Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0
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Redlands18
Well-Known Member
Reduce costs? The 155mm guns on the Zumwalts have actually been decommissioned due to the extreme cost of the rounds, $800,000 plus, there has even been investigations into removing them. There has been investigations over the years for fitting 155mm Howitzer systems to ships, for shore bombardment missions but they would not be suitable for AAW and they would use up more space and weight when compared to the 127mm.
No body is going to develop a 155mm calibre naval gun, does not offer enough capability improvement over the Leonardo 127/64 nor the Mk 45 127/62 to be worth the expense and loss of room and weight allowances on a ship.
Current naval guns and magazines as I understand are designed for 1 piece ammunition natures.
Most modern 155 systems use separate rounds and charge bag systems for propellent.
Significant engineering and re-design would be required to change to the different systems. Not worth the cost I expect.
FormerDirtDart
Well-Known Member
The Zumwalt's 155mm AGS has absolutely no similarities to any Army's 155mm howitzer ever fielded, other than the diameter of the round.
Was there not an experimental mounting of a Pzh 2000 turret onto a German Frigate?
Do not remember the issues but not kept in service.
Yes the ammo was the problem…not the gun as such. If the same projectiles as used by Army my thought was the production volumes across the calibre would allow for greater volumes and therefore savings. I think there has been some work on a 155mm AAW round… not sure how it’s progressed but how are current 127 mm being relied for Anti Aircraft weapons when SM and ESSM are available?
The Army's Big, Dumb Guns Aren't Dumb Anymore (and Now They Can Shoot Down Planes)
Looks like the howitzer learned a new trick.
www.popularmechanics.com
Following answer from @ADMk2 was that naval guns are 1 piece ammunition vs Army being 2 piece so that makes some sense.
@FormerDirtDart - I wasn’t suggesting there was any similarity other than the calibre.
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
LDO_Comm_Datasheet_4C_R2 (leonardo.com)Yes the ammo was the problem…not the gun as such. If the same projectiles as used by Army my thought was the production volumes across the calibre would allow for greater volumes and therefore savings. I think there has been some work on a 155mm AAW round… not sure how it’s progressed but how are current 127 mm being relied for Anti Aircraft weapons when SM and ESSM are available?
how much extra weight is involved? Some of the SPGs have automated systems that I would assume you’re not talking 100s of tons …50 odd tons Vs 21 for a Mk45.The Army's Big, Dumb Guns Aren't Dumb Anymore (and Now They Can Shoot Down Planes)
Looks like the howitzer learned a new trick.
Following answer from @ADMk2 was that naval guns are 1 piece ammunition vs Army being 2 piece so that makes some sense.
@FormerDirtDart - I wasn’t suggesting there was any similarity other than the calibre.
Leonardo claims its 127/64 LW Vulcano has a secondary AAW capability, certainly not an alternative to missile systems but it is a useful back up. Between the Oto-Melara/Leonardo and Mk 45 127mm systems there are 18 navies currently operating well over 100 guns between them, so production volume for 127mm ammo is very high anyway
Apparently a RN 4.5" shot down an Exocet during the Falklands.
Several years ago 155mm was postulated as a CRAM option in Afghanistan, using proximity, or even timed, fragmentation rounds.
There are currently course corrected / guided rounds for 127mm, 76mm and 57mm, one has to wonder how far away it is for 40/35/30 mm etc.
Several years ago 155mm was postulated as a CRAM option in Afghanistan, using proximity, or even timed, fragmentation rounds.
There are currently course corrected / guided rounds for 127mm, 76mm and 57mm, one has to wonder how far away it is for 40/35/30 mm etc.
Stuart M
Well-Known Member
The Brits did it
A victim of cutbacks.
If you awant a really big expensive ship for big guns I'd think a variation of the Des Moines class auto 8 's are fairly cool design to to with. And who knows, if "Lazers" work out we might be back to battle wagons trading broadsides.
There was an the Brits looked at putting the AS-90 turret onto some of their vessels.
Neither proposal was taken up…
Because defence decided to drop the original idea of a T26 modified to carry CEAFAR2 with minimal changes with growth to be looked at in the second batch. From discussions of those engaged in the risk assessment Defence decided to grow the design from the get go. The combination of the CEA radar suite with AEGIS and SAAB 9LV had a massive impact on space and power supplies.
It should be noted that the Hobart is going to struggle to take this fit out when they are upgraded. However, the Hunter will still have some growth margin and will deploy a multi static ASW capability (The Hobart is a bistatic fit). Consider this as a bit like the CEC of the ASW world.
So you have an ASW frigate with a very good AAW and ABM capability (as good as the DDG, maybe better due to CEA radars) but with possibly less cells (still to be confirmed). It also has an outstanding ASW capability (in an area wher a lot of nations are buying submarines and they are a direct threat). In addition it will have an equivalent ASuW weapon to the Hobart as well. The multi mission bay provides a capability to carry two helos and/or a combination of ASV (with a TA these help extend the area the vessel can cover) and remotely controlled drones. This is a lot of extra capability the Hobart simply does not have.
Its that whole apples and apples thing. Those wanting a massive ship with 100+ cells seem to be focused on the AA risk. We still need a very good ASW capability and this cannot be delivered by the SSN alone (these would also need to present a threat to opposing groups .... preferably near a choke point).
I find the entire process to be an embarssing mess that does nothing for Australia's defence. Both sides of politics and Defence carry the can for this and I would expect a lot of defence primes to add additional cost to any contract or RFT to guard against a change of mind.
The Hunter is effectively in build (first steel on the 'prototype' modules to be used the actual hull has been cut) so lets see how that goes as it will the in the water before the other options .................... unless it is cancelled.
The ANAO report into the Hunter program makes it pretty clear that the underlying issue has been that BAE overstated the maturity of the reference design.
On the mission bay and the ability to embark a second MH-60R and UXVs, where exactly are the accommodations for the crews which would need to embark with the additional equipment?
The Navy's site was updated and now states Hunter has a crew of 183 excluding flight crew and accommodations for 208.
With a single flight crew embarked that brings the complement to 199, meaning there's only 9 excess accommodations.
C
Could be a typo. The PDF on the same page says 180 including embarked flight. The reference Type 26 design says 157 crew excluding embarked flight. I don’t know if you can hang your hat on anything just yet.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Okay, I have to ask this. Where are you getting a figure of 16 personnel required to support one embarked MH-60R Seahawk? The normal flight (not ground) crew for an MH-60R Seahawk is three, a pilot, co-pilot, and then a sensor operator. I would expect additional personnel would be required to to carry out the support and maintenance functions whilst aboard ship (refueling, re-arming, repairs, etc.) and there could also be a 2nd entire flight crew to permit greater utilization without as much risk of aircrew fatigue, but a requirement of nine non-flight crew (assuming a double flight crew) sounds rather high and more than double what I would expect would be required.
Incidentally, I looked at the USN aviation detachments that would have been embarked aboard USN Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates and they would typically be composed of ~six officers and 15 enlisted, to support, maintain and operate a pair of SH-60 LAMPS III Seahawks. Of these 21 personnel, I suspect this would have provided a total of three flight crews (pilot officer, co-pilot/airborne tactical officer, and an enlisted aviation warfare systems operator) leaving a dozen ground crew aboard ship to support a pair of helicopters.
So two MH-60R operating off the one ship need how many crew?
16 or 32 or something in between these numbers.
Thanks S.
Very few auditors are technically minded, let alone competent in the fields they are auditing. Audits I've responded to, rather than defending what they've found, I've actually had to ask them how they missed the problems we were already aware of.
In the Hunters the reason they have AEGIS and the latest iterations of Standard is because successive governments allowed our destroyer force to shrink from nine (and never less than five), high end, GP ships with regionally superior capability, to only three. I say destroyer force, because the FFGs were procured as replacements for destroyers, after the cancellation of the DDL program.
The ASW frigates were a separate capability, initially war built River and Bay class, then Type 15 conversions of the Q Class destroyers, finally the River class DEs. The ANZACs were patrol frigates that were upgraded to GP frigates after successive governments failed to maintain destroyer numbers or to acquire ASW frigates.
In an ideal world the ANZACs would have been six ASW frigates, i.e. Type 23 Type 123 or M Class, the DDGs would have been replaced one for one by Burkes and the FFGs replaced one for one with F100s or Type 124s, and we would be now be building stock Type 26s to replace whatever the ANZACs were.
Oh, we would have had a Corvette instead of the Armadales and would be building a light or patrol frigate to replace them due to the deteriorating international situation.
This isn't fantasy fleets, this is a one for one replacement of existing platforms with the relevant suitable successor designs based on strategic needs. They would have been paid for with the bucket loads of money government of both colours pissed up against the wall during the two decades of sustained economic growth and economically distorting resources booms (i.e. super profits taxes instead of letting ahole multinationals move money off shore).
In the Hunters the reason they have AEGIS and the latest iterations of Standard is because successive governments allowed our destroyer force to shrink from nine (and never less than five), high end, GP ships with regionally superior capability, to only three. I say destroyer force, because the FFGs were procured as replacements for destroyers, after the cancellation of the DDL program.
The ASW frigates were a separate capability, initially war built River and Bay class, then Type 15 conversions of the Q Class destroyers, finally the River class DEs. The ANZACs were patrol frigates that were upgraded to GP frigates after successive governments failed to maintain destroyer numbers or to acquire ASW frigates.
In an ideal world the ANZACs would have been six ASW frigates, i.e. Type 23 Type 123 or M Class, the DDGs would have been replaced one for one by Burkes and the FFGs replaced one for one with F100s or Type 124s, and we would be now be building stock Type 26s to replace whatever the ANZACs were.
Oh, we would have had a Corvette instead of the Armadales and would be building a light or patrol frigate to replace them due to the deteriorating international situation.
This isn't fantasy fleets, this is a one for one replacement of existing platforms with the relevant suitable successor designs based on strategic needs. They would have been paid for with the bucket loads of money government of both colours pissed up against the wall during the two decades of sustained economic growth and economically distorting resources booms (i.e. super profits taxes instead of letting ahole multinationals move money off shore).
Maturity is certainly an issue but the RN T26 are in series build with the first hull in the water. If the Australian project had confined itself to the UK T26 reference then the project would have been considerably more advanced. The added 24 month to get to the Hunter Class is due to the desire to grow the platform design beyond that being used for the RN T26. The scope of the design changes are such that the first prototype blocks could not be used on the Hunter Class (these relate to the bridge structure) due to the differences in design.
So, yes design maturity of the T26 contributed to the delay but the Australian changes resulted in a significantly different vessel and further delays.
To be fair, if either the FREMM or modifed Navantia design had been selected as both would have required very significant design changes (and growth) if they would have been required to meet the same capability that is being built into the Hunter design.
So BAE carry some of the can for this .... but so does the project.