Brahmos is blind without sensor shooter integration
1. IMO, the naval fighting capability of the Philippines is in serious doubt. If they met an enemy fleet at the Singapore Navy’s level of capability, they would be spanked so hard, they won’t know what hit them. The PLA(N), their notional enemy in the South China Sea, is much more capable when compared to the Singapore Navy.
2. Lack of robust sensor-shooter integration means the Pinoys are going to fight blind within 2 days of war start. The Pinoys getting the Brahmos for the Philippine Navy and Army is just bragging rights — I will not take them seriously until they buy the 2nd squadron of MRF for their Air Force.
1. IMO, the naval fighting capability of the Philippines is in serious doubt. If they met an enemy fleet at the Singapore Navy’s level of capability, they would be spanked so hard, they won’t know what hit them. The PLA(N), their notional enemy in the South China Sea, is much more capable when compared to the Singapore Navy.
2. Lack of robust sensor-shooter integration means the Pinoys are going to fight blind within 2 days of war start. The Pinoys getting the Brahmos for the Philippine Navy and Army is just bragging rights — I will not take them seriously until they buy the 2nd squadron of MRF for their Air Force.
3. That is why most in ASEAN lack credibility on naval modernisation and fleet renewal. I don't think political observers writ large understand what a big deal this 9 May 2022 election will be. The Philippines had a revolution to oust the Marcos dictatorship in Feb 1986. That revolution is now being completely unwound with the expected victory of Bongbong Marcos (with his preferred VP, to provide dynastic support from the Duterte).
4. Navies need 24/7 presence in a number of ‘less than war’, scenarios in both good and bad weather, OPV designs need to enable endurance and persistence in tracking grey zone activities in patrols. The Australians are retiring this class and replacing it with true OPVs for extended endurance.
(a) Likewise, Singapore’s 4 interim Sentinel-class maritime security and response vessels (MSRV) will be replaced by OPVs starting in 2026. The current MSRVs are intended to take damage from ramming in ‘other than war’, scenario against Malaysia — will be interested to see the extended endurance OPVs to replace MSRVs and it’s related CONOPS by the 2030s, to operate with more capable surface combatants. It will take a while to fully develop Singapore’s OPV CONOPS (which I suspect will be even more UAV and USV heavy than the LMVs). The LMVs are flexible but have limited endurance compared to the forth coming 5,000 ton MRCVs.
(b) I like the upcoming Philippine Navy OPV design (81m x 13.1 m x 3.5m), provided they can develop the needed CONOPS, to operate with more capable surface combatants. In terms of draft, this HHI vessel, with reconfigurable spaces below the helicopter deck, is a way superior design to the KCR-60, with the caveat that this is an apples-to-oranges comparison — top side stability is influenced by tonnage and draft. KCR 60M, batch 3, made a new history for PT PAL Indonesia, because for the first time the procurement of two ships was built complete between platforms and their weapons systems, which is a positive.
(c) Thats 3:0 for HHI (Frigate, Corvette, OPV) over the course of six or seven years. Under Duterte’s corrupt leadership, the Pinoys had a very, very sour taste from what transpired during the course of frigate program. Now, they seek to blame HHI for local desire for corruption. It is the Pinoy politicians in a position of power would not approve of the tender or RFI (without kick backs). This is similar to the Kang Ding-Class demand for kick backs by corrupt Taiwanese officers and politicians.
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