Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Armchair]

Why are we building warships at all? It seems the dumbest of the dumbest manufacturing industries to invest in. We don't own the intellectual property so have no capacity to sell export hulls without foreign perimission and their is no potential for a 'sovereign' capability. All we seem to achieve is featherbedding South Australian jobs. Imagine how much better it would have been to have sunk the shipbuilding money from the Anzacs into the Bushmaster and had an active production line during 2002-2008 when South Africa scored $15 billion worth of rattlebox RG31 contracts.

I take it you mean the savings from an off shore build rather than not building Anzacs at all?
let’s imagine a shipbuilding program costs $20bn in Australia and $10bn overseas.
If a government believes it will gain a sufficient electoral advantage by committing (some future government) to spend the $20bn (or not cancelling a program it promised to keep) it will do so. The core business of government is being re-elected (being seen to be able to defend the nation’s interest is just one component of that).

 

[Maranoa]

I was simply stating the obvious. Want to pay double for your warships and take a decade longer to put them in service, by all means go with South Australian builds. Or was it really three times the price. And, the previously stated Bushmaster sale failure to the USA outburst is totally incorrect .

 

[Todjaeger]

I was simply stating the obvious. Want to pay double for your warships and take a decade longer to put them in service, by all means go with South Australian builds. Or was it really three times the price. And, the previously stated Bushmaster sale failure to the USA outburst is totally incorrect .

Which particular RAN warship class build are you referring to? I ask, because if you meaning the Hobart-class DDG build, IIRC there was a decision by gov't to slow down construction to reduce up front costs, which had significant (and negative) follow-on effects. A major one, aside from dragging SEA 4000 out which ended up making it cost more overall, was the the full planned workforce was never established, which has impacted SEA 1180 and SEA 5000.

It is also worth noting that the US gov't did some studies on naval and submarine construction in a couple of allied nations. Some of the conclusions from the US funded studies were that a warship built in Australia circa 2006 could cost 30% or more than one built elsewhere, and still be a net economic advantage to Australia if built domestically as opposed to built overseas and imported.

As I recall it, one of the reasons why the US did the study was that there was US concern about key allies being able to maintain their respective domestic naval industrial capacities and the potential negative defence outcomes should certain nations no longer be able to produce what their navies needed.

 

[iambuzzard]

Depends what you mean by “timely.”

The appropriate time horizon isn’t a crash course to get something in the water in the next 3 to 5 years. This is done. It’s not happening.

This is about setting up the fleet size and supporting industry for the long term so we don’t ever find ourselves in this scenario again.

What we should be thinking about now is:

1) How many MFUs do we need?
2) Of what mix?
3) Where should they be built?

My personal view is that we need a minimum of 18 MFUs, and a mix of 6x DDGs, 6x FFGs and 6x GP/patrol frigates. I think for scale’s sake these should all be built in SA, but can see that there is some capability in WA we can potentially leverage but this is a suboptimal long term solution.

The above will take a minimum of 10 years to achieve at very best, and probably more like 20.

If we need capability before that it’s not going to come from MFUs. If we’re going to splash the cash to get something quickly that can sink ships we should be buying more P-8s and LRASM.

Very sensible and well thought out suggestion

 

[Armchair]

Depends what you mean by “timely.”

The appropriate time horizon isn’t a crash course to get something in the water in the next 3 to 5 years. This is done. It’s not happening.

I think timely is something like 3-5 years based on the DSR.

I agree with almost everything else you wrote except for the quoted part. I genuinely don’t know whether it is impossible to have a small warship in the water within 3-5 years (possibly even second hand, though I am not advocating this)

I don’t imagine the main job of that vessel would be to sink ships ( though it should be able to threaten them) but to escort littoral lift vessels and carry out minor warfare tasks around islands not far north of Australia (hopefully under land based air cover from Australia). The threats that I anticipate the vessels would face would primarily be air and ground launched anti ship missiles with submarines as a secondary threat. I will spell out the scenarios I anticipate in the ADF thread.

If you are right (and I accept you could be) and it is impossible to acquire vessels that can perform those tasks (or small armed warships are totally useless for Australia even when intended to be used in archipelagos) then I don’t think the DSR goals can be achieved (and the army orbat reorg would be futile in those terms).

 

[Bob53]

I know this is rehashing matters that have been widely discussed here but I hope I add a slightly new perspective on some matters. Again I don’t disagree on AH140 (or Mogami) but I don’t think it is realistic for Australia to acquire those vessels in a timely manner.

I don’t think Australia has the capacity to pursue another onshore major fleet unit acquisition at the same time as acquiring SSNs. Almost all of the procurement disasters have been for the RAN (followed by the Army). A 5700 ton design would become a 8000 ton redesign delivered 8 years behind schedule. It might be perfect for Australia’s blue water needs (after years of addressing top weight issues) but it would still be under construction in the mid 2030s. The range of the AH140 in a shipyard is 0 nautical miles (regardless of whether it has been upgunned to 127mm or not).

I don’t think there would be the political will for an offshore build of a major fleet unit (for a vessel of a size within the capacity of the current yards). State governments in South Australia and/or Western Australia (as well as industry and unions) would add their voices to whichever party was in opposition in Canberra at the time the decision was taken. After the proposal was killed off the new government (or the new PM of the old government) would cancel the off shore build.

I don’t understand your point? You don’t think we can build another ship design here in Australia and you don’t think it would be acceptable to build offshore.

 

[Bob53]

I was simply stating the obvious. Want to pay double for your warships and take a decade longer to put them in service, by all means go with South Australian builds. Or was it really three times the price. And, the previously stated Bushmaster sale failure to the USA outburst is totally incorrect .

Not sure about the decade longer ..I’ll leave it to other to comment. As for cost the thing is every dollars spent with Australian suppliers and labour enters the thing call the Australian economy where it gets washed around multiple times. Some of it is returned to the Government as income tax and in profits, capital gains etc and then gets spent a 2nd, 3rd , 4th time. those taxes help pay for the dole and the wardens for the Kiwis living there.

Money spent off shore is gone. Not all of an Australian build stays here but the economist Johnnies in the government must of worked it out that it’s worth doing.

 

[hauritz]

This story from the ABC this morning certainly bears that out.
After the problems with the Navantia built ships, the appetite for further work to them overseas would have disappeared I would think.

Sailors forced to drink bottled water as new overseas-built warships suffer 'poor quality manufacture'

Sailors serving on board two new overseas-built Australian warships are being forced to drink bottled water as the navy works to urgently fix a contamination problem.

www.abc.net.au

Personally I would steer clear of any more Spanish built or even designed ships. While I do believe the Hobart production line should have stayed open that isn't because of any great affection for that ship. That option is now gone and I don't have any desire to revisit it.

The build issues that obviously exist with the new tankers is a timely reminder that maybe we should resist the urge to have three additional destroyers rush built in Spain or consider the Alfa 3000 as a candidate for any future corvette program.

What is the old engineering adage? You can build good, fast or cheap but you can't do all three.

 

[Todjaeger]

I think timely is something like 3-5 years based on the DSR.

I agree with almost everything else you wrote except for the quoted part. I genuinely don’t know whether it is impossible to have a small warship in the water within 3-5 years (possibly even second hand, though I am not advocating this)

I don’t imagine the main job of that vessel would be to sink ships ( though it should be able to threaten them) but to escort littoral lift vessels and carry out minor warfare tasks around islands not far north of Australia (hopefully under land based air cover from Australia). The threats that I anticipate the vessels would face would primarily be air and ground launched anti ship missiles with submarines as a secondary threat. I will spell out the scenarios I anticipate in the ADF thread.

If you are right (and I accept you could be) and it is impossible to acquire vessels that can perform those tasks (or small armed warships are totally useless for Australia even when intended to be used in archipelagos) then I don’t think the DSR goals can be achieved (and the army orbat reorg would be futile in those terms).

If the intent is to have an effective warship, then there is essentially no way to get one built in three to five years. If you read further back within the this, there should be a few posts by me which delve into timelines.

I do not wish to re-hash everything here but there are several stages which would occur during a warship class build, and a number of those stages can take several years per stage. It can easily take three years or more just to go through the design specification and selection process and then the actual contract signing to build whatever the detailed design stage delivers. All of this would most likely need to happen before the first long-lead items could be ordered, never mind first steel cut. On the back end of things, once the actual construction is completed, builders and acceptance trials are usually conducted to make sure everything functions as needed, and these trials can take a year or more.

Now once supply and production chains get established, including those producing long-lead time items, then it might become possible to have additional orders placed with deliveries made within a few years of the additional orders getting placed. In this case, much would depend on what the long-lead items are and how far in advance (how long the lead time is between ordering and delivery) some of the systems need to be ordered so that the system delivery is made whilst the vessel is at an appropriate stage of construction. AFAIK Aegis/SPY systems have some of the longest lead times and can be several years in advance. I would expect that some of the other highly advanced and precise systems like alternate radar arrays as well as the CMS and their associated electronics could likewise take perhaps a few years to have built and tested/certified as ready for installation.

 

[Armchair]

I don’t understand your point? You don’t think we can build another ship design here in Australia and you don’t think it would be acceptable to build offshore.

sorry for being opaque. I don’t think an additional major fleet unit design can be built in Australia at the same time as building Hunters and preparing for SSNs. Again the problem is not really building — it is decision making, redesigning and second and third guessing by incoming governments.

I do think a smaller warship ( say 2000 tons or so for brown water operations) could be built quickly in Australia (E.g. within 5 years).

edit. Sent before Todjaeger’s post but yes I have read earlier posts. I am happy with what I have said. Agree not to rehash further and probably best left to surface fleet review release.

 

[Todjaeger]

sorry for being opaque. I don’t think an additional major fleet unit design can be built in Australia at the same time as building Hunters and preparing for SSNs. Again the problem is not really building — it is decision making, redesigning and second and third guessing by incoming governments.

I do think a smaller warship ( say 2000 tons or so for brown water operations) could be built quickly in Australia (E.g. within 5 years).

edit. Sent before Todjaeger’s post but yes I have read earlier posts. I am happy with what I have said. Agree not to rehash further and probably best left to surface fleet review release.

A couple of points that I would be interested in clarification on, as some of what has been posted does not make sense, whilst other things I am interested in what the thinking is behind the belief.

AFAIK, brown water operations tends to mean riverine operations though some include near shore areas, with green water ops being done in littoral areas and adjacent seas, and finally blue water ops being open ocean. In that regard, a 2,000 ton RAN vessel operating in riverine areas would be problematic. Such a vessel would make more sense for littoral or green water operations.

I am interested in the thinking behind why a quick build (under five years) of a ~2,000 ton vessel is possible, since that is at odds with Australian procurement processes assuming one is talking about having a new class of vessel built, or a fairly significant variant of an existing class that is already in production.

Using the Arafura-class OPV programme the SEA 1180 project as a reference, the CEP started in late 2015 and ended in a contract being signed with Lurssen on 31 Jan 2018. It is also worth noting that there was work on the project that had to take place before the start of the CEP, in order for the CEP to happen, at least some of this work started on or before 2014. All of this was also before first steel was cut for the lead ship later on in 2018 and about five years later, Nuship Arafura has not yet been accepting into service.

Once a shipbuilding programme gets underway, with the associated supply chains established and ticking along, then vessels would likely be able to get delivered every couple of years. Looking at the end of the ANZAC-class frigate build, there was a roughly three year interval between a vessel being laid down and then commissioned into the RAN. The problem tends to be in determining what to build, getting a design which is fitted with what the RAN uses and how it gets used, and then establishing the supply chains to source everything needed for the build.

 

[spoz]

Don’t read too much into the potable water issue. Many ships have had similar problems over the years; sometimes because an inappropriate piece of pipe has been fitted somewhere, sometimes because of corrosion, sometimes because the ROWP has a pressure or membrane issue. And on one occasion of which I am aware, a slight difference in allowable impurities between a foreign and the Australian standard. They are usually teething problems.

The delay in getting it fixed, if there is one, may be related to a discussion about who is liable (although I must emphasise I say that with absolutely no knowledge of this actual case).

 

[StingrayOZ]

I don't know if Navantia are in the good books at the moment.

Sailors forced to drink bottled water as new overseas-built warships suffer 'poor quality manufacture'

Sailors serving on board two new overseas-built Australian warships are being forced to drink bottled water as the navy works to urgently fix a contamination problem.

www.abc.net.au

HMAS Supply and her sister ship HMAS Stalwart were commissioned in 2021 after being constructed by Spanish state-owned company Navantia at its Ferrol shipyard.

Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy says the government was recently informed that water supplies on both Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment vessels were unsuitable for human consumption.

"Poor quality manufacture has led to pipes being contaminated, drinking water being contaminated and our sailors not being able to access safe drinking water," he told the ABC.

Apparently there have been a fairly large number of issues with both ships, mean very, very limited time at sea.
I don't know where people get the idea that overseas builds are significantly cheaper and better.

Even state governments have learned hard lessons buying ferries from China. Rectification is basically a nightmare. Think about it, if its built overseas, why on earth would they care if it works or not. A lot of these ship yards are state owned enterprises. Trying to strong arm the Chinese government into fixing a Ferry after its been delivered is impossible. Thailand bought submarines, that were not fitted with engines because the Chinese couldn't buy the german engines, so they just continued to build the submarine and didn't fit any engines. Fitting engines involved cutting the submarine in half and refitting the entire sub.

Are people not familiar with the issues the Ice breaker is having?

 

[Bluey 006]

Are people not familiar with the issues the Ice breaker is having?

I often wonder if we need to consider a 2nd icebreaker or Polar class patrol vessel. There seem to be a lot of icebergs floating about out there.

 

[Volkodav]

The only Australians who believe Australians can't make things, are Australians who don't make things.

The problem is not, and never was the tradies, techos and engineers, it's management, and non technical management at that.

By shifting production overseas you reduce the number of technical people overall, but especially entering management. This has the flow on effect of management being dominated by contract managers, project managers, accountants, administrators, etc.

Another effect is, because there's no build, there's less design work, less systems engineering, integration, implementation. This means many of the technical people who do make it to management have maintenance backgrounds, and no experience in design or build. This means they are far less effective in procurement, requirements, T&E etc. which is precisely the skill sets you need to ensure you aren't buying a lemon.

 

[Armchair]

A couple of points that I would be interested in clarification on, as some of what has been posted does not make sense, whilst other things I am interested in what the thinking is behind the belief.

AFAIK, brown water operations tends to mean riverine operations though some include near shore areas, with green water ops being done in littoral areas and adjacent seas, and finally blue water ops being open ocean. In that regard, a 2,000 ton RAN vessel operating in riverine areas would be problematic. Such a vessel would make more sense for littoral or green water operations.




I am interested in the thinking behind why a quick build (under five years) of a ~2,000 ton vessel is possible, since that is at odds with Australian procurement processes assuming one is talking about having a new class of vessel built, or a fairly significant variant of an existing class that is already in production.

Using the Arafura-class OPV programme the SEA 1180 project as a reference, the CEP started in late 2015 and ended in a contract being signed with Lurssen on 31 Jan 2018. It is also worth noting that there was work on the project that had to take place before the start of the CEP, in order for the CEP to happen, at least some of this work started on or before 2014. All of this was also before first steel was cut for the lead ship later on in 2018 and about five years later, Nuship Arafura has not yet been accepting into service.

Once a shipbuilding programme gets underway, with the associated supply chains established and ticking along, then vessels would likely be able to get delivered every couple of years. Looking at the end of the ANZAC-class frigate build, there was a roughly three year interval between a vessel being laid down and then commissioned into the RAN. The problem tends to be in determining what to build, getting a design which is fitted with what the RAN uses and how it gets used, and then establishing the supply chains to source everything needed for the build.

Yes “brown water” was just my stupidity (can’t even blame Navantia for that one). I was just trying to avoid saying corvette or Tier 2 and chose the wrong alternative,

So replying for courtesy rather than wanting to continue to rehash.

Broadly speaking I think a quick build for a small ship is possible because

1. Luerssen claimed it is possible (link has appeared previously in this thread Luerssen pitches C90 corvette derivative to RAN - Australian Defence Magazine ) to deliver a c90 in 2028 with steel cut in 2024. Luerssen might be mistaken but I suspect some of those who disagree strongly with him also have vested interests (I am not referring to people in this forum)

2. Aus government might adopt a different and rapidly expedited procurement process for this build If the surface fleet review recommends it

3. Some other nations building small warships have been able to build those within 5 years of the order (I am going off wikipedia references for that, I haven’t checked those so don’t offer them here but they inform my thinking which is what you have asked about).

4. both Osborne and Henderson now have small ship building experience with the Arafura class.

All of that leads me to be uncertain as to whether a quick build is possible. Just to illustrate. If 5 years is impossible then is 6 years also impossible? Yes? Is seven years still impossible? There must be some time span where a rational person believes it is possible to build a small warship In Australia. In my case I think a small warship build is just remotely possible in 3 years (from 2024) moving to close to a 50:50 in 5. For a new class of MFUs (Aegis) my minimum is 10 years and my 50:50 is 15 years.

 

[Volkodav]

Yes “brown water” was just my stupidity (can’t even blame Navantia for that one). I was just trying to avoid saying corvette or Tier 2 and chose the wrong alternative,

So replying for courtesy rather than wanting to continue to rehash.

Broadly speaking I think a quick build for a small ship is possible because

1. Luerssen claimed it is possible (link has appeared previously in this thread Luerssen pitches C90 corvette derivative to RAN - Australian Defence Magazine ) to deliver a c90 in 2028 with steel cut in 2024. Luerssen might be mistaken but I suspect some of those who disagree strongly with him also have vested interests (I am not referring to people in this forum)

2. Aus government might adopt a different and rapidly expedited procurement process for this build If the surface fleet review recommends it

3. Some other nations building small warships have been able to build those within 5 years of the order (I am going off wikipedia references for that, I haven’t checked those so don’t offer them here but they inform my thinking which is what you have asked about).

4. both Osborne and Henderson now have small ship building experience with the Arafura class.

All of that leads me to be uncertain as to whether a quick build is possible. Just to illustrate. If 5 years is impossible then is 6 years also impossible? Yes? Is seven years still impossible? There must be some time span where a rational person believes it is possible to build a small warship In Australia. In my case I think a small warship build is just remotely possible in 3 years (from 2024) moving to close to a 50:50 in 5. For a new class of MFUs (Aegis) my minimum is 10 years and my 50:50 is 15 years.

The problem Luerssen has is Arafuras construction went very well, as it has done for the following ships, the delay is on the certification side. That is, the ships were built efficiently to a high standard, but management failures have cause serious delays.

The ships were built by ASC personnel, contacted to do the build, and from the third onwards, Civmec. Lurerssen are the ones who have overseen the delays, due to integration and certification, yet they are saying they can deliver far more complex ships without a hitch?

 

[Mikeymike]

One thing when comparing offshore builds and onshore builds is while onshore builds tend to have a premium you have to remember that a lot more of that money is going into the Australian economy including back into the governments pocket through GST and income tax. You also have additional benefits from supporting an industry and while we may not be exporting ships the businesses that this industry supports can and do win export contracts into overseas builds.

Most of the problems with Australia's shipbuilding come from management and the government constantly changing their minds, delaying decisions or making decisions for purely political reasons. When the builders actually get to build the ships i believe quality is world-class and mostly within budget.

 

[Volkodav]

One thing when comparing offshore builds and onshore builds is while onshore builds tend to have a premium you have to remember that a lot more of that money is going into the Australian economy including back into the governments pocket through GST and income tax. You also have additional benefits from supporting an industry and while we may not be exporting ships the businesses that this industry supports can and do win export contracts into overseas builds.

Most of the problems with Australia's shipbuilding come from management and the government constantly changing their minds, delaying decisions or making decisions for purely political reasons. When the builders actually get to build the ships i believe quality is world-class and mostly within budget.

Local builds also upskill contracts, PM, procurement, etc. Basically, all the professions required for procurement are needed for builds, but the people get to grow and learn a lot more.

 

[Todjaeger]

Okay, several points to cover here.

Broadly speaking I think a quick build for a small ship is possible because

1. Luerssen claimed it is possible (link has appeared previously in this thread Luerssen pitches C90 corvette derivative to RAN - Australian Defence Magazine ) to deliver a c90 in 2028 with steel cut in 2024. Luerssen might be mistaken but I suspect some of those who disagree strongly with him also have vested interests (I am not referring to people in this forum)

Regarding Lurssen's claim, the devil is very much in the details. The company itself might have already done the detailed design work on a purely speculative basis, to take their base C90 design and make it into something fit for Australian service as well as something which can be built and fitted out in Australia but TBH I rather doubt that. I suspect that instead, Lurssen is pitching the idea so that they might receive a contract to do the detailed design work which would be needed for Australian C90's. One of the reasons I suspect this is that the detailed design work required to actually build a warship costs millions. Looking at the USN's FFG(X) programme, which has become the future Constellation-class frigate, five of the six shipbuilders that submitted proposals were issued contracts worth USD$15 mil. to produce conceptual designs. Fincantieri Marinette Marine was selected and awarded a contract for detailed design work and construction of the first ship with the contract worth USD$795 mil. I have not been able to determine how much of that USD$795 mil. was specifically for the detailed design work, but if the conceptual designs were USD$15 mil. I would expect detailed designs to be in the hundreds of millions. Meanwhile, the USN's FY2020 budgeting for the lead ship was USD$1.281 bil. which means that the contract for the detailed design and construction was not including the material and labor costs to build the lead vessel.

Now if the detailed design work still needs to be done, that is something which is going to take time, and also would need to be completed before long lead items can be ordered, and the detailed design work is also something which has to be done well before first steel can be cut.

If the detailed design work has already been done by Lurssen, then it would be a matter for Australia decide if the detailed design is adequate to meet Australian needs and then draft and sign the appropriate contracts. BTW this would touch on your point #2 which I have a response for below.

Assuming that the detailed design has been done and is rapidly accepted by gov't and a contract rapidly drafted and signed, then whoever will be building the vessels can start building the supply chain to construct the vessels. This would involve placing orders for the needed materials and systems from the appropriate enterprises, as well as establishing a workforce or re-directing an existing workforce. As has been mentioned several times before, long-lead items would need to be ordered. I cannot comment on what items in the design would have long lead times, in part because we do not know what would be included in the fitout, nor can we comment with any degree of certainty about how long the lead times are for some of these still unknown pieces of kit. By the same token though, Lurssen cannot really make any accurate claims on how quickly the build could be finished without the following;

1. A complete detailed design
2. Established a potential supply chain for the design
3. Been in contact with the vendors and enterprises which will supply systems and gotten delivery times for kit

From the linked article, it mentions several potential systems which it could be equipped with;

• 16 VLS cells
• 76 mm main gun
• 35 mm secondary gun
• NSM AShM
• pair of triple torpedo tubes
• CEA radar
• 9LV CMS

At least some of these items would likely be considered long lead items, which then raises the question of how long would it take for some of them to be delivered, once an order was placed. My personal suspicion would be that either the CEA radar or the 9LV CMS would be the one with the longest lead time, and either/both of them might require several years for delivery. Delivery of all the systems would also be required before the vessel could be completed and ready for service and some systems might need to be delivered during various stages of construction in order for them to be properly installed. Some of the ship's machinery and gen sets come to mind for a requirement like this. Also worth considering is that it would be likely at least some of the kit Australia would want fitted would fall under US ITARS and FMS rules, of which there is a process which has be carried out in order for these to be received and fitted and this process takes time, in addition to whatever time would be required to produce the impacted pieces of kit.

2. Aus government might adopt a different and rapidly expedited procurement process for this build If the surface fleet review recommends it

Australia might adopt some type of expedited or perhaps sole source procurement process, which might accelerate elements of the process, but not all elements of the process are likely under Australian control (i.e. ITARS and FMS) and these are in addition to whatever else is going on with the desired vendors, the facility, and so on.

3. Some other nations building small warships have been able to build those within 5 years of the order (I am going off wikipedia references for that, I haven’t checked those so don’t offer them here but they inform my thinking which is what you have asked about).

I have gone through various modern corvette classes that I can recall and are in the ~2,000 ton range to try and get a feel for how long things took. The two classes which seemed most relevant to what you seem to be proposing are the Turkish Ada-class, and the German/Israeli Sa'ar 6-class. Of these, the Sa'ar 6-class lead ship was ordered ~May 2015 and delivered 11 December 2020, so 5.5 years from when the order was placed to first delivery. However, before that order could get placed the detailed design work had to have been completed.

What would likely be more accurate (but harder to establish) would be to look at how long various corvette shipbuilding programmes took from the time the programme commenced to delivery of the first ship. I mention this because if one is measuring the time from when the order is placed, there are usually a couple of years of work which have already been completed before the order can get placed.

4. both Osborne and Henderson now have small ship building experience with the Arafura class.

TBH I do not consider Osborne or Henderson a significant issue, since both should have a work force with recent naval shipbuilding experience. In fact, when looking at how long most shipbuilding programmes take, not just those in Australia, the time between a vessel being laid down and commissioned is usually just a couple of years or less. What seems to drag things out is the need to make decisions on what to have fitted and then the time it takes for deliveries of systems and kit to the building yards.

All of that leads me to be uncertain as to whether a quick build is possible. Just to illustrate. If 5 years is impossible then is 6 years also impossible? Yes? Is seven years still impossible? There must be some time span where a rational person believes it is possible to build a small warship In Australia. In my case I think a small warship build is just remotely possible in 3 years (from 2024) moving to close to a 50:50 in 5. For a new class of MFUs (Aegis) my minimum is 10 years and my 50:50 is 15 years.

Again, when are you benchmarking the times? If you are just going off of when first steel is cut, or a vessel is laid down, that is not considering several things which need to get done before cutting steel or laying down a hull, and that is starting with an already complete design. If one does not have a completed design to begin with, that adds more time.