They are also an aging platform with various obsolescence, fatigue, and systems issues that may not be well defined. Managing aging platforms is difficult enough for a long term operator, but a critical risk for a new operator.
Royal Australian Air Force [RAAF] News, Discussions and Updates
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
A cool $1M AUD, to operate a flight of 4 Aircraft for 1 Hour, a cool $20-50m to arm that flight per mission. and 40yo aircraft, sounds like a great idea.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #8,683
You are making a number of assumptions in the above post, and IMO some of the assumptions being made are rather presumptuous.
The first is assuming that there would be anything worthwhile for Australia to purchase. If the USAF is retiring the B-1B Lancer from service, it is likely because the ongoing costs to keep the type in service vs. the capability provided is rapidly approaching the point of not being worthwhile, or else it is rapidly approaching the point of not being feasible. By the time the USAF is no longer a Lancer operator, there just might not be enough aircraft with flight hours remaining to be worth operating before aircraft would need comprehensive rebuilds.
The second is that because of AUKUS, the US would be willing to "hand over" B-1B Lancers and everything else needed for Australia to become a Lancer operator. Without diving into the virulent open cess pit that is the current US political scene, one had to keep in mind that any such Australian purchase would need to satisfy multiple levels of US approval, some of which would involve people with different outcome objectives.
Lastly, if one is desiring that the RAAF get a capability to launch volumes of standoff cruise and/or AShM, then consider Rapid Dragon which the USAF is working on, to enable cargo aircraft to launch pallets of cruise missiles.
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
Strategically, enables a strategic bombing capability for Foreign Partners & Allies, reverses cost imposition curve, and serves as a strong means of deterrence.
Think that line from the article says it all. And Australia plans to increase the number of aircraft capable of deploying this system from 20-32.
Takao
The Bunker Group
Again, @Todjaeger is 100% correct (mods, can I get a macro to write that pls?). B-1s are not a feasible option.
They didn't stop the Germans fighting in 1942-1945. They didn't stop the Japanese fighting in the same period. They didn't stop the Chinese crossing the Yalu in 1950. The millions of tonnes of bombs dropped on the VC and NVA didn't deter or stop them. The mass of allied airpower didn't stop the Taliban in 2021. It didn't deter Belgrade from genocide. It didn't deter tribes making attacks throughout the Middle East in 1925 when it was British policy to use air power to respond.
Only once has air power been successful at deterring a significant threat. And that was Berlin in 1948. And there wasn't a single pointy grey thing there - bomber or fighter. You want air power that can achieve operationally and strategically significant results without needing Navy or Army support? Spend every cent you find to fund B-21s on building and buying more C-17s**.
**yes, I know, production line is closed.
Without nuclear weapons, bombers have never deterred anyone.
They didn't stop the Germans fighting in 1942-1945. They didn't stop the Japanese fighting in the same period. They didn't stop the Chinese crossing the Yalu in 1950. The millions of tonnes of bombs dropped on the VC and NVA didn't deter or stop them. The mass of allied airpower didn't stop the Taliban in 2021. It didn't deter Belgrade from genocide. It didn't deter tribes making attacks throughout the Middle East in 1925 when it was British policy to use air power to respond.
Only once has air power been successful at deterring a significant threat. And that was Berlin in 1948. And there wasn't a single pointy grey thing there - bomber or fighter. You want air power that can achieve operationally and strategically significant results without needing Navy or Army support? Spend every cent you find to fund B-21s on building and buying more C-17s**.
**yes, I know, production line is closed.
I'm always wary of operating costs figures when I don't know the basis for the calculation. Sometimes they're just the marginal cost, sometimes they include everything up to & including capital cost, & there can be all sorts of different figures in between.A cool $1M AUD, to operate a flight of 4 Aircraft for 1 Hour, a cool $20-50m to arm that flight per mission. and 40yo aircraft, sounds like a great idea.
This can lead to the lunacy of suggesting that X type have its flying hours cut because the cost per hour has gone up sharply, when that was a result of cutting hours & apportioning the cost of aircraft sitting on the ground across fewer hours . . . .
I presume the USAF figures are all on the same basis - but what does that basis include?
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
The post was more about the ridiculousness of the idea of the RAAF buying 2nd hand 40yo Bombers and any way you calculate it, the cost per hour to operate them is extreme
InterestedParty
Active Member
I was working at RAAF Amberly and watched the end of life troubles with the F-111 without the support from the US. They were buying up every spare part they could lay their hands on. I think that experience alone would negate any chance of a repeat. At least in the case of the F-111 we had operational experience and depot level maintenance experience with 501 Wing, to build on.
With the B1 we have nothing
Aardvark144
Active Member
Mate - don't want to be nit picky but USAAF? I gather a typo.
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
Aardvark144
Active Member
The true victim of the RAFs obsession with the bomber wasn't directly the army or navy, it was the RAF. Tactical airpower, maritime airpower, and to a slightly lesser degree, fighters/air defence, all had to be revitalised, grown and developed to fill urgent operational needs while resources were being wasted on bombers.
Takao
The Bunker Group
Exactly
The underfunding of Costal Command and the Fleet Air Arm had direct impacts on the war and nearly contributed to the capitulation of the British Isles. Look at the success these Commands had in helping contain the U-Boat threat...and image if they could have been available 18 - 24 months earlier.
Every single idea about bombing outside of a tactical, army/navy support role has failed to be proven. Again and again and again.
Trust me, I want and need those RAAF F-35s and F/A-18s overhead, supported by E-7s and KC-30s. The idea of fighting without them (or allies) is horrible. But this perception that air power can win the war, or that all we need are a handful of bombers to win all our conflicts and deter the world - it needs a solid hit by a 2000 lb JDAM....
I remember once seeing an article many, many years ago (before the internet, "printed on paper"
) that said that in the mid war period Bomber Command was absorbing 30% of the British war effort. how reliable this article was I do not know.I believe that some of this forums nautical historians are missing a couple of things on pre-WWII RAF and Air Power:
1. The RAF was under considerable threat of being disbanded in the 1920's due to the economic constraints of the Depression, the 10 year rule (sic), and Navy/Army shenanigans
2. It was a fascinating period for aircraft; Air Power doctrine post WWI not only forgot the recent tactical lessons but it also created significant emphasis on strategic bombing campaigns ("air fleets" and "the bomber will always get through") partly as organisational wishful thinking and partly a reaction to the horror of WWI trench warfare. It was widely believed by politicians and the public that wars would be over in weeks after cities had been leveled with gas and explosive: due to immature technology, the promised level of destruction did not happen and led to RAF night area bombing (see the amusingly named 1941 Butt Report "If the number of bombers actually dispatched on a raid is used then the number of bombs within 5 miles of a target has been quoted as low as 5%." Military Histories - The Butt Report)
As a result, the RAF had both the popular doctrine and professional ammunition to justify its existence and the limited RAF resources were prioritised towards bombers. The RN/RAN did likewise in turn and started WWII with small numbers of everything, especially escorts. Obviously the same for British and Australian Land, which were actively steered away from their end of WWI type, continental armies.
Therefore, it's a long bow to draw to say that FAA, Fighter and Coastal Command, and coordination of the tactical air support first used in WWI, were deliberately underfunded. Again, depression, perceived 10 year rule etc. The rationalised priority was Bomber Command, just as today with current resourcing not covering all RAAF requirements, in depth, and funding is allocated to the competitive missions. It's even more of a stretch and plain wrong to say strategic air has failed in everything; 1944 and 1945 had a few successful strategic campaigns, in both theatres.
And to quibble, all sea, land, and air tasking are in support of the national objective, not stand alone somehow. Hence why, as a whole, the BLACK BUCK missions were ultimately successful VLR sorties.
In that vain, whilst these Air Power history discussions are fascinating they neither prove nor disprove the need for RAAF VLR bombers. That decision will be made by CoA and ADFHQ over this decade if VLR, flexible, firepower is required in addition to the limited range, inflexible, contributions from RAN and Land.
1. The RAF was under considerable threat of being disbanded in the 1920's due to the economic constraints of the Depression, the 10 year rule (sic), and Navy/Army shenanigans
2. It was a fascinating period for aircraft; Air Power doctrine post WWI not only forgot the recent tactical lessons but it also created significant emphasis on strategic bombing campaigns ("air fleets" and "the bomber will always get through") partly as organisational wishful thinking and partly a reaction to the horror of WWI trench warfare. It was widely believed by politicians and the public that wars would be over in weeks after cities had been leveled with gas and explosive: due to immature technology, the promised level of destruction did not happen and led to RAF night area bombing (see the amusingly named 1941 Butt Report "If the number of bombers actually dispatched on a raid is used then the number of bombs within 5 miles of a target has been quoted as low as 5%." Military Histories - The Butt Report)
As a result, the RAF had both the popular doctrine and professional ammunition to justify its existence and the limited RAF resources were prioritised towards bombers. The RN/RAN did likewise in turn and started WWII with small numbers of everything, especially escorts. Obviously the same for British and Australian Land, which were actively steered away from their end of WWI type, continental armies.
Therefore, it's a long bow to draw to say that FAA, Fighter and Coastal Command, and coordination of the tactical air support first used in WWI, were deliberately underfunded. Again, depression, perceived 10 year rule etc. The rationalised priority was Bomber Command, just as today with current resourcing not covering all RAAF requirements, in depth, and funding is allocated to the competitive missions. It's even more of a stretch and plain wrong to say strategic air has failed in everything; 1944 and 1945 had a few successful strategic campaigns, in both theatres.
And to quibble, all sea, land, and air tasking are in support of the national objective, not stand alone somehow. Hence why, as a whole, the BLACK BUCK missions were ultimately successful VLR sorties.
In that vain, whilst these Air Power history discussions are fascinating they neither prove nor disprove the need for RAAF VLR bombers. That decision will be made by CoA and ADFHQ over this decade if VLR, flexible, firepower is required in addition to the limited range, inflexible, contributions from RAN and Land.
Read the book, it was an eye opener.
Basically the RAF post WWI got the cream of the air minded officers from the other services and then forced them to follow the bomber supremacy fallacy or leave. They gamed their own data to justify bombing cities instead of defended military targets and factories. They literally tried to end tactical airpower as it was seen as too dangerous and too risky for the aircraft.
The thing is, bombers are a niche capability that require a lot of resources to deliver very little practical effect unless you have large numbers of them. Arguably our money could be better spent on providing a safe bastion for US bombers to operate than on buying our own. At least then that safe bastion would also support or existing capabilities and harden our nation against attack.
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I read a very entertaining book about General Douglas MacArthur, written from an Australian, a long time ago in the mid noughts. Not complimentary at all, and unbalanced. It shaped my opinion about him though for years. In 2017, I read the massive 'American Caesar', and was floored by the contradictions of my former opinions and came to the conclusion that he was not a one dimensional character. A short time later, I read another kinder 600 pager on Dug-out-Doug, and again had my opinions challenged.
If you are able, I suggest you do the same about RAF and pre-WWI Air Power theory. I read the reviews on Amazon about your book. One touched on my feelings: "... The name Douhet is not mentioned at all and it would have been useful to see whether the British experience of promoting the bomber was unique or shared common aspects with the air forces of these other nations." If I am able, I'll try your book as it sounds interesting. However: context, context, context. Both for our discussions of pre war RAF and for future RAAF.
I've previously made my case for Air Power and why RAAF VLR may be an answer. This stands.
You thoughts on providing secure concrete for USAF aircraft are interesting in the context of 1941 British strategy against Japan in Malaya. Like our SSN acquisition, why spend $B on boats and instead offer safe support for the USN; because US have their own priorities and not enough equipment. Similar thing to why Spitfires and Wellingtons etc were not in Malaya in 1941.
If you are able, I suggest you do the same about RAF and pre-WWI Air Power theory. I read the reviews on Amazon about your book. One touched on my feelings: "... The name Douhet is not mentioned at all and it would have been useful to see whether the British experience of promoting the bomber was unique or shared common aspects with the air forces of these other nations." If I am able, I'll try your book as it sounds interesting. However: context, context, context. Both for our discussions of pre war RAF and for future RAAF.
I've previously made my case for Air Power and why RAAF VLR may be an answer. This stands.
You thoughts on providing secure concrete for USAF aircraft are interesting in the context of 1941 British strategy against Japan in Malaya. Like our SSN acquisition, why spend $B on boats and instead offer safe support for the USN; because US have their own priorities and not enough equipment. Similar thing to why Spitfires and Wellingtons etc were not in Malaya in 1941.
In times of peace governments start buying long range supposedly multirole aircraft to replace tactical airpower, ground and sea forces. When the shooting starts tactical airpower comes to the fore as governments scramble to rebuild their withered land and sea power.
Without airpower land and sea forces are at a serious, perhaps fatal disadvantage. Without land or sea power, you have handed those domains to the enemy.
Combined arms and joint operations are the name of the game, if a capability delivers little or nothing to the joint capability there needs to be some very special, game changing, justification in investing in it.
In 1974 Cyclone Tracy hit Darwin and multiple RAN, Army and RAAF elements deployed to assist. This included warships and army combat units, but no bombers. Same happens over and over again, floods bushfires, earthquakes, tidal waves, civil unrest, terrorism, invasion. The use of bombers is the exception, not the rule, submarines probably get more use and at least have a peace time role and a joint function that can't be provided by anything else.
Some people think heavy armour is a nich capability, as I and others claim bombers to be. Again it's different, at its heart, heavy armour is combined arms, it's what enables the other arms to do their job.
The best that can be said for a small force of bombers, is that if all the stars align and they know where their targets are, they may be able to damage, attrite, or destroy them before they can harm our other capabilities, or more to the point, slightly before our other capabilities do the same thing.
Before inflight refueling you needed big aircraft to carry heavy loads and reach strategic distances, even then single seat fighters, not to forget light strike bombers were achieving similar ranges in the last couple of years of the war. Mustang, Mosquito anyone?
Early nuclear weapons needed big aircraft to carry them, but by the late 50s tactical fighters were doing just fine.
Here's an alternative, let's add the $28 billion plus, to acquiring hypersonic strike missiles. Have army mobile launchers, Navy submarine and surface ship launchers and look see if we could launch them from P-8, C-17, or perhaps even KC-30.