Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[alexsa]

Interesting ASPI article regarding the potential procurement of modern sea mines for the RAN, and a high speed method of laying those sea mines.

ADF will need fast minelayers for its new ‘smart’ mines | The Strategist

Australia has made the long-overdue decision to arm its military with sophisticated sea mines. The surface combatant review now underway needs to consider the acquisition of at least two fast minelayers able to lay protective ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

I can very easily see an Austal, or Incat, passenger/vehicle ferry fitting that potential requirement.

A number of years back I was onboard an Austal high speed ferry (in the Greek Islands), and I can easily see the very large lower vehicle deck fitted out to carry and deploy a large number of sea mines, and then quickly move onto the next operational area, and so on.

Interesting...

Yes and no ..... A few things to consider:

• Operational Sea State limitations. This things lightly built for their impressive speed. Commerically they are subject to the High Speed Craft Code and they have sea state limitations. In commerial service they are require to be within 4 hours of a safe haven for PAX operations and 8 hours for cargo operations. The ones built for the military are based on the same code.
• Sustained speed. When the sea state gets up the speed of these vessels goes down. If the sea state gets higher that 5 then tunnel slam can become an issue and the vessel will have to slow down .... a lot. It would be better to have a vessel that can maintain a decent speed in higher sea states IMHO.
• Operating area. I expect the RAN would like a local and distant mine laying capability. I would not like to be the folk trying to use such a vessel to mine distant choke points. In local waters sure. For distant waters you needs some self defence capability (see below).
• Deadweight and uplift capacity. A lot of the big fast ferries have a low deadweight. The Austal Sea Frame that the LCS is based on has a deadweight of around 900 tonnes. This 900 tonnes covers all fuel, stores, weapons, people, their gear as well as cargo. To convert those to a vessel that operates beyond a fast ferry route you are going to have to add cabins and amenities as well as any weapons systems .............. as well as the mines. That 900 tonnes will disapear in a hurry noting these things need a lot of fuel.
• Damage resistance. These light weight aluminium vessels are not designed to take a hit. The use of lightly armed high speed vessels (even those built for the military) could be a easy kill (see links below). The self defence systems will need to be pretty good so you are starting to look at an LCS as opposed to to a fast ferry conversion if this vessel is intended to be used in contested waters (see above).

Former U.S. Navy HSV-2 Swift wrecked in Yemen missile attack | WorkBoat
Missile Attack Destroys Ex-Navy Ship off Yemen (maritime-executive.com)

As an aside, I am not advocating for the purchase of LCS.

Not saying it won't happen as lots of folk are attracted by good looking locally built vessels ............... but it will be limited by the design of the vessel if a fast ferry derivative is selected

 

[alexsa]

.

For Australia to deploy the proposed sea mines it is suggested that surface or subsurface vessels including military and commercial vessels ‘taken up from trade’, Collins-class submarines fitted with external mine racks, or from the air using military aircraft. The use of the Arafura class OPVs is not consider as the author believes that the current surface combatant review will scrap the OPVs (plus he feels that the OPVs are too slow). It is claimed that surface minelayers should be used to lay protective minefields in home waters and approaches to ports to "achieve speed and the high accuracy required to protect friendly merchant shipping and naval forces".

I have no issue with most of your post and agree that the ASPI article references to WW2 are not really relevant to the current situation. My issue is Collins Class with external mine racks. At this point in time there is no such fitting. I think fitting such devices would be counterproductive as it will slow the boat down and compromise its acoustic stelth. Contrary to what some of the press say, the Collins at low speed is very quiet.

The Collins can deploy mines out of its tubes. I cannot see this being done any other way.

 

[Volkodav]

The logical fast (25kt+) minelayer is, lo and behold, a corvette/light frigate/OPC(or wherever)/ or even a converted light destroyer or DE. This is exactly the type of ship that has been considered for the RAN, off and on, for decades.

It strikes me that ANZAC and Corvette replacements could easily have had multi mission decks and stern boat launching arrangements, to facilitate such missions. That is, assuming we had maintained eight or more high end FFGs or DDGs that would have allowed the smaller combatants to be more flexible.

Take it a step further, the highly successful RN fast mine layers were used extensively as fast transports, even assault transports. The USN made extensive use of old destroyers and new build DEs converted to fast assault transports (APD), which could also still be pressed into service as ASW escorts and fast mine sweepers.

Post WWII the RANs DE equivalents, the River Class frigates, were used in a variety of roles. With the Bays, we had twelve of these useful ships, and then dozens of Bathurst Class corvettes on top of that. This was in addition to frontline destroyers, and ASW frigate conversions of war built destroyers.

Do not forget that at this time we also operated cruisers and carriers.

To me, having a class of multi role ships, is a sensible way to go. A design with a viable self defence and sensor suit, sufficient volume and displacement, plus a suitable layout to facilitate operation of modular mission equipment, or even just to be used as a fast assault transport, as required.

Such a ship, without mission modules and associated crew, could be used as, shock horror, OPVs. Said mission modules could be stored, or even better, installed ashore, to permit training of reserve personnel to operate them.

 

[hauritz]

We tend to forget just how effective, and cost effective sea mines are. In WW2 I believe more shipping was destroyed by sea mines than any other method. The British sank over a 1000 axis ships with mines. That is more than twice as many as their submarines managed to sink.

Having them is one thing but we need to know how to deal with them as well. Last estimate I saw had China with over 100,000 sea mines.

The logical fast (25kt+) minelayer is, lo and behold, a corvette/light frigate/OPC(or wherever)/ or even a converted light destroyer or DE. This is exactly the type of ship that has been considered for the RAN, off and on, for decades.

It strikes me that ANZAC and Corvette replacements could easily have had multi mission decks and stern boat launching arrangements, to facilitate such missions. That is, assuming we had maintained eight or more high end FFGs or DDGs that would have allowed the smaller combatants to be more flexible.

Take it a step further, the highly successful RN fast mine layers were used extensively as fast transports, even assault transports. The USN made extensive use of old destroyers and new build DEs converted to fast assault transports (APD), which could also still be pressed into service as ASW escorts and fast mine sweepers.

Post WWII the RANs DE equivalents, the River Class frigates, were used in a variety of roles. With the Bays, we had twelve of these useful ships, and then dozens of Bathurst Class corvettes on top of that. This was in addition to frontline destroyers, and ASW frigate conversions of war built destroyers.

Do not forget that at this time we also operated cruisers and carriers.

To me, having a class of multi role ships, is a sensible way to go. A design with a viable self defence and sensor suit, sufficient volume and displacement, plus a suitable layout to facilitate operation of modular mission equipment, or even just to be used as a fast assault transport, as required.

Such a ship, without mission modules and associated crew, could be used as, shock horror, OPVs. Said mission modules could be stored, or even better, installed ashore, to permit training of reserve personnel to operate them.

It does seem to fit in with the whole corvette/light frigate narrative being pushed by the government.

 

[Julian 82]

I

The logical fast (25kt+) minelayer is, lo and behold, a corvette/light frigate/OPC(or wherever)/ or even a converted light destroyer or DE. This is exactly the type of ship that has been considered for the RAN, off and on, for decades.

It strikes me that ANZAC and Corvette replacements could easily have had multi mission decks and stern boat launching arrangements, to facilitate such missions. That is, assuming we had maintained eight or more high end FFGs or DDGs that would have allowed the smaller combatants to be more flexible.

Take it a step further, the highly successful RN fast mine layers were used extensively as fast transports, even assault transports. The USN made extensive use of old destroyers and new build DEs converted to fast assault transports (APD), which could also still be pressed into service as ASW escorts and fast mine sweepers.

Post WWII the RANs DE equivalents, the River Class frigates, were used in a variety of roles. With the Bays, we had twelve of these useful ships, and then dozens of Bathurst Class corvettes on top of that. This was in addition to frontline destroyers, and ASW frigate conversions of war built destroyers.

Do not forget that at this time we also operated cruisers and carriers.

To me, having a class of multi role ships, is a sensible way to go. A design with a viable self defence and sensor suit, sufficient volume and displacement, plus a suitable layout to facilitate operation of modular mission equipment, or even just to be used as a fast assault transport, as required.

Such a ship, without mission modules and associated crew, could be used as, shock horror, OPVs. Said mission modules could be stored, or even better, installed ashore, to permit training of reserve personnel to operate them.

My understanding is that the MEKO A100 design has a stern ramp and aft flex mission deck with space for 6 TEU sized mission modules. It should be able to carry and deploy a decent number of sea mines (while defending itself in contested waters).

 

[old faithful]

I have no issue with most of your post and agree that the ASPI article references to WW2 are not really relevant to the current situation. My issue is Collins Class with external mine racks. At this point in time there is no such fitting. I think fitting such devices would be counterproductive as it will slow the boat down and compromise its acoustic stelth. Contrary to what some of the press say, the Collins at low speed is very quite.

The Collins can deploy mines out of its tubes. I cannot see this being done any other way.

At slow speeds (3 knots) the Collins class are quieter than the ambient sea level sounds.

 

[ddxx]

I

My understanding is that the MEKO A100 design has a stern ramp and aft flex mission deck with space for 6 TEU sized mission modules. It should be able to carry and deploy a decent number of sea mines (while defending itself in contested waters).

The issue with the MEKO A100 is that it has a range of only 4,500 nm at 14 Knots.

It wouldn’t even be able to keep up with modern merchant ships under escort over the vast distances of our sea lanes.

ANZAC, originally procured as a ‘Tier Two’ patrol frigate, has a range of 6,000 nm at 18 Knots.

Additionally, If we thought managing through life growth margins for a MEKO 200 (Anzac) was hard, imagine working with an even smaller hull. It would be a crazy move.

 

[Jason_DBF]

At slow speeds (3 knots) the Collins class are quieter than the ambient sea level sounds.

I love when experts start saying how quiet at certain speeds Collins class submarines are.

 

[Volkodav]

I love when experts start saying how quiet at certain speeds Collins class submarines are.

The exact signatures are classified but the more general performance has been public domain for over twenty years.

Basically when the media and politicians were spreading the narrative of how noisy and useless they were, their performance in trials and exercises, pre upgrade, was showing the complete opposite. This was publisized but gained nowhere near the airtime as the negative narrative.

 

[MickB]

The logical fast (25kt+) minelayer is, lo and behold, a corvette/light frigate/OPC(or wherever)/ or even a converted light destroyer or DE. This is exactly the type of ship that has been considered for the RAN, off and on, for decades.

It strikes me that ANZAC and Corvette replacements could easily have had multi mission decks and stern boat launching arrangements, to facilitate such missions. That is, assuming we had maintained eight or more high end FFGs or DDGs that would have allowed the smaller combatants to be more flexible.

Take it a step further, the highly successful RN fast mine layers were used extensively as fast transports, even assault transports. The USN made extensive use of old destroyers and new build DEs converted to fast assault transports (APD), which could also still be pressed into service as ASW escorts and fast mine sweepers.

Post WWII the RANs DE equivalents, the River Class frigates, were used in a variety of roles. With the Bays, we had twelve of these useful ships, and then dozens of Bathurst Class corvettes on top of that. This was in addition to frontline destroyers, and ASW frigate conversions of war built destroyers.

Do not forget that at this time we also operated cruisers and carriers.

To me, having a class of multi role ships, is a sensible way to go. A design with a viable self defence and sensor suit, sufficient volume and displacement, plus a suitable layout to facilitate operation of modular mission equipment, or even just to be used as a fast assault transport, as required.

Such a ship, without mission modules and associated crew, could be used as, shock horror, OPVs. Said mission modules could be stored, or even better, installed ashore, to permit training of reserve personnel to operate them.

So in other words Sea 1180, or what the LCS should have been. Remove the over the top speed requirements of the LCS and I have no doubts they would have ended up with a steel warship such as described above.

An interesting design that was floated around at that time was the BMT Venator 110, a ship of comparable armament and performance to the Anzacs of the time but including a mission deck and stern launching facilites.
And an advertised crew requirement of roughly half the size of the Anzacs.

 

[Reptilia]

So in other words Sea 1180, or what the LCS should have been. Remove the over the top speed requirements of the LCS and I have no doubts they would have ended up with a steel warship such as described above.

An interesting design that was floated around at that time was the BMT Venator 110, a ship of comparable armament and performance to the Anzacs of the time but including a mission deck and stern launching facilites.
And an advertised crew requirement of roughly half the size of the Anzacs.

I thought the Arrowhead 120 was also a good design and was in competition with the BMT venator 110 For the type 31.
Yes, it is a paper design but a good cross between an Anzac and an Arafura.

 

[ngatimozart]

I thought the Arrowhead 120 was also a good design and was in competition with the BMT venator 110 For the type 31.
Yes, it is a paper design but a good cross between an Anzac and an Arafura.

The Arrowhead 140 (AH140) is the base platform for the Type 31. The Arrowhead 120 (AH120) is a significantly smaller variant. In an Australasian context an AH120 would make for a good corvette or lightweight escort frigate because of its size and range. If a navy ran an AH140 / AH120 combination it would be quite efficient, financially and logistically, because of platform commonality.

 

[Jason_DBF]

The exact signatures are classified but the more general performance has been public domain for over twenty years.

Basically when the media and politicians were spreading the narrative of how noisy and useless they were, their performance in trials and exercises, pre upgrade, was showing the complete opposite. This was publisized but gained nowhere near the airtime as the negative narrative.

I'm a serving submariner on Collins

The exact signatures are classified but the more general performance has been public domain for over twenty years.

Basically when the media and politicians were spreading the narrative of how noisy and useless they were, their performance in trials and exercises, pre upgrade, was showing the complete opposite. This was publisized but gained nowhere near the airtime as the negative narrative.

I'm pretty familiar with the Collins class submarines. Still serving as a submariner and very mindful of what I write.

 

[Volkodav]

I'm a serving submariner on Collins

I'm pretty familiar with the Collins class submarines. Still serving as a submariner and very mindful of what I write.

I know the feeling. Certain things are only discussed with certain people in certain locations. Need to know is also very important, I stick to that one quite strictly as what I don't know I can't accidentally reveal.

 

[Hoffy]

Speaking of Submarines , Kevin Rudd (among other very senior figures) answers a few questions during a visit to Newport News Shipbuilding, courtesy of WAVY.com:

Sen. Kaine in Newport News to discuss AUKUS Agreement | WAVY.com

 

[OldNavy63]

Speaking of Submarines , Kevin Rudd (among other very senior figures) answers a few questions during a visit to Newport News Shipbuilding, courtesy of WAVY.com:

Sen. Kaine in Newport News to discuss AUKUS Agreement | WAVY.com

The Weekend Australian (subscription), also carried this report in which K. Rudd used the analogy of the making of a sausage (untidy, messy, prolonged), to the passing of legislation (for technology transfer etc).

I hope this sausage will soon be successfully produced in the shape of big juicy SSNs for the RAN! (And it may be wise to remind Mr Rudd to go easy on the sauce, at all of the ambassadorial events along the way).

 

[old faithful]

I love when experts start saying how quiet at certain speeds Collins class submarines are.

Yeah sorry, I read it in a Navy magazine or saw it somewhere, the article was reffering to the bad rep they had at the start of their lives. I shouldn't have quoted that as a fact, I really don't know how quiet they are! Apologies.

 

[Going Boeing]

Yeah sorry, I read it in a Navy magazine or saw it somewhere, the article was reffering to the bad rep they had at the start of their lives. I shouldn't have quoted that as a fact, I really don't know how quiet they are! Apologies.

In the early days of the Collins class, I recall reading that there were individuals in the RAN who were doing everything possible to ensure that the options for two more Collins (7 & 8) were not confirmed as those funds would result in two fewer surface combatants. They fed the media a lot of information about problems with the Collins (not necessarily true) who swallowed it up and the resultant media reports made it impossible for any government to order the extra submarines.

Having been given such a bad reputation by the media, it has been difficult to restore public confidence in the Collins class - despite it evolving into one of the best diesel electric submarines in service.

 

[Tasman]

In the early days of the Collins class, I recall reading that there were individuals in the RAN who were doing everything possible to ensure that the options for two more Collins (7 & 8) were not confirmed as those funds would result in two fewer surface combatants. They fed the media a lot of information about problems with the Collins (not necessarily true) who swallowed it up and the resultant media reports made it impossible for any government to order the extra submarines.

Having been given such a bad reputation by the media, it has been difficult to restore public confidence in the Collins class - despite it evolving into one of the best diesel electric submarines in service.

As it turned out the RAN ended up with 3 fewer surface combatants (6 FFGs being replaced by 3 Hobarts) as well as losing Collins 7 and 8!

Tas

 

[Volkodav]

As it turned out the RAN ended up with 3 fewer surface combatants (6 FFGs being replaced by 3 Hobarts) as well as losing Collins 7 and 8!

Tas

Actually six fewer, three DDG, six FFG replaced by the Hobart's.

While it could be argued the last two FFGs were an increase to the fleets numbers, they entered service as the first two River Class frigates retired. As for the eight ANZACs replacing four / six Rivers, this was actually part of the restructure of the RAN following the retirement of the carrier, which was meant to see both an increase in numbers, and individual capability of surface combatants.