well as technically), and how much additional time refuelling would add to the refit time.

Oh, plus the sheer loss of face of returning to a French option at this point, even if they would consider it.

The Suffren also has about half the weapons carrying capacity of an Astute class.

 

[SammyC]

That would depend on cost of refuelling, whether it could be done *in Australia* (politically as well as technically), and how much additional time refuelling would add to the refit time.

Oh, plus the sheer loss of face of returning to a French option at this point, even if they would consider it.

The Suffren also has about half the weapons carrying capacity of an Astute class.

To clarify, I think the Virginia and AUKUS options are way better than the Suffren.

My point was that I don't think, refuelling or not refuelling was a core decision in the selection of the USN/RN subs over the French ones. Good for publicity, but that's all. I actually think contractual relationship breakdown, American combat systems and access to strike missiles were all more significant.

I think a refuelling, given every other complexity with owning an SSN could have been managed. It comes out, goes into a container, and then gets buried in a desert. Maybe I've over simplified, but it's not like landing on Mars.

If Suffrens were magically our only option, then I think we would have made it work, and it would have been better than what we are currently forced to do.

 

[Todjaeger]

To clarify, I think the Virginia and AUKUS options are way better than the Suffren.

My point was that I don't think, refuelling or not refuelling was a core decision in the selection of the USN/RN subs over the French ones. Good for publicity, but that's all. I actually think contractual relationship breakdown, American combat systems and access to strike missiles were all more significant.

I think a refuelling, given every other complexity with owning an SSN could have been managed. It comes out, goes into a container, and then gets buried in a desert. Maybe I've over simplified, but it's not like landing on Mars.

If Suffrens were magically our only option, then I think we would have made it work, and it would have been better than what we are currently forced to do.

Inarguably though a decision on the ability/need to refuel a reactor would be absolutely a core one, though I too suspect that it was not the primary reason why USN/RN sub options were chosen in place of French ones.

I agree that Australia, if absolutely necessary, could establish processes and facilities to actually carry out refueling as well as storage and disposal of spent fuel. However, all of this would add extra costs for new/more facilities and infrastructure, require more time for the processes to be developed as well as infrastructure built. Perhaps even more problematic is that it would likely require even more trained personnel to both handle the refueling, as well as manage, transport and monitor spent fuel. This burden of needing extra trained personnel would further increase costs to both raise the capability initially, as well as sustain it, and perhaps even more problematically, even more time would be needed to recruit and then train these 'extra' bodies.

When one factors all the above in, plus the problems Australia had encountered with getting Naval Group to adapt the Attack-class for Australian service from the Suffren-class SSN AND get sensitive US systems like the AN/BGY-1 fitted (with the sharply restricted access to system specs and reqs), it is not hard to imagine that Australia would not see value in trying to push things further.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Refuelling a French submarine is not impossible even by a nation with fairly basic nuclear capability. If we wanted less reliance on France, we could talk to the South Americans (brazil is building nuclear french designed submarines, Argentina provides fuel rods to Australias OPAL reactor). The French would have to be involved in setting that kind of capability up. We could have some sovereign capability in that space. Being LEU, commercial style capabilities are relevant. Australia has a nuclear research and medical reactor, and has continuously operated nuclear reactors for 60+ years, just in a very small, non-naval capability. But it would be expensive and slow to expand this capability with no commercial capability.

Australia moves and stores spent fuel rods, and has existing arrangements and agreements. We had to get rid of many tonnes of material from HIFAR, which was all weapons grade HEU spent fuel rods from 1950's style reactors. We had stored effectively the entire life time of fuel from that reactor before we sent it off for reprocessing. It seemed that we were quite happy to have many tonnes of spent HEU contaminated with Plutonium.

Australia already needs nuclear waste storage facility. SSNs just further expands the size of that need.

Australia to receive UK nuclear waste shipment amid bitter dispute over national storage facility

Two-tonne load to be stored at Sydney’s Lucas Heights until national facility built in several years

www.theguardian.com

Australia's nuclear waste legacy is hidden in plain sight

Even without nuclear power and submarines in use, the nation is already producing, processing and storing radioactive waste.

www.abc.net.au

Instead of burying the waste in the desert currently we store them in the middle of the most populous city in Australia.
Personally I don't see diesel Baracuda/Sufferens ever getting back onto the table. Im not completely sure SSN Sufferens were ever on the table but more of an option of escalation to deter.

In the current context, getting the US to work with other allies is a very difficult ask. French and US relations are highly complex and ebb and flow even during peaceful periods.

AUKUS was to fall over, early on, and there was genuine questions about getting material for reactors, or the subs not getting into service quick enough. There are other options. We could try to acquire and refurbish an older UK SSN. Its possible, but much much more expensive and takes longer and are in worse material state. We could try to acquire conventional Japanese submarines or/and build those here, or base them out of Australia.

By far the most viable hedging option is Collins. Which is still going to be critical even if we do get a few SSN operating. But we have kind of lowered our expectation around operational avalibility and try to limit costs for that platform. Given the current context, I am not sure that is the way forward.

We may want to talk to the Japanese are about Submarine technologies that can be applied to Collins, particularly if we expect them to stay around longer.

We have over 100 sailors in the US SSN pipeline. Signing up for service on Collins vs signing up for service on a future Australian SSN are pretty different. From what I hear those in the US SSN pipeline feedback is very positive from both sides.

 

[SammyC]

AUKUS cash flows to Australian firms despite doubts over pact

again sorry for a paywalled article, however this is an update on Australian industry involvement in the Virginia supply chain.

The core of the article is that Honeywell has been awarded a contract from the USN to assist Australian manufacturers through the American quality and security system. Aparently there are approximately 1,000 Australian providers who meet at least the first round viability checks (good to see this has been completed, with lot of potential providers, more than I thought), with the first of these to now progress with the next round. This will eventually form a trusted Australian network which technology and IP can then be transferred to.

Huntington Ingalls has also commenced qualifying some Australian providers. Of note, suppliers of more complex items (I assume electrical and electronic components) are being processed first. Hycast Metals in Sydney was called out in the article.

This is all part of the program to increase Virginia production rates, and it signals Australia becomming even more tightly interwoven with the Americans. It becomes progressively harder to deny sales of boats as this supply chain matures.

Sometimes we need to look at the actions rather than words to understand what is really going on in the US. The above seems to be a good sign. A country making decisions to disengage would not be looking at our supply system.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Huntington Ingalls has also commenced qualifying some Australian providers. Of note, suppliers of more complex items (I assume electrical and electronic components) are being processed first. Hycast Metals in Sydney was called out in the article.

This is all part of the program to increase Virginia production rates, and it signals Australia becoming even more tightly interwoven with the Americans. It becomes progressively harder to deny sales of boats as this supply chain matures.

Sometimes we need to look at the actions rather than words to understand what is really going on in the US. The above seems to be a good sign. A country making decisions to disengage would not be looking at our supply system.

I think there is some incentives from both sides for this to happen. In a world where decisions are made very quickly and cuts are the general theme, having a strong AU-US program already in place, is highly desirable. That maybe this would make these cuts less desirable and decisions more stable. Many of these are funded directly by Australia, so doing a partnership is desirable from the US side. For those in uniform and those from the industry sectors.

There is a fear in the US not that everything gets cut, but funding becomes erratic and unreliable, that their business could be affected by random tariffs. The current stock market reflects that. Australian business and American business are looking around, and realising, it would be a very good thing for them to work together.

 

[hauritz]

Refuelling a French submarine is not impossible even by a nation with fairly basic nuclear capability. If we wanted less reliance on France, we could talk to the South Americans (brazil is building nuclear french designed submarines, Argentina provides fuel rods to Australias OPAL reactor). The French would have to be involved in setting that kind of capability up. We could have some sovereign capability in that space. Being LEU, commercial style capabilities are relevant. Australia has a nuclear research and medical reactor, and has continuously operated nuclear reactors for 60+ years, just in a very small, non-naval capability. But it would be expensive and slow to expand this capability with no commercial capability.

Australia moves and stores spent fuel rods, and has existing arrangements and agreements. We had to get rid of many tonnes of material from HIFAR, which was all weapons grade HEU spent fuel rods from 1950's style reactors. We had stored effectively the entire life time of fuel from that reactor before we sent it off for reprocessing. It seemed that we were quite happy to have many tonnes of spent HEU contaminated with Plutonium.

Australia already needs nuclear waste storage facility. SSNs just further expands the size of that need.

Australia to receive UK nuclear waste shipment amid bitter dispute over national storage facility

Two-tonne load to be stored at Sydney’s Lucas Heights until national facility built in several years

www.theguardian.com

Australia's nuclear waste legacy is hidden in plain sight

Even without nuclear power and submarines in use, the nation is already producing, processing and storing radioactive waste.

www.abc.net.au

Instead of burying the waste in the desert currently we store them in the middle of the most populous city in Australia.
Personally I don't see diesel Baracuda/Sufferens ever getting back onto the table. Im not completely sure SSN Sufferens were ever on the table but more of an option of escalation to deter.

In the current context, getting the US to work with other allies is a very difficult ask. French and US relations are highly complex and ebb and flow even during peaceful periods.

AUKUS was to fall over, early on, and there was genuine questions about getting material for reactors, or the subs not getting into service quick enough. There are other options. We could try to acquire and refurbish an older UK SSN. Its possible, but much much more expensive and takes longer and are in worse material state. We could try to acquire conventional Japanese submarines or/and build those here, or base them out of Australia.

By far the most viable hedging option is Collins. Which is still going to be critical even if we do get a few SSN operating. But we have kind of lowered our expectation around operational avalibility and try to limit costs for that platform. Given the current context, I am not sure that is the way forward.

We may want to talk to the Japanese are about Submarine technologies that can be applied to Collins, particularly if we expect them to stay around longer.

We have over 100 sailors in the US SSN pipeline. Signing up for service on Collins vs signing up for service on a future Australian SSN are pretty different. From what I hear those in the US SSN pipeline feedback is very positive from both sides.

Australia really has three bites of the Cherry as far as aquiring SSNs are concerned. Even if the Virginia deal were to fall through you will still have the AUKUS SSNs in the 2040s. Failing that we could always go crawling back to the French. If everything goes belly up then the precedent has been set with the GPFs. Just buy some OS built, off-the-shelf SSKs. Pretty sure Japan or Korea would be happy to oblige.

Really I don't see any reason to panic yet. That the US has thus far failed to lift its submarine production rate should surprise nobody. You can't accelerate production overnight. There are signs that it is being addressed. For example Austal USA was recently awarded $450M to build a new submarine construction facility. It is scheduled to be completed by 2026 and will employ 1000 new workers.

I believe the current plan is to hit 2 submarines built per year by 2028 and then eventually increasing to 2.3 per year. Optimistic maybe but it is a case of wait and see.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Just buy some OS built, off-the-shelf SSKs. Pretty sure Japan or Korea would be happy to oblige.

Im not sure that capability is endlessly avalible.

Either from europe or JP/SK.. There is a lot of movement about pressing for orders and capacity. There are definately some europeans eyeing off SK capabilities for subs. As is Canada.

We have to realise the situation isn't just happening to Australia. Infact its happening much more to everyone else.

Comments from the US isn't that they don't see the point to sell to Australia. Its that if the US and China are at all out war, they will need every bit of capability they can muster. Which is true. He has highlighted the priority of preparing for war with China, he can't go back and say its not a priority for even countries military deals like Australia.

The issue with the AUKUS submarines, or a AUK submarine, is nuclear fuel. But that is also a hot topic now, because UK and europe are now relooking at their nuclear umbrella coverage.

Because, if China and the US go to war. A lot of capability will be lost for sure. Also as part of any peace deal, existing military agreements may be re-negotiated or rethought.

I don't think there is a reason to panic, but we should probably look at where we can hedge our bets and still get useful capability.

If the defence budget needs a sudden boost to 3%. We may need to rethink Collins LOTE, at least on the later boats to increase capability and use the earlier boat to de risk the program, and perhaps add risk and capability in the later boats. Just as if say war breaks out early in 2026, we may need to adjust our plans accordingly.

In many cases, I think it would be very very hard to increase defence spending from its current level to 3% in less than 5 years. But that may be required.

 

[Reptilia]

Current build programs…
French > 3 more Suffren, 4 SNLE 3G and the future 4 Orka for the Dutch.
U.K > 1 more Astute, 4 Dreadnought, TBD SSN-AUKUS
South Korea > 6 more Dosan Ahn Changho batch II+III, plus potential Canadian order.
Sweden > 2 Blekinge
Japan > Up to 12 Taigei, Taigei successor in the 2030s
Germany > Up to 15 Type 212CD for both Germany and Norway.
Spain > Up to 6 S80
Poland also looking to buy 4 from the above.

IMO, if no interim Virginias, it must be the Japanese.

Quickest to service option would probably be the Taigei off the shelf.
1 of the 2 builders push out a sub every March like clockwork.
Taigeis successor is already underdevelopment too and set to enter service in the 2030s. See below.

Kawasaki Heavy Industry unveils new submarine concept with VLS - Naval News

Japan's KHI unveiled its new submarine concept for the JMSDF. The design features vertical launch systems (VLS).

www.navalnews.com

2029, the JMSDF will have 5 or more Oyashio, 12 Soryu and 8 Taigei in service. 25+ submarines.
2035 - up to 12 Soryu, 8-12 Taigei and 2 or more new Gen subs.

When we were looking at the Soryu over a decade ago, the builders were able to boost the production rate and increase the length of the boat 6-8 metres to provide additional fuel and battery space for increased range and to fit the taller Australian crew. Given the Taigei is basically the same hull form as the Soryu, a lengthened Taigei might be a possibility. Taigeis successor would be better but it’s entry into service is too far away.
6-9 SSK and 6 SSN AUKUS is a great tier 1+2 mix.

 

[Bob53]

TOPIC- mitigating risk of Virginia class SSN export delay

I was on Twitter (will never call it anything other than that) and watching and responding to the excellent Alex Luck @AlexLuck9 who was fielding off some reactionary criticism of AUKUS inspired by recent Guardian articles by Peter Briggs and Chris Barry etc, in part saying we need a plan B etc (going back to a Suffren etc) and it got me thinking.

Yes a smart government (big assumptions here, yes I know) should have plans mitigating all strategic risk. Whilst I don't think our relationship with the US is remarkable effected by the Trump Administration (as yet), the greater risk IMO is our dependency on improvements in US shipbuilding to sustain USN and AUKUS needs.

So whilst I don't advocate going back for a Suffren (almost out of spite as I don't want to give Macron ammunition to repeat his line "I don't think, I know", mind you I still don't know why our then PM Morrison concluded that a Suffren would be "obsolete by the time it hit the water" per his recent commentary- who briefed him that or did he make it up???), I am puzzled why we cant consider other options inside of AUKUS to mitigate the risk of US Shipbuilding issues, namely:

1. Conduct a feasibility study whether we can commence SSN Aukus construction at Osborne at a much earlier date (on the knowledge that Barrow is tied up with the Dreadnaugh class before it can commence any SSN Aukus construction and furthermore we only receive delivery on the 3rd boat off that line); or
2. Conduct a feasibility study whether Osborne can commence a build for either an Astute SSN or even a Deadnaught class in an SSGN capacity at the first available opportunity?

There are clear pro's and con's for each idea. The obvious is that Osborne will be tied up with the Collins LOTE (hmmm) and additionally may have real difficulty getting the yard up to scratch for an SSN or SSGN build/ is likely to stuff it up (needed time to learn more from Barrow etc).

The real scarcity here IMO is the industrial capacity to build a SSN. CoA is really limited in their options here, so why are we not advancing Osborne on the knowledge that whilst there is some risk here, its a risk we are always going to face regardless of timings, and to develop our own capacity ultimately improves our soverignty and mitigates risk where external factors impact our security strategy. Why do we need to be reliant upon a Virginia delivery when ultimately other avenues within Aukus may suffice?

I know Governement and wonder if anyone is looking how to mitigate risk WITHIN Aukus, not outside of it. Would it be considered taboo to even consider a plan B (what you are saying here is hereacy ... witch, wiitch! ... burn them at the stake!!!) ???

For me, contingency planning is crucial to good performance. Surely it's reasonable to ask the question whether Osborne is up to an advanced role mitigating the Virginia risk and see what's possible?

Thoughts?

As you suggest putting Australian resources into accelerating UK production.., hull sections for the dreadnoughts to try and accelerate that build with AUKUS sections to follow…etc makes sense. At least there is a probable outcome. I cannot in anyway see any Virginias being available. They need to manufacture 2.4 this year. If that’s not achieved it snowballs…2.6 next year, 2.8 the following year and the backlog keeps snowballing.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Taigeis successor is already underdevelopment too and set to enter service in the 2030s. See below.

Their involvement with Australia's requirement has probably shifted their future design specs. Part of the issue of the Japanese subs was that they had built them for the Japanese CONOPS very specifically, so things that needed to be very good and modern for that, were, but things like the periscope, which they didn't utilise in the same way, were old school.

When we were looking at the Soryu over a decade ago, the builders were able to boost the production rate and increase the length of the boat 6-8 metres to provide additional fuel and battery space for increased range and to fit the taller Australian crew.

Sizing for Australian crew isn't really the issue, the height difference between the average Australian and the average Japanese is ~3cm. Subs are always small and cramped, but japanese subs and Japan as a culture probably adopt an even more compact personal space approach. As someone who is 6'7 and been through Collins and Oberons, more room would always be better, but on a sub changing deck height is essentially impossible.. One of the benefits of opening women up to submarine service is their generally smaller dimensions.

But long range patrol and endurance is. But then again, a lot of that was based around being based in Australia and for use during peacetime or for long range offensive operations. That may not longer be the case. While we wouldn't want to give up all long range capability, if it is the only subs we could quickly acquire... and if they were forward based, or just used for continental protection within our EEZ....

Japan has a neat trick where it tends to slightly overbuild to ensure it has a constant production line of ships, so it can shuffle its service life/decommissioning generally if required to make boats/ships available such as what is proposed with Mogami. This is how Japan rapidly increased the number of operational submarines, by very slightly increasing production rates, but also increasing service lives. Because the actual platform material cost, isn't actually the big part of the over capability cost.

How Japan could quickly build up its submarine force | The Strategist

Japan can quickly and inexpensively increase its force of diesel-electric combat submarines from 22 to at least 28, if it stops prematurely retiring them. That would provide more of the one category of warship that ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

U.S. Congress studies Japan's fixed submarine production schedule

Building a boat a year, Tokyo adjusts fleet size by adjusting ship retirement age

asia.nikkei.com

Other options include acquiring the Gotland class. The Blekinge class you mention above is expected to be delivered in 2027-8. Gotland is essentially a mini-collins structurally. These hulls may be useful to acquire for spares, training, de-risking developments, de-risking new yards etc. Even if they just operate out FBE or FBW for coastal defence and ASW training duties. It may also be attractive to acquire some swedish submariners, who want to travel with the platform over to Australia, rather than retrain for the new gen subs. Training and layout would mostly carry over. It may allow those who are looking for a different type of submarine service to stay in the service. Do more like a two week deployment from Sydney to train regional surface combatants. I've mentioned the Singapore Archer class, which are also of a swedish design and have had some Collins class improvements applied. That would be an additional 5 operational submarines, able to be acquired for essentially scrap value off allies, that share a huge commonality with Collins. Sweden also has the Sodermanland submarine, so you could bump that up to 6 hulls... They are smaller crews, so the crewing and collins commonality would go a long way.

But these would be coastal submarines. They are not blue water subs. But as we have seen, there may be value in having something that can operate in our own EEZ and train our surface ASW capability.

So again, while an idea, we would have to be pretty desperate to put so much energy and effort in getting these 1980's relics into service with the RAN. I would imagine Japan would readily make available subs to Australia, particularly if they were based in Japan on rotation. In trying to expand their submarine service, they too will find it difficult. But extending the service life of a submarine also generally means, extending the service of those crewing it. Their model is one we should definitely be looking at.