PLAN would lose up to 40% of it's entire fleet to sink just 1 US aircraft carrier

[Eeshaan]

I think cdxbow is considering the downsizing of the US military and current economic crisis causing a decrease in the overall capability of the US Navy by 2025, as a factor in his prediction, no ?

What you should also consider is the possibility of an internatinal coalition. If such a scenario were to take place, it might not just be the US Navy that the PLAN will have to face. It's not like the other east-asian nations such as Japan and Korea, and the allies of US & Taiwan are going to just sit idly by and condemn any aggression by China in the UN...

Also, it is an interesting debate on how the Falklands conflict would have played out had the Argentinians had more Exocet missles & launchers.

 

[ngatimozart]

Also, it is an interesting debate on how the Falklands conflict would have played out had the Argentinians had more Exocet missles & launchers.

Also if their carrier had been at sea along with ASW escorts and operational. I am aware that a RN SSN was in the area but that Argentinian carrier and its accompying group could have made a difference if used well enough. But the Argentinian Navy didn't do that so it's really moot.

 

[the road runner]

I always assumed that China relying so heavy ,on importing its energy needs such as oil/gas/petrol would be seen as a big weakness to its economy. Id imagine the US Navy would be using a tactic similar to what Germany used against the British in WW 2 by going after merchant shipping.

The Shift: America’s Energy Boom, China’s Energy Need | Pacific Money | The Diplomat

This would force the Chinese Navy to venture out further into the big blue ,have its navy escort its merchant shipping and play into the US Navy advantage.

 

[StobieWan]

I think folk often underestimate the difficulty in physically locating a carrier group - I know it sounds daft as in "it's a chuffing big bunch of ships" but seriously, the USN has been traditionally very good at getting a carrier to sea, then disappearing in the ocean, keeping all ships and aircraft at a distance. Even with satellite surveillance, it's still a relatively small group to spot in a big drop of water, and passing that along in a timely manner is a challenge.

This is what's been talked about in previous discussions of targeting a carrier group with a DF-21- you've got to locate the group, get co-ordinates back, pass them to the missile battery, then keep the missile updated in it's flight.


Same or worse with large groups of FAC's -and the friction of battle cuts both ways.

 

[Volkodav]

SM3 has been proven capable of destroying satellites, it would not be inconceivable the US could sanitise an area of useful surveillance assets as a precursor to any activity likely to result in a DF21 attack.

I imagine an anti DF21 capability may be announced for the high energy laser the USN has just deployed as well. Not too big a stretch to assume a laser would be more use against a ballistic target than a sea skimming one, no issue with horizon etc.

 

[cdxbow]

Your point? I don't think you realize just how difficult it would be to put that kind of coordinated attack together. Not to mention no actual accounting for the time/distances involved, actual operating patterns, etc. You're basically assuming all the pieces of the puzzle magically fall into place.

That's pure "What if" territory and not very useful. Especially since it can easily go the other way.

If I had no clue what actually goes into "missile tests" I guess I probably wouldn't gain much confidence either. And technical tests are not the same as tactical exercises.

Not so hard. PLA hat on.
I'm on home turf. You are only 200-300kms away (I said south of Taiwan and the straits are pretty narrow). I've got multiple platforms & delivery systems that can reach that far, a bundle of munitions built by the worlds largest industrial base and I've prepared for this for 30 years. All of the systems mentioned are currently operational. No what ifs so far.

If the DF21 actually do perform as advertised then I in fact I believe I have effectively lured the USN group in a trap. I can keep shooting my DF21 at them all the way out to 2500+ kms as they retreat, or intercept reinforcement's as they cross the pacific. I can even hit land targets in Japan and Taiwan. Any fixed target, is within my reach, including ships in port.

I shouldn't have resorted to 'What ifs', but there is uncertainty inherent in all this, and it's always a big part of warfare. PLA hat on again. My big uncertainty would be are my DF21 truly capable of hitting a moving target at sea. Correct me if I am wrong, but the only test in the public domain successfully hit a immobile target in the desert. I'm not going to tell you about the failures.

 

[cdxbow]

I think folk often underestimate the difficulty in physically locating a carrier group - I know it sounds daft as in "it's a chuffing big bunch of ships" but seriously, the USN has been traditionally very good at getting a carrier to sea, then disappearing in the ocean, keeping all ships and aircraft at a distance. Even with satellite surveillance, it's still a relatively small group to spot in a big drop of water, and passing that along in a timely manner is a challenge.

This is what's been talked about in previous discussions of targeting a carrier group with a DF-21- you've got to locate the group, get co-ordinates back, pass them to the missile battery, then keep the missile updated in it's flight.


Same or worse with large groups of FAC's -and the friction of battle cuts both ways.

The USN group are only 200-300 kms from shore. In range of many surveillance assets. Usual carrier screen has been constrained by proximity to shore and operational aspects have been constrained by the fact it is not outright conflict, but 'escalating tension'. The PLA have grabbed the opportunity.

The targeting issue as you said is the key. I thought it must of had some visual recognition system (hey that's a big carrier shape, I'm going for that) for terminal guidance, as it is travelling so fast, but it seems it depends on external data. Does it totally depend of some data for terminal guidance?
Does the missile get updates and manoeuvre while it is exoatmospheric? How much can it manoeuvre within the atmosphere? How many times can it receive updates and it's course be changed? At that speed it can't be many. How vulnerable are any of these steps to disruption?

 

[cdxbow]

I always assumed that China relying so heavy ,on importing its energy needs such as oil/gas/petrol would be seen as a big weakness to its economy. Id imagine the US Navy would be using a tactic similar to what Germany used against the British in WW 2 by going after merchant shipping.

The Shift: America’s Energy Boom, China’s Energy Need | Pacific Money | The Diplomat

This would force the Chinese Navy to venture out further into the big blue ,have its navy escort its merchant shipping and play into the US Navy advantage.

Closer to home historical analogy, US limiting Japanese access to resources was one of the things that made them decide to attack Pearl Harbor. Gotta' be careful for what you wish for....

 

[cdxbow]

If I had no clue what actually goes into "missile tests" I guess I probably wouldn't gain much confidence either. And technical tests are not the same as tactical exercises.

I have read about missile tests and a little about tactical exercises. But none of them truly fully test a system. You can do all sorts of volume testing on your simulators but it's still never true testing of all elements (sensors, effectors) of the system under load/stress. I bet there has never been a live test with 50 or 100 drone missiles attacking at once? I bet the USN has never actually tested launching 100 SM3 or SM6 missiles in a very short space of time within proximity of each other and 50 or 60 targets? So the systems are not fully tested under load. Live fire does test the sensors and missiles, and the integrity of the system but in the very unrealistic setting of 1 or 2 missiles attacking and only a few needed launched to defend.

Often even the data used is dodgy. True parameters for the missiles performance that you are simulating may not be unknown. Same with live fire exercises, the drones performance may be very different to the likely targets.

I also worry about sensor data in what would become a very cluttered environment. Real time sensor data is notoriously fuzzy to start of with. Add explosions, debris, multiple targets, decoys, multiple radars operating in close proximity, jamming, it's going to be a mess. Perhaps even exoatmospheric area will become challenging after a dozen or so SM3 have intercepted targets. all that debris in orbit. And I realize it cuts both ways. Perhaps the winner will be the one who can exploit the messy environment the best.


Overall I don't gain a lot of confidence from missile tests or simulations that my battle group is safe (within 2500 km of Chinese mainland).

 

[CB90]

All of your posts are full of terrible assumptions.

I could go through them point by point, but I really just don't have the time or inclination. I'd guess a good 30 minutes to finish and in the end I doubt it would change your mind anyway.

If you honestly want to believe what you're spouting is at all in accordance with reality, then go ahead.
Some of your points are correct, even with an incomplete understanding of the big picture. We don't do live fire tests with 50-100 simultaneous inbounds. Or live fire tests with 100 missiles. However, there are many good and valid reasons we don't, which can be summarized as "because it would be really stupid." Your underlying understanding of the entire problem is simply threadbare.

I'm trying to avoid being insulting or condescending, but seriously...you're way off base.

 

[cdxbow]

All of your posts are full of terrible assumptions.

I could go through them point by point, but I really just don't have the time or inclination. I'd guess a good 30 minutes to finish and in the end I doubt it would change your mind anyway.

If you honestly want to believe what you're spouting is at all in accordance with reality, then go ahead.
Some of your points are correct, even with an incomplete understanding of the big picture. We don't do live fire tests with 50-100 simultaneous inbounds. Or live fire tests with 100 missiles. However, there are many good and valid reasons we don't, which can be summarized as "because it would be really stupid." Your underlying understanding of the entire problem is simply threadbare.

I'm trying to avoid being insulting or condescending, but seriously...you're way off base.

How can you ever be sure a thing works until you test it fully under stress?

Why would it be so stupid to test it with 50 missiles at once? Horribly expensive yes, but stupid, no.

Please help me more getting the big picture, I seel knowledge and resort to condescending if you need to.

 

[Bonza]

The USN group are only 200-300 kms from shore. In range of many surveillance assets. Usual carrier screen has been constrained by proximity to shore and operational aspects have been constrained by the fact it is not outright conflict, but 'escalating tension'. The PLA have grabbed the opportunity.

But why is the US Navy going to deploy a high value asset like an aircraft carrier a couple of hundred kilometres from shore? You have that as part of your starting conditions but I have to ask why the USN would be there in the first place, considering that regardless of whether the DF21 works as advertised, such distances would put the carrier well within the range of China's land based strike assets. They're not going to just sit a carrier off the coast, regardless of whether it's outright war or a period of "escalating tensions". And when they do go hostile, they're going to use a range of assets to progressively roll back hostile systems, with carriers committed accordingly - they don't have to come within 200km of the coastline to do their job, so why on earth would they? Especially if it's going to constrain their screening units - that was another condition you mentioned, again, why is the USN intentionally limiting its advantages in the face of potential hostilities with an emerging superpower?

I'm not really interested in debating "who would win", but I'm curious as to why you've arranged your scenario in the manner you have when it seems extremely unlikely to me that a USN carrier group would be in any way inclined to behave as you describe. Personally I think the only USN assets that would be found anywhere near the coast of China during a period of escalating tensions would be submarines performing ISR duties.

And in addition I should add that if it does kick off, it won't just be the USN but every tactical and strategic asset the United States can bring to bear - and I'm not saying this to throw my hat in the ring for anyone, but I'm trying to reinforce that the United States, if it has to fight, isn't going to fight fair. Chinese military power is, for the moment, more constrained by range and targeting requirements than that of the United States. I don't know of any reason why the United States wouldn't exploit this to the fullest.

Of course, in the event of war there's a very real possibility of one or both sides escalating to nuclear weapons, at which point there isn't a whole lot left to talk about...

 

[CB90]

How can you ever be sure a thing works until you test it fully under stress?

Why would it be so stupid to test it with 50 missiles at once? Horribly expensive yes, but stupid, no.

Please help me more getting the big picture, I seel knowledge and resort to condescending if you need to.

Bonza's point pretty much makes the other details irrelevant.

Regarding the test...because there are cheaper and smarter ways to get the data you need. Without getting into specifics, if I shoot a bulletproof vest and find it fails with a 7.62 round, I don't go out and buy a .50 caliber rifle to see if it stops that too.

 

[cdxbow]

But why is the US Navy going to deploy a high value asset like an aircraft carrier a couple of hundred kilometres from shore? You have that as part of your starting conditions but I have to ask why the USN would be there in the first place, considering that regardless of whether the DF21 works as advertised, such distances would put the carrier well within the range of China's land based strike assets. They're not going to just sit a carrier off the coast, regardless of whether it's outright war or a period of "escalating tensions". And when they do go hostile, they're going to use a range of assets to progressively roll back hostile systems, with carriers committed accordingly - they don't have to come within 200km of the coastline to do their job, so why on earth would they? Especially if it's going to constrain their screening units - that was another condition you mentioned, again, why is the USN intentionally limiting its advantages in the face of potential hostilities with an emerging superpower?

I'm not really interested in debating "who would win", but I'm curious as to why you've arranged your scenario in the manner you have when it seems extremely unlikely to me that a USN carrier group would be in any way inclined to behave as you describe. Personally I think the only USN assets that would be found anywhere near the coast of China during a period of escalating tensions would be submarines performing ISR duties.

And in addition I should add that if it does kick off, it won't just be the USN but every tactical and strategic asset the United States can bring to bear - and I'm not saying this to throw my hat in the ring for anyone, but I'm trying to reinforce that the United States, if it has to fight, isn't going to fight fair. Chinese military power is, for the moment, more constrained by range and targeting requirements than that of the United States. I don't know of any reason why the United States wouldn't exploit this to the fullest.

Of course, in the event of war there's a very real possibility of one or both sides escalating to nuclear weapons, at which point there isn't a whole lot left to talk about...

The original article was so bloody stupid, I thought I would put a PLA hat on and think about the problem from their point of view and set up a realistic scenario that might bring the USN with 300 km, it suited because I would fight on home turf.

As mentioned in an earlier reply it was a period of escalating tension, a few provocations had occurred between the PRC and Taiwan. The USN was 'showing the flag' as they did in ?1996 when they responded to PRC missile tests near Taiwan. (more missile tests!) They didn't expect conflict. I made the USN do what they did in the past, I didn't even put them right in the straights.

I picked 200-300km because that was mentioned in the article and that would put the group south of Taiwan.

The potential ability of the DF21 to control the sea without controlling the air is perhaps unique, so to classify it simply as an area denial weapon understates it a bit. It really leads to a whole new strategic situation with a lot of avenues for further exploitation. PLA hat on. I'm getting my PLA engineers to put a torpedo in an appropriate re-entry vehicle with a small sonar I drop into the location. An antisubmarine ballistic missile. Wouldn't that upset the strategic balance! Next I'm adding a third stage........

Added this link to image showing DF21 C & D ranges - the 21D is possibly overstated at 3000km. There is a lot of SEA (and a lot of sea) in range.

 

[gf0012-aust]

I picked 200-300km because that was mentioned in the article and that would put the group south of Taiwan.

and I think everyone has politely tried to reinforce that the scenario construct is a nonsense

blue is not going to play on reds terms - and there is a whole pile of C4ISR which blue can bring to bear before they decide to operate within that 300km layer

unless that battlegroup commander is drunk on tom clancy scenarios, the vignette is a nonsense of the first order....

 

[Bonza]

The original article was so bloody stupid, I thought I would put a PLA hat on and think about the problem from their point of view and set up a realistic scenario that might bring the USN with 300 km, it suited because I would fight on home turf.

Well yes, it was stupid, but there's no reason to take cues from it. If your premise is flawed from the start then there's little point pursuing the scenario further. Start analysing before you put on a "PLA hat".

As mentioned in an earlier reply it was a period of escalating tension, a few provocations had occurred between the PRC and Taiwan. The USN was 'showing the flag' as they did in ?1996 when they responded to PRC missile tests near Taiwan. (more missile tests!) They didn't expect conflict. I made the USN do what they did in the past, I didn't even put them right in the straights.

I picked 200-300km because that was mentioned in the article and that would put the group south of Taiwan.

But it's not as though China can escalate from minor provocations to a war footing immediately. Think beyond sinking a lone carrier - think about having to anticipate and plan for defeating the US response to a carrier being sunk. You can't just shoot off some DF21s and call it a day. You have to plan to put your entire military effort into motion, which requires large scale movement of an immense number of assets. Firstly, this can't just happen overnight, and secondly, how are you going to hide it from intelligence gathering assets? The change in military footing WILL be noticed, what do you think happens to the carrier group then? Even if they're flying the flag somewhere near Taiwan, any large scale buildup of forces in China that looks like a war footing will trigger a massive intelligence response, and the first thing that carrier group is going to do is go dark and disappear into the ocean.

I'm just trying to get across to you that because this will not be an activity in isolation, it requires you to be making moves across your entire military, as you must anticipate and plan for how you survive the inevitable response, which is going to be hard and, given US basing and strategic assets in the region, potentially quite fast. It's not just a matter of phoning up your air defence sites and telling them to keep their eyes peeled, you know? You need to ensure your assets are deployed and logistically maintained in the right places to meet the response.

If you don't do prepare for war in this fashion, you lose the initiative to the most potent military on the planet, which is such a bad idea that I'm not even sure it's worth mentioning as an option. Again I'm trying to reinforce that this is not going to be an isolated action. If you sink a carrier you've committed yourself to all out war with a nation that not only has the largest navy in the world, they also have nuclear capable strategic assets deployed in your region. If you're going to meet the response, you will need your military ready for war. If your military moves to a war footing, US intelligence assets will pick it up, and I very much doubt the carrier sticks around to watch what happens next. Whether it's an attempt to reduce tensions or a decision made purely to preserve the carrier as a warfighting asset, either one results in the carrier making tracks once your military buildup is noticed.

The potential ability of the DF21 to control the sea without controlling the air is perhaps unique, so to classify it simply as an area denial weapon understates it a bit. It really leads to a whole new strategic situation with a lot of avenues for further exploitation. PLA hat on. I'm getting my PLA engineers to put a torpedo in an appropriate re-entry vehicle with a small sonar I drop into the location. An antisubmarine ballistic missile. Wouldn't that upset the strategic balance! Next I'm adding a third stage........

I didn't classify it as anything, rather I said that China is constrained by range and targeting requirements and that these constraints would be exploited in the event of war.

I'm not sure you understand what's required to hunt submarines effectively. The capability to drop a ballistic missile in a piece of ocean specific enough to hit a moving ship is still being debated, and that's with a visible target the size of an aircraft carrier. Hunting submarines is an entirely different type of activity, involving multiple resources (think ASW vessels working with helos) and even with those resources it requires a lot of time and effort to effectively perform ASW duties. It's not like plinking targets.

The capability to detect a submarine and pass on targeting data accurate enough to drop a ballistic missile in the same patch of ocean as said submarine is, at this time, pure fantasy. I don't say this to be rude but rather to underscore how difficult it would be, and for that matter how inefficient it would be - if you have sensors on the scene that can find a targeting solution for a hostile submarine, it makes a whole lot of sense to drop an ASW torpedo on it from a frigate or helo. It's more immediate than a ballistic missile anyway, and costs a mere fraction of the price. It's not really an effective use of a strategic resource to use them up trying to plink subs when whatever is on the scene providing the targeting data is far more well placed to do something about it.

Unless you were talking about finding submerged, moving submarines with space based sensors, to which I say good luck to you, but again this is a fantasy far removed from our time.

 

[cdxbow]

Just thinking out aloud out the torpedoes, thank you for the exposition. Still there would seem to be lots of possibilities if the DF21 is as accurate as claimed. Sub munitions on airfields would be another good one. I was hoping someone may have more up to date info than I do on it's performance, how it all works and measures to trip it up, especially with targeting.

 

[gf0012-aust]

I was hoping someone may have more up to date info than I do on it's performance, how it all works and measures to trip it up, especially with targeting.

where's any evidence that the concept - let alone the platform works as claimed?

no evidence of static tests
no evidence of mobility tests with any other weapons system - let alone using a TBM, MRBM, IRBM, ICBM etc....
no evidence of any of the chinese having multiple seeker systems in any tansoceanic or transcontinental systems - let alone across blue water without the aid of ancilliary support systems (sats, nodes etc....)

I'm personally underwhelmed by all the claims about DF21 - and I've been discussing this capability on a variety of tech forums and like minded forums for over 6 years since the chinese first trotted out brochures (yep, pretty pictures) as various PACRIM open forum functions.

there are so many things that need to be in place - and where there is a spectacular lack of any evidence that they have any of the requirements in place - let alone evidential history of long range mobility tests supporting the processes that would be needed to carry this off

 

[cdxbow]

where's any evidence that the concept - let alone the platform works as claimed?

no evidence of static tests
no evidence of mobility tests with any other weapons system - let alone using a TBM, MRBM, IRBM, ICBM etc....
no evidence of any of the chinese having multiple seeker systems in any tansoceanic or transcontinental systems - let alone across blue water without the aid of ancilliary support systems (sats, nodes etc....)

I'm personally underwhelmed by all the claims about DF21 - and I've been discussing this capability on a variety of tech forums and like minded forums for over 6 years since the chinese first trotted out brochures (yep, pretty pictures) as various PACRIM open forum functions.

there are so many things that need to be in place - and where there is a spectacular lack of any evidence that they have any of the requirements in place - let alone evidential history of long range mobility tests supporting the processes that would be needed to carry this off

Part of a Great Bluff perhaps? I thought the Gobi desert test, while static was a thought to be a genuine test. There doesn't seen to be much new in public domain since about 2011.

 

[CB90]

Just thinking out aloud out the torpedoes, thank you for the exposition. Still there would seem to be lots of possibilities if the DF21 is as accurate as claimed. Sub munitions on airfields would be another good one. I was hoping someone may have more up to date info than I do on it's performance, how it all works and measures to trip it up, especially with targeting.

Developing an accurate weapon is not hard. Developing a long ranged weapon is not hard either. The weapon piece is only a small piece of the big picture.

Successfully executing a detect to engage sequence is one of the hardest things in military operations. Ballistic missiles face a similar problem as trying to hit a high value terrorist running from tent city to tent city. Trying to covertly track a target in an inhospitable environment to the sensor, sending signals without getting caught, and also hoping the target doesn't at any point just bug out and leave or kick up a big cloud of dust and hide. Except the "target" here is much better defended and aware of its surroundings. When the payloads were nukes it didn't matter. With a conventional warhead, it does.

You have to find the target in an environment that is inhospitable to the sensor (anything looking for the CSG...well...then there's things out looking to kill IT). Up to now you've ignored the Blue aircraft flying around, a friendly SAG operating SPY between your scouts and the CSG, maritime patrol aircraft and AWACS from Guam, friendly SSNs, the island of Taiwan itself, etc.

Then that sensor needs to tell a "shooter" where the target is. Over the hundreds, maybe a thousand miles involved, your options are unbelievably limited (options able to operate that far aren't very good), and critical communications nodes are vulnerable to jamming and getting killed. To put it another way, just like operating a CSG in the heart of that land based network is stupid, putting the relatively limited PLAN/PLAAF resources out that far away to search would play into USN hands to snuff out the large sea going units and long ranged aircraft. But you can't execute the DF-21 strikes without doing it, which creates an impasse.

Even if the sensor gets that signal off, over the distances involved, it will take a long time for the weapon to get "close enough" to do its thing. During that time, something has to continue to track the target...without dying in that time.
And in doing so, it needs to update something that is talking to the weapon while it is in transit...because odds are that sensor is not capable of talking directly to the weapon in flight. More signals being sent, more opportunities to be found and die prematurely. While you've got national ELINT assets sniffing just for this type of activity. You keep underestimating the challenges of the comms piece.

You're also hoping that whatever is talking to the weapon (probably a ground relay station) is something cheap that you can proliferate throughout the country...otherwise it's probably already dead from sub cruise missile strikes. But, given the power, stability, and security requirements, it's probably not, and it's probably going to be fixed, and probably going to die too.

If up to this point all went well, the weapon arrives in its "basket" and gets to attempt to execute its purpose in life. Maybe there will be jamming. Or hardkill attempts. Point is, the survival rate of the weapons beyond this point will not be 100% of those that got this far.

But if literally any ONE thing goes wrong in that ridiculously convoluted sequence described leading up to that moment where it becomes directly missile vs target, you just waste very, very expensive missiles splashing into the ocean. A basic principle of war is to find the weakness in that chain and break the sequence. The longer and more complex the chain, the easier it is to find that critical vulnerability.

The long sequence described is why we started using UAVs to go terrorist hunting. With the time from launch to impact, there were too many things that could go wrong to waste a missile. It's optimal if the spotter is also the shooter. And that's when we didn't have to worry about our sensors getting spotted, comms being intercepted, comms nodes being blown up, able to move rapidly with relative impunity (helos and sealift), etc. That kind of operation is hard enough to pull out with all the cards stacked in your favor. Assuming you can pull it off when it's not goes well beyond bold to just plain ridiculous.