John Fedup
The Bunker Group
As per comments in the ADF thread, B-21s are not an option for several reasons. A DOA fantasy.
Nobody. There would be no point taking a backward step to a 4+ Gen aircraft on this one. We're better off just going down the JSM/LRASM/JASSM-ER/XR etc. path IMO.Apart from the USA, where else are they building bomber type aircraft? I now Germany are looking to replace their Tornados with a updated Typhoon. Anyone else?
Russia is considering new bombers but funding is a challenge and China probably is as well. A SU-57 derived bomber design was a consideration at one point, similar to the FB-22 concept. Given the J-20's size, a derivative of it could be an option for China. From a Russian and Chinese perspective, the billions required to develop a new strategic stealthy bomber might be be better applied to increased hypersonic missile capability.Apart from the USA, where else are they building bomber type aircraft? I now Germany are looking to replace their Tornados with a updated Typhoon. Anyone else?
Others may know him better but from what I have read about him I would suggest;I don’t know squat about this site so I am looking forward Australian member comments on this article. My quick observation is Australia’s purchase of F-35s was for replacement of aging 4th Gen fighters, just like most other buyers. While strike capability is limited (from an Australian perspective due to range), it is better than classic Hornets. Like other JSF partners, the F-35 is about multirole fighter replacement and business opportunities for aerospace. There is nothing available to replace or improve on Australia’s former F-111 capability other than the future B-21 Raider
or a substantial inventory of long range missiles. Thoughts???
Australia’s F-35s: Lessons from a problematic purchase
I find myself frustrated with authors who are critical of decisions made, yet offer no viable alternative.I don’t know squat about this site so I am looking forward Australian member comments on this article. My quick observation is Australia’s purchase of F-35s was for replacement of aging 4th Gen fighters, just like most other buyers. While strike capability is limited (from an Australian perspective due to range), it is better than classic Hornets. Like other JSF partners, the F-35 is about multirole fighter replacement and business opportunities for aerospace. There is nothing available to replace or improve on Australia’s former F-111 capability other than the future B-21 Raider
or a substantial inventory of long range missiles. Thoughts???
Australia’s F-35s: Lessons from a problematic purchase
Indeed, I also got the impression that the author was very much RAAF service-centric, which I also found somewhat humourous given some of what he wrote, specifically about the need to defend airbases from threats like long-ranged land attack missiles from PRC forces. To provide defence against such a threat, either a CAP and AEW&C capability would need to be covering the airbase and approaches, and/or GBAD systems would need to be in place. IIRC Australia's GBAD systems are operated by the RRAA, which is under the Army...Others may know him better but from what I have read about him I would suggest;
He had 34 years in the RAAF finishing as an O-6 (Group Captain),
He has flown F-111s and it would appear he is/was a fan,
He seems to buy into the theme postulated by the two Chiefs of Air Force last week that casts out the ADFs push to purple in favour of a larger stake and consequent recapitalisation of the RAAF.
other that the above he is better credentialed than many who comment on these matters.
I agree with @ngatimozart - my read of that article was using AIR 6000 as an example of why rushing to decision isn't always good, and highlighting that making decisions without considering a holistic approach is generally a gamble. I agree with him too - I think that AIR 6000 was flawed and the all in gamble on F-35 isn't necessarily in the Joint Force's benefit. There is also some very good questions about the design time, the....creative....assessment of Lockheed's marketing documents and the obsolete when introduced issues that are bigger than the ADF. Note that the last one I don't hold anyone in uniform or civilians accountable for - there has to be a better way sure; but what that way is I have no idea.I think that you all are missing his point. He's not arguing that the F-35 is the wrong buy, but that the acquisition process used was wrong. Secondly, he's arguing that the methodology used for threat and force structure assessment by Australia may not be the correct one and that other methodologies exist that maybe better. So whilst he appears to be arguing with a single service bias, in fact the ramifications of his arguments affect the whole of the ADF force structure, not just the RAAF. If you follow his links in his article, such as this one ANZUS in Trumpland—should we have seen it coming? | The Strategist you will see what his talking about. It has quite an interesting diagram in it with four possible outcomes and an explanation to go with it.
AIR 6000 was to replace F-111s and F/A-18s. I've seen some work recently that suggests some are trying to forget about the first one; but the F-35 is a replacement for the Pigs. That has been.....massaged by the RAAF as the first three Sqn will be 3, 75 and 77 - with a claimed need for another 30 JSF for 1 and 6 Sqn. That decision still hasn't been made.I don’t know squat about this site so I am looking forward Australian member comments on this article. My quick observation is Australia’s purchase of F-35s was for replacement of aging 4th Gen fighters, just like most other buyers. While strike capability is limited (from an Australian perspective due to range), it is better than classic Hornets. Like other JSF partners, the F-35 is about multirole fighter replacement and business opportunities for aerospace. There is nothing available to replace or improve on Australia’s former F-111 capability other than the future B-21 Raider
or a substantial inventory of long range missiles. Thoughts???
Australia’s F-35s: Lessons from a problematic purchase
All what you say is true that the F35 can operate from host nation infrastructure and or increase its operational range using AAR assets, the object of using something like a future b21 that it gives options to strike at range from home infrastructure if needed as those overseas bases may not be available. When you take into account the armament of a single B2 of 16xM84 we are looking at strike package of 8xF35A plus the supporting enablers the risk is actually greater using the multirole fighters at 85mil each 8 aircraft will cost 680mil plus the cost of KC30ABut - the strike role is so much more than a F-111 now. In the 1970s the F-111 was it - it was the long-range strike capability. Now we have so many options - all of which share one main thing: they don't have a crew. Our current strike platforms are DDG, FFG, FFH, SS, F-35, F/A-18, P-8 and L8113. Also a bunch of computer savvy peoples in dark, air-conditioned rooms. All of them have options that beat a F-111, and in many cases can beat the B-21. Furthermore, what ASPI has forgotten in their latest "articles" is that they can all leave Australia.... So if I want to strike....5000 km from Amberley, I don't have to leave from Amberley. I could leave from, Diego Garcia. Or Guam. Or Singapore. Or Tripoli. Or.... The other advantage is that missiles are cheap. A B-2 is ~$2 bn and a AGM-186 is about $2 m. So I can buy 1000 AGM-186 for a B-2. That's....a lot of options and firepower. And I risk - no one.
TLDR - our ex-CAFs have forgotten they signed off that the F-35 could do the job of a F-111. And they forget it's a Joint Force now....
Does this mean that you suggest we have large fleets of aircraft with specialist roles in numbers sufficient to do....what?Cant see it happening but it would not be the first time that Australia has elected to operate a small fleet of very large and very expensive planes. Wedgetail, A330, P8 ...