PLAN would lose up to 40% of it's entire fleet to sink just 1 US aircraft carrier

[Eeshaan]

RAND suggests using land-based ASMs to turn China's Area Denial strategy on it's head :

RAND Suggests Using Land-based ASMs Against China | Defense News | defensenews.com

An effective tactic in my opinion. ASMs are generally inexpensive and are exactly China's strategy used against them in time of conflict. Not only does this provide a good counter to China's area denial capability, but also helps US allies with their own anti-access capabilities in case of any Chinese aggression.

 

[gf0012-aust]

not convinced on this report

1) Static launchers mean dead launchers
2) Current AShM have limitations, range etc and quite a few countries that need to defend themselves might find themselves subject to MTCR (bearing in mind that MTCR is almost redundant anyway with a few countries who don't abide and which have circumvented the initial range limitations that came with the initial product)
3) mobile hypersonics is a better solution from a whole pile of perspectives, esp reaction time, deployment flexibility once they finesse air and ship launched options

 

[My2Cents]

not convinced on this report

1) Static launchers mean dead launchers
2) Current AShM have limitations, range etc and quite a few countries that need to defend themselves might find themselves subject to MTCR (bearing in mind that MTCR is almost redundant anyway with a few countries who don't abide and which have circumvented the initial range limitations that came with the initial product)
3) mobile hypersonics is a better solution from a whole pile of perspectives, esp reaction time, deployment flexibility once they finesse air and ship launched options

See Employing Land-Based Anti-Ship Missiles in the Western Pacific | RAND

1) They are assuming mobile launchers with multiple hides. Launcher would deploy to a launch site and then immediately proceed to a different hide after launch. Many of the locations offer extensive overhead cover negating aerial reconnaissance.
2) The report (Table 1 on page 14 -- page 39 of .pdf) indicates that 100km range missiles are adequate if both sides of each strait are available. Some require 200km range missiles if only one side is available. MTCR limit is 300km.
3) Reaction time is not a factor, targets will be in range for several hours at a minimum.

 

[My2Cents]

RAND suggests using land-based ASMs to turn China's Area Denial strategy on it's head :

RAND Suggests Using Land-based ASMs Against China | Defense News | defensenews.com

An effective tactic in my opinion. ASMs are generally inexpensive and are exactly China's strategy used against them in time of conflict. Not only does this provide a good counter to China's area denial capability, but also helps US allies with their own anti-access capabilities in case of any Chinese aggression.

Quote from article:

The release of the report coincides with Japan’s announcement that it is conducting an exercise that places Type-88 surface-to-ship missiles on Miyako Island. It is the first time Japan has conducted such an exercise. The strait between Okinawa and Miyako is a common access route to the Pacific by the Chinese navy.​

Looks like Japan either got a pre-release copy or, more likely, came up with the same idea. China just saw their bet raised, their response will be interesting -- it is unlikely that they will fold. The possibility of an eventual war ultimately seems to rest mainly the perception by the 2 sides of the USA willingness to become involved.

 

[StobieWan]

I suspect if the Japanese need to close that strait, they'll just crack out the Soryu's - the missiles will be a bit of a distraction but that's about it compared to the havoc being wreaked by those SSK's.

 

[colay]

Aside from a fleet of Kilos, didn't Viet Nam purchase a number of advanced AShMs to protect it's coast?

 

[RobWilliams]

I think Vietnam & Russia signed an agreement early last year for joint production of AShMs, based on the Uran subsonic AShM IIRC and I think by now they're already producing them in house.

 

[colay]

I think Vietnam & Russia signed an agreement early last year for joint production of AShMs, based on the Uran subsonic AShM IIRC and I think by now they're already producing them in house.

Thanks, I recalled they bought a limited number of Yakhont missiles on mobile launchers some years back. I wasn't aware of the Uran deal which puts a lot more arrows in the quiver.

 

[gf0012-aust]

I suspect if the Japanese need to close that strait, they'll just crack out the Soryu's - the missiles will be a bit of a distraction but that's about it compared to the havoc being wreaked by those SSK's.

Its a nonsense vignette

USN doctrine is not to commit their assets into contested space until they delaminate the threat

China has over 1500 airfields within 500km of the coast and capable of taking aircraft that can lift heavy missiles

Nobody is going to b be lobbing land based AShM until that capability has been reduced and/or negated sufficiently to send in a major force. Let alone within MTCR ranges where they'd be asking for grief.

You wonder what goes on in the heads of some of these people ......

 

[Crunchy]

Thanks, I recalled they bought a limited number of Yakhont missiles on mobile launchers some years back. I wasn't aware of the Uran deal which puts a lot more arrows in the quiver.

Vietnam currently operates three different mobile coastal defence systems:

1 battallion equipped with the Redut-M with the P15M Antiship-Missile

1 battallion equipped with the Shaddock Antiship-missile

Those two unit are already obsolete & nearing their end of the operational use. The missile are going to be expended in live fire drills.

The replacement for those are 4 battallion of the Bastion-P with the Yakhont antiship-missile. Two are already delivered and operational. Vietnam People's Navy is actually the launch customer, before the Syrian Navy. (The Syrian ones have been already destroyed by the Isreali Air Force earlier this year.)

The Molinya corvette (12 in service, license production ongoing) carry each 16 Uran ASMs. As mentioned before the Uran are now produced in license in Vietnam.

The Gepard light frigate (2 in service + 2 U/C) carry each 8 Uran ASMs.

The 6 Kilos will also will equiped with Klub-S ASM.

The Sigma 9814 (4 U/C + possible license production) carry each 4 Excocet.

The People's Air Force is also equiped with Kh-31s (anti-radation-version).

All in all Vietnam's stockpile of sub-sonic & super-sonic ASMs is probably only second to Singapore's.

 

[My2Cents]

USN doctrine is not to commit their assets into contested space until they delaminate the threat

Uhm … This is the Japanese, not the USN. The missiles are likely to be stationed on Miyako Island before the shooting starts. They may well be part of the reason the shooting to starts.

China has over 1500 airfields within 500km of the coast and capable of taking aircraft that can lift heavy missiles

• And it is another 550 km from the closest point on the coast to Miyako Island. That is going to limit the number of airfields, and the aircraft types that can reach the target from them. China has limited air-to-air refueling capability.
• Okinawa is less than 300 km away from Miyako Island, so the attacking Chinese aircraft will be flying into an active Japanese air defense zone.
• The targets are mobile, not static, so long range heavy missiles strikes will be meaningless. It will be Scud Hunt situation.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Uhm … This is the Japanese, not the USN. The missiles are likely to be stationed on Miyako Island before the shooting starts. They may well be part of the reason the shooting to starts.

• And it is another 550 km from the closest point on the coast to Miyako Island. That is going to limit the number of airfields, and the aircraft types that can reach the target from them. China has limited air-to-air refueling capability.
• Okinawa is less than 300 km away from Miyako Island, so the attacking Chinese aircraft will be flying into an active Japanese air defense zone.
• The targets are mobile, not static, so long range heavy missiles strikes will be meaningless. It will be Scud Hunt situation.

Ummmm???

What do you think the USN is doing in Yokahama?

Skip the attitude

 

[Eeshaan]

I believe My2Cents has a point.

How would China go after the ASMs in the situation My2Cents described ?

Not only is there an air defense network around where the missles would be deployed, but the launchers themselves would be highly mobile. So an airstrike or airborne operation of any sort can be ruled out. Neither is any carrier getting within300 km of those ASMs.

That leaves an IRBM strike as the only remaining option, which may or may not even get a single successful hit due to the mobility of the launchers.

How would you keep track of and successfully kill several targets like that ? Not an easy thing to do, at least in my opinion.

Edit : Then there's also the matter of the JSDF airforce and US Navy's and Airforce's aircraft in the vicinity...

 

[gf0012-aust]

The issue of Chinas capacity to strike has been discussed at various PACRIM military conferences since the first I attended in Hawai'i 2004 - and basically becomes a major duscussion point every year since 2004

Nobody is going to place forces inside the chinese umbrella, That means delamination of red team as much as poss.

China is a land based power, ie she cannot effectively project and/or protect extended forces without the protection of her land based air - despite all the fuss and bluster about what people want her to be able to do in canned scenarios, until 2020-2030 she is highly dependant on having her fleets protected by land based air - and hence also why the response in the region by all of SEA and EA is to buy modern subs - In fact sub purchases in the PACRIM is the fastest growing anywhere,

Blind freddy says that you aren't going to play to your opponents advantages - and that means neutralizing the red team well before you bring your forces to bear and within range of reds abilities and strengths

They can move major air elements to over 1500 airfields capable of taking those assets. In a lot of cases they are dry bases - but they don't need to be able to do anything but get the air up once and on its way. Both Japan and the USAF know that, so for the USAF to be on its way in time to provide support for whichever force needs it is a big ask - so countering chinese saturation has to be done before anyone launches anything

There seems to be this concept that china vs japan/USN can be debated much like a game of counterstrike/chess etc..... that's far from the reality.

The purchasing and intended purchasing behaviour of the regional neighbours since 2004 is a fairly good indicator of how other countries want to counter chinas growing force development. Even Janes have been able to get their analysis right as the trends are blatantly obvious.

Nobody is going to be fighting to chinas strengths - so the counterstrike type scenarios (traditional thinking if you like) were divorced as good ideas almost 10 years ago.

Look at curr weapons developments. More importantly, start drawing range rings around chinas principle weapons systems and think about what "you" would do to break those range rings

 

[colay]

A2/AD and A4 are appear to be opposite sides of the same conceptual coin. I surmise that Chinese military strategists are just as focused on countering the US A4 advantage as their US counterparts are in,addressing the A2/D2 challenge.

Assured Access, Anytime, Anywhere | U.S. Naval Institute

Assured Access, Anytime, Anywhere
By Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd Freeman, U.S. Marine Corps

The Navy’s preoccupation with anti-access/area denial is a throwback to ‘counting battleships’ as a measure of naval capability. It’s time to shift focus to the Navy’s overwhelming dominance of its adversaries... By focusing on numbers rather than capability, we likely will fail to procure platforms at the right cost, and worse, we might end up procuring the wrong platforms altogether. Sometimes the Navy can also misread the future operating environment. For the past ten years, the service has been obsessed with so-called anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) weapon systems, despite the fact that the Navy has no near-peer competitor. This may actually have little to do with the future security environment in which the Navy could find itself. A2/AD does not focus on the incredible, peerless U.S. naval capabilities; instead, it makes our potential adversaries out to be ten-foot giants when they really may just be three-foot munchkins. A better approach—more appropriate for a naval power with unprecedented dominance—is assured access, anytime, anywhere (A4). This more accurately reflects the capabilities of the Navy, which in turn will free procurement and policy advocates to more accurately focus on future programs and employment options.

MORE...

 

[CB90]

That message feels overly cheerful. I agree with the author that solely focusing on the adversary's capabilities creates problems with tunnel vision when it comes to strategic planning, there are some real challenges worth considering and factoring in as well. And the current trends will likely make things more challenging, not less.

 

[koxinga]

Here a somewhat related question (given some of the members expertises in hypersonics). Both India and China claims to have developed or have within testing, missiles(India's Shourya, Brahmos II, China's YJ-12) that operate in the hypersonic envelope. The CM-400AKG claims Mach 5.5 numbers in terminal phase.

There isn't much context (launch, cruise or terminal phases) or information about them. Given the current state of research in this area, are those claims realistic? What are the qualifiers?

 

[the concerned]

just asking about the DF-21 anti ship ballistic missile . How do you launch a ballistic missile at a nuclear equipped enemy and not expect them to fire back with the same weapon. Wasn't that one of the reasons that the US stopped work on the conventional trident missiles. Also attacking a CV is one thing but you would have to overwhelm the how battlegroup you are talking about at least 8,000 US lives. I would hate to think of the response if you succeeded.

 

[StobieWan]

There are a lot of IRBM's and SRBM's in play and it'd be obvious where the missile was aimed while still in flight. There'd be no need to trigger a SIOPS based response (ie, we're under attack, the nuclear triad is at risk, launch everything now)

Effectively, the US could wait and see.

 

[ngatimozart]

There are a lot of IRBM's and SRBM's in play and it'd be obvious where the missile was aimed while still in flight. There'd be no need to trigger a SIOPS based response (ie, we're under attack, the nuclear triad is at risk, launch everything now)

Effectively, the US could wait and see.

That's the problem. They may not have that much time. They wouldn't know whether it was a nuke or conventional warhead and a CVN is a capital asset. It's a totally different scenario to Saddam Hussein launching Scuds. The big question is how far down the nuclear attack warning reaction and decision chain do they get before a US SIOPS response go /no go? Then there are the Russian, Indian and Pakistani responses to a Chinese launch and possible US SIOPS response. It would be a very dangerous and touchy situation.