Royal Australian Air Force [RAAF] News, Discussions and Updates

[Redlands18]

The point I was trying to make is army and navy combat units re role and deploy in support of the population without delay, RAAF combat units don't. A bomber is only a bomber, a fighter is a fighter, but can do some of what a bomber can do. Pretty much every other unit in the ADF however can be used for multiple roles, including fighting fires and building flood levies.

You can throw in the useful multirole capabilities the Army lost when the Tiger replaced the Kiowa's and Huey Gunships too. Have long had the feeling the Army misses that and it might be one of the reasons they pushed for the Light SPECOPS Helicopter.

 

[Volkodav]

You can throw in the useful multirole capabilities the Army lost when the Tiger replaced the Kiowa's and Huey Gunships too. Have long had the feeling the Army misses that and it might be one of the reasons they pushed for the Light SPECOPS Helicopter.

Very true, I have wondered about the loss of a lot of army aviation's liaison, and light transport function. That, besides scouting and observation, was one of its main roles in the past.

Ironically providing a light utility or scout type to 1Avn could have also taken pressure off tiger. I wonder what Takao's thoughts on this are?

My understanding is US Army Aviation used to mix types in attack and cavalry companies/squadrons. If memory serves it used to be nine gunships and six scouts, although I also recall a 2 to 1 ratio, i.e. ten gunships and five scouts. Maybe it was different scales for the different roles of cav and attack.

 

[south]

The point I was trying to make is army and navy combat units re role and deploy in support of the population without delay, RAAF combat units don't. A bomber is only a bomber, a fighter is a fighter, but can do some of what a bomber can do. Pretty much every other unit in the ADF however can be used for multiple roles, including fighting fires and building flood levies.

Which is of course factually incorrect. Despite the fact that the ACG aeroplanes are not that useful in a DACC role (the same way that the rifle and bayonet of the infantry unit is not), ACG units have contributed personnel to many DACC tasks in the past, and will again in the future.

 

[Volkodav]

Which is of course factually incorrect. Despite the fact that the ACG aeroplanes are not that useful in a DACC role (the same way that the rifle and bayonet of the infantry unit is not), ACG units have contributed personnel to many DACC tasks in the past, and will again in the future.

Fair call.

I confess to getting frustrated and perhaps a little irrational in this bomber debate. I used to love bombers but then again I used to believe the mythology built around them. Now I'm a bit like a reformed smoker on the topic.

 

[south]

Exactly

The underfunding of Coastal Command and the Fleet Air Arm had direct impacts on the war and nearly contributed to the capitulation of the British Isles. Look at the success these Commands had in helping contain the U-Boat threat...and image if they could have been available 18 - 24 months earlier.

Every single idea about bombing outside of a tactical, army/navy support role has failed to be proven. Again and again and again.

So lets take a look at the stuff that has been dropped over the last couple of days. RAF Bomber vs Coastal Command and the Mid-Atlantic gap...

There are many other reasons behind the success of U-Boats, but if we look at the critical period in 1942/43 to solely lay the feet at "underfunding" due to the "bomber barons" is a reductionist argument at best. In 1942, the vast majority of ships were sunk in the American zone - within range of medium range aircraft, rather than in the British zone or the Mid-Atlantic Gap - largely due to USN lack of preparedness, and intransigence in following the RN established doctrine . You can view the losses in the maps by month page (I've selected June 1942) at this excellent resource.

The carnage that was subsequently inflicted on Allied shipping travelling in the American zone in 1942—some 6.1 million tons of shipping, nearly three times the previous yearly averages since 1939—makes this failure one of the great military blunders in history, and one of the greatest Allied catastrophes of the war.

Even so, having identified that Very-Long-Range aircraft were critical to combating the U-Boat threat there were significant other factors behind the assignment of VLR Liberators to Coastal Command; including Churchill's desire to continue opening a second front, as promised to Stalin. A second factor was belief that the USAAF wouldn't continue to send Bombers to have them re-assigned to Maritime patrol. Even when a further 2 Squadrons worth of Liberators assigned (32 Liberators were assigned to Coastal Command in August-October 1942), they weren't modified to VLR standard and with Admirality approval were assigned to patrol the Bay of Biscay, rather than the Mid-Atlantic Gap.

However, when Coastal Command, supported by the Admiralty, decided in summer 1942 to implement some of its newly acquired Liberators in the bay offensive, they made a crucial mistake, as these aircraft were more urgently needed to help close the air gap.

Why did this occur? Because of poor operational analysis on behalf of the Coastal Command and the Admirality, only rectified in January 1943. *Note - the strategy around finding/fixing the U-boats sounds pretty similar to what USAAF conducted with the Luftwaffe later during 'Big Week'.

He proved that the most likeliest place to find (and kill) U-boats was not in the Bay of Biscay transit routes, but around the convoys themselves. Since the number of U-boats in the air gap meant that the wolf packs could no longer be avoided by evasive routing, and since the U-boats were drawn to the convoys, it was here where the escorts, both ships and aircraft, could have the greatest success at sinking enemy submarines. In a way, then, the convoys acted as "bait" to draw the U-boats in where surface and air escorts could pounce.

Even then - the answer isn't just RAF assignment of aircraft. The US had similar issues.

When the President discovered how low the numbers of aircraft operating in the air gap (including zero from the Western Atlantic), and when he learned of the USAAFs reluctance to surrender its Liberators, Roosevelt threatened to intervene directly if none of these aircraft were allocated for convoy defence.

So what's the full story? Is Bomber Command blameless? Of course not. But to blame the perilous situation the UK found herself in during Late 1942/Early 1943 solely on the 'Under-Funding of Coastal Command' ignores many other factors. A substantial percentage of the losses, particularly in 1942 were outside of the British (by extension RAF Coastal Commands) AO. Blaming strategic mis-prioritisation solely on Bomber command ignores that there were political pressure and strategic mis-prioritisation from Churchill himself, as well the Combined Chiefs of staff, or that there were legitimate concerns that the USAAF would stop delivering aircraft if they were not used as Bombers. When Liberators were delivered in mid-late 1942, they were not misused and poorly tasked.

As we have seen, Coastal Command and the Admiralty are not completely innocent. Although they advocated the hardest to secure V L R Liberators to close the air gap, they also hampered these efforts through their support of the Bay of Biscay offensive and their push to have Bomber Command bomb the U-boat bases. In addition, noted Royal Navy historian Stephen Roskill has even emphasized the failure of A.V . Alexander, first lord ofthe Admiralty, and Admiral Dudley Pound, first sea lord, to influence Churchill enough and convince him of importance of the defensive strategy.

 

[Gooey]

G'day swerve and south

Thank you for this information which I found fascinating. I had read snippets of this closing the air gap by VLR aircraft; for me the historically relavent take away is the joint 1939-1945 sea-air campaign which both gradually but also dramatically tilted the advantage to the Allies. Recently, I better understood the escort carriers hunter-killer contributions too.

When I said 'context' previously in my contribution last week, WRT the RAF WWII bomber effort, my understanding was the importance of recognising that The Empire/UK had the bomber campaign only to generate offensive action against Nazi Germany in late 1940. It certainly was not perfect, principally due to technology limitations of the day, but that was all there was short of starting a continental land campaign. After loosing their heavy equipment in 1940, this was something that North Africa and raids like Dieppe proved were difficult for the Allies Land until 1944.

Interesting Bomber Harris was opposed to many demands to remove resources from his commands bombing strategy. Including for Dam Busting, North Africa, Far East, as well as Coastal Command. He saw concentration of the primary aim as being paramount; I have no idea if he read this from Sun Tsu. As the head of Bomber Command, it was his job to defend his patch. It was the job of the War Cabinet after Imperial General Staff and RAF filtering to make the decisions. So in effect, Harris did not make the decision to under-equip Coastal Command.

In the context of 2023 RAAF, and Australia, for the next few years VLR bombers are certainly not available for consideration. That does not mean that they should not be or will not be considered in the near future due to their combination of flexibility of targeting, speed of response, and superior firepower. Just as with the air support to Joint Operations and WWII 'Jeep Carriers', in the near future we should consider small carriers. In the short term, as Volkodav and others have written, lets deepen our current infrastructures, inventory, personnel, reserves, and especially war stocks.

 

[MickB]

Once again, good analysis by Perun(

)this time of the current 6th programs.

Will Australia join one off these programs to allow input into a future F35 replacement?
Which program is the most likely, working with the USN as so often in the past or given our ever closer defence ties the UK and Japan consortium?

 

[John Fedup]

Once again, good analysis by Perun(

)this time of the current 6th programs.

Will Australia join one off these programs to allow input into a future F35 replacement?
Which program is the most likely, working with the USN as so often in the past or given our ever closer defence ties the UK and Japan consortium?

Likely difficult to join either of the international programs due to workshare. NGAD, unlikely because the US won’t want to share the tech as per the F-22 saga. Also, the price will be prohibitive. The FA-XX, maybe. Most likely, just a basic purchase of either the GCAP or FA-XX with some minor workshare, just my two cents.

 

[76mmGuns]

My personal hope is the new plane has a longer range, like the F-111 did. Then there's a chance we might purchase it in the distant future, when the F-35 gets long in the legs. Problem is that the same issue we face when buying subs. Every other nation besides the USA is close to their enemies, so longer ranges aren't a priority the same way they are for us. But I can hope. I mean, China's supposed 5th gen planes have far longer ranges, so maybe that will be considered in designing the new plane.

 

[seaspear]

Although this does not provide the range of the previous f1-11 a new engine for the f-35a could be in range of possibility to extend the range of this fighter for the R.A.A.F
F-35s Could Get New Engines As Soon As 2027 | The Drive

 

[ddxx]

Longer range is great for the strike role, but doesn’t alone solve our limited ability to provide persistent air cover and support over the distances our region presents.

Arguably, the Super Hornets should remain until replaced by a future 6th gen platform, ideally one optimised for payload, stealth and range (as per the reported goals of NGADs crewed platform). These would then operate in more of a focused penetrative strike role, working with uncrewed systems like the MQ-28A.

Meanwhile, once all 72 ordered F-35As arrive late next year, the remaining 28 F-35 options should be exercised in the form of the F-35B.

I don’t agree that NGAD’s crewed platform should be assumed off-limits for Australia - a lot has changed since the F-22 saga, and arguably SSN tech is of far greater sensitivity.

It’s worth remembering that our MQ-28A has been tested by the USAF as part of the ongoing work on NGAD’s uncrewed component.

 

[Morgo]

the remaining 28 F-35 options should be exercised in the form of the F-35B.

Why do you say that?? Why not a fleet of a single type?

Unless you’re suggesting another acquisition for the RAN… that which shall not be named….

 

[ddxx]

Why do you say that?? Why not a fleet of a single type?

Unless you’re suggesting another acquisition for the RAN… that which shall not be named….

Because without persistent organic air cover and support, a LHD isn’t going to leave port let alone a full ARG if the destination is any further than southern PNG or Timor Leste.

I’m purely looking at this through the lens of published strategic aims, and being honest as to where capability doesn’t align.

The choice for the Joint Force is clear. The Army uses 100% of the ship’s capacity and doesn’t leave port, or it uses 75% of the capacity and does. The amount of groupthink nonsense which clouds such a basic and clear shortcoming is mind boggling.

 

[south]

How much persistent organic air cover do you think will be generated with 2-3 F-35? (25% ship capacity).

1) There have been plenty of reasons given in the past as to why there isn’t support (even, seemingly from within Navy for F-35B).

2) Historically, these sort of operations you are alluding too have been conducted with at least localised air superiority. Witness the preconditions for Normandy or any of the WW2 Pacific actions, or Inchon in Korea. Or even the duration of Gulf War 1 air war before major land operations were conducted.

 

[ngatimozart]

I realise that it's Xmas / New year and some people have time on their hands. That doesn't give reason to obsess on RAAF 6th Gen fighter / strike aircraft or the perennial favourite, operating F-35B, with roos painted on them, off RAN flat tops. IIRC that is a forbidden, verbotten, banned, not allowed topic.

Don't drink and post, or toke and post if you're that way inclined and I definitely wouldn't advise having 10 triple shot expressos and posting.

A very happy, safe, and prosperous New Year to everyone.

 

[Volkodav]

How much persistent organic air cover do you think will be generated with 2-3 F-35? (25% ship capacity).

1) There have been plenty of reasons given in the past as to why there isn’t support (even, seemingly from within Navy for F-35B).

2) Historically, these sort of operations you are alluding too have been conducted with at least localised air superiority. Witness the preconditions for Normandy or any of the WW2 Pacific actions, or Inchon in Korea. Or even the duration of Gulf War 1 air war before major land operations were conducted.

It would be 100% more than there currently is.

It could be argued how much difference would a couple of Growlers, a single Peregrine, or Wedgetail make?

At the same time if airpower provided by small numbers is so useless, why are Tigers deployed on the LHDs? Or for that matter, why do the USMC bother deploying small numbers of Harriers and Lightnings on their big deck amphibs?

How many fighters RAAF deploy for operations overseas as a rule?

Not every military operation is D Day or Inchon, or Desert Storm for that matter. Some

Actually this argument reminds me of the ones made by the Assistant/Deputy Chief Scientist against replacing the carrier Melbourne. Back then it was "the harrier/seaharrier isnt supersonic, therefore it is inferior to everything that is supersonic. There are supersonic fighters that can operate from carriers, they are better than harriers and therefore worth having. Unfortunately Australia can't afford a carrier that can operate supersonic fighters, therefore it is not worth having a carrier at all".

That said just because we can do or afford a capability, or it would be useful, doesn't necessarily mean it is the highest priority.

 

[Volkodav]

It would be 100% more than there currently is.

It could be argued how much difference would a couple of Growlers, a single Peregrine, or Wedgetail make?

At the same time if airpower provided by small numbers is so useless, why are Tigers deployed on the LHDs? Or for that matter, why do the USMC bother deploying small numbers of Harriers and Lightnings on their big deck amphibs?

How many fighters RAAF deploy for operations overseas as a rule?

Not every military operation is D Day or Inchon, or Desert Storm for that matter. Some

Actually this argument reminds me of the ones made by the Assistant/Deputy Chief Scientist against replacing the carrier Melbourne. Back then it was "the harrier/seaharrier isnt supersonic, therefore it is inferior to everything that is supersonic. There are supersonic fighters that can operate from carriers, they are better than harriers and therefore worth having. Unfortunately Australia can't afford a carrier that can operate supersonic fighters, therefore it is not worth having a carrier at all".

That said just because we can do or afford a capability, or it would be useful, doesn't necessarily mean it is the highest priority.

Whoops sorry Ngati, I didn't see you green post until after I posted. I hope it passes muster as I technically didn't say should or shouldn't, just queried the logic of the against argument.

 

[Stampede]

Because without persistent organic air cover and support, a LHD isn’t going to leave port let alone a full ARG if the destination is any further than southern PNG or Timor Leste.

I’m purely looking at this through the lens of published strategic aims, and being honest as to where capability doesn’t align.

The choice for the Joint Force is clear. The Army uses 100% of the ship’s capacity and doesn’t leave port, or it uses 75% of the capacity and does. The amount of groupthink nonsense which clouds such a basic and clear shortcoming is mind boggling.

I'm content for Army using only 10% of the ships company with the other 90% dedicated to support and logistics for the purpose at hand if that is what is required.


Cheers S

 

[Reptilia]

Quite a few options for aus

NGAD (USA)
FA/XX (USA)
GCAP (UK, Japan, Italy)
FCAS (France, Germany, Spain)
Do the Koreans have 6th gen program?

plus
Next gen Ghost bat enlarged version, twin engine?

 

[StingrayOZ]

Lets leave aside the F-35 on LHD for a moment given that it should not be discussed, this is the wrong thread for it, and obvious limited capabilities. But I think the F-35B might be worthy of discussion in the RAAF thread.

• The F-35B is a useful aircraft. It is the most advanced 5th gen available. It is being integrated with all the existing RAAF weapons stocks. It will continue to do so.
• The F-35B has high commonality to the F-35A. Its not a mixed fleet type proposal of operation, while there are differences they are of the order of variations of the same plane. Many air forces operate both F-35A and F-35B aircraft.
• The USMC made a F-35B deployment to a mainland austre airfield as part of Pitchblack this year. There is an existing model of how this could be supported for the F-35B. There is no model/system for the F-35A. Thus it cannot and has not be deployed that way. In attempting to do so, eg developing a special probe version of the F-35, improving its short field performance, you have now re-created a F-35B (or F-35C). Marines exercise austere operations in Top End - Australian Defence Magazine
• The F-35B could operate from smaller island airfields, such as many in our region, including Christmas Island, Momote, which would give Australia key strategic reach. Projecting power with the F-35 (part 4): offshore bases | The Strategist
• Many other nations have either acquired or are intending to acquire F-35B to operate from forward fields, using ships to essentially transport the planes and assist in supporting planes from these bases. Including the US, Italy, UK and Japan (and soon Spain). The idea isn't that these ships conduct blue water operations in the middle of the ocean, or fight against land based aircraft, launching from a carrier. UK, US, Japan could all support forward basing at the Australian bases with this model. Obviously the US and the UK have large carriers, but the RAF and USMC do support austre basing. Italian Air Force, Italian Navy F-35B jest conduct austere training on Pantelleria Island
• The F-35B could be refuelled from existing refuelling assets or the KC130J that we indicated we may wish to purchase 6 of and cannot refuel any other ADF asset other than SuperHornets. There aren't a whole lot of small, short field refuellers available for the F-35A that are in service and compatible with the existing RAAF fleet. More Hercules for RAAF? - Australian Defence Magazine
• It offers minimal compromises over the F-35. Mostly in internal fuel. But the fact it can be refuelled and operated at bases thousands of kilometres closer clearly resolves that limitation into an advantage.
• From these remote bases, 737 based assets like E7 and P8 can still be deployed.
• These remote/Austre bases, while somewhat limited, would be able to support a much higher rate of operation, of more aircraft and more capable aircraft than any carrier ever could. Australia will never be able to operate the E7, P8 or MC55A from a carrier.
• Purchasing and acquiring F-35B's would be much cheaper than upgrading every base in the region (in and out of Australia) to support F-35A operations.
• F-35B looks like getting the advanced cycle engines and further upgrades in the future.

I don't see any 6th gen fighter program particularly attractive for Australia at this stage. In fact they might all well evaporate except the US based ones.

FCAS is in all sorts of problems, as Germany is acquiring F-35's, and Spain now that Germany is acquiring F-35's, is also looking at acquiring a F-35A/F-35B acquisition. The date of entry of service for this aircraft is ballooning out to 2040 or 2050.

As perhaps an all 5th gen air force, the F-35 will still be a very capable aircraft going forward, upgrades to its engines, sensors and systems will likely keep it competitive with any "6th generation" program.

The main advantage of the proposed future 6th gen aircraft over the 5th gen appear to be twin engine.

IMO it would be worthwhile for Australia to flag an interest in the UKJ GCAP fighter. IMO the program might develop into something that may become of interest to Australia, and involves 2 large defence partners of Australia.

If it was made longer range (5000km), with a maritime strike capability, then that would be more interesting and useful to project power. Even then however, I presume the UK and Japan would still intend to operate F-35B alongside their 6th generation solution.