RAN Collins class subs: verdict?

[gf0012-aust]

Thank you for the additional information. I was aware of quality issues with the welding but was not aware it was quite that bad (the stories I heard related to hull penitrations).

Form what I have been told upgraded boats are a very capable platform but it is a pity the problems with the project delayed the full realization of this potential until well after they were in operation.

On the other hand I am aware the athe development of the technolighy to build and equip such platforms is a challenge in itself and, as such, the process (and technological realtionships) should assist in making the construction of a follow class less prone to such problems.

There have been some savage lessons learnt out of this project which probably won't ever get released until the expiry of the "30 year secrecy rule". The Collins was a classic example of how not to run a build programme or how to manage platform procurement. It was at the time, the single most complex project run in australia outside of the Snowy Mountains Hydro scheme.

We learnt some tough lessons from it, the benefit of those lessons has been that we now have a superior platform than what we ever intended, we became smarter at project definition, we became better at integrating dissimilar systems, we learnt that vendors should not be taken at face value on initial technical claims, and that we do have the capability to fix these ourselves.

The really beneficial test will be how we manage the Air Warfare Destroyer contract. That will be the most technically demanding single military project to date. If we mismanage that, then we've learnt nothing from the Collins imbrglio.

I am really looking forward to the next sub that we build, just incorporating what we've developed in the last 2 years will make it a very lethal sub - way beyond the capability of Collins as it won't be a retro fit like we have done with Collins.

I'll be interested to see how the USN fairs against the Gotland. It is nicknamed Mini-Me in defference to substantial hull and operational similarities to the early Collins. Hopefully I'll find that out at the next UDT Conf in Hawai'i later this year.

 

[alexsa]

Not that it is an issue at the moment with the state of the NZ defence budget, but I suspect the NZ would have some issues getting access to the necessary US technology employed in the Collins due to the countries polictical stance on some issues.

If the policy was ever adopted it would certaily add a potent capability to the NZ navy although I would wonder how it would fit into their operational strategy and would question the balance of the force.

Cheers

 

[nz enthusiast]

Langes idea was that there would be two multi role frigates that would escort the landing ship and the tanker 'endevour' and planned landing ships . The subs would be there to attack the opponent. They would also be used for patrol duty.

The thing is with Europe being so advanced we could purchase non-nuclear subs off Germany or Sweeden with minimal american equipment.

 

[gf0012-aust]

The thing is with Europe being so advanced we could purchase non-nuclear subs off Germany or Sweeden with minimal american equipment.

not really. HDW absorbed Kockums - and the US partner owns 40% of Kockums.

If NZ is committed to a path of ease of systems and platform integration - then at a comms level alone the vessels require US largesse.

That is a non trivial exercise. The RIMPAC exercises are a small example of management difficulties with dissimilar comms philosophies. Admittedly that is fundamentally a Japanese Constitiutional issue - but in a working environment it shows the difficulties to be dealt with.

Under the current system, NZ would probably have some difficulty gaining access to some of the future combat systems. As it is, the FCS for Collins will only used by the Virginia, Seawolf and some 688I's. There is no intention for the UK to get access either. There's also some co-development work happening in this area (stealth/sensors/mapping technologies) which australia will bring to the table in exchange for combat systems development etc... so it will actually make them completely different vessels. Some in the US already refer to them as the "non-nuke nuke" If the UK is not getting access, then I can't see NZ getting access. (even though we share substaintial info and data with them - we're "cousins" - so you still keep family close.

 

[EnigmaNZ]

I have vague memories of that as well NZ-Enthusiast, got me all excited at the time, remember also Muldoons' lot proposing the Leanders be converted to COGAG. In those days we spent twice as on defence as a % of GDP. Another memory, the NZ $ was at one point $NZ1.20 = $AU1 lol, back in Langes day,but I digress.
It seems that defence equipment is always problamatic initually. We have/had problems with MRV(offloading at sea), URV(engine reliability),Charles Upham(instability), LOV, Scorpian(gearbox and tracks), 105mm howitzers, steyrs, etc just from memory.
For a paper design, the Collins have turned into a very quiet capable submarine with the additional development put into it. The equipment problems I read were due to the requirement to have all displays able to access all data in a raw state and process which just couldn't be handled by the system fitted.
When you remember that at the time it was proposed, 2 decades ago, main servers were considered the way to go, and weren't much better than a modern high end decktop, desktop computers were in their infancy, the Space Shuttle was fitted with a computer with the capability of the Commodore 64. We had similar problems here with the new Police computer back then INIS, IBM's design was a central server iirc, with local terminals, iirc we had spent $70 mil at that point, over budget and were looking at at least $120 mil to complete, it didn't work as promised, couldn't be made to work as promised and was scapped. The design was overtaken by progress and is now being done using COTS. Who knew back in '85 the remarkable progress in computing power that would occur in the future. The average teen probably has a better grasp of computers today than many of the experts back in "85, and in defence, the boundries are often pushed to get the most, the best, the most capable for the least ammount of money.
Guess it comes down to "Beware of salesman making extravagent promises not backed up in fact."
Sorry, the thoughts have rambled a bit, doesn't pay to reply to threads before one has consumed one's first morning coffee :coffee

 

[seantheaussie]

There have been some savage lessons learnt out of this project which probably won't ever get released until the expiry of the "30 year secrecy rule". The Collins was a classic example of how not to run a build programme or how to manage platform procurement. It was at the time, the single most complex project run in australia outside of the Snowy Mountains Hydro scheme.

We learnt some tough lessons from it, the benefit of those lessons has been that we now have a superior platform than what we ever intended, we became smarter at project definition, we became better at integrating dissimilar systems, we learnt that vendors should not be taken at face value on initial technical claims, and that we do have the capability to fix these ourselves.

The really beneficial test will be how we manage the Air Warfare Destroyer contract. That will be the most technically demanding single military project to date. If we mismanage that, then we've learnt nothing from the Collins imbrglio.

We have learnt nothing from the Collins imbroglio. The main lesson was "for cost effective defence buy off the shelf". Wedgetail, bushmaster, Adelaide upgrades? & AWD's strongly suggest that we haven't learnt this. The final capability of a platform is meaningless without reference to the price relative to alternatives.

 

[gf0012-aust]

We have learnt nothing from the Collins imbroglio. The main lesson was "for cost effective defence buy off the shelf". Wedgetail, bushmaster, Adelaide upgrades? & AWD's strongly suggest that we haven't learnt this. The final capability of a platform is meaningless without reference to the price relative to alternatives.

couple of things:

subs - the cost benefit to expense is immeasurable - most of which will never come out in public for another 30-37 years. These platforms are literally a generation ahead of even some of the new vessels that some of our European allies are trying to flog to the market. Aust'n defence companies do not advertise their wins, but I can assure you that from my involvement with these platforms, we have a veritable queue of allies trying to get access to some of the gear that we've designed ourselves. ASC has now been determined as a high threat risk to espionage due to the number of technologies we've developed.

wedgetail - the mistake was not to treat wedgetail as a commercial model - we've missed out on heavy royalties due to a lack of commercial nouse. The turks (and any follow on customers) reap the advantage of this mistake. they are literally the best platform of their size in the world.

bushmaster - agree somewhat - but they are there for a doctrine issue. ie, armoured taxis going into theatre - they are not AFV's. The mistake now is that we have probably lost some of the hard earned development (especially in explosion resistance and mine protection) Now that ADI are part owned by the French, we have seen them offer the design to China. I have some very strong opinions on this. As a vehicle, they are more mine resistant than the Caspirs (which were a benchmark for mine resistance). We could have sold more of them to other allies if we didn't have french involvement with ADI. It is unfortunate as we had very good sales prospects up until then. ADI, whether they like it or not, are not trusted in some circles due to their curent shareholder base.

Adelaides - again, they are regarded as the most capable of the OHP's in their current iteration. There are quite a few in the USN who argue that the path we have taken with the Adelaides is what the US should be doing. So I'm not sure what your beef with them is. We should have done it earlier.

AWD's - again, this is a vessel that is regarded as going to be superior to the Kongos and with a more efficient crewing model. Interestingly enough, the USN and RAN are working closely together as the USN wants to try and model their crewing ratios on a similar model to the RAN. We typically crew at 20-30% less for the same sized/capable platform. I'm not sure what your argument is with the AWD's - no decision has been made on vessel type yet, but we know that we'll be installing proven systems complimentary to Aegis that no one else uses. We haven't had an AWD since the Brisbane and her sisters were turned into hostels for tropical fish. We need the capability. If your'e arguing the relevance of their ABM capability - then you might have been seduced by the rubbish thats been touted as logical in the public media/press. Quite frankly, the average journo in australia wouldn't know a destroyer from a battleship - and actually quite regularly get them confused.

Look at the commentary from serious defence journos's like Cotteril, Ferguson and Sheridan and you get a more balanced and intellectual view with the absence of ignorance I usually associate with the "ambo chasers".

 

[Supe]

GF: Just on your comments vis-a-vis Wedgetail and Bushmaster....it is rather disturbing to read that Australian business is not capitalising on the large investment of time/money/research. Is anyone in that particular community grasping the lessons being taught?

I wasn't aware that NZ had any interest in acquiring Subs... I would think that a Navy the size of New Zealand's would have high difficulty in getting sufficient crew to man them...especially the proposed four. That's apart from the determination upon the current government to spend as little as possible on defence thus precluding any possibility of owning/maintaining such a platform. I do think it would make sense to have at least one, given the niche capabilities it would offer as both intelligence gathering role AND as a vessel for deployment of NZSAS. I suspect that one unit would not be enough though and a minimum of two would be required.

 

[gf0012-aust]

GF: Just on your comments vis-a-vis Wedgetail and Bushmaster....it is rather disturbing to read that Australian business is not capitalising on the large investment of time/money/research. Is anyone in that particular community grasping the lessons being taught?

There is nothing concrete to date, but there are some very strong indications that some foreign sales may well have been compromised due to the fact that there is French shareholder involvement. There was a pretty high level of confidence that we could sell them into the Middle East. Kuwait as an example bought some 28 Aust made Armoured vehicles a few years back. The Bushmaster is a substantially superior vehicle to the one that they bought. Although there are several middle eastern countries looking at them again now, there are some (including me) who think that French shareholder involvement has crippled the opportunity to have volume sales.

Wedgetail is a legacy of not redefining the contract with Boeing and the junior development partners. We could clearly have assuaged the costs against future orders. As a result the Turks get a developed platform basically paid in R&D $'s by Australia.. Obviously this is to their benefit and they are lucky enough to capitalise on it.

We have done the same with the RAAF HUG upgrades to the Hornets. Canada is virtually walking into a full R&D upgrade opportunity without having to invest in any of the effort made by Aust. Again, more luck to them as they have been able to get a "free ride" on an upgrade. There are some in the CDF (airforce) who do regard it as getting a freebie off of our R&D efforts - but, they'd be crazy not have taken the gift horse if it was there.

I wasn't aware that NZ had any interest in acquiring Subs... I would think that a Navy the size of New Zealand's would have high difficulty in getting sufficient crew to man them...especially the proposed four. That's apart from the determination upon the current government to spend as little as possible on defence thus precluding any possibility of owning/maintaining such a platform. I do think it would make sense to have at least one, given the niche capabilities it would offer as both intelligence gathering role AND as a vessel for deployment of NZSAS. I suspect that one unit would not be enough though and a minimum of two would be required.

NZ isn't in any position to get subs. To get 2 on decent sea time she would need to buy at least 3. A one off unit would be a waste of time. If she was so inclined, she could have picked up an entire Danish sub squadron for a virtual gift. In real terms she doesn't have a requirement though.

If NZSAS need to go covert, then they can operate off of ours or the UK's subs. (assuming the politics is converging)

 

[seantheaussie]

AWD's - again, this is a vessel that is regarded as going to be superior to the Kongos and with a more efficient crewing model. Interestingly enough, the USN and RAN are working closely together as the USN wants to try and model their crewing ratios on a similar model to the RAN. We typically crew at 20-30% less for the same sized/capable platform. I'm not sure what your argument is with the AWD's - no decision has been made on vessel type yet, but we know that we'll be installing proven systems complimentary to Aegis that no one else uses. We haven't had an AWD since the Brisbane and her sisters were turned into hostels for tropical fish. We need the capability. If your'e arguing the relevance of their ABM capability - then you might have been seduced by the rubbish thats been touted as logical in the public media/press. Quite frankly, the average journo in australia wouldn't know a destroyer from a battleship - and actually quite regularly get them confused.

It is PLANNED to be superior than the Kongos. I am certain we will not get a money back guarantee. If we need AWD's and we cannot buy Kongos due to japanese law we should buy Arleigh Burkes off the production line with certain price, capability & delivery date. There is almost no chance that the AWD's will give us more capability per dollar over the next 30 years than old fashioned Arleigh Burkes even if they give more capability per ship.
I also have a different problem with the need for AWDs. They are mainly for alliance maintainance & the US is rebalancing her fleet away from billion dollar ships towards more frigates(LCS). The best Australian capability to contribute to the US is spending the money on air force tanker transports which is an area of large & increasing weakness for the US & of great use in DOA.
ABM capability. Would you put your nuclear bombs on a missile or in a container on a ship? I don't doubt bad guys have/will get weapons. I do doubt ABM will stop them.

Adelaides - again, they are regarded as the most capable of the OHP's in their current iteration. There are quite a few in the USN who argue that the path we have taken with the Adelaides is what the US should be doing. So I'm not sure what your beef with them is. We should have done it earlier.

My problem is with media reports of an ANAO report saying that we have spent most of the money & are yet to get back a single ship that the navy will certify as fully capable. I don't doubt they will eventually be the most capable OHPs on earth, I do doubt they will be value for money.

With no insider knowledge I can only go by public foreign sales as to cost effectiveness which leaves me depressed.

 

[gf0012-aust]

It is PLANNED to be superior than the Kongos. I am certain we will not get a money back guarantee. If we need AWD's and we cannot buy Kongos due to japanese law we should buy Arleigh Burkes off the production line with certain price, capability & delivery date.

The Kongos or their fittings aren't for sale. The Kongos are typically used as an example of a superior Burke with lower manning levels. The USN and the RAN are currently working together on reduced crew models for the USN. They're actually takling our lead on this.

There is almost no chance that the AWD's will give us more capability per dollar over the next 30 years than old fashioned Arleigh Burkes even if they give more capability per ship.

Why is that? whats your tactical or strategic reason for doubting capability against current and perceived threats?

I also have a different problem with the need for AWDs. They are mainly for alliance maintainance & the US is rebalancing her fleet away from billion dollar ships towards more frigates(LCS).

No, thats a rather ALP/Democrat/Greens perception IMV. They are actually a 21st Century role substitute for the Pert/Hobart/Brisbane. They're battle management assets. The notion that the press promote that they are USN support assets against ABM's is somewhat fragile and clutching at best. Before the "demon spawn" expression "ABM" entered the journos lexicon, they were still a requirement. The ABM porion is actually an example of instrinsic capability. The ABM role is an adjunct to an extrememly capable management and protection asset.

The best Australian capability to contribute to the US is spending the money on air force tanker transports which is an area of large & increasing weakness for the US & of great use in DOA.

The current incoming tanker fleet will be a 1/3rd the size of the Brits. and they are an expeditionary designed military. In the last 3 weeks they have actually scaled back their tanker numbers.

Would you put your nuclear bombs on a missile or in a container on a ship? I don't doubt bad guys have/will get weapons. I do doubt ABM will stop them.

and that reinforces the fact thatthe Oz media have no comprehension of why the Aegis platforms are being bought in the first place. ABM is a supplementary role.

My problem is with media reports of an ANAO report saying that we have spent most of the money & are yet to get back a single ship that the navy will certify as fully capable. I don't doubt they will eventually be the most capable OHPs on earth, I do doubt they will be value for money.

If they were real value for money at a sheer cost level, then we wouldn't build them in Oz, we'd get the Sth Koreans to do it and save probably a 1/4 of the platform cost. Builds are sometimes made in Oz due to national interest issues of maintaining skillsets. If we didn't do that then most Govts would run the risk of losing power anyway. It's an interest that covers a lot of issues - the media barely comprehend what our military does and yet they persist in making comment about stuff which is sometimes nonsenical to say the least.

With no insider knowledge I can only go by public foreign sales as to cost effectiveness which leaves me depressed.

and thats a dangerous prism of perspective IMV. I spent of 25 years in Fed Govt, and I've been involved with projects such as Collins, AP3C's Perentie, Raven, pre Bushmaster trials, S400's, signature management, Austeyr fixes and a few more unmentionables. In all that time I've yet to see the media get it right on any of the projects I was sometimes intimately involved with.

 

[seantheaussie]

Why is that? whats your tactical or strategic reason for doubting capability against current and perceived threats?

I doubt cost effective capability compared to Arleigh Burke.

No, thats a rather ALP/Democrat/Greens perception IMV. They are actually a 21st Century role substitute for the Pert/Hobart/Brisbane. They're battle management assets. The notion that the press promote that they are USN support assets against ABM's is somewhat fragile and clutching at best. Before the "demon spawn" expression "ABM" entered the journos lexicon, they were still a requirement. The ABM porion is actually an example of instrinsic capability. The ABM role is an adjunct to an extrememly capable management and protection asset.

If they are not for DOA or policing the South Pacific then they are for expeditionary operations with America, hence alliance maintainance. I agree ABM is a relatively unimportant part of it but you're the on who brought it up.

Quote:
Originally Posted by seantheaussie
The best Australian capability to contribute to the US is spending the money on air force tanker transports which is an area of large & increasing weakness for the US & of great use in DOA.



The current incoming tanker fleet will be a 1/3rd the size of the Brits. and they are an expeditionary designed military. In the last 3 weeks they have actually scaled back their tanker numbers.

Does the US have a greater weakness in tankers & transports or AEGIS? We want to spend alliance maintainance funds on items the US needs with subsidiary DOA applications.

Quote:
Originally Posted by seantheaussie
My problem is with media reports of an ANAO report saying that we have spent most of the money & are yet to get back a single ship that the navy will certify as fully capable. I don't doubt they will eventually be the most capable OHPs on earth, I do doubt they will be value for money.



If they were real value for money at a sheer cost level, then we wouldn't build them in Oz, we'd get the Sth Koreans to do it and save probably a 1/4 of the platform cost. Builds are sometimes made in Oz due to national interest issues of maintaining skillsets. If we didn't do that then most Govts would run the risk of losing power anyway. It's an interest that covers a lot of issues - the media barely comprehend what our military does and yet they persist in making comment about stuff which is sometimes nonsenical to say the least.

This was about the adelaide upgrade, sorry for the confusion

Quote:
Originally Posted by seantheaussie
With no insider knowledge I can only go by public foreign sales as to cost effectiveness which leaves me depressed.



and thats a dangerous prism of perspective IMV. I spent of 25 years in Fed Govt, and I've been involved with projects such as Collins, AP3C's Perentie, Raven, pre Bushmaster trials, S400's, signature management, Austeyr fixes and a few more unmentionables. In all that time I've yet to see the media get it right on any of the projects I was sometimes intimately involved with.

I don't really understand the connection between the quote of me & your response. I admit the media is not the best but how can they get foreign military sales wrong? Or are foreign military sales irrelevent when it comes to cost effective equipment?

 

[gf0012-aust]

I doubt cost effective capability compared to Arleigh Burke.

CE is based on requirements and objectives. we're not going to have the same economies of scale as the US - but on capability for platform - it really is the minimum system required. We need battle management systems, Aegis provides that

If they are not for DOA or policing the South Pacific then they are for expeditionary operations with America, hence alliance maintainance. I agree ABM is a relatively unimportant part of it but you're the on who brought it up.

and we live in a volatile area. Indonesia, Lombok Straits, Paracels. Spratlys are all areas of interest that effect our region. If the merde hits the fan with any of our FPDA allies we have a responsibility there as well. If Indonesia somehow collapses into a failed government, we have no idea whether our relationship will deteriorate back into the hoary old days of Konftontassi. You plan for contingencies - not preferred expectations

Does the US have a greater weakness in tankers & transports or AEGIS?

We want to spend alliance maintainance funds on items the US needs with subsidiary DOA applications.

no we don't. we're a sovereign nation. we have systems to compliment working with our principle allies - we don't buy systems to be the Sthn Hemispheres version of the USMC

I don't really understand the connection between the quote of me & your response. I admit the media is not the best but how can they get foreign military sales wrong? Or are foreign military sales irrelevent when it comes to cost effective equipment?

The mainstream media rarely gets it right. Thats why I referred to Cotteril, Ferguson, Sheridan etc as Journos with a more approp comprehension of issues. and our FMS/FMP are extremely relevant to battle efficiencies. Like most countries, Oz Media has a limited comprehension of military matters especially procurement. My point is that the very messengers of information the general public rely upon are usually hopelessly innaccuarate when it comes to portraying things in a diligent manner.

The complete failure on the part of the media and for that matter ALP/Democrats to understand AWD relevance means that they have no idea what the vessels are fundamentally for, the issues of an already existing capability gap in the AirWarfare skimmer capability (by almost 4 years already). ipos facto, they are not exactly the best vehicles of message that the general public can rely on.

One of the primary reasons why we didn't go in GW1 was that we already had capability shortfalls - that has only just started to be rectified now.

 

[seantheaussie]

no we don't. we're a sovereign nation. we have systems to compliment working with our principle allies - we don't buy systems to be the Sthn Hemispheres version of the USMC.

I believe, Greg Sheridan believes & John Howard believes that we are currently spending procurement dollars in order to conduct expeditionary warfare alongside the US. I believe this should be limited to 10-15% of the defence budget while Sheridan believes it should be much more. There are certainly better ways to spend DOA money than AWD's & LHD's as we would never send ships into a potential invaders air superiority(no I can't name the invader because I can't see the future)

The mainstream media rarely gets it right. Thats why I referred to Cotteril, Ferguson, Sheridan etc as Journos with a more approp comprehension of issues. and our FMS/FMP are extremely relevant to battle efficiencies. Like most countries, Oz Media has a limited comprehension of military matters especially procurement. My point is that the very messengers of information the general public rely upon are usually hopelessly innaccuarate when it comes to portraying things in a diligent manner. .

I have no idea what FMP is. Can you give me the first names & publications of Cotteril, Ferguson. Thanks

 

[seantheaussie]

Daniel Cotterill & john Ferguson from the Australian?

 

[Supe]

I am really looking forward to the next sub that we build, just incorporating what we've developed in the last 2 years will make it a very lethal sub - way beyond the capability of Collins as it won't be a retro fit like we have done with Collins.

Is Australia capable of designing its own Subs? It's clear that they can be built, maintained and upgraded here...surely the next step is to design one. Hopefully, when the time comes to procure newer Subs, more than six will be acquired.

 

[Aussie Digger]

Sean, I don't understand how you consider the AWD's useless for DOA tasks. Does the fleet no longer have a responsibility to protect itself and Australia from air attack? Do protecting our sea lanes no longer matter?

Does a strong ASuW and ASW capability no longer matter? Remember the AWD's will in all likelyhood replace the FFG's, meaning the end of ANY sort of long range air defence capability present in the RAN, should the AWD's not be acquired. (This capability is already extremely limited given the radar and fire control limitations of the FFG's). The FFG's operational service cannot be extended much longer due to problems with the superstructure cracking...

Do you think ESSM equipped ANZAC frigates will be sufficient to provide the air defence capability for the RAN and for any deployed forces whether operating with the US or without?

Australia is intent upon improving it's expeditionary forces capability. That's not a bad thing. DOA is the LEAST likely contingency the ADF will have to face.

Simply acquiring off-the-shelf Arleigh Burkes is hardly the answer either. For one thing, they have no aircraft hanger, meaning helo's can only be deployed on the helo for short durations (ie: hours)... In addition as GF pointed out, the manning levels of Arleigh Burkes are far beyond what the RAN can support. The Perth Class DDG's were retired early for just this reason. 2 of our 6 FFG's are partly being retired for this reason also...

On top of this I doubt the Arleigh Burkes would be much cheaper anyway. They are a far bigger warship than we are intending to acquire. The AWD's will probably end up between 6000 and 7000 tons. The Arleigh Burkes are slightly over 8000t...

 

[knightrider4]

Simply and my middle name is simple. I,m all for the AWD and the LHD and the JSF although F-22 would be better. I love Abrams tanks and anything else that concerns the minds of those who may be potential enemies. Bring on the stand off weopons and the extra mechanized battalion. It;s much easier to decide not to use something you have than to want to use something you wish you had. Australian servicemen and women demand nothing less.

 

[Supe]

Simply acquiring off-the-shelf Arleigh Burkes is hardly the answer either. For one thing, they have no aircraft hanger

AD: Arleigh Burke Flight IIA's have a hangar and facilities.

Ships in production Flight IIA, starting with USS OSCAR AUSTIN (DDG-79), also have landing and hangar facilities for operation of two multi-purpose Light Airborne Multipurpose System LAMPS MK III helicopters. This capability will be added for the remaining 29 ships of the class. The construction of the helicopter hangar is the most visible change for this new generation of AEGIS Destroyers. Located aft of the after Vertical Launching System (VLS), the hangar is large enough to accommodate 2 SH-60F helicopters, support equipment, repair shops and store rooms. The aft warping capstan and towing padeye are retractable to keep the helicopter deck clear. link

Acquiring these ships and its capabilities makes sense to me...but aren't Frigate numbers a little light? Someone (GF?) floated the total proposed number of Frigates in service as being twelve.

 

[Aussie Digger]

Yep the frigate force is to be capped at 12. It is currently at 12 (6 ANZAC's and 6 FFG's). 2 more ANZAC's are to be delivered by June 2006 and 2 FFG's will be retired by May 2006. If the Government decides to replace the FFG with the AWD (rather than operating both classes) than the total major surface combat force will stand at 11...

I don't believe that decision has been made yet though. A force of 15 major surface combatants would be nice, but I think its unlikely...

I wasn't aware of te helo deck for the Arleigh Burkes, thanks for correcting that.