Royal Australian Air Force [RAAF] News, Discussions and Updates

hauritz

Well-Known Member
Certainly I think Australia would be a welcome customer for GCAP. It has good relations with all three members, especially the UK (thanks, AUKUS). Japan would see the benefit of having a friendly state like Australia equipped with long range, sixth-gen aircraft. Italy would be happy for the extra income, even if it's a bit shruggy over the Pacific.

But a word of caution, Australia would be a customer, not a partner. The 2035 delivery window is vital for Japan, and unless Australia is already in discussions about joining there simply won't be time to reorganise work shares and the like. Maybe it could be involved in the project down the road, but not as a core member.
One benefit of joining GCAP is that we might be able to do a reciprocal deal with the MQ-28.

I know Japan is already considering the Ghost Bat for their combat support unmanned aircraft program.

 
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StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
But a word of caution, Australia would be a customer, not a partner. The 2035 delivery window is vital for Japan, and unless Australia is already in discussions about joining there simply won't be time to reorganise work shares and the like. Maybe it could be involved in the project down the road, but not as a core member.
I don't think that would be a big problem. It would be british or japanese subsidiaries that would likely be doing anything here anyway.
If anything 2035 is maybe too late. We would want key integration and FOC before we got delivery.

It would depend on if the plane is going to be focused on just air to air, or maritime patrol and strike with significant air to air capability. If its just air to air, it will be of no interest to Australia. So its not just about the plane, but about the weapons it has. We would be more interested in making weapons here than fighter planes.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
I was thinking a long range interceptor/escort could provide some useful balance to the f35 ,at this stage its not known the capability of this type of aircraft
 

Bob53

Well-Known Member
Certainly the Tempest program is becoming more tempting than just acquiring more of the F-35s,This article suggests the Tempest will be available in mid 2030s although no specifics are given about performance its wing structure and size suggest a longer range than the F35 with possibility of carrying larger long range missiles still in development e.g. hypersonic
[/QUOTE
By that stage our early F35s will be 17 + years old and and add another 6 or 7 years on delivery time frames…. Earliest F35s will be 20+ years old …
 
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south

Well-Known Member
Priority 3 - proper airlift. Airlift is the only thing outside nukes that air power can offer independently that has strategic effects. For all the pointy grey noise, air lift is what genuinely matters. Ideally something in the C-17 class; but really anything worthwhile that is C-130J or bigger.
If we define strategic effect as having a change to policy/strategy as a result or consequence of action or other cause... I'd like to offer a few counters where independent strategic effect has been airmailed in:

1. Battle of Britain. The Luftwaffe inability to achieve air superiority and thus protection of the channel crossing led to cancellation of Operation Sea Lion - demonstrably a decisive change to German overall strategy.

But for the invasion to have any chance of success, the Germans needed to first secure control of the skies over southern England and remove the threat posed by the Royal Air Force (RAF). A sustained air assault on Britain would achieve the decisive victory needed to make ‘Sealion’ a possibility – or so the Germans thought.
2. Battle of Germany. The defeat of Luftwaffe (as directed in Point Blank Directive, an outcome of Casablanca directive), in concert with the transportation plan were direct enablers of D-Day landings; key enablers to the allied strategy.

In the CBO against Germany, the Allies eventually succeeded in creat- ing systemic effects that impeded the enemy’s war-sustaining and war- making operations. This outcome tends to support interwar theories that airpower would create such effects by striking key points or vital economic centers;
3. Operation Allied Force. NATO Air Forces defeated Serbian forces, and undoubtedly drove the changing of Slobodan Milosovic's Strategy.

Operation Allied Force pitted NATO against Slobodan Milosevic in what has been called a humanitarian intervention, coercive diplomacy, the first information war, and the first war won by airpower alone.
Plenty of strategic effect... achieved through AirPower, not just airlift...
 
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Julian 82

Active Member
If we define strategic effect as having a change to policy/strategy as a result or consequence of action or other cause... I'd like to offer a few counters:

1. Battle of Britain. The Luftwaffe inability to achieve air superiority and thus protection of the channel crossing led to cancellation of Operation Sea Lion - demonstrably a decisive change to German overall strategy.



2. Battle of Germany. The defeat of Luftwaffe (as directed in Point Blank Directive, an outcome of Casablanca directive), in concert with the transportation plan were direct enablers of D-Day landings; key enablers to the allied strategy.



3. Operation Allied Force. NATO Air Forces defeated Serbian forces, and undoubtedly drove the changing Slobodan Milosovic Strategy.



Plenty of strategic effect... achieved through AirPower, not just airlift...
I would add that airlift can only happen if you have air superiority. A lot of people take air superiority for granted until you don’t have it.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Operation Sealion would never have succeeded while the Home Fleet existed as a fighting force. The only weapon the Germans truly had against the Home Fleet was airpower, their air power was useless so long as the RAF had air superiority.

Force Z showed what could happen when capital ship lacked fighter cover, the Mediterranean showed what a fleet could do with even minimal air support even against a multi tiered air threat. The RN FAA showed what happens when a fleet in habour isn't adequately protected from air attack.
 

Takao

The Bunker Group
If we define strategic effect as having a change to policy/strategy as a result or consequence of action or other cause... I'd like to offer a few counters where independent strategic effect has been airmailed in:

1. Battle of Britain. The Luftwaffe inability to achieve air superiority and thus protection of the channel crossing led to cancellation of Operation Sea Lion - demonstrably a decisive change to German overall strategy.

2. Battle of Germany. The defeat of Luftwaffe (as directed in Point Blank Directive, an outcome of Casablanca directive), in concert with the transportation plan were direct enablers of D-Day landings; key enablers to the allied strategy.

3. Operation Allied Force. NATO Air Forces defeated Serbian forces, and undoubtedly drove the changing of Slobodan Milosovic's Strategy.

Plenty of strategic effect... achieved through AirPower, not just airlift...
Key word in my statement was independent. Air power proponents like to sell that air power answers anything and can hence replace land/sea power; my argument is that is incorrect for anything that is not airlift. Taking your examples as evidence:

The Battle of Britain helped cancel German plans, but its wasn't the main reason. The existence of the Home Fleet provided that strategic impetus. Both German and British sources identified that the Royal Navy would sortie to stop an invasion fleet, regardless of the air situation. Remember that the Royal Navy had already bloodied the Kriegsmarine's nose during one invasion, and that wasn't in defence of the Home Islands. The success of the RAF helped reduce that likely cost to the Royal Navy, but between the fleet and Berlin's shift to the east, it did not do it alone.

In reverse, the defeat of the Luftwaffe was an enabler of D-Day, but again, in isolation it did not achieve anything. The defeat or otherwise of the Luftwaffe meant nothing without the commitment of sea and land power on 6 Jun 44 - and in many ways was irrelevant if you don't care how far west the Soviets come. Yes, the CBO helped pull guns off the Eastern Front and helped get the Soviets through 42/43, but it didn't achieve anything independently.

This is the closest I think you can get to, where kinetic airpower has achieved strategic effects. Except, one of the overlooked points was the increased efforts in putting a NATO ground force into action. It was fairly clear to Serbia they could not win against a ground invasion, especially without support from Moscow, but they could hold out long enough for the international pressure on the questionable actions of NATO (as in, legally questionable to start bombing, not Takao thinks intervening was questionable) to stop. KFOR rolls in within 2 days of NATO ratification of Serbia's surrender - a clear sign that it was poised and ready to go in for combat operations (which is true). Again, air power helped, but the increasing threat of ground forces forced Milošević 's hand.

In all of those situations, the air power contributed, but could not independently bring about the strategic effect. In at least two of them, the naval and/or land forces could have achieved the same result without air power (at more time and expense). Compare to the Berlin Airlift (and arguably Operation Nickle Grass) where neither land nor sea could achieve what air power could. Compare the post-war history of the RAAF, where the fighters and bombers didn't really achieve any strategic success, but our Caribou's, Herc's and C-17s along with transport helicopters have been at the forefront of many Australian diplomatic efforts in the region. I know there is a claim about F-111s influencing Jakarta, but I've never seen any evidence of that (despite asking here and elsewhere, including work, multiple times).

I'm all for an Air Force. Given the option of fighting under a sky owned by REDFOR or a sky owned by red kangaroos, I'll take the later every single day. If I am ever involved in ground combat operations again, I want there to be a 50 000ft high stack of kangaroo's armed with bombs, rockets, missiles and cannons - all designed to rain a bunch of HE down on REDFOR's head so my men and women can operate safely. What I do draw the line at is when people lose sight of the real limitations of airpower, and the fetishization of pointy, fast, grey things. The latter isn't air specific, but the air domain is where it is most prevalent. And, given Australia's current resource pressures and strategic situation, I think spending money on more fighters is one of the worst things we could do. And, if you have to force me into buying platforms, it'll be airlift before anything else.
 

south

Well-Known Member
Key word in my statement was independent. Air power proponents like to sell that air power answers anything and can hence replace land/sea power; my argument is that is incorrect for anything that is not airlift. Taking your examples as evidence:
I'm more than happy to agree that we're arguing at cross purposes around 'independent' functions - and while this may seem semantics - the use the word effect is critical. In all of the cases listed strategic effects were achieved, independently. While in reality, the consequences of effects are summed - they can, and often are, pursued in isolation or in parallel efforts - which may be decisive in themselves. If they were not we might as well be discussing strategic victory - which is the thrust of your post.

It's a bold strategy cotton, to argue a hypothetical like the allied landing would have been pursued without air power. To quote Eisenhower 'Without Air Supremacy, we wouldn't be here'.. It's revealing that he drafted a note to be pushed going to push in the event of defeat of the landings - even with incredibly disparate power projection capabilities from the air, I struggle to see this as a realistic proposition.

End of the day - it's a moot point - I can't think of true strategic victory achieved independently in the last 100 years - and it's only going to be more connected in the future - not less.
 
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DDG38

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
A bit of background and some updates on the Ghost Bat program from Flight International (subscription) :
"Local hero
By Greg Waldron Singapore, Flight International
Saturday 1 March 2025 at 12:00:00 am AEDT

The Australian-developed MQ-28 has made swift progress since emerging at the Avalon air show six years ago, with a Block 2 version coming soon and more local suppliers getting on board

Representing a crucial part of Boeing's collaborative combat aircraft (CCA) strategy, the MQ-28 Ghost Bat also stands to enhance Australia's position in the global defence aerospace industry.

The developmental unmanned ‘loyal wingman' is a joint effort between Boeing and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). Four years on from its first flight in February 2021, an improved Block 2 version is in the works, as Boeing Defence Australia invests in the industrial capacity that will be needed should the new jet gain a customer.

The MQ-28 created a stir in 2019 when a full-sized mock-up of what was then called the Airpower Teaming System was unveiled at the Avalon air show. Today, it is a maturing platform in a crowded field of aspiring CCAs. The Ghost Bat is coming of age during a decade that will see the operational concept of the CCA clarified, with automated combat aircraft moving closer to working seamlessly with their manned counterparts.

Glen Ferguson, the director of Boeing's global MQ-28 programme, is well versed in air warfare, having previously spent 17 years in the RAAF, most of it as a navigator in the now-retired General Dynamics F-111 fighter-bomber.

“Once we got through the teething issues of getting the aircraft flying and all the elements with that, we proved out the airframe, and we're largely done with airframe testing,” he says.

Over the past 12-18 months the focus has been on testing mission systems, with an emphasis on electronic warfare (EW) and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).

This entails integrating and operating payloads, and exploring the aircraft's behaviour in a mission environment. Ferguson stresses, however, that the mission system - and not the MQ-28 platform as such - is the real priority.

“The mission system is probably more important than the airframe,” he said in the run-up to this year's Avalon show, which will be staged near Melbourne from 25-30 March. “In many ways, the airframe becomes the vehicle within which we get the mission system to the fight.”

In other words, the know-how that applies to the MQ-28 could also be applied to other CCAs. This includes the aircraft's ability to generate contacts and then automatically fuse that information with input from other aircraft and sensors.

By earlier this year, the small MQ-28 test fleet had been flown for around 100h, but more than 20,000h of testing had been completed in a digital environment.

“Our mission system is maturing at a rate that I don't think anyone has comprehended in the past, because we are now flying multiple aircraft at a time, including virtual hybrid-live aircraft,” says Ferguson.

“We're running a virtual aircraft so that we can do sensor and data fusion to track operational targets at operationally relevant ranges to deliver the outcome to the air force.”

Operational tests have taken place at Australia's Woomera test range approximately one out of every three months, with the aircraft flying one to three sorties daily, including some flights at night.

The RAAF is heavily involved in the programme, funding ongoing development work and with personnel embedded across MQ-28 operations. Also involved are representatives from the US Air Force (USAF) and US Navy (USN): the first Ghost Bat “pilot” from the latter service graduated from training last year.

The involvement of US personnel on a fundamentally Australian programme is part of a larger collaboration between the two governments on CCAs.

“This gives us the ability to co-ordinate with the US government on where they are going, and the most important part of that is that we get access to their architectures and their plans,” says Ferguson.

“It's all about interoperability and interchangeability. We are developing the MQ-28 to be aligned with US government architectures of the future, so that we are compatible, and an [MQ-28] can turn up at any place in the sky and jump on board with western aircraft.”

Boeing has given the MQ-28's range as 2,000nm (3,700km). Australia's vast geography and the sheer size of the Asia-Pacific region make long-range performance an essential attribute for a CCA operating with the RAAF or other air forces. Another emphasis is collaboration between the unmanned type and Australia's two fighter types: the Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornet and Lockheed Martin F-35A.

Although an MQ-28 was sent to the USA in 2023, ostensibly for work related to the USAF's CCA programme, in July 2024 a USAF down select effectively focused the service's ‘increment one' efforts with two California-based companies: Anduril Industries and General Atomics Aeronautical Systems. Each will receive funding to design and manufacture “production-representative test articles”, and to conduct flight-testing of prototype aircraft.

Boeing, for its part, says the MQ-28 was not part of its offering for the USAF's increment one requirement nor was a variant of the MQ-25 Stingray, which is being developed as an air-to-air refueller for the USN.

“We did not propose the MQ-28 or an MQ-25 derivative for increment one of this programme,” the company confirms. “We proposed another proprietary solution tailored to the US Air Force's unique CCA phase one requirements.”

Alongside the USAF's CCA effort, MQ-28 work in Australia has continued. The fleet comprises eight Block 1 examples that Boeing views as developmental test assets - those will be retired as a new Block 2 version is produced. Unlike the current aircraft, the Block 2 model will be classed as an operational test asset.

“All of the things that you need to be operational are embedded in the Block 2 design, and we'll move across all the technology that we'll have tested in the Block 1 airframe,” Ferguson says. The first Block 2 aircraft is in production at Boeing's Melbourne facility, with ground tests and a first flight to come later this year. Boeing is building three examples, under an A$399 million ($248 million) Australian government contract signed in February 2024.

The new version will not feature any major airframe changes from the Block 1 standard, with perhaps the main external update to be the removal of its original ‘dogtooth'-design wing. Internally, the aircraft will see wiring modifications and other changes that will improve maintainability.

Block 2 aircraft also will get a new global positioning system/inertial navigation system, to replace the Block 1's commercially available equipment, which Ferguson quips “wouldn't last three seconds in a denied environment”.

Flight is highly automated, with the “pilot” mainly serving as a supervisor during take-off and landing. Once the Ghost Bat is airborne it will be handed off to another platform, such as the RAAF's Boeing E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft. Boeing has not revealed which engine powers the MQ-28, but there is speculation that it uses either a Williams International FJ44 or Pratt & Whitney Canada PW300. While also declining to comment, Ferguson says it will not change for the Block 2 version.
 

DDG38

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
part 2 :
While the MQ-28 could be armed in the future, for now work is focused is on EW and ISR applications.

Mission capable

By the end of September Boeing aims to conduct a demonstration of an operational CCA capability, during which the MQ-28 will team up with in-service RAAF types. Prior to mounting such a complicated undertaking, the company also will conduct a series of demonstrations that address specific missions.

Ferguson also sees potential for interesting operational concepts between its CCA architecture and the 737-based E-7. Early visions of a ‘loyal wingman' capability tended to focus on supporting combat types such as the F-35A, but another concept could see a “stack of CCAs sitting somewhere” that a Wedgetail's battle management crew could allocate for specific missions.

Another element of the MQ-28 - and one that could swing the balance for future RAAF orders - is its broad local supply chain. Boeing says that over 74 Australian companies contribute “critical and important products and services” to the programme in areas such as manufacturing, machining, electrical systems, landing gear, and others. In all, more than 200 local suppliers have contributed to the MQ-28 programme, including 50 small and medium-sized enterprises.

Recent partners

Saab Australia is one of the more recent companies to have joined the programme. Its involvement includes communications systems and avionics, along with electromechanical actuators and controllers for the primary flight control system.

“The Ghost Bat is an exciting programme and demonstrates what can be achieved through collaboration between global defence organisations, local businesses, and the Australian Defence Force,” says Saab Australia managing director Andy Keough.

The big task facing the MQ-28 and other CCA offerings is, of course, securing sales.
In the absence of orders, Boeing is still moving forward with an investment in an MQ-28 production location in the Wellcamp Aerospace and Defence Precinct to the west of Brisbane.

Ferguson admits that there is somewhat of a “chicken and egg” paradox.

“If we don't build it, we can't contract with defence, and if we don't contract with defence, we can't build a building. So, we're going out with Boeing funds to build the building, trusting in the heritage of the product and its future success.”

On the broader market opportunity, he believes that the MQ-28 will deliver an operational capability in the coming years, and that the jet's cost will be competitive. Low cost is seen as an imperative for CCAs, which are envisaged as bringing “affordable mass” to air forces which are equipped with a limited number of manned combat platforms.

“Our business strategy here is to deliver it, make it work, make it cool, make it cheap, and they will come,” Ferguson says."
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
According to the APDR the target unit price of the MQ-28 will be around $15 million, with the first production version rolling out in 2028. Interesting to see how many will be ordered. You never really see UAVs ordered in bulk.
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
According to the APDR the target unit price of the MQ-28 will be around $15 million, with the first production version rolling out in 2028. Interesting to see how many will be ordered. You never really see UAVs ordered in bulk.
Cheap is relative. They are cheaper, but they are also generally, less capable, and realistically still require significant manpower to operate and significant cost to operate. Development also is also time-consuming not quite the instant development people perhaps had hoped.

It would be good to have a squadron of something like this, but it raises questions about how much manned capability we want to give up for it.
 

Mark_Evans

Member
Interesting article about Canada buying Australia's JORN for 6.6 billion.

 

Morgo

Well-Known Member
Boeing Wins F-47 Next Generation Air Dominance Fighter Contract

NGAD winner announced overnight.

Most interestingly for the RAAF:

“Perhaps most surprisingly, Trump said that U.S. allies “are calling constantly” with a view to obtaining an export version of the NGAD fighter. He said that the United States would be selling them to “certain allies … perhaps toned-down versions. We’d like to tone them down about 10 percent which probably makes sense, because someday, maybe they’re not our allies, right?””
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Boeing Wins F-47 Next Generation Air Dominance Fighter Contract

NGAD winner announced overnight.

Most interestingly for the RAAF:

“Perhaps most surprisingly, Trump said that U.S. allies “are calling constantly” with a view to obtaining an export version of the NGAD fighter. He said that the United States would be selling them to “certain allies … perhaps toned-down versions. We’d like to tone them down about 10 percent which probably makes sense, because someday, maybe they’re not our allies, right?””
By the time a toned version is available, GCAP and maybe even FCAS will be available as well so alternative sources from "more reliable friends". Also, lets not forget the contract winner.....a company with some significant issues. Guessing a NG naval 6th gen might be a better option for clients that don't have trust issues with America.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
Boeing Wins F-47 Next Generation Air Dominance Fighter Contract

NGAD winner announced overnight.

Most interestingly for the RAAF:

“Perhaps most surprisingly, Trump said that U.S. allies “are calling constantly” with a view to obtaining an export version of the NGAD fighter. He said that the United States would be selling them to “certain allies … perhaps toned-down versions. We’d like to tone them down about 10 percent which probably makes sense, because someday, maybe they’re not our allies, right?””
So I guess if the full version isn't offered to Australia then we would be in the category of "Maybe someday not being an ally". Not sure Australia is really going to be interested in NGAD but if we were it would have to be the full version or nothing.
 

Morgo

Well-Known Member
So I guess if the full version isn't offered to Australia then we would be in the category of "Maybe someday not being an ally". Not sure Australia is really going to be interested in NGAD but if we were it would have to be the full version or nothing.
Yes you would have to think so.

And how are any Virginia's we get going to be similarly hobbled?
 
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